1. Petitioner by way of present petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India seeks quashment of initiation of disciplinary proceedings emanating with the issuance of charge sheet dated 10.1.2010 whereby the petitioner is charged of the following charges:-
आरोपः- आरक्षक रणदीप सिंह को, सवारी गाडी क्रमांक 2627/2628 कर्नटक एक्सप्रेस में इटारसी-बिन के मध्य आर्मस्-अम्यूनीशन से अन्य बल सदस्यें के साथ स्कार्टिग डियूटी होतु तैनत किय गया थ ढिनंक 05-09-08 के स्कार्टिग डियूटि के ढैरान आरक्षक जसवंत सिंह जो कि मिलकर ढूषित मनसिकत करण रेल यत्री पंकज अग्रवाल जो के कोच नं एस-1 के बर्थ नं . 9 पर एक्स बंगलैर से अलिगढ़ फ़े लिये यत्रा कर रहे थे, मोबाईल सुरक्षक करने की बजय स्वतः चोरी कर लिय/ जिस संबंध में ढिनंक 05-09-08 को जि आर पी थन बीन में अ.क्र 168/09 अंर्गत धारा 379 आई. पि. सी के तहत दर्ज किय जया । अतएव, आरक्षक रेल यत्री के मोबाईल सुरक्षक करने की बजय स्वतः चोरी कर लिय धृणित/ शेभनीय कलपें से रेसुबल विभग की छवि खराब हुई है । अतः आरक्षक किया गया उक्त कृत्य बल सदस्य के विरुध्द् है और रेसुबल नियम 1987 के नियम 146.2 (1) 146.4 एवं 147.1(i) (iv) (vii) (xxii) और सथ ही सथ रेल सेवा आचरण नियम 1966 के नियम 3.1 (i) (iii) का स्पष्टरुप से उल्लंधन है ।
2. The incident which gave rise to issuance of charge sheet arose when the petitioner was deployed for escorting duty in Karnataka Express no. 2627/2628 on 5.9.2008 whereon one Pankaj Agrawal who was traveling in Coach No. S-1, berth No. 9 from Banglore to Aligarh reported the matter before G.R.P Bina district Sagar that, his Mobile has been stolen and suspected the petitioner and one Jaswant Singh. On the basis of said report an F.I.R was registered vide Crime No. 268/2008 for an offence under Section 379 of Indian Penal Code and the petitioner was arrested which led to his suspension.
3. The prosecution was launched on the basis of the aforesaid F.I.R and the matter as reported is pending before Judicial Magistrate First Class.
4. When the matter stood thus, the petitioner has been served with charge-sheet dated 10.1.2010 alleging that the conduct of the petitioner being not in consonance with Rule 146 (1), (2) (i), 146 (4) and 147 (i) (iv) (vii) (xxii) of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 read with Section 3.1 (i) (iii), Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966. The petitioner seeks quashment/stay of departmental proceedings on the ground that he cannot be subjected to dual proceeding, on the same set of facts. It is also urged that if the respondents are allowd to continue with the departmental enquiry, the same would result in exposing the petitioner of his defence, which may be used by the prosecution in criminal case against the petitioner. It is on these grounds that the petitioner seeks the direction. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents; however, refutes the contentions that the petitioner would be prejudicially effected if the departmental enquiry proceeding is allowed to continue simultaneously with the criminal proceedings. It is urged that in a criminal proceeding it is the mens rea which is required to be proved by way of an evidence beyond doubt; whereas, in a departmental proceeding, it is the conduct of a government servant which is being examined and the misconduct is not required to be proved by strict proof of evidence. It is accordingly urged that the petition being devoid of substance deserves to be dismissed. Considered rival submissions. Indisputably, the petitioner is a member of disciplined force and the charges which are leveled against the petitioner, prima facie, can by no stretch of imagination be construed to be a conduct congenial of a member of a disciplined force. The question, however, is what was displayed by the petitioner as alleged would tantamount to misconduct when the petitioner is admittedly charged of violation of Rule 146 (1), (2) (i), 146 (4) and 147 (i) (iv) (vii) (xxii) of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 read with Section 3.1 (i) (iii), Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966. The relevant Rules whereunder the petitioner had been charged provides for:
146.2 Neglect of duty: No member of the Force without good and sufficient cause shall
(i) Neglect or omit to attend to or fail to carry out with due promptitude and diligence anything which is his duty as a member of the Force to attend to or carry out; or 146.4 Discreditable conduct: No member of the Force shall act in any manner prejudicial to discipline or conduct himself in such a manner which is reasonably likely to bring discredit to the reputation of the Force. 147. (i) violation of any duty; (iv) withdrawing from duty of his office without permission; (vii) engaging himself without authority for any employment other than his duty as an enrolled member of the Force; (xxii) aiding or abetting or attempting to commit any of the offences under this Act or these rules or doing any act towards the commission of such offence."
