(Prayer: This appeal is filed against the judgement and decree dated 23.10.2009 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, F.T.C.NO.II, Coimbatore, in O.S.No.501 of 2006.)
1. This appeal is focussed by the plaintiff in the suit, animadverting upon the judgement and decree dated 23.10.2009 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, F.T.C.NO.II, Coimbatore, in O.S.No.501 of 2006.
2. The parties, for convenience sake, are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court.
3. A summation and summarisation of the relevant facts, which are absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this appeal could be portrayed thus:
(i) The appellant herein/plaintiff filed the suit O.S.No.501 of 2006 for partition of the immovable properties described in the schedule of the plaint, claiming 1/4th share in her favour on the main ground that those properties happened to be the ancestral ones, which her father-Selvaraj/D1 got them in a partition, which emerged between himself and his brothers.
(ii) While so, the father of the plaintiff-Selvaraj/D1 entered into an agreement to sell unjustifiably and illegally with D4-Nataraj, so as to sell an extent of 11 acres of land, which constitutes a portion of the suit property.
(iii) Whereupon, the said Nataraj-D4 filed the suit O.S.No.138 of 2000 for specific performance of the said agreement to sell, citing D1 herein-Selvaraj and also his two children, the then minors, namely, Senthilkumar-D2 herein and the plaintiff-Nandhini herein as D1 to D3 therein.
(iv) The said Selvaraj was shown to be the guardian ad litem for his two minor children there. However, all remained ex-parte. Whereupon no Court guardian also was appointed and the ex-pare decree was passed on 28.1.2003.
(v) However, even before such passing of the ex-parte decree, pendente lite of that said O.S.No.138 of 2000 for specific performance, a registered partition dated 13.12.1999 emerged among the said Selvaraj-D1 herein, his the then minor son-Senthilkumar-D2 herein and the then minor Nandhini-the plaintiff herein, the minors were represented by their mother. However, such a partition was an unequal one and in fact, the suit property in the specific performance suit, was allotted to Senthilkumar. There was unequal partition, as only a small moiety for namakevaste sake allotted in favour of Nandhini-the plaintiff herein and such a partition also has to be set aside and the ex-parte decree for specific performance also should be ignored.
Accordingly, the plaintiff prayed for partition.
4. Nataraj-D4 in the suit filed the written statement resisting it by contending that the said suit is a collusive one among the family members and purely for the purpose of falsifying his claim under the said decree for specific performance, they did choose to file such a suit.
5. Nandhini's father and mother, namely, Selvaraj/D1 and Bakkiyam-D3 and Nandhini's brother Senthilkumar-D2, who were arrayed as defendants remained ex-parte in the partition suit also.
6. Issues were framed. During trial, the plaintiff examined herself as P.W.1 along with P.W.2 and marked Exs.A1 to A4. On the defendants' side, D4 examined himself as D.W.1 and marked Exs.B1 to B7.
7. Ultimately, the trial Court decreed the suit in respect of the suit property, excluding the 11 acres of land covered under the decree for specific performance referred to supra.
8. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgement and decree of the trial Court, the plaintiff filed this appeal, in which, her parents and brother remained ex-parte. Only D4-Nataraj has contested this appeal.
9. Heard both.
10. The points for consideration are as under:
(i) Whether the suit O.S.No.501 of 2006 filed by the plaintiff for partition is bad for want of a prayer for setting aside or cancelling the ex-parte decree passed in O.S.No.138 of 2000, which was the suit filed by D4-Nataraj, for specific performance? and whether in the absence of a specific prayer for cancelling or setting aside such ex-parte decree in O.S.No.138 of 2000, the plaintiff could press for ignoring the said decree on the sole ground that the minor was not represented at all either by the natural guardian or by any Court guardian?
(ii) Whether the trial Court was justified in not ignoring the said ex-parte decree passed in O.S.No.138 of 2000?
