1. These revisions arise from the order of Land Reforms Appellate Authority, Alappuzha (for short, "the Appellate Authority") in A.A.Nos.22 of 2009 and 92 of 2005 confirming the order passed by the Deputy Collector (Land Tribunal), Alappuzha (for short, "the Land Tribunal") in O.A.No.658 of 1976. Question raised for a decision is whether in the case of a deemed tenant who was found so by the Civil Court after the expiry of six months from the date of commencement of Act 35 of 1969, an application for resumption under Section 17 of Kerala Land Reforms Act (for short, "the Act") could be filed within six months from the date of decision of the Civil Court regarding deemed tenancy?
2. Short facts necessary for a decision of the question are: Respondent No.1 filed O.S.No.1089 of 1966 in the court of learned Munsiff, Thiruvananthapuram for redemption of mortgage over 11 cents with two buildings thereon. Learned Munsiff passed a decree for redemption in favour of respondent No.1. The mortgagees challenged that decree in A.S.Nos.531 and 533 of 1968. During pendancy of the appeals Act 35 of 1969 came into force with effect from 01-01-1970. The mortgagees claimed that they are deemed tenants under Sec.4A of the Act.
The claim was negatived and the appeals were dismissed on 13-04-1973. Judgment and decree of the first appellate court were challenged in S.A.Nos.1021 and 1022 of 1973. The second appeals were disposed of by common judgment dated 06-02-1976 (reported as Parameswaran Pillai v. Narayanan Nair - 1976 KLT 341-FB)). This court while disposing of the second appeals held that defendant No.1 is a deemed tenant under Sec. 4A of the Act and hence respondent No.1 is not entitled to recover possession of the property. Judgment and decree of the courts below were set aside and suit for redemption of mortgage ended in a dismissal. Within six months from the disposal of second appeals on 06-02-1976 respondent No.1 filed O.A.No.658 of 1976 in the Land Tribunal for resumption of one-half of the suit property under Sec.17 of the Act claiming that he is a 'small holder'. That application was contested by petitioners who claimed title over the property under defendant No.1. They denied that respondent No.1 is a small holder entitled to resumption under Sec. 17 of the Act and contended that at any rate O.A.No.658 of 1976 is filed beyond the prescribed time and hence is barred. The Land Tribunal held that respondent No.1 is a small holder entitled to seek resumption Sec. 17 of the Act. So far as plea of limitation (or bar as the case may be) is concerned the Land Tribunal got over the difficulty relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sankaranarayanan Potti (Dead) by L.Rs. v. K Sreedevi and Ors. (AIR 1998 SC 1808).
Accordingly, O.A.No.658 of 1976 was allowed which petitioners challenged before the Appellate Authority in A.A.Nos.92 of 2005 and 22 of 2009. Appellate Authority has confirmed order of the Land Tribunal. Hence these revisions.
3. At the time of hearing learned counsel for petitioners did not challenge finding of the lower authorities that respondent No.1 is a 'small holder' as referred to in Sec. 17 of the Act.
Hence it is not necessary to go into that question in these revisions. It is contended by learned counsel for petitioners that O.A.No.658 of 1976 is filed beyond the prescribed time and hence is barred under Sec. 72(4) of the Act. According to the learned counsel right, title and interest of respondent No.1 in the schedule property vested with the Government on the expiry of six months from 01-01-1970 and hence any application for resumption under Sec.17 of the Act ought to have been filed before such vesting.
O.A.No.658 of 1976 was filed only in the year 1976, ie, much after the right, title and interest of respondent No.1 vested with the Government by virtue of Sec.72(4) of the Act. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Full Bench of this court in Parameswara Pillai v. Kunchali Lekshmi (1987(2) KLT 349 (F.B)). It is also contended that lower authorities were not justified legally or factually in trying to get over the decision of the Full Bench by reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sankaranarayanan Potti (Dead) by L.Rs. v. K Sreedevi and Ors. (supra), which learned counsel argued, has no bearing on the facts of the case. In response, it is contended by learned counsel for respondent No.1 that issue regarding deemed tenancy arose only when the second appeals were disposed of by this court on 06-02-1976. Until then, respondent No.1 was a mortgagor entitled to redeem the mortgage as held by the trial and first appellate courts and hence the contention that respondent No.1 ought to have filed the application for resumption within six months from 01-01-1970 cannot be accepted.
