(PRAYER: Second Appeal is filed under section 100 C.P.C. against the Judgment and Decree dated 13.01.2004 made in A.S.No.28 of 2002 on the file of the IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai in reversing the Judgment and Decree dated 16.02.2001 made in O.S.No.4987 of 1976 on the file of the 14th Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai.)
This appeal is directed against the Judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.28 of 2002 dated 13.01.2004 in reversing the Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court made in O.S.No.4987 of 1976 dated 16.02.2001 in dismissing the suit.
2. The appellant herein was the 7th defendant in the suit and the first respondent was the plaintiff and the respondents 2 to 6 were the defendants 2 to 6 and the respondents 7 to 15 were the defendants 9 to 17 before the trial Court. The rank of parties before the trial Court are being maintained for convenience.
3. The case of the plaintiff as stated in the plaint would be as follows:
(a) The plaintiff is the owner of premises No.78-A, (Old No.108), General Patters Road, Madras-2. One S.Narasimhalu Chetty, father of defendants 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 and the husband of the 2nd defendant, was a tenant of the said premises for non-residential purposes, under the plaintiff on a monthly rent of Rs.110/-. Defendants 7 and 8 are the sub-tenants of the entirety of the premises let into possession by the said S.Narasimhalu Chetty. The said Narasimhalu Chetty was in arrears of rent and he died on 10.09.1973. Many years prior to his death, the said Narasimhalu Chetty ceased to occupy the premises himself and he did not even carry on any business in the premises. After the death of the said S.Narasimhalu Chetty, the 1st defendant was paying the amounts due by his father towards the arrears.
(b) The first defendant, though not a tenant under the plaintiff and not having the status of a tenant in law, is collecting rents from defendants 7 and 8. The first defendant made payments to the plaintiff towards arrears due by his late father. On 11.02.1975, the first defendant paid the plaintiff a sum of Rs.2,000/- towards damages for use and occupation after verifying the accounts. A receipt was issued by the plaintiff for the said amount. However, the first defendant, surprisingly come to the plaintiff once again on 12.02.1975 and for reasons best known to the first defendant, he insisted that the plaintiff should accept him as the tenant and change the recital in the receipt issued by the plaintiff on 11.02.1975. The plaintiff refused to do so as neither the first defendant nor the defendants 2 to 6 and 17 are his tenants. Thereupon, the first defendant requested the plaintiff to refund the sum of Rs.2,000/- returning the receipt. The first defendant, after getting back the said sum of Rs.2,000/- surprisingly for the reasons best known to him, on 12.02.1975 sent a cheque for Rs.2,160/- along with a letter containing utterly false allegations that the amount represents the arrears of rent up to January, 1975. The said cheque has been returned to the first defendant along with the letter of the plaintiff's Advocate, dated 20.02.1975.
(c) The defendants 1 to 6 and 17 are not his tenants and have no legal status of tenants, neither the 1st defendant nor the defendants 2 to 6 and 17 were associated with the said S.Narasimhalu Chetty in his business and in fact the said Narasimhalu Chetty was not carrying on any business in the plaintiff's premises for very many years before his death, he having sublet the entire premises to defendants 7 and 8 years ago.
(d) The first defendant, with a wholly malafide intention, has resorted to this attempt with the ulterior motive of earning huge amounts from defendants 7 and 8 attempting to become somehow or other a tenant under the plaintiff. The defendants are in wrongful possession of the plaintiff's premises.
(e) The defendants 7 and 8 who were sub-tenants under the late S.Narasimhalu Chetty, have no further right whatsoever to continue to be in possession of the plaintiff's premises after the death of the said Narasimhalu Chetty. There is not privity of contract or estate between the defendants and the plaintiff.
(f) By an Advocate's notice dated 20.02.1975 the defendants were called upon to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises No.78-A (Old No.108) General Patters Road, Madras-2, now in occupation of defendants 7 and 8. To the said notice, defendants 1, 7 and 8 sent replies containing false and untenable allegations.
(g) Both at the inception of the tenancy as well as at the time of the death Narasimhalu Chetty none of the defendants 1 to 6 and 17 were carrying on any business along with him or associated with him in his business in the plaintiff's premises. The tenancy does not devolve on the defendants 1 to 6 and 17 on the death of the said Narasimhalu Chetty, with the result, defendants 7 and 8 are in unlawful possession of the suit premises.
(h) In the circumstances set out above, the defendants are in unlawful possession. They are bound to vacate and deliver vacant possession to the plaintiff. The defendants 1 to 6 and 17 are also liable to pay the plaintiff mesne profits at the rate of Rs.110/- per month from the date of the death of S.Narasimhalu Chetty till they vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff, apart from the sum of Rs.323.67 being the balance of arrears of rent due and payable by S.Narasimhalu Chetty till 10.09.1973.
(i) As none of the defendants are tenants of the plaintiff, none of them are entitled to the benefits of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. As the original demise in favour of Narasimhalu Chetty was on the land and building and not land alone, defendants 1 to 6 and 17 are not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act as falsely alleged by the 1st defendant. None of the defendants are entitled to any notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act as none of them are tenants under the plaintiff.
4. The objections raised by the 1 to 6th defendants in the written statement are as follows:
(a) The plaintiff is not the owner of the suit premises at No.78, General Patters Road, Madras-2. Only this Defendants' father Sri Narsimhalu Chetty was the owner of the superstructure. The said Narasimhalu Chetty was a tenant of the land only and the tenancy is started only in the year 1950. Originally the super-structure was owned by M/s. Metro Garage and this defendants' father purchased the super-structure from Sri Parthasarathy Iyengar as early as in the year 1950. Right from the date of purchase, the said Narasimhalu Chetty was paying only the land rent and he has been paying property Tax etc., for the super-structure. These facts were well within the knowledge of the plaintiff. While so, it is rather strange that the plaintiff has alleged that Sri Narasimhalu Chetty was the tenant of the entire property paying land rent for the super-structure also. Mr.Narasimhalu, till his death was in possession and in enjoyment of the suit land and super-structure put up by him in his own right.