(iii) Whether the trial Court committed any error in passing the preliminary decree for partition excluding the property covered under the ex-parte decree in O.S.No.138 of 2000?
(iv) Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the judgement and decree of the Court below?
11. The Indubitable and indisputable, unarguable and unassailable facts are detailed and delineated, projected and portrayed thus:
(i) Ex.A2-the registered partition deed dated 2.4.1974, which emerged among Sellappagounder, his wife-Velayathal and his children-Sivashanmugam and Selvaraj(D1 herein) would connote and convey that the 'C' scheduled property mentioned therein was allotted to the share of Selvaraj-D1 herein, while he was a bachelor.
(ii) The core question would arise as to whether the property which Selvaraj got in the said partition could be termed as an ancestral property.
12. No doubt, at the time of Selvaraj obtaining the said property, he was the sole surviving coparcener with regard to that property, which he got under the partition. However, on his marrying and giving birth to his son-Senthilkumar-D2 herein, there emerged a coparcenary between Selvaraj and his son Senthilkumar.
13. The contention as put forth on the side of the learned counsel for D4-Nataraj is to the effect that at the time of D1-Selvaraj obtaining his share, he was only a bachelor and in such a case, the said property which he obtained should be treated as his self-acquired property. In a bid to buttress and fortify his stand, he would like to cite the following decisions:
(i) (1987) 1 Supreme Court Cases 204 Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar
10. This question has been considered by this Court in CWT v. Chander Sen (1986) 3 SCC 567:1986 SCC (Tax) 641, where one of us (Sabyasachi Mukharji,J.) observed that under the Hindu Law, the moment a son is born, he gets a share in father's property and becomes part of the coparcenary. His right accrues to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth. Normally, therefore whenever the father gets a property from whatever source, from the grandfather or from any other source, be it separated property or not, his son should have a share in that and it will become part of the joint Hindu family of his son and grandson and other members who form joint Hindu family with him. This Court observed that this position has been affected by Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and, therefore, after the Act, when the son inherited the property in the situation contemplated by Section 8, he does not take it as karta of his own undivided family but takes it in his individual capacity. At pages 577 to 578 of the report, this Court dealt with the effect of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the commentary made by Mulla, 15th edn. Pages 924-26 as well as Mayne's Hindu Law, 12th edn. Pages 918-19. Shri Banerji relied on the said observations of Mayne on 'Hindu Law', 12th edn. At pages 918-19. This Court observed in the aforesaid decision that the views expressed by the Allahabad High Court, the Madras High Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the andhra Pradesh High Court appeared to be correct and unable to accept the views of the Gujarat High Court. To the similar effect is the observation of learned author of Mayne's Hindu Law, 12th edn. Page 919. In that view of the matter, it would be difficult to hold that property which devolved on a Hindu under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would be HUF in his hand vis-a-vis his own sons. If that be the position then the property which devolved upon the father of the respondent in the instant case on the demise of his grandfather could not be said to be HUF property. If that is so, then the appellate authority was right in holding that the respondent was a licensee of his father in respect of the ancestral house.
11. But as mentioned hereinbefore, even if we proceed on the assumption that the respondent was a member of the HUF which owned the ancestral house, having regard to his share in the property and having regard to the need of other sons of the father who were living in the ancestral house along with their families, the appellate authority was still right in holding that the need of the respondent was bona fide."
(ii) AIR 2000 andHRA PRADESH 29 Kasireddy Ramayamma v. Kasireddy Rama Rao, certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"13. ..... It is also well accepted that no relief can be granted to a defendant party in spite of the plaintiff failing to prove or establish his claim. Therefore, under these circumstances, the bar is staring against a party defendant in making an attempt to avoid a document to which he is a party by taking the mere plea of fraud without the same being declared void in a suit filed under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, more so, when the apprehension is writ large on the allegations in the plaint where the document is relied on and used against the defendant."
