1. The judgment dated 21.01.03 passed by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Sawai Madhopur in Sessions Case No.39/02 (36/02) State v. Dinesh and another whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under is in challenge in this appeal:-
Appellant No.1 Dinesh
1.For offence 302 IPC – Life imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/-. In default of payment 3 months further imprisonment.
2.For offence under section 324 - One year rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.3,000/-. In default of payment 15 days further imprisonment.
Appellant No.2 Mahesh
1.For offence under section 302/34 IPC - Life imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/-. In default of payment further imprisonment of three months.
2.For offence under section 324/34 IPC - One year rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,000/-. In default of payment further imprisonment of 15 days.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that Mohan Lal, son of Gendaram, submitted written report Ext.P6 before Ramsharan Lal, SHO Police Station, Bonli on 28.04.2002 alleging therein that while he and his family members were sleeping in his house, Dinesh and Mahesh, sons of Gopal, came to the residence of Teacher Hemraj at about 11.00 p.m. in the night and started banging on the doors, that on hearing the noise, Hemraj and his brother, Shanker, woke up and when Hemraj opened the door, they pulled him outside, where Mahesh caught hold of him, and Dinesh inflicted knife blows on the stomach and chest of Hemraj, and that when Prithviraj came out of his house, he was also caught hold of by Mahesh, and Dinesh tried to inflict a knife blow on his stomach, but Prithviraj managed to avoid it, as a result he received the knife blow on his left forearm, that other villagers also reached the spot, at which the accused persons ran away towards their houses, and that later on Gopal also reached there with other persons of the village. On the receipt of the above report, FIR No.60/02 for offences under sections 302, 307 and 34 I.P.C. was registered and investigation commenced. During the investigation, the police arrested the appellants and recorded their statements under section 27 Evidence Act leading to recovery of Lathi and Knife from them. The police also got injury and postmortem report Ext.P5 of deceased Hemraj and injury report of Prithviraj Ext.P4 prepared from the concerned Medical Officers. The police also recorded the statements of eye witnesses and other witnesses. Site plan was prepared and the sample of soil, knife recovered from accused Dinesh and clothes of the deceased were sent for chemical examination. On conclusion of the investigation, report under section 173 Cr.P.C. was submitted in the court of the Judicial Magistrate, Bonli who committed the appellants for standing trial before the Court of the Sessions, Sawai Madhopur. The case was transferred by the learned Sessions Judge, Sawai Madhopur for trial to the learned Special Judge Schedule Caste / Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Sawai Madhopur. Charges were framed against the appellants and they pleaded not guilty. The prosecution produced 20 witnesses and documents Ext.P1 to P33. The statements of the appellants, under section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded. They did not produce any witness in defence but documents Ext.D1 to D14 were exhibited. After hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court convicted the appellants as detailed above.
3. We have heard the learned Senior Advocate of the appellants as well as the Public Prosecutor carefully at great length and gone through the record of the case thoroughly.
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has submitted that there are many contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses; the witnesses have made improvements in their statements; the appellant, Mahesh has not caused any injury to anybody and the recovery witnesses of knife and lathi have not supported recovery and no blood stains were found on the spot, hence, the appellants are entitled for acquittal. The learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the above submissions.
5. We have considered the above submissions carefully. We were taken through the statements of the eye witnesses namely, Mohan Lal PW5, Kamla PW6, Ravindra PW7, Shanker PW8, Prithviraj PW9 and Ramdayal PW14, but we find that there are no material contradictions in their statements so as to make them unreliable. A close scrutiny of the statements of the above witnesses shows that they have not improved their version from the one given by them in their statements recorded u/s.161 Cr.P.C. So far as the contention relates to the statements of Purshottam PW16 and Prahlad PW17, witnesses of recovery, is concerned, it will suffice to mention that though they have been declared hostile, yet they have admitted their signatures on seizure memo Ext.P19 and P20. The Investigating Officer Ram Sharan Lal PW12 has proved the above recovery memos which were prepared by him in pursuance of the information given to the Police u/s.27 of Indian Evidence Act in Ext.P31 and P32. A perusal of the recovery memos Ext.P19 and P20 coupled with the report of FSL Ext.P33 proves that human blood was found on the knife recovered from the accused, Dinesh, soil taken from the spot and clothes of the deceased, Hemraj. Learned trial court has considered the evidence of the prosecution in detail as is clear from its judgment and we do not find any reason to disagree with its assessment.