According to the learned counsel right of respondent No.1 to seek resumption under Sec.17 of the Act arose only on this court holding on 06-02-1976 that defendant No.1, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners is a deemed tenant. Respondent No.1 could not move an application for resumption before the Land Tribunal when the issue whether the mortgage is redeemable or not was pending consideration of the civil court. The Land tribunal could not also decided the question then. Hence lower authorities are justified in holding that the application filed within six months from 06-02-1976 is not barred. Learned counsel argued that respondent No.1 could not be expected to move an application for resumption under Sec.17 of the Act at a time when he was holding a confirmed decree for redemption of mortgage.
4. Act 35 of 1969 came into force on 01-01-1970. This court vide judgment dated 06-02-1976 held that predecessor-in- interest of petitioners is a deemed tenant under Sec.4A of the Act. Sec.17 of the Act enables a small holder to apply to the Land Tribunal to apply for resumption. Sec.18 of the Act deals with the general conditions and restrictions applicable to resumption under Secs.14 to 17 of the Act. A 'small holder' does not come within the description of Sec.18. Sub sec.(1) of Sec.18 deals with tenancies subsisting at the commencement of the (parent) Act and states that no application for resumption shall be made after a period from one year from the commencement of the parent act. The proviso deals with certain categories of persons which does not cover a 'small holder'. But, Sec.72(4) of the Act deals with a 'small holder' as well. Sec.72 states about vesting of landlord's rights in the Government and subsec.(1) states that on a date to be notified in the Gazette all right, title and interest of landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants shall vest in the Government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon (on the date of vesting). Subsec.(4) which is relevant for the decision of the present case reads as under:
Where in the case of a holding or part of a holding, the landowner or an intermediary is a minor or a person of unsound mind or a member of the Armed Forces of a seaman or a legal representative of any such member or seaman, or a small holder, the right, title and interest of the landowner and intermediaries, if any, in respect of such holding o part of a holding shall vest in the Government- (a) on the expiry of six months from the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, or on the date notified under sub- section (1), whichever is later, in cases where no application for resumption of the holding or part of the holding has been preferred;
(b) in any case where application for resumption has been preferred, on the date on which the order rejecting such application, either in part or in full, has become final or on the date notified under sub-section (1), whichever is later. As per sub-section (4) in the case of a holding or part of a holding where the landowner comes within the category of persons referred to therein (including a 'small holder') the right, title and interest of the landowner or intermediary in respect of such holding or part of such holding would vest in the Government on the expiry of six months from the commencement of Act 35 of 1969 (ie.01-01-1970) or on the date notified under sub-section (1) whichever is later. Sub clause (a) further states that the said rule applied to cases where no application for resumption of the holding or part of holding has been preferred. Sub clause (b) relates to cases where an application for resumption has been preferred and the date of vesting in such case is postponed to the date on which rejection of such application either in part of in full, has become final or on the date notified under sub-section (1), whichever is later. In the present case, there was no application for resumption preferred by respondent No.1 on commencement of Act 35 of 1969. O.A.No.658 of 1976 was filed only in the year 1976. Hence clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Sec.72 has no application. The provision that would therefore, apply is clause (a) of subsection (4) of Sec.72. Hence in the case of respondent No.1 who is a 'small holder', vesting of his right, title and interest in the property with the Government occurred on the expiry of six months from commencement of Act 35 of 1969. Vesting took place on 01-07-1970.
5. Now the question is whether this court having held defendant No.1, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners to be a deemed tenant on 06-02-1976, application for resumption under Sec.17 of the Act preferred within six months from that date is within time or, it could be said that Sec.72(4)(a) of the Act barred respondent No.1 from filing that application after 01-07-1970.
6. It is apposite to refer to the relevant decisions of this court which is ultimately led to the decision of the Full Bench in Parameswara Pillai v. Kunchali Lekshmi (supra). First of the decisions is Raghavan Nair v. Narayana Panicker (1976 KLT 369) rendered by a learned Single Judge. That was a suit for recovery of possession of property filed in the year 1966.
The suit was pending on 01-01-1970 when Act 35 of 1969 came into force. Petitioner claimed to be a deemed tenant under Sec.7B of the Act introduced by Act 35 of 1969. That claim was allowed as per decree dated 24-07-1970. Respondent filed application under Secs.17 and 22 of the Act for resumption. That application was resisted on the ground of bar under Sec.72(4) of the Act.