(b) The defendants have stepped into the shoes of late Sri Narasimhalu Chetty being his legal heirs. Subsequent to the death of late Narasimhalu Chetty, the tenancy ensured to their benefit. Hence, the defendants are entitled to all the rights especially the valuable rights to purchase the land under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act. While so, the 1st defendant has paid Rs.2,000/- as land rent. The plaintiff mischievously called it as damages for use and occupation. The first defendant without knowing the significance of the contents of the receipt, received the receipt and when the significance was understood by the 1st defendant, the 1st defendant demanded the return of Rs.2,000/- and sent a cheque for Rs.2,160/- representing land rent.
(c) Only the 1st defendant actively assisted the late Narasimhalu Chetty in his business in the suit land. The defendants 7 and 8 are occupying only a small portion constructed by late Narasimhalu Chetty and the other portions are in the occupation of the 1st defendant only. Late Narasimhalu Chetty was carrying on business under the name and style of 'Metro Garage' till his death and the 1st defendant who assisted him in his business actively till his death is now continuing on the business. The defendants reiterate that Late Narasimhalu, father of the defendants was in possession of the land leased out to him right from 1954 onwards till his death and the super-structure have been put up by him as heirs. The defendants 2 to 6 are entitled to invoke all the benefits of late Narasimhalu Chetty including the rights under the City Tenants Protection Act.
5. The objections raised by the 7th defendant in the written statement would be as follows:
(a) The 7th defendant became a tenant of a portion of the suit land and building under S.Narasimhalu Chetty, father of defendants 1 to 6 in the year 1952 and since then he had been carrying on his business therein. On enquiry, he was informed that the suit land was taken on lease by S.Narasimhalu Chetty from its owner prior to 1952 and the superstructure then existing in 1952 when he became a tenant was put up by S.Narasimhalu Chetty. As such the tenancy of the land in favour of Late S.Narasimhalu Chetty to which the defendants 1 to 6 became entitled to on his death in 1973 is governed by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants' Protection Act, 1955 as amended and the above suit is therefore not maintainable in law and on facts.
(b) Pursuant to the permission granted by Late S.Narasimhalu Chetty during his life-time, he had made improvements and additions to the portion of the property demised to him at considerable cost and expenses, on his promise and undertaking to reimburse this defendant of the cost of improvements and additions at the time when possession therefore had to be given by him.
(c) After the death of S.Narasimhalu Chetty in 1973, he had been paying the monthly rent to S.N.Veeraraghavulu Chetty the first defendant, who had been nominated by defendants 2 to 6 as their representatives to receive the rents on their behalf as well.
(d) The plaintiff is not the owner of the superstructure in the suit property. The 8th defendant does not admit that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit land as well and this defendant puts the plaintiff to strict proof that he is the owner of the suit land.
(e) The 8th defendant denies that the late S.Narasimhalu Chetty was a tenant under the plaintiff of the suit land and the building. As already stated, late S.Narasimhalu Chetty was the tenant of the land only and not any part of the superstructure and that too he was not a tenant under the plaintiff.
(f) The 8th defendant emphatically denies that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit land or any portion of the superstructure thereon. This defendant also denies that the plaintiff was the landlord of S.Narasimhalu Chetty and subsequent to his death in 1973, of defendants 1 to 6 herein of either the suit land or the superstructure thereon. As such, the above suit is not maintainable.
(g) The 8th defendant submits that in the event this Hon'ble Court finds that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit land and superstructure, then, and in such event, the suit is not maintainable in this Hon'ble Court as this Hon'ble Court has no jurisdiction to try the same.
(h) Late S.Narasimhalu Chetty was the tenant of the suit land till his death and subsequent to his death in 1973, defendants 1 to 6 had become tenants of the land, but not under the plaintiff.
(i) The 8th defendant, as the tenant of a portion of the suit land and building, has every right to continue in possession thereof until he is evicted under the due process of law.
(j) The averments and allegations contained in the reply notice of the defendant dated 26.03.1975 are true and correct.
(k) The 8th defendant is in lawful possession and enjoyment of a portion of the suit land and building and he cannot be evicted therefrom by the plaintiff in the present proceedings.
(l) The 8th defendant is not bound to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the portion of the suit property in his occupation to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has no locus standi to maintain the above suit as he is neither the owner nor the landlord of any portion of the suit land and or the building.
(m) He is entitled to the protection of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, as amended. He cannot be evicted from the property except under the provisions of the said Act. He denies that the demise in favour of S.Narasimhalu Chetty was of both the suit land and the superstructure. Late S.Narasimhalu Chetty was the tenant of only the suit land and that too he was not the tenant of only the suit land and that too he was not the tenant under the plaintiff, and he was during his life-time and subsequent to his death in 1973 defendants 1 to 6 are entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act.
(n) The suit is not maintainable, as no valid notice of termination had been given as contemplated by law and the suit had not been correctly valued and that proper court-fee had not been paid.
(o) The suit is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected since the plaintiff has not alleged any cause of action for the maintainability of the suit.
(p) The particulars of the property including measurements, survey number, extent and boundaries have not been correctly mentioned in the Schedule to the plaint, and as such the suit is liable to be dismissed on that ground as well.
(q) He also submits that the suit is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine on the averments and allegations made in the plaint. This defendant therefore prays that this Honourable Court may be pleased to dismiss the same with costs.
6. The objections raised by the 8th defendant in the written statement which was adopted by the defendants 9 to 16 would be as follows:
(a) The 8th defendant is carrying on business in partnership firm under the name and style of "National Turning Works" in the suit premises and it is the firm that is the tenant and the defendant cannot be made liable in his personal capacity. The erstwhile minor should have attained majority already and the plaint has to be amended accordingly. In any event the suit as framed is not maintainable as the tenancy is governed by the provisions of the City Tenants Protection Act as between the plaintiff and the defendants.
(b) The 8th defendant is a tenant of the suit property in his occupation within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and the suit as framed is not maintainable. There are already proceedings under the said Act pending before the Rent Controller and the plaintiff is aware of it. Therefore, The present suit is not maintainable in law and the remedy of the plaintiff will be to follow the procedure under the Rent Control Act on any of the grounds, if any, available under the said Act.