6. In the alternative learned Senior Counsel of the appellants has submitted that as the brother of the appellants, Kamlesh, was murdered by Ram Khiladi, they went in search of him to the house of Hemraj. They had no intention of murdering or causing injuries to Hemraj, but due to sudden provocation they lost self control. Hence, their action will amount only to culpable homicide and their case falls within Exception 1 of Section 300 I.P.C. He has vehemently argued that the learned Trial Court has illegally convicted the appellants for offence under section 302 I.P.C. He has relied on the cases of Gurdip Singh and another v. State of Punjab AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1151; Arvind Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1988 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 132; Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansingh and others AIR 2001 Supreme Court 2328; Krishna Tiwari and another v. State of Bihar JT 2001 (3) SC 331.
7. The learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that the prosecution has by cogent evidence established that the appellants committed murder of Hemraj.
8. We have considered the aforesaid submissions carefully. In order to correctly appreciate the above contention, it is necessary to examine the evidence produced in the case. The story of the prosecution, as revealed in written report Ext.P6, is that the appellants banged on the door of Hemraj and when he opened the door, they pulled him out. The appellant Mahesh caught hold of him and the appellant Dinesh inflicted knife blows on his stomach and chest. Mohan Lal, PW5, has given eye witness account of the incident. According to him Mahesh and Dinesh banged upon the door of the house of Hemraj and, when Hemraj opened the door, Mahesh caught hold of him. Dinesh inflicted knife blows in his stomach and chest. He has also stated that Prithviraj came there and tried to intervene, but a knife injury was caused in his left hand. He has also given the names of other persons who were present there and who saw the incident. Smt. Kamla PW6, the wife of the deceased, has also stated that knife injuries were inflicted in the stomach and chest of her husband. Ravindra PW7, the minor son of the deceased, has stated that knife injuries in chest and stomach of his father were caused by the appellants. Shanker PW8 has also supported the above version. Prithviraj PW9 has stated that when he tried to save Hemraj, Dinesh tried to inflict knife blow on his stomach but as he tried to save himself, the knife injury was caused in his left elbow. All the aforesaid witnesses were cross-examined on behalf of the appellants but their statements could not be shattered. The aforesaid ocular evidence of the prosecution is supported by medical evidence. Dr. Ram Phool Meena PW4 has proved injury report of Prithviraj Ext.P4 and postmortem report of Hemraj Ext.P5. A perusal of Ext.P5 shows that Hemraj had following injuries:-
“Wounds & Injs. (1) Incised wounds 10x5 cm whole thickness of chest below the Rt. neeple redness. Including rupture of peritoneal cavity & diaphragm Involving Antera superior lobe Rt side of liver. Liver having Incised wound 3x1/2x2½ cm. depth. Rt. lateral & Peritoneal cavity having excessive collection of dark red blood beneath the liver and lungs.
(2) Incised wound 2x1x2/3rd thickness of abd. wall on the Ant & lower part of abd left side.”
9. Dr. Ram Phool Meena PW4 has given following opinion about the cause of death of Hemraj:
“After having Postmortem exam. In our opinion the cause of death is due to syncope resulting from excessive loss of blood from liver.”
