Veena Chironji. Vs. the State of Madhya Pradesh, and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:

.....of time when a debt is created in respect of the assets of the establishment, the dues payable under the act would always remain first charge and shall be paid first out of the assets of the establishment notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. it is, therefore, reasonable to take the view that the statutory first charge created on the assets of the establishment by sub-section (2) of section 11 and priority given to the payment of any amount due from an employer will operate against all types of debts.in the instant case the sugar mill had pledged sugar bags with bank as security for repayment of loan. the attachment and sale of these sugar bags for realisation of p.f dues was challenged by the bank on ground that by virtue of the deeds of pledge executed by the sugar mills, the bank had become owner of the sugar bags and the same could not have been attached and sold for realisation of the amount due under the act.held, in the contract of pawn or pledges the pawnee/pledge has only a special property in the pledge but the general property remains with the pawner/pledgor and wholly reverts to him on discharge of debts. the right to..........counsel for the review petitioners, for the state of jammu & kashmir and for the 33 respondents. so far as the first issue referred to in our order dated 1-9-1995 is concerned, we are of the respectful opinion that majority judgment (rendered by dr t.k.thommen and v.ramaswami, jj.) is unsustainable in law. the proposition that where applications are called for prescribing a particular date as the last date for filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that date and that date alone, is a well-established one. a person who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all. an advertisement or notification issued/published calling for applications constitutes a representation to the public and the authority issuing it is bound by such representation. it cannot act contrary to it. one reason behind this proposition is that if it were known that persons who obtained the qualifications after the prescribed date but before the date of interview would be allowed to appear for the interview, other similarly placed persons could also have applied. just because some of the.....

Judgment:

1. Learned counsel for petitioners at the outset submitted that this petition has been rendered infructuous and he may be permitted to withdraw it.

2. Prayer made by the petitioners is opposed by Shri Shroti, learned counsel for respondent no.2, who submitted that because of ad-interim writ all the petitioners have appeared in the preliminary examination and thereafter they were permitted to appear in the main examination for the selection of Civil Judge. That on the date of examination they were not eligible to appear in the preliminary examination, so their application deserves to be rejected. He has placed reliance to a judgment of Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma and others v. Chander Shekhar and another [(1997) 4 SCC 18] and another judgment of Apex Court in M.A.Murthy v. State of Karnataka and others [(2003) 7 SCC 517]. He has further referred to Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Lower Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules 1994 in support of his contention.

3. In reply to this learned counsel for petitioners submitted that Rule 7 of the aforesaid Rules provide that no person shall be eligible for appointment by direct recruitment for the post in category 3 of Rule 1 unless he possesses the Degree of Law of any recognized University. The petitioners were the students at the time of their appearance in the preliminary examination, but subsequently they have earned a Degree in Law from a recognized University. Apart from this, the petitioner no.2 Ritu Chouhan who was permitted by this Court to appear in the preliminary examination cleared the preliminary examination and thereafter appeared in the final examination and now she has been selected as Civil Judge Class-II (Entry Level).

4. To appreciate rival contentions of the parties, it will be appropriate if the legal position in the case is seen. Rule 7 of the aforesaid Rules is as under :-

"7. Eligibility - No person shall be eligible for appointment by direct recruitment to posts in category (i) of Rule 3(1) unless :-

(a) he is a citizen of India;

(b) he has attained the age of 25 years and not completed the age of 35 years on the first day of January of the year in which applications for appointment are invited: Provided that the upper age limit shall be relaxable upto a maximum of five years if a candidate belongs to Scheduled castes, Scheduled Tribes or other Backward Classes :

Provided further that the upper age limit of a candidate who is a Government servant (whether permanent or temporary) shall be relaxable upto 38 years;

(c) he possess a degree in law of any recognized University;

(d) he has practiced as an Advocate for not less than 3 years on the first day of January of the year in which applications for appointment are invited; and

(e) he has good character and is of sound health and free from any bodily defect which renders him unfit for such appointment."

5. The aforesaid Rule specifically provides that no person shall be eligible for appointment by direct recruitment to the post of Civil Judge Class-II (Entry Level) unless he possesses a Degree of Law from any recognized University. The aforesaid provision is very clear that until and unless a person is possessing a Degree of Law from a recognized University, he shall not be eligible for appointment as Civil Judge Class-II. What should be the criteria to a candidate to apply for the post has been considered by the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) wherein the Apex Court considering the legal position held thus :-

"6. The review petitions came up for final hearing on 3-3-1997. We heard the learned counsel for the review petitioners, for the State of Jammu & Kashmir and for the 33 respondents. So far as the first issue referred to in our Order dated 1-9-1995 is concerned, we are of the respectful opinion that majority judgment (rendered by Dr T.K.Thommen and V.Ramaswami, JJ.) is unsustainable in law. The proposition that where applications are called for prescribing a particular date as the last date for filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that date and that date alone, is a well-established one. A person who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all. An advertisement or notification issued/published calling for applications constitutes a representation to the public and the authority issuing it is bound by such representation. It cannot act contrary to it. One reason behind this proposition is that if it were known that persons who obtained the qualifications after the prescribed date but before the date of interview would be allowed to appear for the interview, other similarly placed persons could also have applied. Just because some of the persons had applied notwithstanding that they had not acquired the prescribed qualifications by the prescribed date, they could not have been treated on a preferential basis. Their applications ought to have been rejected at the inception itself. This proposition is indisputable and in fact was not doubted or disputed in the majority judgment. This is also the proposition affirmed in Rekha Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan [(1993) Supp (3) SCC 168]. The reasoning in the majority opinion that by allowing the 33 respondents to appear for the interview, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talent available and that such course was in furtherance of public interest is, with respect, an impermissible justification. It is, in our considered opinion, a clear error of law and an error apparent on the face of the record. In our opinion, R.M.Sahai, J. (and the Division Bench of the High Court) was right in holding that the 33 respondents could not have been allowed to appear for the interview."

6. In M.A.Murthy (supra) the Apex Court reiterated the law laid down in Ashok Kumar Sharma.

7. In view of aforesaid it is apparent that the eligibility criteria should be on the cut off date as may be fixed by the authority issuing an advertisement for applying for the post. It may be cut off date for application or as on the date of examination or otherwise. If a person is not possessing a Degree as on the cut off date he shall not be entitled to apply for the same post. In the present case, as petitioner no.2 Ritu Chouhan has already been appointed as Civil Judge Class-II, (Entry Level), we do not find it proper to disturb her appointment as she has appeared in the preliminary examination, because of the order passed by this Court dated 22.7.2009, which was passed in the light of earlier order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.3428/2007 (Bhasker Pandey and another v. State of M.P. & others) dated 7.3.2007. The respondents shall not cancel her appointment because of this order. With the aforesaid clarification, we dismiss this petition as rendered infructuous. No order as to costs.