(c) The defendant was not a tenant of the property under one Narasimhalu, father of the first defendant. The said Narasimhalu Chetty was tenant of only the land and not any premises as alleged by the plaintiff. The superstructure belong to the tenants and the plaintiff has no right over the same.
(d) The suit property forms part of a vast extent of land which belongs to a Hindu undivided family. The plaintiff is put to strict proof of his separate individual right to title in respect of the specific area mentioned in the plaint schedule. The suit land was let long before 1954 and the rights between the landlord and the tenant is governed by the provisions of the City Tenant's Protection Act.
(e) On the plaintiff's own admission that the father of the defendants 1 to 6 was the tenant of the suit property under him, the legal representatives of the deceased tenant will be entitled to claim the rights. The plaintiff also admits that he has received the arrears of rent from the first defendant which tantamount to recognition of the rights of the legal representatives of the deceased tenant. In the circumstances, the allegation made by the plaintiff that defendants 1 to 6 are not his tenants and that they have no legal status of tenants of the suit property is neither tenable nor intelligible. The allegation relating to Narasimhalu's business or subletting of premises or the present defendants being associated or not with the business are all wholly irrelevant and purposeless for the purpose of the case. The plaintiff cannot be permitted to take a self contradicting stand in the suit as regards the jural relationship between him and the defendants.
(f) The 8th defendant became a tenant under Narasimhalu Chetty with the knowledge of and consent of the plaintiff's father and guardian and he is entitled to be in possession of the property till his tenancy is lawfully determined by his landlord. The plaintiff cannot seek to dispossess the 8th defendant as there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and this defendant. As the plaintiff issued a notice claiming rights in himself and disputing the first defendant's rights to collect the rent this defendant has filed a petition before the Rent Controller for directions to deposit the rent into Court pending decision as to the persons entitled to collect the rent.
(g) If the demised property is a building, the plaintiff's remedy will be to approach the Rent Controller. If however it is only of land the plaintiff is to follow the procedure under the City Tenant's Protection Act. The present suit on the basis of trespass or unlawful possession has to be dismissed in limine. On the plaintiff's own admission the suit is liable to be dismissed in limine as the lease of the suit property is governed by either of the two special enactment referred to by the plaintiff in the plaint. The plaintiff should first establish that the defendants are in unlawful possession before he could maintain the suit. In any event the suit is liable to be dismissed for want of proper notice to quit under the law.
(h) The valuation of the suit property for purposes of court fees is neither proper nor correct. The suit land is situated in Mount Road and is a building site and it has to be valued on the market price and not the letting value if the plaintiff's case of trespass is to be accepted. The annual value of the Corporation for property-tax is on the rent and not on the market price. The suit land is nearly four grounds in area and its market value will be ever a lakh of rupees. The value of Rs.27,000/- is not proper. This defendant submits that the issue relating to the valuation of the property and the Court fee paid should be decided first before the plaintiff is permitted to proceed further with the suit.
(i) The suit is not maintainable in law and is only a coercive attempt on the part of the plaintiff to dispossess the defendant.
7. The objections raised by the 17th defendant in the written statement are as follows:
(a) The death of the first defendant, namely, S.N.Veeraraghavelu does not in any way change or improve the the position of the suit.
(b) The 17th defendant is also entitled to the benefits under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act. The reasons have already been stated in the written statement filed by the first defendant.
(c) The 17th defendant's possession is lawful. The allegations to the contra are only self-serving statements.
(d) She is not liable to pay mesne profits at Rs.110/- per day as alleged. Out of enimity only to deprive this defendant of the benefits under Section 9 of the City Tenant's Protection Act, the plaintiff is keen on harassing this defendant.
(e) The cause of action paragraph cannot be introduced by the plaintiff for the first time in the plaint by means of amendment to the plaint in I.A.No.19433 of 1985 and the defect cannot be cured as it goes to the root of the matter. The suit is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed since the plaintiff had not alleged any cause of action in his plaint. On a combined reading of Order 7 Rules 1 (a) and 11(a) and the Forms of pleadings in Appendix 'A' of C.P.C. and as per decisions of Courts, it is mandatory to incorporate a specific paragraph in the plaint for its maintainability disclosing the facts along with dates stating when the cause of action arose and also that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that failure to allege the same would necessitate the rejection of the plaint.
8. On the above pleadings, the trial Court had framed necessary issues and entered into the trial. After appraising the evidence adduced before it, the trial Court had dismissed the suit without costs. Aggrieved by the Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.28 of 2002. The First Appellate Court heard the arguments on either side in the appeal and had come to the conclusion of setting aside the Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and thus, allowed the appeal with costs throughout. Having aggrieved by the reversal Judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, the 7th defendant preferred the present appeal.
9. On admission of the second appeal, this Court had formulated the following substantial questions of law for consideration in this appeal.
a. Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to order eviction of the appellant whose status as a sub-tenant has been upheld in the prior proceedings under the Rent Control Act only on the ground that on the death of the Chief Tenant his legal representatives could claim as tenants under the Rent Control Act?
b. Whether the appellant cannot claim the protection under the Rent Control Act as a representative of the deceased Chief Tenant whose interest he represents?
10. Heard Mr.N.Damodaran, learned counsel for the appellant / 7th defendant and Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned counsel for the first respondent / plaintiff. No appearance for other respondents.
11. The learned counsel for the appellant / 7th defendant would submit in his argument that the reversal Judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court was not in accordance with law and in the facts and circumstances of the case. He would also submit that the suit filed by the plaintiff invoking the jurisdiction of the Civil Court ought to have been dismissed as not maintainable, since the provisions under the Rent Control Act would apply when the alleged denial of title has been the ground for eviction. He would also submit that 7th defendant was continuing in possession and enjoyment of the suit property as Sub-lessee since 1952 under the original tenant, Narasimhalu Chetty, who died thereafter. He would further submit that the occupation of the 7th defendant / appellant in the suit property was upheld as that of a sub tenant permitted by the landlord and the Rent Control Original Petition filed by the landlord for eviction on the ground of willful default of rent and sub-letting was dismissed in between the parties by the learned Rent Controller, which was also confirmed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority and therefore, the possession of sub tenant in respect of the suit property was lawful. He would further submit that the plaintiff has filed the suit on the ground of denying the title of the landlord and in such circumstances, the landlord ought to have filed the original petition under Section 10(2)(vii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and therefore, the suit filed before the Civil Court is not maintainable. He would also submit that the plaintiff have impleaded the legal representatives of the original landlord, under whom 7th defendant became a sub-tenant. He would also submit that in view of impleadment of the chief tenant or his legal representatives for eviction of the Sub-tenant / 7th defendant herein, the provisions of the Rent Control Act could alone apply and the Civil Suit filed by the plaintiff as if the 7th defendant was trespasser cannot be sustained.