10. A perusal of his statement shows that there has been excessive bleeding from the liver of Hemraj. The aforesaid witness has deposed that the said injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
11. Apart from the above evidence, the circumstances and other facts of the case give clear indication about the intention of the appellants. Admittedly, an accident took place near the temple about 45 minutes earlier to the present incident in which the brother of the appellants, namely, Kamlesh, is said to have been murdered by Ram Khiladi. According to the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, the appellants received sudden provocation from the said incident and reached the house of Hemraj in search of Ram Khiladi. There is nothing on record to show that Hemraj was present at the site of the incident where Kamlesh was beaten to death. There is no evidence on record to show that Ram Khiladi was hiding in the house of Hemraj when the appellants reached there. There is nothing on record to show that when the appellants banged upon the doors of Hemraj and he opened the door, the appellants enquired from him about the whereabouts of Ram Khiladi. Rather it has come in the statements of witnesses that Hemraj was watching TV in his house with his family. Thus, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the appellants reached the house of Hemraj in search of Ramkhiladi, who had murdered their brother, is without any foundation and substance.
Exception 1 of section 300 I.P.C. reads as below:-
“When culpable homicide is not murder. – Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. (Emphasis supplied).
The above exception is subject to the following provisos:-
First – That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.
Secondly – That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
Thirdly – That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.
Explanation – Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.”
12. Illustration (a) of section 300 I.P.C. provides.
“ A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills. Y, Z’s child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.”
13. To obtain the benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300, I.P.C., it must be proved: (a) that the deceased injured the accused by acts or words and thus caused provocation; (b) that the provocation should be such as to cause a reasonable man to lose his power of self-control and should have actually caused in the accused a sudden and temporary loss of self-control. Under the Exception engrafted in Section 300, I.P.C. the atrocity of the offence is mitigated if that is done under the influence of feeling which temporarily takes away from the offender control over his action. Provocation is an external stimulus which can be objectively gauged but loss of self-control is a subjective phenomena and can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, the manner in which the accused reacted to the circumstances and accused’s own description of his mind which can be verified with reference to relevant objective facts by the Court imaginatively reconstructing the psychological situation in which the accused found himself.
14. Moreover, the act must be done whilst the person doing it is deprived of self-control by grave and sudden provocation. That is, it must be done under the immediate impulse of provocation. The applicability of the doctrine of provocation thus rests on the fact that it brings about a sudden and temporary loss of self-control. The test is of a reasonable person in circumstances which give rise to grave and sudden provocation. What may amount to grave and sudden provocation as has been provided for in the Explanation to Exception 1 of Section 300, is a question of fact. The provocation has to be, not only sudden, but grave and the gravity of the provocation is to be judged by the fact whether or not the offender is deprived of the power of self-control. Each little provocation cannot be called grave simply because the consequences ensuing from that provocation at the hands of the accused have been grave.
15. We have examined cases relied on behalf of the appellants in the light of aforesaid principles of law. The case of Gurdip Singh (Supra) is about the intention of attack for taking revenge on account of suspected illicit relation with a female of their family. In the case of Arvind Kumar (Supra) the incident took place in the heat of passion. In the case of Takhaji Hiraji (Supra) the incident took place because of a sudden quarrel between two communities. In the case of Krishan Tiwari (Supra) the incident took place all of a sudden without premeditation. Hence, the authorities relied upon on behalf of the appellants do not help them.
16. If we apply the aforesaid principle in this case it is found that there is no evidence that Hemraj was present in the temple where the first incident took place in which Kamlesh was murdered. Hence, there is no question of the appellants having been provoked by his action. The appellants came from the temple to the house of the deceased, Hemraj. The time lag between the two incidents is about 45 minutes. It deserves to be mentioned that in the famous case of K.M. Nanawati v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 Supreme Court 605 the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation. There is not an iota of evidence that deceased Hemraj gave any provocation to the appellants even when they reached his house. The nature of the injury on the stomach of deceased, is as follows:
“Including rupture of peritoneal cavity & diaphragm Involving Antera superior lobe Rt side of liver. Liver having Incised wound 3x1/2x2½ cm. depth.”