Learned Single Judge held that Sec.18(1) relates to tenancies existing on the date of commencement of the Act (01-04-1964) and that in respect of a 'small holder', Sec.18 does not prescribe any period of limitation. Accordingly objection to the application on the ground of limitation was rejected.
In Ravindranathan Nair v. Saraswathi Amma (1982 KLT 997) a suit for redemption of mortgage was filed in the year 1968 and plaintiff filed I.A.No.8862 of 1970 under Sec.17 r/w Sec.132(3)(C) of the Act claiming resumption. That application was dismissed on 08-01-1975.
The suit was dismissed on 09-01-1973 holding that defendant No.1 was a deemed tenant under Sec.17(1) of the Act and the case was remitted to the trial court. The suit was then decreed on 19-10-1974 allowing plaintiff to resume one-half of property from defendant No.1 under sec.132(3)(C) of the Act. The appeal filed by defendant No.1 was dismissed. In second appeal, this court observed that "commencement of this Act" referred to in Sec.18(1) of the Act has to be interpreted as referring to commencement of the Principal Act which came into force on 01-04-1964.
7. Then came the decision in Subramanian v. Kunjamma (1983 KLT 351) rendered by a Devision Bench While accepting the view expressed in Raghavan Nair's case (supra) that Sec.18(1) of the Act does not prescribe any period of limitation for an application for resumption by a small holder, the Division Bench observed that in such a situation Article 137 of the Limitation Act applied and the period of limitation is three years. That was a suit for redemption of mortgage and a decree was passed on 31-07-1959 which was confirmed in appeal. After Act 35 of 1969 came into force petitioner claimed to a deemed tenant. Decree holder filed application for resumption. It was held that right to apply for resumption accrued to the decree holder on 01-01-1970 but, applying Article 137 of the Limitation Act the application filed within three years of the date on which the right accrued was found to be within time.
8. Overruling the decision in Raghavan Nair's case and dissenting from the decision of the Division Bench in Subramanian's case, another Division Bench rendered the decision in Kallyani Amma v. Kerala Varma Thirumu (1985 KLT 777). The Division Bench considered the question whether an application for resumption by a small holder against the mortgagee who is a deemed tenant under Sec.4A can be filed after the expiry of six months from 01-01-1970 (when Act 35 of 1969 came into force). In paragraph 3 of the judgment, Division Bench referred to the question whether simply because no time limit is fixed under Sec.17 of the Act an application for resumption by a small holder could be filed after the right of landlord has vested in the Government by virtue of Sec.72 of the Act. Referring to Sec.72(4) of the Act it was held that if the landlord or intermediary is a 'small holder', vesting takes place on the expiry of six months from 01-01-1970 except when an application for resumption under Sec.17 was pending as on 01-01-1970.
9. The foregoing conflicting decisions were considered by the Full Bench in Parameswara Pillai v. Kunchali Lekshmi (supra). The Full Bench considered the issue regarding filing of an application after the expiry of six months from 01-01-1970 in the case of a deemed tenant where an application for resumption was not pending on the commencement of Act 35 of 1969 (01-01-1970).
That was a case where petitioners filed the suit in the year 1966 for redemption of mortgage and pending the suit, Act 35 of 1969 came into force whereby Sec.72(4)(a) of the Act was introduced. Respondents claimed to be deemed tenants under sec.4A of the Act. That contention was upheld in the suit. Petitioners (mortgagors) filed application for resumption of one-half of the property under Sec.17 of the Act. But, that application was filed long after the expiry of six months from the commencement of Act 35 of 1969. The Land Tribunal relied on the decision Raghavan Nair Vs. Narayana Panicker (supra) and held that there is no time bar for filing the application.
Appellate authority confirmed that order. The Full Bench referred to Sec.72 of the Act and said that vesting of right, title and interest of the landlord with the Government took place when Act 35 of 1969 was introduced with effect from 01-01-1970 and hence on 01-01-1970 the mortgagees were deemed as tenants by virtue of Act 35 of 1969. So far as application for resumption is concerned, the Full Bench held that it ought to have been filed before the expiry of six months from the commencement of Act 35 of 1969 under Sec.72(4) of the Act (in relation to a small holder and in a case where no application for resumption was pending on the date of commencement of Act).