12. The learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that the First Appellate Court had unnecessarily interfered with the Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, on the appeal, namely, the denial of title to the suit property by the 7th defendant was bona fide and therefore, the correct proceedings to be taken was only under the rent control proceedings. He would also submit that the well considered Judgment of the trial Court, without any reason, was reversed. He would further submit that the findings of the lower Appellate Court that the denial of title by the 7th defendant was not bona fide and it cannot be sustained in view of the fact that 7th defendant was held as authorized Sub-tenant in the earlier proceedings. The denial of title of the plaintiff by the deceased first defendant and the respondents 2 to 6 was bona fide, since superstructure put up therein was claimed by them and therefore, the denial of title cannot be held as not bona fide. The father of the plaintiff was a party in the earlier Rent Control Proceedings and it would bind the plaintiff also and therefore, he was estopped from filing the present suit. He would also submit that the first defendant was paying the rent for the demised premises to the plaintiff after the death of the original tenant, Narasimhalu Chetty and therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to contend that the legal heirs of Narasimhalu Chetty would not become the tenants. He would also submit that the suit filed for ejectment was not maintainable for want of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. He would further submit that the first Appellate Court ought to have found that the first respondent / plaintiff should invoke the jurisdiction of the Rent Control Proceedings and not through the Civil Courts. He would further submit that the 7th defendant would be entitled to the protection of Rent Control Act as the representative of the deceased chief-tenant, since he continued to be in possession and enjoyment of the demised premises after the death of chief tenant.
13. The learned counsel for the appellant would draw the attention of the Court to the definition of a 'tenant', in case of non-residential building, as a person continuing in possession after the death of the tenant and would claim that the appellant / 7th defendant would be considered as tenant and therefore, the provisions of the Rent Control Act would apply.
14. The learned counsel for the appellant would also rely upon the Judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in AIR 1991 Supreme Court 1094 (M/s. East India Corporation Ltd. v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.) for the principle that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of denial of title and the Rent Controller first finds a decision whether such denial or claim is bona fide and the suit cannot be filed if the Rent Controller found that the denial of title was not bona fide.
15. The learned counsel for the appellant would also cite a judgment of this Court reported in (2008) 3 MLJ 632 (Arunachalam @ Annamalai vs. Subbulakshmi Ammal and others) for the same preposition of law. He would also cite another judgment of this Court reported in (1992) 1 MLJ 8 (Natesan Pillai v. Sethumani Ammal) for the same principle. He would also cite yet another judgment of this Court reported in (2012) 2 L.W. 268 (Saradabal vs. Santhi and Others) for the same principle.
16. The learned counsel for the appellant would further submit in his argument that the defendants 1 to 6 and 17 were the legal representatives of the chief-tenant Narasimhalu Chetty and they are entitled to step into shoe of the said Narasimhalu Chetty and claim their right accrued as chief tenant and therefore, the defendants 1 to 6 and 17 cannot be deemed as trespassers to the suit property. He would also draw the attention of the Court to a Judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in AIR 1982 SCC 1043 (Mahabir Prasad Verma vs. Dr.Surinder Kaur) for the principle that the sub-lease lawfully done would not become unlawful on the ground of the contractual tenancy came to an end.
17. He would further insist in his argument that the chief tenant, Narasimhalu Chetty, was authorized to let the premises to the sub-tenants, like, defendants 7 and 8 and the same was also considered as authorized in the earlier proceedings in HRCs produced in Exs.B1 and B2. He would, therefore, submit that the chief-tenant Narasimhalu Chetty would be considered as landlord as far as 7th defendant is concerned and therefore, when the chief tenant (the landlord of the 7th defendant) died, the legal representatives, namely, the defendants 1 to 6 and on the death of first defendant, the 17th defendant would be entitled to collect rent from the 7th defendant and therefore, the rights of the defendants 1 to 6 and 17 cannot be defeated on the death of chief tenant, Narasimhalu Chetty.
18. The learned counsel for the appellant would also bring it to the notice of this Court that the suit filed by the plaintiff was purely on the ground that the defendants have become trespassers and therefore, the civil suit would lie for recovery of possession of the suit property. He would also submit that the plaintiff has categorically admitted in the plaint that notice of termination was not issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, since the defendants have no status of tenants and they are only the trespassers in respect of the suit property and therefore, the entire suit was filed by the plaintiff without resorting to the Tamil Nadu Building Lease and Rent Control Act would not be maintainable. He would further submit that the trial Court had considered the evidence adduced and also the position of law, had came to a correct conclusion of dismissing the suit. However, the first Appellate Court, without any finding regarding commission of grave errors in the Judgment of the trial Court, had interfered and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, which is not correct. He would also submit that the reversal judgment of the first Appellate Court was not based upon any preposition of law and on facts, but, was perverse without any sufficient reasons. Therefore, he would request the Court to set aside the Judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court and to allow the appeal thereby, to restore the Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court.