17. Such an injury can only be caused after predetermination of causing death and it cannot be called incidental.
18. The learned Trial Court has also discussed this aspect of the matter in para-24 of the judgment and held that it cannot be accepted that the action of the appellants was caused due to sudden provocation. We agree with the said conclusion and we are unable to accept the argument of the learned Senior Counsel that it is a case of sudden and grave provocation falling under Exception 1 to 300 I.P.C.
19. The learned Senior Counsel of the appellants has submitted that no overt act is alleged against appellant Mahesh and he has not caused any injury to any person. In the circumstances, the learned Trial Court has committed illegality in convicting him with the aid of section 34 I.P.C. He has submitted that no offence is made out against him and he is entitled for acquittal. In support of his argument, he has placed reliance on the cases of Ramashish Yadav and others v. State of Bihar AIR 1999 Supreme Court 3830 and Suresh Sitaram Surve v. State of Maharashtra 2003 (1) WLC (SC) Criminal 280.
20. The Public Prosecutor has opposed the above contention and submitted that the appellant Mahesh participated in the crime actively and shared common intention.
21. We have considered the above submission. Section 34 IPC requires common intention of the accused persons which has to be proved by the prosecution. Pre-arranged plan may be inferred from circumstances and conduct. Prior concert or prior plan of the accused has to be judged from the facts and circumstances of the case as direct evidence in respect thereof is difficult to come by. Only the acts of the parties will make out the intention and so, this factual aspect is to be inferred from the facts and circumstances. This Court in Harji v. State of Rajasthan, 1996 Cr.L.J. 3616 held that when the accused persons purchased some agricultural field but were stopped by the complainant party from carrying on agricultural operation on the ground that they were transferee from the Khatedar tenants of the field, on resistance being shown by the accused the complainants being few in number, tried to escape and some of them succeeded in doing so but accused continued the beating even after two members of complainant party had fallen down helplessly, it was held that they had a definite common intention to kill the victims.
22. When we examine the instant case in the light of aforesaid principles of law it deserves to be mentioned that common intention can be proved from the conduct of an offender unfolding itself during the course of action. The case of Suresh Sitaram Surve (Supra) has no application in the instant case. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held in the case of Antar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2007 (1) Crimes 226 that whether in a given situation, accused persons had shared common intention to commit murder must be judged having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. In the aforesaid case, all the accused persons were held liable for the offences as they went inside the house of the victim. In the instant case both the appellants came together from the temple to the house of deceased Hemraj and banged upon the door of his house. When Hemraj opened the door, the appellants committed the crimes. In the case of Murari Thakur and another v. State of Bihar 2007 (1) Crimes 395, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that when both appellants had caught hold of deceased and the third accused cut the neck of the deceased, conviction of the appellants with the help of section 34 I.P.C. suffered no illegality. The present case is fully covered by the aforesaid judgments. Hence, we do not approve the contention raised on behalf of the appellant Mahesh.
23. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the written report submitted by Mohan Lal Ext.P6 cannot be considered as First Information Report and is not admissible in evidence as it is hit by the provision of section 162 Cr.P.C. The contention is that the same was submitted by Mohan Lal after the investigation of the case had already commenced on the basis of telephonic message received at the Police Station, Bonli. The learned Public Prosecutor has contested the above submissions and submitted that written report Ext.P6 is in fact First Information Report of the case and is not hit by the provisions of section 162 Cr.P.C. He has further submitted that the learned Trial Court has considered the objection and rejected it which is correct.