It was held that application preferred after six months from 01-01-1970 (ie. after 01-07-1970) is barred under Sec.72(4) of the Act. While holding so, the Full Bench overruled the decisions in Raghavan Nair's case and Subramanian's case (supra) and approved the decision of the Division Bench in Ravindranathan Nair's case and Kallyani Amma's case (supra).
The Full Bench held in paragraph No.13,
"From the foregoing decision it would be clear that the period of limitation for resumption under Sec.17 of the Act by a small holder in respect of deemed tenants is six months from 01-01-1970, the date of commencement of Amendment Act 35 of 1969 in a case where no application for resumption has been preferred and application after that date is not maintainable in view of vesting of the right, title and interest of small holder and the intermediary in the Government on the expiry of that period."
If that be so, vesting having taken place on the expiry of six months from 01-01-1970 (ie. on 01-07-1970) in the case of a small holder entitled to seek resumption under Sec.17 of the Act as no application for such resumption was pending when Act 35 of 1969 came into force, the application for resumption ought to have been filed by respondent No.1 before such vesting took place (ie. before 01-07-1970) while the application in the present case was filed only in the year 1976.
10. The lower authorities have relied on the decision of the apex court in Sankara Narayanan Potti v. K Sreedevi and Ors. (supra). To decide whether reliance placed on that decision is correct on facts and on point of law it is necessary to go into the relevant decisions on the point. Parameswaran Thampi v. Podiyan Thomas (1984 KLT 397) was a case involving recovery of possession. Plaintiff claimed that he leased the property to defendant No.3 in 1120 ME and that there was a surrender of lease hold right to the plaintiff on 30-04-1954.
According to the plaintiff he, then, leased it to two others in the year 1962 who surrendered the property to the plaintiff in the year 1969 and thereafter he was in possession of the property. He filed the suit on 29-03-1972 alleging that there was trespass into the property by defendant No.3. The latter claimed that he continued to be in possession of the property as a lessee from 1120 ME onwards and is entitled to fixity of tenure under Sec. 72 of the Act. Question was referred to the Land Tribunal under Section 125(3) of the Act. Reference was answered in favour of defendant No.3 and the suit was dismissed.
In the meantime, there was an original application filed by defendant No.3 in the Land Tribunal which went in favour of defendant No.3. This court while considering the appeal held that when the question of tenancy was in issue in a civil court, a party to that proceeding could not bypass the civil court and seek to obtain orders from the Land Tribunal by filing an application under Sec.72 of the Act. It was observed that if such an application was filed before the Tribunal, that Tribunal ought to have waited till the civil court rendered its decision, or if the Tribunal proceeds to enter any finding on tenancy it will only be a tentative decision subject to the final decision of the civil court. The decision in Parameswaran Thampi' s case was challenged in the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court rendered its decision in Mathevan Padmanabhan v. Parameswaran Thampi (1995(1) SCC 479). The Supreme Court observed that the High court was right in its approach that when the question of tenancy is in dispute in the civil court the Land Tribunal was not correct in directing appellant/defendant No.3 to purchase the property (as if he is entitled to fixity) and that ultimately if the High Court found that defendant No.3 is not a tenant, his entitlement to purchase the property would be lost. Under those circumstances appropriate course for the Land Tribunal would have been to keep the application under Sec.72B filed by defendant No.3 pending till the dispute was resolved in the civil court. Then came the decision of this court in Sankara Narayanan Potti Vs. K Sreedevi and Ors. (supra) (unreported decision in C.R.P.No.1271 of 1995). That was a suit for redemption of a mortgage dated 01-12-1944 executed by the Tarwad in favour of Parameswaran Pillai and his sons.