19. The learned counsel for the first respondent would submit in his argument that the defendants were none other than the trespassers in respect of the suit property and the defendants 1 to 6 and 17 could not become the chief-tenants in the place of Narasimhalu Chetty, despite they happened to be the legal representatives, since the suit property was a non-residential property. He would also submit that unless the chief-tenant Narasimhalu Chetty, was having any business in the suit property and the defendants 1 to 6 were continuing the said business, then only, the tenancy would devolve upon the defendants 1 to 6 and 17 and therefore, the tenancy between the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 6 and 17 would not be in existence and there is no privity of contract in between the plaintiff and the sub-tenants, even though recognized as per the orders of the Court. Therefore, he would submit that all the defendants would be the trespassers. He would also submit that since the defendants were trespassers, there is no necessity to terminate their tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. He would also submit that there is no necessity to approach the Rent Controller for getting a decision under Section 10(i) of the Act that the denial of title would be a bona fide one and thereafter, to approach the Civil Court for ejectment. He would also submit in his argument that the first Appellate Court was correct in reversing the Judgment of the trial Court, since there was no relationship between the landlord and tenant and the defendants are none other than trespassers in the suit property. He would also submit that even otherwise the 7th defendant was considered to be a recognized sub-tenant, he could not have any relationship with the plaintiff as there was no privity of contract in between himself and the plaintiff.
20. The learned counsel for the first respondent would cite a judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in AIR 1967 SC 1853 (Hiralal Vallabhram vs. Kastorbhai Lalbhai and Others) in support of his arguments. Relying upon the said judgment, he argued that when the tenancy agreement in between landlord and chief-tenant/deceased and the legal representatives of the chief-tenant, by virtue of the definition of a tenant in the Act, the sub-tenant cannot become the chief tenant. He would also cite a Judgment of this Court reported in 1994 L.W 102 (S.Balasubramaniam vs. Gulab Jan) in support of the same proposition. He would also rely upon various judgments reported in 1954 8 ILR 539 (Dr.Prem Nath vs. Pt. Manmohan Nath Dar and others), 2012 5 SCC 187 (Kersi Commissariat and others vs. Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies, Govt. of Maharashtra, Mumbai and another), 1977 L.W.187 (T.Parthasarathy Chetti vs. K.Shyamalamba by agent P.Lakshminarayana), 1984 L.W 743 (K.C.Chandu Kutti Kurup v. Gulam Mohideen Saheb), 1989 L.W.147 (N.A.Karim Sait (dead) and others vs. Hyat Basha) for the principle that the sub-tenant has no statutory right to question the action of landlord on chief-tenant and also in respect of relationship of the landlord, chief tenant and sub-tenant. He would further submit in his argument that the plaintiff can file a civil suit straight away for ejectment of their erstwhile tenant, who ceased to be chief tenant, and the sub-tenant of the chief tenant since they became trespassers in respect of the suit property. He would also rely upon the judgments reported in1979 (2) MLJ 413 (Haji Abdullah Sait vs. K.Sanjeevi Rao and 8 others), 1990 (1) LW 97 (Sankarlal Jain vs. R.Kalavathi Amal and 2 others) in respect of maintainability of a suit before the Civil Court filed for ejectment. He would further submit in his argument that the first appellate Court had discussed the evidence and came to a conclusion regarding factual aspect that the defendants were the trespassers of the suit property and therefore, it had decreed the suit for ejectment after correcting the Judgment passed by the Trial Court. Therefore, he would request the Court that the said finding of the first Appellate Court need not be interfered since there was no perversity or biased attitude found in the Judgment of the first Appellate Court. He would also submit that there was no grave error nor any violation of principles of law in the findings reached by the first Appellate Court and therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate Court may not be disturbed and it may be confirmed and consequently, the second appeal may be dismissed.
21. I have given anxious thoughts to the argument advanced on either side.
22. The suit was filed by the plaintiff against the defendants seeking a direction to deliver vacant possession of the suit property and directing the defendants 1 to 6 and 17 to pay out of the estate of Late Narasimahalu Chetty in their hands, a sum of Rs.323.67p being the arrears of rent till 10.09.1973 and also for the past mesne profit from 11.09.1973 till the date of suit for a sum of Rs.2,970/- with interest at 12% p.a and also to pay future mesne profit at Rs.110/- per month from the date of plaint till the date of delivery of vacant possession at 12% p.a. with costs.
23. For the said relief sought for in the plaint, the plaintiff has claimed that the defendants were not at all tenants and they were not entitled to the benefits of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The main plea to be fortified by the plaintiff was that the defendants 1 to 6, 7 and 8 were trespassers in the eye of law and their possession in respect of the suit property was unlawful. The reason stated for such stand taken by the plaintiff was that after the death of chief-tenant Narasimhalu Chetty, his legal representatives, namely, the defendants 1 to 6 and 17 were not carrying on any business along with him or associated with him in his business in the suit property and therefore, the defendants 7 and 8 even though they were recognized as sub-tenant by the Court, their possession deemed unlawful and therefore, they are liable to be evicted and the vacant possession should be handed over by them.
24. The admitted case of both parties would include that the suit property was originally leased away by the plaintiff's father Lodd Mohanakrishnadoss to the said Narasimhalu Chetty and the said Narasimhalu Chetty had in turn sub-leased the property to the defendants 7 and 8 and the defendants 7 and 8 are continuing their possession. Even though letting half of the property by chief-tenant to 7th defendant and to one T.R.Gnana Moorthy and thereafter to one Panneer Selvam was disputed, it was held that sub-letting of the premises to 7th defendant and one Gnana Moorthy by original tenant Narasimhalu Chetty was authorized. Therefore, the 8th defendant, who continues to be the successor to Gnanamoorthy - the sub tenant of the premises, is in possession and enjoyment of the said property as sub-tenant under the chief tenant Narasimhalu Chetty. After the death of Chief tenant Narasimhalu Chetty, the sub-tenants namely, the defendants 7 and 8 were continuing in possession and enjoyment of the suit property as sub tenants of the erstwhile chief-tenant.
25. The defendants 1 to 6 were the legal representatives of the deceased Narasimhalu Chetty and since Narasimhalu Chetty was dead, the defendants 1 to 6 were necessarily added as parties to the suit. Since the 8th defendant was dead during the pendency of the suit, his legal representatives, namely, the defendants 9 to 16 were brought on record as legal representatives of the 8th defendant. Since the first defendant also died during the pendency of the suit, his only legal representative, 7th defendant was ordered as party.
26. The important argument put forth by the learned counsel for the plaintiff was that the suit could be maintained in a Civil Court, since it was a suit for delivery of possession of the suit property from the defendants as they are not having any right to possess the said property, since they were only trespassers to the suit property. For that, the plea raised in the plaint was that after the death of chief-tenant, the defendants 1 to 6 being the legal representatives of the deceased Chief tenant Narasimhalu Chetty did not do any business or in continuous association with the chief tenant for the purpose of carrying on such business of the chief tenant up to the death of the chief tenant and they are continued to do their business thereafter also, since the demised premises was a non-residential building. Since the chief tenant was not succeeded by his legal representatives as tenant in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 (8) (ii) of the Rent Control Act, the defendants 7 and 8 even though found as authorized sub-tenants by the Court cannot get the status of sub-tenants or tenants under the plaintiffs.
27. In a Judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents reported in 2012 5 SCC 187 (Kersi Commissariate and others vs. Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies, Government of Mahasthra, Mumbai and another), it has been held as follows:
“In Bhatia case, AIR 1953 SC 16, it has been clearly laid down that Section 4(1) of the 1947 Act applies to premises and not to parties or their relationship. Section 3 of the 1999 Act uses the term “premises”. Section 3(1)(b) makes it clear that the 1999 Act does not apply to premises let or sub-let to any bank, public sector undertaking or certain other categories of tenants. Thus, the 1999 Act does not apply to the premises held by Defendant 1 Insurance Company who is a tenant.”
28. In a Judgment of this Court reported in 1977 L.W.187 (T.Parthasarathy Chetti vs. K.Shyamalamba by agent P.Lakshmi Narayana), it has been held as follows:
“From the terms of the definition of the word “tenant” set out above, it will be clear that a person liable to pay rent in respect of the land, under a tenancy agreement express or implied would be a tenant.
A sub-tenant is certainly under a contractual agreement to pay rent to the head tenant, that is his lessor.”
29. The learned counsel for the first respondent would also refer to a Judgment reported in 1984 L.W.743 (K.C.Chandu Kutti Kurup v. Gulam Mohideen Saheb), quoting the following passage:
“Held, rejecting the contentions, a sub-tenant who is in possession, is a tenant only of his lessor, in this case the lessor of the sub-tenant being defendant in the suit, and the sub-tenant will have neither a privity of contract nor privity of estate so far as the superior lessor (in the present case the landord) is concerned.”
30. A Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 1989 L.W.147 (N.A.Karim Salt (dead) and others v. Hyath Basha) would depict the following passage in respect of non availability of the statutory right to the sub-tenant.:
“12. ….. As he has failed to do so and there is no privity of contract or estate between the landlord and the sub-tenants, the landlord could very well recover the money from the tenant-defendant. By merely alleging that he had delivered the key with reference to the portion in his occupation, the tenant cannot be said to have taken steps to see that the sub-tenants were kept out of the premises so as to enable the landlord to take possession. …..”
31. In a Judgment reported in 1954 (8) ILR 539 (Dr.Prem Nath vs. Pt.Manmohan Nath Dar and others), it has been held as follows:
“If the tenant fails to pay the rent the landlord has the same rights to dispossess the sub-tenant as he would have to dispossess the tenant. If the original tenancy is determined by efflux of time or by forfeiture or by operation of law the sub-tenancy also ceases to exist.”
32. Similar view would have been taken by this Court in a Judgment reported in 1994 L.W.102 (S.Balasubramaniam vs. Gulab Jan) with regard to the right of a sub-tenant. The relevant passage would run as follows:
“The sub-tenant cannot put forth any grievance since the Act confers upon him no protection whatsoever and his right to be in possession is, in the very nature of things, very nebulous and is a defeasible right. In the present case, the sub-tenant has not put forth and substantiated any plea of collusion between the landlord and the main tenants, respondents 1 to 4 before the Rent Controller. S.26 of the Act is only an enabling provision and it does not affect the well established principle that a sub-tenant has no independent right of his own to be protected under the Act and in the absence of contest by the main tenant for valid reasons and in the absence of collusion or fraud between the landlord and the main tenant, it is not permissible for the sub-tenant to stultify the proceedings for eviction by the landlord by putting forth any independent contest of his own. If the position is understood in the above light, I am unable to countenance the stand of the sub-tenant, the respondent herein against the proceedings for eviction by the landlord.”
33. A Judgment reported in AIR 1967 SC 1853, (Hiralal Vallabhram vs. Kastorbhai Lalbhai and others), has been cited for the following principle of law in respect of the position of the sub-tenant after the chief tenant ceased to be a tenant. The relevant passage would be as follows:-
“In that view the sub-tenant, namely, the present appellant, cannot be deemed to be a tenant-in-chief of the landlord. Therefore, as the tenants-in-chief have not been ejected, the appellate Court had no jurisdiction to eject merely the sub-tenant. Thus the judgment of the appellate Court is without jurisdiction on this ground in the alternative and is liable to be set aside.”
34. On a careful study of the aforesaid judgments, I could understand that after the cessation of the chief tenant, a sub-tenant cannot become a chief tenant of the landlord. Similarly, the sub-tenant cannot be proceeded by the landlord without the impleadment of the chief tenant for ejectment or eviction. Similarly, the sub-tenant has no statutory right to question the landlord since his landlord would be the chief tenant and not the superior landlord. The termination of the chief-tenancy by the landlord would make the sub-tenant also a trespasser. Cessation or eviction order against the chief tenant would bind the sub-tenant also even though the sub-tenant was not made a party to that proceedings. No doubt, those principles are settled in nature. Whether those principles will help the respondents to sustain the judgment of the first appellate Court is a question.
35. According to the reversal findings of the first appellate Court, the chief-tenant, namely, Narasimhalu Chetty was not succeeded by any chief-tenant after his death, namely, by the defendants 1 to 6, 17 since they were not attracted under the definition of the tenant under Section 2(8) of the Act. The suit premises is admittedly a non-residential building or commercial building. Therefore, the chief-tenant would be succeeded by any person including the legal representatives also, who associates with the business. The provisions of Section 2(8) of the Act would run as follows:
2(8) "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son, or daughter, or the legal representative of a deceased tenant who -
(i) in the case of a residential building, had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of the tenant's family up to the death of the tenant, and
(ii) in the case of a non-residential building, had been in continuous association with the tenant for the purpose of carrying on the business of the tenant up to the death of the tenant and continuous to carry on such business thereafter, and
a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter-house or of rents for shops has been farmed out or leased by a Municipal Council or a Panchayat Union Council or the Municipal Corporation of Madras or the Municipal Corporation of Madurai.
