ORDER:
1. This writ petition is instituted by a company involved in seed production. A writ of mandamus is solicited for declaring the advertisement of the 2nd respondent's applications in respect of MRC-7918, MRC-7041 BGII and MRC- 7160 varieties in the "Plant Variety Journal of India" without following the due procedure specified under the provisions contained in Sections 19, 20, 21 read with Rule 29 and 30 of Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, 2001 as illegal and unconstitutional and for other allied reliefs.
2. The 2nd respondent is also a seed manufacturing company whose applications for registration, have been advertised by the 1st respondent authority constituted in terms of the aforesaid Act. On behalf of the 2nd respondent, M/s. Lakshmi Kumaran & Sridharan, who entered appearance, circulated a letter to the Registry on 7.2.2012, that the issue raised in this writ petition is covered by the judgment rendered by a Division Bench on 24.1.2012 in Writ Appeal No. 651 of 2010 and batch of cases. That is how the matter came to be listed for judgment.
3. Heard Sri S.Niranjan Reddy, learned counsel for the writ petitioner and Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of M/s. Lakshmi Kumaran & Sridharan, Advocates for the 2nd respondent.
4. In accordance with the provisions of Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers Rights Act, 2001, the 1st respondent authority came to be constituted for enabling registration of plant varieties and essentially derived varieties. An application must be made to the Registrar and the variety sought to be registered conforms to the criterion of novelty, distinctiveness, uniformity and stability, the same becomes entitled to be registered in accordance with Section 15 of the Act. After conducting necessary tests and evaluation that the parental material conforms to the standards specified, the 1st respondent is required to take out an advertisement of the application calling for objections from persons interested in the matter, in accordance with Section 21 of the said Act. Depending upon the sustainability of the objections, the variety can be registered pursuant to which rights get conferred on the breeder to produce, sell and market, distribute, import or export the said variety exclusively in terms of Section 28 of the Act. Therefore, registration of a particular variety acquires lot of legal and commercial significance, capable of having impact upon the business of other breeders operating in the field as well. The 2nd respondent herein lodged applications for registration in respect of MRC-7918, MRC-7041 BGII and MRC-7160 varieties which were advertised by the 1st respondent. That gave rise to the present writ petition.
5. It will be appropriate at this stage to notice that previously the same writ petitioner filed three different writ petitions bearing Nos. 8031 of 2010, 16892 of 2010 and 20326 of 2010 against the same respondents challenging the validity of similar advertisements on identical grounds. WP NO. 8031 of 2010 was dismissed by this court by its judgment dated 23.8.2010 on the ground that this court does not have territorial jurisdiction. Whereas WP Nos. 16892 of 2010 and 20326 of 2010 were decided by a common order passed on 1.7.2011 holding that this court does not have territorial jurisdiction to decide the dispute raised in the said writ petitions. The present writ petitioner herein has preferred WA No. 651 of 2010 challenging the correctness of the judgment and order dated 23.8.2010 rendered in WP No. 8031 of 2010. Similarly, WA Nos. 537 and 539 of 2011 are directed against the common judgment rendered on 1.7.2011 in WP Nos. 16892 of 2010 and 20326 of 2010 respectively. It will also be appropriate to notice that along with these three writ appeals, WP No. 27663 of 2010 was also heard, in view of similarity of contentions, by a Division Bench comprising of My Lord Hon'ble the Chief Justice and Hon'ble Sri Justice P.V.Sanjay Kumar. The Division Bench by it's judgment rendered on 24.1.2012 dismissed all the four cases. Hence, the 2nd respondent has circulated the aforementioned letter suggesting that the present writ petition should also be disposed of on the same terms as in WA No. 651 of 2010 and batch of cases which were disposed of by the Division Bench.