Preliminary decree for redemption was passed on 22-01-1963 and the appeal arising therefrom was dismissed. The second appeal was dismissed on 19-02-1969. Defendant No.11 filed I.A.No.5092 of 1979 on 17-11-1979 (ie, after Act 35 of 1969 came into force) for passing final decree. Defendant No.2 contended that application for passing final decree is time barred. He also contended that he had obtained an order in his favour from the Land Tribunal that he is a deemed tenant and hence decision of the Land Tribunal on the question of tenancy operated as res judicata. Trial court found that application for passing final decree is time barred and accordingly dismissed that application. Defendant No.11 filed appeal as A.S.No.198 of 1982. That appeal was allowed on 10-01-1989 holding that application is not time barred. Application was remitted to the trial court for decision on the other objection raised by defendant No.2. Defendant No.2 filed I.A.No.1307 of 1994 contending that defendant No.11 is not entitled to get a final decree in the light of the purchase certificate issued in her favour in O.A.No.599 of 1973. Defendant No.2 wanted question regarding maintainability of the application for passing final decree to be decided as a preliminary point. That application was opposed by defendant No.11 on the ground that O.A.No.599 of 1973 was decided pending suit, after the preliminary decree and hence not binding on the civil court. The trial court accepted that contention and dismissed I.A.No.1307 of 1994 filed by defendant No.2. That order was challenged in C.R.P.No.1271 of 1995. This court said that defendant No.2 had not raised a plea of fixity of tenure when the appeal was disposed of though he could have raised that question in the appeal. This court held that when the Land Tribunal was moved with the application it was clearly precluded from going behind the finding in the second appeal rendered by this Court that the transaction is a redeemable mortgage and hence the Land Tribunal could not hold on the face of the said adjudication binding on defendant No.2 that he is a deemed tenant. This court was of the view that decision of the Land Tribunal which went behind the binding decision of this court in second appeal was without jurisdiction. Reference was also made to the decisions in Parameswaran Thampi v. Podiyan Thomas (supra) and Mathevan padamanabhan Vs. Parameswaran Thampi (supra). The decision of this court in the C.R.P was challenged in Sankaranarayanan Potti (Dead) by L.Rs. v. K Sreedevi and Ors. (supra). The Supreme Court held that it was not proper for the Land Tribunal to have decided on the issue when the civil court was ceased of the matter. When the matter is pending in the civil court if any such application is preferred before the Land Tribunal the appropriate course open to it was to keep the application pending until decision of the civil court and (then) pass consequential orders based on the decision of the civil court. The Supreme Court however did not approve the finding of this court in the C.R.P that defendant No.2 is not entitled to claim fixity of tenure. The Supreme Court directed that the question be decided by the trial court in the application for passing final decree.
11. The said decision of the Supreme Court in Sankaranarayanan Potti (Dead) by L.Rs. v. K Sreedevi and Ors. (supra) is relied on by the lower authorities to hold that the application for resumption preferred by respondent No.1 in the year 1976 is not barred under Sec.72(4) of the Act. I am afraid; the lower authorities have made wrong reliance on the decision in Sankaranarayanan Potti's case (supra).
That decision only said that if, while the matter is pending decision in the civil court an application is made to the Land Tribunal claiming fixity of tenure, the appropriate course open to the Land Tribunal is to keep the application pending until decision of the civil court rather than going behind that or without waiting for the decision of the civil court rendering a decision on the application. It is pertinent to note that the Supreme Court did C.R.P.Nos.155 and not say that when a suit is pending in the civil court the Land Tribunal is not entitled to entertain (admit for consideration) an application. The right to entertain an application is different from the right to decide the question which is pending decision before the civil court.
Certainly, the Land Tribunal was not competent to decide the question when the matter is pending decision in the civil court as the Land Tribunal was bound to respect decision of the civil court on the issue and pass consequential orders in the matter based on the decision of the civil court. Pendancy of the suit before the civil court did not bar the Land Tribunal from entertaining (admitting for consideration) the application.
Viewed in that line, that the appeals were pending consideration of the first appellate court or this court in second appeals did not prevent respondent No.1 from filing an application for resumption under Sec.17 of the Act before the Land Tribunal. Nor did pendancy of the appeals/second appeals bar the Land Tribunal from entertaining the application. It is only that the Land Tribunal could pass consequential orders on that application only after the question was decided by the civil court.
12. Referring to the decision in Parameswara Pillai v. Kunchali Lekshmi(supra) I stated that it is only when an application for resumption was pending as on the date of commencement of Act 35 of 1969 that the date of vesting is pushed to the date on which such application is finally decided or, the date notified under subsec.(1) of Sec. 72, whichever is later. In all other cases as stated in clause (a) of subsec.(4) of Sec.72, vesting took place on the expiry of six months from the date of commencement of Act 35 of 1969 ie, on the expiry of six months from 01-01-1970.
