1. In this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the impugned demand made by the respondent no.
2 i.e. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority vide allotment letter, being annexure -1 to the writ petition, at the rate of Rs.43,560/- per square meter and further sought for a direction upon the respondent no. 2 to issue a revised allotment letter at the rate of Rs.39,600/- per square meter, as it was done in the case of other successful allottees of the scheme.
3. According to the petitioner, she was found successful in a draw of lots held on 08 th November, 2008 in respect of the plot, being Plot No. G-48, Sector-44, Noida (Gautam Budh Nagar). However, in spite of repeated requests no allotment letter was issued to her.
4. Ultimately, on 30 th September, 2010 such allotment letter was issued requiring the petitioner to deposit the amount at the rate of Rs.43,560/- per square meter though, according to the petitioner, in the said locality i.e. Sector 44 price of land was fixed at the rate of Rs.39,600/- per square meter for the others. On 26 th October, 2010 the petitioner deposited the allotment money and lease rent, as shown in the allotment letter, without any delay to avoid the penalty. After deposit of the allotment money, the petitioner met with the Manager (Residential Plot) of the Noida authority on various occasions on account of the demand having been made at the rate of Rs. 43,560/- per square meter instead of Rs. 39,600/- per square meter, which has been charged from the other allottees of the scheme of 2004, but she has got only reply from the authority that since the rate has been revised, they have charged the revised rate. According to the petitioner, there was delay on the part of the respondent authority in issuing allotment letter but there was no fault on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, she should not be compelled to pay the revised rate as proposed against the petitioner. In this background, the petitioner submitted that the rate which is being charged from the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 43,650/- per square meter is unwarranted, therefore, the respondent authority be directed to issue fresh allotment letter prescribing the rate of Rs.39,600/- per square meter.
5. The respondent-New Okhla Industrial Development Authority has come with a case that the functions of the authority are governed by the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 and the petitioner has been charged at the prevailing rate available at the relevant point of time. Mr. Ramendra Pratap Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-Noida, has relied upon various judgements to establish his case. Firstly, he relied upon 1980 (2) SCC 129 (Premji Bhai Parmar and others v. Delhi Development Authority and others) to establish before us that pricing policy is an executive policy. The executive has a wide discretion in this regard and is only answerable provided there is any statutory control over its policy of price fixation. The experts alone can work out the mechanics of price determination. Court can certainly not be expected to decide without the assistance of the experts. Therefore, ordinarily it is not the function of the Court to sit in judgement over such matters of economic policy unless it is patent that there is hostile discrimination against a class. Relying upon 1989 (2) SCC 116 (Bareilly Development Authority and another v. Ajai Pal Singh and others) he has further stated that while determining price of the houses/flats constructed by the authority and the rates etc., the authority after entering into the field of ordinary contract acts purely in its executive capacity.
6. Thereafter the relations are governed not by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter se. In AIR 1995 SC 1 (Delhi Development Authority v. Pushpendra Kumar Jain) the Supreme Court has held that mere drawl of lots does not vest an indefeasible right in the allottee for allotment at the price obtaining on the date of drawl of lots. Since the right to flat arises only on the communication of the letter of allotment, the price or rates prevailing on the date of such communication is applicable. In 1999 (1) AWC 122 [Maharia Re-Surfacing and Construction (P.) Ltd. and another v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority and another] a Division Bench of this Court has held that unless the contract is executed, if any offer is made pursuant to invitation to offer and the offer is accepted on some conditions, it will be simply a counter offer but not execution of the contract. Execution of the contract will come later on when both the parties are agreed on the terms and conditions. Therefore, if they do not agree to the terms of the contract, either it has to be accepted as a whole or it will be rejected as a whole but neither it can be rejected in part or accepted in part. In 2006 (3) SCC 129 (Duncan Industries Ltd. and another v. Union of India) the Supreme Court has held that price fixation is an administrative discretion and it is not open to the Court to interfere in minute details, except on the grounds of malafide or arbitrariness.
7. Interference should be only within very narrow limits, such as, where there is a clear violation of a statute or a constitutional provision or extreme arbitrariness in the wednesbury sense. He has further relied upon 2008 (3) SCC 21 (Tamil Nadu Housing4 Board and others v. Sea Shore Apartments Owners Welfare Association) to establish that the Supreme Court has held that it is open to the allottees not to pay the additional amount demanded by the authority and not to take possession, but after agreeing to pay the amount and by paying such amount and taking possession one can not go back from the concluded contract. In 2010 (9) SCC 157 (Greater Mohali Area Development Authority and others v. Manju Jain and others) once again it has been held by the Supreme Court that mere draw of lots/allocation letter does not confer any right to allotment. The system of draw of lots is resorted to identify the prospective allottee. It is not an allotment by itself.
8. Mere identification or selection of the allottee does not clothe the person selected with a legal right to allotment.
Mr. Ramanand Pandey, learned Standing Counsel has contended that the petitioner can not raise any issue with regard to price fixation on the basis of a concluded contract. Even if she wants to show any arbitrariness or discrimination, which can be construed as hostile discrimination against a class of people residing in the concerned sector for any reason, it is open to her to approach the State under Section 41(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 for due consideration. Such section is quoted hereunder:
41. Control by State Government.(1) The Authority, the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman shall carry out such directions as may be issued to it from time to time by the State Government for the efficient administration of this Act.
(2) If in, or in connection with, the exercise of its powers and discharge of its functions by the Authority, the Chairman or the Vice Chairman under this Act any dispute arises between the Authority, the Chairman or the ViceChairman and the State Government the decision of the State Government on such dispute shall be final.
(3) The State Government may, at any time, either on its own motion or on application made to it in this behalf, call for the records of any case disposed of or order passed by the Authority or the Chairman for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or property of any order passed or direction issued and may pass such order or issue such direction in relation thereto as it may think fit: Provided that the State Government shall not pass an order prejudicial to any person without affording such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
(4) Every order of the State Government made in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court.
9. Against this background, we do not propose to pass any affirmative order in favour of the petitioner fixing the price as claimed by the petitioner. Therefore, the writ petition is dismissed, however, without imposing any cost.
10. In any event, passing of this order will no way affect the right of the petitioner, if any, to approach the State Government under Section 41 (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, if so advised.