6. I consider that it is important to notice the following principles, that emerge from the judgment rendered on 24.1.2012 by the Division Bench: (1) In order to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that the legal right claimed by him has prima facie either been infringed or is threatened to be infringed by the respondent and that would provide the necessary cause of action for invocation of a legal remedy. The Division Bench clearly held that a farmer or a breeder, therefore, need not wait till the competent authority completes the registration of a plant variety in violation of his rights before approaching the competent court. The threat posed by the impending registration contrary to the prescribed procedure in the Act would be enough to constitute a redressable cause of action. Hence, the Division Bench did not agree with the view expressed by the learned single Judge who decided WP Nos. 16892 and 20326 of 2010. (2) If a part of cause of action arises within the territory of the State, the jurisdiction of this court can be invoked though the authority who took the decision may have been stationed beyond the territorial limits of the State. The Division Bench did not agree with the opinion of the learned single Judge who dismissed the WP No. 8031 of 2010 that a writ of certiorari cannot be issued to the competent authority as the same is not situated within the territorial limits of the State. Therefore, the Division Bench held that the writ petitions cannot be said to be not maintainable before this court for want of territorial jurisdiction. (3) Notwithstanding the availability of territorial jurisdiction, the doctrine of forum conveniens may have also to be taken into consideration. Accordingly, the Division Bench opined that multiplicity of proceedings before different High Courts on the same issue grounded on common facts is neither proper nor desirable. Accordingly, the Division Bench while upholding the plea of the writ petitioner-appellant that this court has territorial jurisdiction in the matter, but nevertheless refused to entertain those cases applying the principle of forum conveniens.
7. Sri S.Niranjan Reddy, learned counsel for the writ petitioner would contend that because of the peculiar facts prevailing in those four cases, particularly in view of the fact that one of the connected writ petitions preferred by the 2nd respondent was already pending consideration before the Delhi High Court, the Division Bench has considered it appropriate to apply the doctrine of forum conveniens whereas in the present case, the similarity ends with the fact that the 1st respondent has advertised the applications made by the 2nd respondent for another set of different varieties. Further, if a lis involving the 2nd respondent is to be raised by the petitioner, he cannot be driven every time to the Delhi High Court. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur1 and Ashwani Kumar Singh v. U.P. Public Service Commission2, in support of his plea that this writ petition is maintainable.
8. It is not at all difficult to concede in principle that a part of cause of action has undoubtedly arisen within the State of Andhra Pradesh for the writ petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this court. That is not what is enough for this writ petition to be entertained. Hence, I am of the opinion that the two judgments upon which Sri S.Niranjan Reddy placed reliance upon would not be of much help to him.
9. Per contra, Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel would contend that similar contentions are canvassed with regard to the breach of procedure adopted by the 1st respondent earlier also by the very same writ petitioner, who has raised objections with regard to five varieties while no objections were raised with regard to four other varieties, and hence the fairness and legality of the procedure adopted by the 1st respondent in taking out the advertisement with regard to the applications lodged earlier by the 2nd respondent was the subject matter of pending lis. Therefore, contends the learned Senior Counsel that the reasons as to why the Division Bench applied the principle of forum conveniens are very much available even in the instant case.
10. The doctrine of forum conveniens (or forum non conveniens) is invoked by a court in exercise of its sound discretion by rejecting to adjudicate or pronounce upon a particular dispute even though jurisdiction and proper venue were established by the suitor. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert3, Justice Jackson described some of the multifarious factors relevant to the invocation of the said doctrine in the following words: "An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained.... "Factors of public interest also have [a] place in applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach, rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself."
11. Although the origin of this doctrine in Anglo-American Law is somewhat obscure, however, most authorities are in agreement that this doctrine found its earliest expression in Scottish estate cases. For long, it was observed that the problem of plaintiffs misusing a particular venue to the inconvenience of the defendants "is a very old one affecting the administration of the courts as well as the rights of litigants" and hence courts have worked out various techniques and criterion for dealing with such situations. That is how the doctrine has long been used as a doctrine of general application. This doctrine is one of procedure than of substance and is entitled to be invoked to avoid dis-uniformity of decisions amongst various courts which were grappling with similar if not identical questions. Therefore, as a balancing act between all relevant public and private interest factors, the doctrine is invoked.
12. In the instant case, the very question as to the legality, fairness and propriety of the procedure adopted by the 1st respondent in seeking to register some of the applications filed by the 2nd respondent company is now currently engaging the attention of the Delhi High Court. The learned Senior Counsel for the 2nd respondent Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, is therefore right in his submission that if the present writ petition is heard and decided by this court, it might result in dis-uniformity of decisions between these two High Courts and that should be avoided.
13. I am, therefore of the opinion that the present writ petition should not be entertained by this court leaving liberty to the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court where a similar issue is already raised.
14. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. But, however, without costs. It is totally needless to note that the merits of the matter are not reflected hereinabove.