The fact that question of redeemability of the mortgage was pending consideration before the first appellate court when Act 35 of 1969 came into force did not prevent or postpone vesting under Sec. 72(4)(a) of the Act. By a statutory fiction the right, title and interest of respondent No.1 in the schedule property vested with the Government and since admittedly no application for redemption under Sec.17 of the Act was pending on commencement of Act 35 of 1969, on the expiry of six months from 01-01-1970. That being the operation of law, cannot be prevented by the fact that first appeal filed by predecessor-in-interest of petitioners was pending consideration of the first appellate court.
The fact that date of vesting is extended by law only in a situation where application for resumption was pending on date of commencement of Act 35 of 1969 indicated that in no other situation the Legislature wanted date of vesting to be postponed. Hence there is no escape from the conclusion that right, title and interest of respondent No.1 in the schedule property vested with the Government on the expiry of six months from 01-01-1970. This court while disposing of second appeals on 06-02-1976 only declared the law as per Act 35 of 1969 and as applicable on the date of its commencement. It is not as if this court was conferring any right on the party de horse the statutory provision. Hence respondent No.1 could not take advantage of the fact that the second appeals were disposed of only on 06-02-1976 and contend that vesting is postponed to a further period of six months from 06-02-1976.
In the light of the decision of the Full Bench in Parameswara Pillai v. Kunchali Lekshmi(supra) respondent No.1 was barred from filing the application for resumption after his right, title and interest in the property vested with the government on the expiry of six months from the commencement of Act 35 of 1969 on 01-01-1970. The lower authorities were wrong in placing reliance on Sankaranarayanan Potti (Dead) by L.Rs. v. K Sreedevi and Ors.(supra) to hold that respondent No.1 could apply for resumption within six months from 06-02-1976 when the second appeals were decided by this court.
13. No doubt, such a situation will cause heart burns to many like respondent No.1. For, he was nursing the belief that redeemability of the mortgage will be upheld in the second appeals as held by the trial and first appellate courts. Ultimately on 06-02-1976 his hopes were dashed when this court, applying provisions of Act 35 of 1969 held that predecessor-in-interest of petitioners was a deemed tenant under Sec.4A of the said Act, he is entitled to fixity of tenure and by that time, filing of an application for resumption under Sec.17 of the Act r/w Sec.72(4) of the Act became barred. This situation was not lost sight of when the Full Bench decided Parameswara Pillai v. Kunchali Lekshmi(supra). The Full Bench reminded the Legislature,
"As is evident from the present case itself, it took a long period (a decade in the present case) for a court to finally decide whether the particular mortgagee in question came within the purview of Sec.4A. It was soon thereafter that the application for resumption in the present case was filed. This cannot be an isolated case. Very many persons would have had similar difficulties arising out of the complexities or law and the prolongation of litigation. When a rigid time limit of six months has been fixed by the Legislature (as we have so held) these supervening difficulties and legal complications would not have been within its contemplation. The Legislature had provided for suitable extensions, when such difficulties had been anticipated. For example, under the provison to Sec.72(1), the vesting date in relation to cases coming under that sub-section is postponed, till after the pendency of a resumption application before any court or Tribunal or in appeal or revision. A similar benefit is conferred in limited contingencies under Sec.72(4)(b) also. Those small holders who would have bonafide felt doubt about the mortgages in question coming within Sec.4A and awaited the culmination of the legal proceedings in which their claims were being considered, would altogether lose their right, when at a later dated they are made to realise by a court decision that the mortgage did come within the ambit of Sec.4A. This is an avoidable hardship. However, it is only for the Legislature to consider the matter and remedy the situation, if deemed fit. Understandable frustration is likely to arise in the minds of a section of society, unorganised and suffering, and frustrated in many ways by the impact of the social legislation. It may only be a fair and just measure if what the Legislature itself has conferred on them as a limited right, is permitted to be availed of by that segment of society. We trust that this will receive due and serious consideration of the Government and of the Legislature."
But nothing was done in the matter. The claim of respondent No.1 has to yield to the law. It follows that application preferred by respondent No.1 is barred under Sec.72(4)(a) of the Act since his right, title and interest in the property vested with the Government on the expiry of six months from 01-01-1970 and the application was preferred only in the year 1976. Resultantly these revisions succeed. Decision of the lower authorities are set aside and O.A.No.658 of 1976 will stand dismissed. The law has to take its course. Laws are man-made and can be unjust as well as just. Salmond, On Jurisprudence (12th Edition) at Page 23, quotes from Austin, "The Province of Jurisprudence Determined" (ed. Hart), 184 thus: "the existence of law is one thing, its merit and demerit another".