Sub-section (ii) of Section 2(8) is applicable to the present case. The death of Narasimhalu Chetty is an admitted one. The defendants 1 to 6 are admittedly legal representatives of the deceased Narasimhalu Chetty. The Narasimhalu Chetty being a chief-tenant, the defendants 1 to 6 should establish that they have associated in the business with the chief tenant Narasimhalu Chetty in the suit premises. It is also an admitted fact that the suit premises was not occupied by the chief-tenant Narasimhalu Chetty and it was sub-leased to the 7th defendant and the predecessor of the 8th defendant. They are actually in possession and enjoyment of the suit property.
36. According to the Judgment of the First Appellate Court, the legal representatives of the deceased Narasimhalu Chetty, namely, defendants 1 to 6 cannot be considered as tenants after the death of the chief tenant as per the definition of Section 2(8) (ii) of the Act. The Principles laid down in the aforesaid Judgment regarding the cessation of lease with the chief-tenant namely, Narasimhalu Chetty, and after his death and no legal heirs would be considered as tenant of the suit premises. The sub-tenants would not also entitle to be in lawful possession. On the said construction of understanding of the status of parties, the first Appellate Court had come to a conclusion that all the defendants 1 to 17 were trespassers in the suit property and found the suit laid before the trial Court as maintainable. The suit was also decreed by the said court since the title to the suit property of the plaintiff was not disputed.
37. However, it was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that for the denial of title by the defendants, the plaintiff cannot approach the Civil Court by directly filing the suit for ejectment, but, to approach the learned Rent Controller under Section 10(i) of the Act and if it is found that the denial is bona fide, the learned Rent Controller has to direct the parties to approach the Civil Court and thereafter only, the plaintiff can file a suit on the foot of finding of the Rent Controller seeking eviction on the ground alleged in Section 10 and 14 to 16 of the Act. It was vehemently contended that the plaintiff has straight away come to the Civil Court without resorting to the said procedure.
38. Reliance was placed over the Judgment of Honourable Apex Court reported in 1991 SC 1094 ( M/s. East India Corporation Ltd., vs. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.) and the relevant passage would be as follows:
“8. What is stated in the second proviso to S.10(1) is the sole circumstance in which the Civil Court is invested with jurisdiction in matters of eviction. But this jurisdiction cannot be invoked otherwise than as stipulated in the second proviso. 'This means that the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Civil Court is that the tenant should have denied the title of the landlord or claimed right of permanent tenancy and the Controller should, on such denial or claim by the tenant reach a decision whether such denial or claim is bona fide. Upon such decision, the Controller must record a finding to that effect. In that event, the landlord is entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court. Where these conditions are satisfied, the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in S.10 or Ss.14 to 16, notwithstanding that the Court has found that the tenant's denial of the landlord's title does not involve forfeiture of the lease or his claim of right of permanent tenancy is unfounded. Except to this limited extent, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in matters of eviction of a tenant is completely barred and the jurisdiction in such matters is vested in the tribunals set up under the statute.”
39. It was also followed by a Judgment of this Court reported in 2008 3 MLJ 632 (Arunachalam @ Annamalai vs. Subbulakshmi Ammal and others). The relevant portion would be as follows:
"17. ...... The respondent / plaintiff in this case approached the Rent Controller at the first instance. But, instead of getting a finding relating to the bona fide denial of title by the first defendant herein, simply allowed the R.C.O.P., to be dismissed and approached the Civil Court which now turned to be fatal to his suit. As such, in this factual matrix, the decisions relied on by the plaintiff are not relevant."
40. Yet another Judgment of this Court reported in 2012 (2) L.W. 268 (Saradambal vs. Santhi and others) has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. The relevant passage would be as follows:
"18. Even a mere reading of the said provision would clearly go to show that a tenant shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of section 10 or sections 14 to 16 of the said Act and further it is made clear that if a tenant denies title of landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Rent Controller shall decide as to whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect, the landlord is entitled to institute a suit for eviction of tenant through Civil forum."
41. Therefore, I could understand from the aforesaid judgments that whenever denial of title of the landlord has been raised by a tenant, the bona fide nature of such denial has been decided by the Rent Controller as per Section 10(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Section 10(i) would run as follows:
"10. (1) A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or Sections 14 to 16:
Provided that nothing contained in the said sections shall apply to a tenant whose landlord is the Government:
Provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court and the Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the said sections, notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded."
42. According to the said provision, I could see that the second proviso of Section 10(i) is applicable to the present case and if the title of landlord has been questioned by a tenant, such denial of claim should have been adjudicated as bona fide and if found bona fide, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of tenant in a Civil Court on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 10 and Sections 14 to 16 of the Act.
43. In case, if the Rent Controller happened to find that the denial of title of the landlord by the tenant was not bona fide, he can straight away pass an order under Section 10(2) (viii) of the Act, which runs as follows:
"10 (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied -
(viii) that the tenant has denied the title of the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such denial or claim was not bona fide, the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application:
Provided that in any case falling under clause (i) if the Controller is satisfied that the tenant's default to pay or tender rent was not wilful, he may, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 11, give the tenant a reasonable time, not exceeding fifteen days, to pay or tender the rent due by him to the landlord upto the date of such payment or tender and on such payment or tender, the application shall be rejected.
44.However, on a careful perusal of the aforesaid dictum laid down by the Honourable Apex Court and this Court, I could see that the landlord has to resort an adjudication from the Rent Controller first under Section 10(i) of the Act regarding the bona fide denial of title of the landlord by the tenant and thereafter only, he can either get an eviction order from the hands of the learned Rent Controller or to approach the Civil Court for filing a suit for eviction on the same grounds as mentioned in Section 10 and Sections 14 to 16 of the Act. These are the remedies or procedures available to a landlord, who wants an eviction against the tenant when the denial of title of the landlord was made by the sub-tenant.