The petitioner is also charged of violation of Rule 3.1 (i) (iii) of the Conduct Rules, 1966 which provides for "3. General
(1) Every railway servant shall at all times -
(i) maintain absolute integrity;
(iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a railway or government servant.
Thus, it is dereliction of duties and violation of specific provisions of Rules of 1987 and 1966 which the petitioner is charged of and though the same has a foundation in the incident dated 5.9.2008; whereon Mobile of a traveller was stolen and on the basis whereof a criminal prosecution for an offence under Section 379 IPC has been launched; however, it is the conduct of the petitioner as a member of disciplined force which is to put under scanner vide the charge-sheet dated 10.1.2010. It is, therefore, not correct on the part of the petitioner to say that while defending himself in respect of alleged misconduct the petitioner would be exposed of his defence in a criminal case. In this context regard can be had of judgment of Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Ram Singh Ex Constable (AIR 1992 SC 2188), it was held by their Lordships.
5. Thus it could be seen that the word 'misconduct' though not capable of precise definition, its reflection receive its connotation from the context, the delinquecy in lts performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour,wilful in character; forbidden act, a transgression oi established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes discipline in the service causing serious effect in the maintenance of law and order. In State of Rajasthan v. B. K. Meena and others (AIR 1997 SC 13) while dwelling upon the similar issue as the present one, it was observed by their Lordships that:
"17. .. .. .. .. . The approach and the objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Indian Penal Code, if any) are established and, if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceedings, to repeat, should not be a matter of course but a considered decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may require reconsideration if the criminal case gets unduly delayed." In Baldev Singh Gandhi v. State of Punjab (2002) 3 SCC 667 their Lordships were pleased to hold:
6. Misconduct' has not been defined in the Act. The word 'misconduct' is antithesis of the word 'conduct'. Thus, ordinarily the expression 'misconduct' means wrong or improper conduct, unlawful behaviour, misfeasance, wrong conduct, misdemeanour etc. There being different meaning of the expression 'misconduct', we, therefore, have to construe the expression 'misconduct' with reference to the subject and the context wherein the said expression occurs. Regard being had to the aims and objects of the statute. In M.M. Malhotra v. Union of India (2005) 8 SCC 351, their Lordships while dealing with the conduct of the persons nbelonging to a disciplined force were pleased to observe:
7. The scheme of the disciplinary rules in general is to identify the conduct which is made punishable and then to provide for the various punishments which may be imposed for the acts which are inconsistent with such conduct. For example, the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 contain provisions which pertain to the standards of conduct which government servants (within the meaning of those rules) are to follow whereas the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 provide the punishment or penalties which may be imposed for misconduct. The Conduct Rules and the Rules for punishment may be provided in separate rules or combined into one. Moreover, there are a host of departmental instructions which elucidate, amplify and provide guidelines regarding the conduct of the employees.
8. The range of activities which may amount to acts which are inconsistent with the interest of public service and not befitting the status, position and dignity of a public servant are so varied that it would be impossible for the employer to exhaustively enumerate such acts and treat the categories of misconduct as closed. It has, therefore, to be noted that the word "misconduct" is not capable of precise definition. But at the same time though incapable of precise definition, the word "misconduct" on reflection receives its connotation from the context, the delinquency in performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. The act complained of must bear a forbidden quality or character and its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve.
"Misconduct" as stated in Batt's Law of Master and Servant (4th Edn. at p. 63) "comprised positive acts and not mere neglects or failures". The definition of the word as given in Ballentine's Law Dictionary (148th Edn.) is: "A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left except what necessity may demand, it is a violation of definite law, a forbidden act. It differs from carelessness."
9. It may be generally stated that the conduct rules of the government and public sector corporations constitute a code of permissible acts and behaviour of their servants. In the case at hand the charges leveled against the petitioner certainly exposit, though prima facie, a Conduct unbecoming of a member of the disciplined force and the same cannot, therefore, be interfered with at the charge sheet level, as has been held by their Lordships the Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [(2006) 12 SCC 28]
"13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge- sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Boar v. Ramesh Kumar Singh (1996) 1 SCC 327, Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghose (2004) 3 SCC 440, Ulagappa v. Divisional Commr. Mysore, State of UP v. Brahm Datt Sharma (1987) 2 SCC 179), etc. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which effects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such a discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter." Since no exceptional circumstances shown to exist in the case at hand no interference is called for. In view of above no case for interference is made out. In the result petition fails and is hereby dismissed.