(iii) AIR 1979 MADRAS 1 The Additional Commissioner of Income tax, Madras-1 v. P.L. Karuppan Chettiar, certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"6. The question is whether when succession opens under Section 8, Karuppan and his son will take the property in the same manner. Clearly, this is not so. When we search for the relatives mentioned in class I of the schedule which is attracted by virtue of Section 8, we find no sorts are mentioned at all though the grandson of a deceased son is mentioned. What would be the effect when such a grandson comes into the picture need not be dealt with in this case. But where the son as well as his son are the persons concerned, by applying Section 8 we have to come to the conclusion that the father alone, namely, Karuppan in this case will inherit the property to the exclusion of the grandson. This being the effect of the statutory provision, no interest will accrue to the grandson in the property which belonged to Palaniappa. Even assuming Palaniappa's property is ancestral property in the hands of Karuppan, still because of the effect of the statute, Karuppan's son will not have an interest in the property. This is directly derogatory of the law established according to the principles of the Hindu Law and this provision in the statute must prevail in view of the unequivocal expression of the intention in the state itself which says that to the extent to which provisions had been made in the statute those provisions shall override the established provisions in the texts of Hindu Law. .....
14. Whereas, the learned counsel for the appellant herein/plaintiff would explain and expound by pointing out that what was obtained by Selvaraj-D1 herein was only in his capacity as a coparcener and not as a legal heir of any deceased person.
15. There is a cleavage or bottomless abyss or a world of difference between the two concepts, so to say, if a person gets his share as a coparcener, such property in his had would remain to be the ancestral property under all circumstances, whereas, if a Hindu male gets a property by virtue of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act read with Schedule-I appended to the said Act, then the said property should be treated as his self-acquired property, irrespective of the origin of the property. This has been found expounded and demonstrated in the decision of the Honourable Apex Court cited supra.
16. Keeping in mind the aforesaid dictum, if the matter is viewed, it is crystal clear that Selvaraj-D1 herein got his share under Ex.A2 not by virtue of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act read with Schedule-I appended to the said Act, but in his capacity as one of the coparceners.
17. I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decision of the Honourable Apex Court:
AIR 1975 SC 498-C.KRISHNA PRASAD V. C.I.T.BANGALORE, certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"8.The share which a coparcener obtains on partition of ancestral property is ancestral property as regards his male issue. They take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence at the time of partition or are born subsequently. Such share, however, is ancestral property only as regards hi male issue. As regards other relations, it is separate property, and if the coparcener dies without leaving male issue, it passes to his heirs by succession (see p.272 of Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law 14thEd.). A Person who for the time being is the sole surviving coparcener is entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property as it were his separate property. He may sell or mortgage the property without legal necessity or he may make a gift of it. I a son is subsequently born to him or adopted by him, the alienation whether it is by way of sale, mortgage or gift, will nevertheless stand, for a son cannot object to alienations made by his father before he was born or begotten (see p.320 ibid). In view of the above it cannot be denied that the appellant at present is the absolute owner of the property which rell to his share as a result of partition and that he can deal with it as he wishes. There is admittedly no female member in existence who is entitled to maintenance from the above mentioned property or who is capable of adopting a son to a deceased coparcener. Even if the assessee-appellant in future introduces a new member into the family by adoption or otherwise, his present full ownership of the property cannot be affected. Such a new member on becoming a member of the coparcenary would be entitled to such share in the property as would remain undisposed of by the assessee. In order to determine the status of the assessee for the purpose of income-tax, we have to look to the realities as they exist at present and it would not be correct to project in to the matter future possibilities which might or might not materialise. This would indeed amount to speculation and the same is not permissible. Excursions to the realm of speculation may be legitimate and justified when one is engaged i the study of philosophy and metaphysics; they are wholly unwarranted when one is dealing with the mundane subject of the status of the asessee for the purpose of the income-tax assessment. For this purpose we have to look to facts as they exist and emerge from the record and not to what they may or may not be in future. As things are at present in the instant case, there can in our view be hardly any doubt that the assessee is an individual and not a family."