45. However, in this case, the pleadings of the plaintiff would not go to show that the tenant namely, the chief-tenant had denied the title of the landlord and therefore, the suit has been launched. The pleadings put forth by the plaintiff was that the chief tenant namely, Narasimhalu Chetty died and therefore, there was no legal representatives for the said chief tenant and the claim of the defendants 1 to 6 and 17 as legal representatives of the chief-tenant would not sustain in view of the provisions of Section 2(8)(ii) of the Act and therefore, the sub-tenancy of the defendants 7 and 8 would also go and therefore, they are to be deemed as trespassers. The crucial point would be that whether the chief-tenant namely, Narasimhalu Chetty could not be succeeded by the defendants 1 to 6 and 17.
46. It is a settled law that whenever a sub-tenant is authorised and the chief-tenant had inducted a sub-tenant, there would not be any privity of contract in between the landlord and the sub-tenant. However, the relationship in between the landlord and chief-tenant would be that of landlord and tenant and as regards the sub-tenant, the chief-tenant would be a landlord since he is entitled to receive rent from the sub-tenant. The dictum as laid down in AIR 1982 SC 1043 (Mahabir Prasad Verma vs. Dr.Surinder Kaur) would be as follows:
"26. ...... The right of possession that the sub-tenants enjoy on the basis of lawful induction as sub-tenants is assured to the sub-tenants as a "tenant" within the meaning of the Act. As a tenant in spite of the determination of his tenancy continues the right to remain in possession as a statutory tenant and enjoys the protection against eviction by virtue of the provisions contained in statute, a sub-tenant who is lawfully inducted, is also recognised by the statute to be a "tenant" within the meaning of the Act and he must necessarily enjoy the protection against eviction afforded to a tenant by the Act. A lawful subletting on the basis of the provisions of the Act does not become unlawful merely because the contractual tenancy of the tenant comes to an end. A tenant incurs the liability to be evicted, if the tenant after the commencement of the Act sublets without the written consent of the landlord; and the tenant who has lawfully sublet with the written consent of the landlord must necessarily enjoy immunity from the process of eviction on that ground. Sub-letting lawfully done with the written consent of the landlord does not become unlawful merely on the ground that the contractual tenancy has come to an end. Subletting to constitute a valid ground for eviction must be without the consent in writing of the landlord at the time when the tenant sublets any portion to the sub-tenant.
A subletting by the tenant with the consent in writing of the landlord does not become unlawful on the expiry of the contractual tenancy of the tenant, unless there is any fresh subletting by the tenant without the written consent of the landlord. Mere continuance in possession of a sub-tenant lawfully inducted does not amount to any fresh or further sub-letting. ......"
47. As far as this case is concerned, the sub-tenancy given to the defendants 7 and 8 were authorized as per the findings of the Rent Controller in Exs.B1 and B2. The above dictum laid down by the Honourable Apex Court would go to show that the extinguishment of the chief-tenant would not terminate the sub-tenancy. However, it has to be seen whether the chief-tenancy has been over due to the death of the original chief-tenant Narasimhalu Chetty is a question.
48. As we have discussed and found, the chief-tenant would be the landlord for the sub-tenant. The chief tenant, namely, Narasimhalu Chetty was therefore be the landlord of the defendants 7 and 8. On the death of chief tenant Narasimhalu Chetty, the landlord of the sub-tenants would be the defendants 1 to 6 and on the death of the first defendant, 17th defendant would also become the landlord of the sub-tenants. When the landlord of the sub-tenants can step into shoes of the chief-tenant as per the definition of Section 2(6) and Explanation and 6-A would entitle the defendants 1 to 6 and 17 to have a legal status as landlords of the sub-tenants / the defendants 7 and 8. The definition of Section 2(6), Explanation and 6-A would run as follows:
"2(6) "landlord" includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the building were let to a tenant;
Explanation – A tenant who sub-lets shall be deemed to be a landlord within the meaning of this Act in relation to the sub-tenant.
[6-A "member of his family" in relation to a landlord means his spouse, son, daughter, grand-child or dependant parent;]"
As per the definition of the landlord stated above in Section 2(6) and 6-A, the defendants would not only occupy the status of the landlords of the defendants 7 and 8, but, would also continue to receive the rents from the defendants 7 and 8, namely, the business of the chief-tenant done regarding the suit property, so as to become the chief-tenant of the plaintiff.
49. The Judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent reported in 1979 2 MLJ 413 (Haji Abdullah Sait vs. K.Sanjeevi Rao and 8 others) and 1990 1 L.W.97 (Sankarlal Jain vs. R.Kalavathi Ammal and 2 others) for the principle that the suit for ejectment in Civil Court is maintainable, when the tenant denies the title of the landlord in respect of the buildings were exempted under Section 30 of the Rent Control Act. Therefore, those judgments would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
50. Therefore, I could see that the relationship of the landlord, chief-tenant and sub-tenant did not vanish on the death of the chief-tenant Narasimhalu Chetty, but, it is still subsisting and when the relationship of the landlord and tenant and sub-tenant are subsisting in between the parties, the defendants cannot be deemed as trespassers as found by the first Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court ought to have exercised much care before it reverses the judgment of the trial Court based on the evidence. But, the first Appellate Court had failed in its duty to exercise care in reversing the Judgment of the trial Court, but, miserably misled in the factual aspects that shows the perversity and biased attitude of the first Appellate Court in rejecting such findings of the trial Court.
51. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the questions of law framed in this appeal would not help the respondents in any way and therefore, they are liable to be answered in favour of the appellant.
52. For the foregoing discussions, I am of the considered view that the Judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate Court are liable to be interfered and set aside and accordingly, the second appeal is allowed and thus, the Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court are restored. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs through out.
53. In fine:
* the second appeal is allowed
* the Judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate Court are set aside
* the Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court are restored.
* the parties are directed to bear their respective costs through out.
Consequently, connected C.M.P.No.7770 of 2004 is closed.