24. We have given our anxious consideration to the above submissions and gone through the discussion made by the learned Trial Court. Before considering the legal position, it will be useful to consider the evidence on the point. Ramsharan Lal PW12 has stated that he was posted as SHO, Police Station, Bonli and during the night of 27th and 28th April 2002, a message was received on telephone that in the disputes in village Kodyie two persons have died. On getting the said information, he alongwith police force proceeded to village Kodyie where Mohan Lal Bairwa submitted written report Ext.P6 on the spot. He recorded endorsement E to F on it, signed at G to H and sent it with Bishanlal, Constable, to Police Station, Bonli for registration of the case on which FIR No.60/02 for offence under section 302, 307 and 34 I.P.C. was registered. In his cross-examination he has stated that he does not know the name of the person who gave the information on the telephone. On the basis of the telephonic message, he got a report recorded in the General Diary by Deviprasad at 12.10 a.m. which is report no.831. He has further stated that, according to the information, two incidents had taken place. One behind the temple and the other in the house of Hemraj. On further cross-examination, he stated that nobody informed him about the names of the accused persons and it was simply told that there has been a scuffle between Bairwa’s and Dholi’s. Abdul Salam PW15 has stated that he registered FIR No.60/02 Ext.P16 on getting written report Ext.P6. During his cross-examination, he has admitted that before registration of the case a telephonic information was received at the Police Station but he does not know who gave the said information. From the above evidence, it is found that a telephonic message was received at the Police Station about the incidents which had taken place in village Kodyie where two persons had died as a result of the struggle. On getting the said information Ramsharan Lal, SHO PW12 proceeded to the village alongwith police force where Mohanlal submitted written report Ext.P6 to him.
25. We have gone through the judgment of the learned Trial Court which has discussed this aspect of the case in paragraphs 22 and 23 elaborately and concluded that written report Ext.P6 is not hit by the provision of section 162 Cr.P.C. Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C. provides as below:-
“(1) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter, shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose, save as hereinafter provided, at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made.” (Emphasis supplied)
26. Such a factual situation has been considered by this Court in Keshar Lal and others v. State of Rajasthan 1997 (2) WLC (Rajasthan) 265 and after considering the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Tapendra Singh v. State of Punjab 1994 (2) SCC 220; Soma Bhai v. State of Gujarat 1994 (2) SCC 698; Dhananjay Chatterjee alias Dhanna v. State of West Bengal AIR 1979 Supreme Court 135 and Ram Singh Babaji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2488 it held that, “telephonic message, giving information of a cognizable offence, is often a matter of controversy as to whether it constitutes an FIR or not. In this matter, the view of the Supreme Court is consistent that if the telephonic message is cryptic in nature and the object and purpose of giving such telephonic message is not to lodge the FIR but to request the Officer Incharge of the Police Station to reach the place of occurrence or where the dead body is lying, it cannot be treated as FIR.
27. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held in Thaman Kumar v. State of Union Territory of Chandigarh AIR 2003 Supreme Court 3975 that when telephonic message about the incident was given by Constable on night patrol duty in which it was mentioned that three persons assaulted the deceased, the said information cannot be regarded FIR of the incident but merely an entry made regarding departure of police person to place of occurrence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vikram & others v. State of Maharastra AIR 2007 Supreme Court 1893 held that when prosecution witness alleged to have informed Officer - Incharge of Police Station on telephone and the Head Constable states that he had written down the same but he as well as the Investigating Officer did not say that it was a detailed report and another First Information Report which was a detailed one came to be recorded, no exception can be taken to the latter being treated as First Information Report.
28. The said authorities are fully applicable in the instant case as the information received on telephone at Police Station Bonli during night of 27th and 28th April 2002 was cryptic and vague. As mentioned above, the SHO, Bonli alongwith police force went to village Kodyie on getting the said information where Mohan Lal produced written report Ext.P6. It is also important to mention here that Ramsharan Lal PW12 has stated during his cross-examination on behalf of the appellants that he received the report from Gopal at 12.45 a.m. and thereafter a written report Ext.P6 was submitted by Mohan Lal. FIR No.59/02 was received by him at 1.45 a.m. while the second FIR No.60/02 was received at 2.30 a.m. He has further stated that he completed investigation of FIR No.59/02 at 7.30 a.m. on the next day and the investigation of FIR No.60/02 was commenced at 7.30 a.m. on 28.04.02. Thus, from the aforesaid facts, it clearly emerges that the written report Ext.P6 was submitted to Ramsharan Lal, SHO PW12 at 1.30 a.m. on 28.04.02 before he commenced investigation of FIR No.60/02 at 7.30 a.m. on 28.04.02. Hence, it can be safely concluded that written report Ext.P6 having been submitted before commencement of investigation of the case registered on its basis is not hit by the provisions of section 162 Cr.P.C. Hence, the aforesaid objection is found to be without any substance.
29. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has further contended that the prosecution has not produced any independent witness for proving its case. The witnesses produced are either relatives or neighbours of the deceased Hemraj and as such no reliance can be placed on their statements and the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case. The learned Public Prosecutor has contested the above submission and submitted that the prosecution has produced only those witnesses who were present at the time of the commission of the offences and their presence is natural and cannot be doubted.
30. We have considered the above submissions carefully and find that Mohan Lal PW5, Ravindra PW7, Shanker PW8, Prithviraj PW9, Hansraj PW10, Ram Dayal PW14 have given evidence in support of the prosecution case. All the above witnesses have given detailed account of the incident. They were cross-examined on behalf of the appellants at length but their statements could not be shattered. The learned Trial Court has elaborately discussed their statements. A perusal of the site plan Ext.P7 shows that the houses of Mohan Lal PW5, Shanker Lal PW8, Hansraj PW10 are in the vicinity of the place of occurrence and their presence in their houses at 11.00 p.m. in the night cannot be doubted and accordingly their presence at the site of occurrence during the commission of the crime is natural. We have also gone through the statements of the above witnesses and feel that they cannot be termed as interested witnesses. Moreover, the statements of the aforesaid witnesses are supported by the medical evidence as well as statements of Kamla PW6 and Rameshwar Prasad PW19.
31. So far as the legal position is concerned, it will suffice to mention that law was laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dilip Singh and others v. State of Punjab AIR 1953 Supreme Court 364 in which it has been held as under:
“A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship, far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalization. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts”.
32. The aforesaid view has been followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its subsequent judgments namely Gulichand and others v. State of Rajasthan (1974) 3 SCC 698 and Kalegura Padma Rao and another v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2007 (2) Crimes 217 (SC).
33. In view of the above legal position and the factual position, the eye witnesses produced by the prosecution cannot be termed as partial and interested witnesses, therefore, we overrule the aforesaid objection as well.
34. An objection has been taken on behalf of the appellants, that the FIR was lodged after delay and its copy was transmitted to the concerned Magistrate after much delay and as such its evidential value is nil. The learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the above submission. We have considered the above question and find that according to prosecution case the incident took place on 27.04.02 at 11.00 p.m. A perusal of written report Ext.P6 shows that it was submitted by Mohan Lal PW5 to Ramsharan Lal, SHO PW12 at 1.30 a.m. on 28.04.02. It has come on record that Police Station Bonli is at a distance of 9 kms. from village Kodyie. Before Mohan Lal PW5 could go to police station Bonli in the morning, the SHO Bonli reached village Kodyie and the aforesaid report was submitted at the earliest opportunity. Thus there is no delay in lodging the same. A perusal of Ext.P6 shows that after its submission it was sent by SHO, Bonli to Police Station for registration of the case and FIR No.60/02 was registered at 2.00 a.m. on 28.04.02. A copy of the report was received in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Bonli on 29.04.02 at 10.00 a.m. It deserves to be mentioned that 28.04.02 being Sunday was a holiday. Thus, copy of FIR Ext.P16 was submitted in the Court without any delay and the objection raised on behalf of the appellants is without any basis.
35. No other point was argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants.
36. From the aforesaid discussion, the appeal is found to be without any merit and is accordingly dismissed. The conviction and sentence of the appellants as awarded to them by the learned Trial Court is maintained.