18. A plain running of the eye over it would shed light on the point that if a sole surviving coparcener gives birth to a child then automatically by birth such child would be a coparcener along with his father and there emerges a coparcenary between the father and the son. Accordingly, if viewed it is crystal clear that the property which D1 obtained under Ex.A2 could only be termed as the ancestral property.
19. There are also other controversial points, but both sides after understanding the realities in this factual matrix refrained from pressing into service those complicate law points, so to say, about the application of the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989 (Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1990) as well as the application of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005.
20. The obvious and axiomatic reason for not raising all those points by both sides is because the parents as well as the brother of the appellant herein/plaintiff have not challenged the partition ordered by the Court below.
21. The learned counsel for Nataraj-D4 would appropriately and appositely and that too, convincingly highlight and spotlight the fact that the then minor no doubt was eo-nomine party as D3 in the O.S.No.138 of 2000. However, after attainment of majority she was served with notice in the E.P.filed by D4 herein as decree holder therein in the specific performance decree. At that time, she entered appearance, but she did not choose to file any application under Section 47 of C.P.C. and for that matter she did not even file any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to get the delay condoned in filing application to get set aside the ex-parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 of C.P.C.
22. Much water has flown under the bridge. The Executing Court executed the sale deed in favour of Nataraj-D4-the decree holder therein and when he desired to take possession of the property covered under the said decree for specific performance, the plaintiff-Nandhini did choose to file the suit for partition without even making a prayer for setting aside or cancelling the said ex-parte decree.
23. At this juncture, I would like to refer to the following decisions of the Honourable Apex Court:
(i) 1988-1-L.W.82 – RAJA and OTHERS V. RADHA AMMAL and OTHERS;
(ii) 79 L.W.214 – DEAF and DUMP SEMBA GOUNDER and OTHERS V. ALAGIA GOUNDER and OTHERS.
24. A bare poring over and perusal of those precedents would unassailably and unequivocally highlight the point that if a minor happened to be a party eo-nomine in a suit, then if the minor, after attaining majority wants to get set aside the decree passed in such a suit, necessarily there should be a prayer to that effect and as per Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, the said relief should be valued and the Court fee paid. But in this case, except for the prayer for partition, absolutely there is no prayer for cancelling or setting aside the said ex-parte decree on the ground that the minor was not adequately represented etc.
25. However, the learned counsel for the appellant herein/plaintiff would try to canvass the point that if anything is void then voidity can rightly be proved straight away and there need not be any specific prayer in that regard.
26. I cannot countenance and uphold such an arguement put forth on the side of the appellant herein/plaintiff for the simple reason that if the minor was not a party to the proceedings concerned or party to any document, then the matter would be different. Per contra, once the minor was shown as eo-nomine party in the earlier suit for specific performance, the question of the minor ignoring that ex-parte decree on the ground of voidity would not arise at all and that too, in view of the dicta found embedded in the aforesaid precedents.
27. The lower Court correctly adverted to that point in paragraph No.16 of its judgement and held that at the instance of the plaintiff the said ex-parte decree cannot be ignored and no partition could be ordered in respect of the property covered by the said decree for specific performance.
CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES:
28. The conduct of the parties should necessarily be seen. The learned counsel for D4-Nataraj, by inviting the attention of this Court to the deposition of D.W.1, would pilot his arguement that there is a candid and categorical admission on the part of the plaintiff that as on the date of filing of the suit and also deposing before the Court, she had been living with her parents in one and the same address. She was described as the daughter of Selvaraj in her deposition as P.W.1, which would denote and connote that she was not married at that time. In the suit for partition also her parents and her brother remained ex-parte. Curiously enough pending the earlier litigation relating to specific performance, Ex.A3-dated 13.12.1999-the the registered partition deed emerged, whereby the said extent of 11 acres, which was the subject matter of agreement to sell, was allotted in favour of Senthilkumar-D2 herein-the brother oif the plaintiff and son of D1-Selvaraj. But neither the parents of the plaintiff nor the brother of the plaintiff challenged the decree for specific performance either by filing an application to get set aside the ex-parte decree or by filing any separate suit on the ground of fraud etc.
29. There is no denying or gainsaying of the fact that the parents and the brother of the plaintiff even though obviously and exiomatically living under the same roof with the plaintiff, remained ex-parte through out the decree for specific performance as well as in E.P. proceedings concerned and also in the partition suit. Scarcely could it be stated that there had been no collusion among them in filing the present suit by Nandhini and that too, violating every rule in the book and also in blithe disregard for the rules.
30. I recollect the maxim: 'Acta exteriora indicanth interiora secreta' – Outward acts indicate the thoughts hidden within.
31. Pendente lite, Ex.A3 emerged and that too allotting the suit property in the said specific performance suit in favour of Senthilkumar, who curiously did not take any steps to safe-guard his alleged share by taking legal steps even before the passing of the ex-parte decree therein on 28.1.2003 or even thereafter. Accordingly if it is viewed it could objectively be seen that the conduct of the parties, namely, the plaintiff and D1 to D3 is not aboveboard.
32. Collusion is writ large. There cannot be any inference possible except the one that the plaintiff's parents and brother having met with their waterloo in the previous litigation for specific performance simply galvanized and instigated the plaintiff herein to challenge the previous proceedings and that too, unsuccessfully and improperly, as highlighted supra.
33. The learned counsel for the appellant herein/plaintiff, by inviting the attention of this Court to paragraph No.7 of the plaint, would pyramid his arguements to the effect that the plaintiff adequately pleaded about the conduct of her father. In fact, the perusal of the plaint would connote and denote, convey and portray as though the plaintiff's father was a sot, who was indulging in profligacies and that in order to meet his illegal requirements he entered into such agreement to sell with D4-Nataraj for selling the 11 acres of land.
34. Even by phantasmagorical thoughts it cannot be visualised that the plaintiff's parents and her brother acted as against the plaintiff's interest by allowing D4 herein, the decree holder therein to get unlawful enrichment. Wherefore it is discernible that the daughter unabashed wild allegations as against her father with whom she, at the relevant time was living under the same roof. If really Selvaraj-D1 herein was a sot or a drunkard or a man of immorality and that he sold the property for meeting his illegal requirements, then there is no knowing of the fact as to what prevented the wife or the son of Selvaraj to highlight these facts and support the cause of Nandhini the daughter of D1.
35. Trite the proposition of law is that 'witnesses might lie but the circumstances would not lie' As such, the deposition of P.W.1 is nothing but a load of baloney fraught with falsity and mendacity and except her ipse dixit, there is no clinching evidence to buttress and fortify her claim.
36. My mind is reminiscent and redolent of the following maxim:
'In re dubia magis infitiatio quam affirmatio intelligenda' – In a doubtful matter, the negation is to be understood rather than the affirmation.
37. Accordingly if viewed it is crystal clear that there is no evidence much less clinching evidence to highlight that the father of the plaintiff herein-Selvaraj, with an intention to meet his illegal requirements entered into such agreement to sell with D4-Nataraj herein and that he simply kept quiet.
38. It is a common or garden principle of law that 'preponderance of probabilities would govern the adjudication in civil cases'.
39. Senthilkumar-D2 herein who is the elder brother of the plaintiff-Nandhini has not raised his little finger challenging the said agreement to sell entered into by his father-D1-Selvaraj with D4-Nataraj. However, pending the suit for specific performance relating to the agreement to sell, the said partition deed dated 13.12.1999 emerged and in that the said Senthilkumar was allotted with the said 11 acres of land. It is therefore crystal clear that the plaintiff, in collusion with her parents and D1, filed the present suit by laying the averments with a trowel, which are having no legs to stand.
40. In fact, the suit is an orchestrated one at the instance of the plaintiff's parents and brother and in such a case, the ultimate finding of the trial Court warrants no interference.
41. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs.