1. The principal matter is under Sections 25 and 29 of the Official Trustees Act, 1913. The first of the two sections empowers the High Court to make such orders as it thinks fit in respect of any trust property vested in the official trustee, or the interest or produce thereof. The other section, inter alia, permits the official trustee to transfer any property vested in him to any person if so directed by the court. The first petitioner claims to be a beneficiary under two trusts of 1912 and 1930. The second petitioner is the secretary of the first petitioner school. The official trustee is the sole trustee of the trust.
2. By a deed of conveyance executed in 1938 the official trustee, as the sole trustee of the relevant trust, purchase land measuring 76 bigha and 17 cottah, commonly known as the Ezra Arakie Park in Ariadaha, in what is now on the northern fringes of the city. In 1950 the official trustee demised a part of such land measuring about 40-bigha in favour of one BM Singh and Sons, a Hindu undivided family, for a period of 51 years. The indenture of lease of June 2, 1950 reserved a monthly rent of Rs.500/- for the entire duration of the lease. The lessee was to pay the owners and occupiers shares of municipal rates and taxes. The lessee was entitled to erect buildings and other structures and set up plant and machinery thereat and the lessee had the right, after the expiry of the lease, to remove the buildings and structures which had been erected and the machinery and accessories brought on the land. The lessee was given the right to sub-let or sub-lease the demised premises or any part thereof with the consent in writing of the lessor which consent would not be unreasonably withheld. The lessee was permitted to mortgage or charge the right, title and interest under the lease but continue to be liable for due payment of the rent. The lessee also had the right to assign the lease with the previous consent of the lessor but the consent was not to be unreasonably withheld.
3. The conveyance of 1938 in favour of the official trustee recorded that the 76-bigha premises was then known as Dutta Villa and that the conveyance covered all buildings, erections, fixtures, hedges, ditches, fences, ways, passages, drainage waters, water-courses, tanks, woods, underwoods, privileges, lights, rights, easements and appurtenances whatsoever to the said piece or parcel of land Though the deed of lease of 1950 provided for erection of structures on the 40-bigha plot by the lessee, the relevant document did not refer to any building or structures in the schedule thereto. The grant under the deed was in respect of all that the said portion of the said Ezra Arakie Park and the said two plots of land (such portion and the said two plots of land being fully described in the said schedule A hereunder written and being delineated and enclosed with red borders in the said map or plan hereto annexed and marked B and being hereinafter referred to as the said demised premises) TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said demised premises unto the Lessees for a term of fiftyone years
Schedule A to the deed does not refer to any buildings or structures but only refers to land. This is a matter of some significance in the context of the right canvassed by the beneficiary. By a writing of March 15, 1951 the lessee assigned the leasehold interest in respect of the 40-bigha land in favour of Beni Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd for the residual period of the lease. The assignment was made upon obtaining the approval of the official trustee. The remainder of the Ezra Arakie Park measuring about 36 bigha and 14 cottah was let out by the official trustee to Beni Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd with effect from June 1, 1950 on the terms and conditions contained in a letter of May 29, 1950. The tenant was to pay a monthly rent of Rs.300/-, inclusive of municipal tax. The tenancy was to continue for a year with an option on the tenants part to continue it for a further year. The petitioners say that the tenancy contained a stipulation that no part of the land or building thereat would be sub-let to any person. The petitioners claim that the 36 bigha 14 cottah plot was let out to the company for the company to use the same as a passage to the rear portion which was covered by the 50-year lease. The petitioners say that the smaller plot was let out to the company in anticipation that during the currency of the tenancy the company would be able to construct a road for access from Barrackpore Trunk Road to the rear plot. Beni Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd changed its name to Beni Ltd and by or about the year 1992 it spun itself into liquidation. The petitioners claim that in or about September, 1998 the petitioners came to be aware that Beni Ltd had gone into liquidation and the 40-bigha land covered by the long lease was sought to be treated as a property of the company in liquidation and sold in auction by the Company Court. There are complaints in the petition as to the inaction on the part of the official trustee. The petitioners instituted proceedings under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 to seek setting aside of an order passed by the Company Court directing execution of the conveyance relating to the 40-bigha plot in favour of a nominee of one Ratnagiri Engineering Pvt. Ltd which was the purchaser of the assets of Beni Ltd (in liquidation) at the court auction. The petitioners claim that in course of the application for, effectively, setting aside the sale of the 40-bigha land in course of liquidation of Beni Ltd, the petitioners came across a notice of April 30, 1999 issued by the State Government seeking to take possession of the entire 76-bigha plot. The petition expresses anguish at the inaction on the part of the official trustee to adequately defend the properties of the trust. The petitioners say that the conduct of the official trustee is even more distressing since an educational institution is the beneficiary of the trust. The petitioners claim that it was around the same time that the petitioners came to be aware of a second appeal pending in this Court arising out of a suit filed by the official trustee in the year 1960 in respect of the 36-bigha plot that had been let out by the trust to the said company for a period of a year renewable for a further year. The suit was filed against the said company and against a partnership firm by the name of Ramanlal Madanlal. The grounds urged were that the property had been sub-let without the permission of the landlord and that the tenant had violated the provisions of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. A commissioner was appointed in the suit. The commissioner filed a report on June 1, 1967 where he recorded that several of the structures found in the premises were built prior to 1950. The petitioners say that the commissioners report was not challenged by the defendants in the suit. The suit was dismissed on February 28, 1972 on the finding that the notice on which the suit was founded was defective. The official trustee succeeded in the resultant appeal. The appellate decree of February 26, 1973 was assailed in the second appeal filed by the partnership firm in 1973. The 40-bigha plot under the possession of Beni Ltd (in liquidation) was included in the assets of the company in liquidation in the notice for sale of the companys properties published in the year 1995. In March, 1996 the sale of the assets of Beni Ltd (in liquidation) was confirmed in favour of Ratnagiri Engineering Pvt. Ltd. In February, 1998 the official liquidator was directed by an order of the Company Court to execute the conveyance in respect of the land in favour of Ratnagiri. A subsequent order of April 2, 1998 modified the earlier order and directed the conveyance to be executed in favour of Ujjwal Barter Pvt. Ltd, a nominee of Ratnagiri. In January, 1999 the beneficiary of the trust applied by way of CA No. 62 of 1999 for setting aside the order of the sale of land in course of the liquidation of Beni Ltd. The Government of West Bengal passed an order on August 30, 1999 seeking to resume the entirety of the 76-bigha land by invoking the provisions of Section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. It appears that two sets of proceedings were launched before the Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal by the beneficiary of the trust and by Ratnagiri and Ramanlal Madanlal against the State Government decision seeking possession of the land. The tribunal disposed of the two petitions by a judgment of January 30, 2002. The tribunals order recorded that Beni Ltd had sub-let a portion of the 36-bigha plot to firm Ramanlal Madanlal and a permanent structure was erected thereat. The auction purchaser at the company sale and its nominee were arrayed as respondents in the beneficiarys application before the tribunal. The auction purchaser and its nominee contended before the tribunal that as far as the 40- bigha plot was concerned, the trust had no right in respect thereof since it did not hold actual possession thereof as on the date of the vesting of the land under the Act of 1953. They argued that it was Beni Ltd which was in possession of the 40-bigha plot on the relevant date and, by operation of law, it was such company that became a lessee in respect thereof under the State Government. The tribunal recorded the submission on behalf of Ramanlal Madanlal Trading Co Pvt. Ltd that such company (or the firm by the substantially similar name) came into possession of a part of the 36-bigha plot under Beni Ltd in 1954. The tribunal noticed that the official trustees suit against Beni Limited and its sub-tenant was dismissed by the trial court and the judgment reversed in appeal. At the time that the tribunals order was made, the second appeal was pending in this Court. It was the contention of Ramanlal Madanlal that Beni Ltd and Ramanlal Madanlal were in possession of the entirety of the 76-bigha land and they were the intermediaries, within the meaning of the Act of 1953, as on the date of vesting. The grievance carried by them before the tribunal was that the State Government had passed an order to obtain possession of the land without affording the persons in possession any opportunity of being heard. The present petitioners contended before the tribunal that they were intermediaries entitled to retain the land, an issue that the tribunal answered against the present petitioners in respect of the 40-bigha plot. The tribunals order observed that the record of rights in respect of 76- bigha land was palpably erroneous. The order spoke of the error being detected in the year 1997 which was long after the final publication of the record of rights. The order noticed that proceedings were thereafter initiated suo motu to rectify the error upon notices being issued to the auction purchaser and to two others. No notice was issued to either the trust or Ramanlal Madanlal though the permissive possession of the trust was recorded in respect of the 36-bigha plot. The tribunals order recorded that permissive possession of the 40-bigha plot was recorded in favour of Beni Ltd which was found to be the holder of such land. The tribunal also documented that the appropriate authority found the permissive possession by the trust in respect of the 36-bigha plot but the appropriate authority held that since there was no existence of the Jews School and since the land was in possession of Beni Engineering, this land also should be recorded in the name of the Company. It was in such circumstances, according to the tribunals order, that the entirety of the 76 bigha 14 cottah land was recorded in the name of Beni Ltd. The order proceeded to notice that it was on the basis of such corrected record of rights that an order under Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act was passed by the State Government. The order held that the record of rights had been appropriately corrected by acknowledging Beni Ltd as the holder of the 40-bigha plot comprised in a factory or workshop. It concluded that in terms of the Act of 1953 Beni Ltd became a lessee under the State Government with effect from the date of vesting on the same terms and conditions on which it held the land and that the lessors right to receive rent in respect of the 40-bigha plot stood vested in the State. The tribunal found that the trust was only entitled to the compensation as envisaged in the statue and no further rent in respect of the 40-bigha land after the date of vesting. The tribunal set aside the decision of the appropriate authority in recording the name of Beni Ltd in respect of the 36-bigha plot. It held that since the order of the State Government that was challenged in the proceedings before it covered the entirety of the 76- bigha plot and since the entry in the record of rights relating to a substantial portion of the land was erroneous, the State Governments order under Section 6(3) of the Act of 1953 was required to be set aside. The appropriate revenue official was directed to decide the question relating to the 36-bigha plot after affording all interested persons an opportunity of hearing. The tribunal directed that orders under Section 6(3) of the Act of 1953 could be made only after the record of rights relating to the 36-bigha plot carried the correct entry. The present petitioners and Ratnagiri challenged the tribunals order before this Court. By a common judgment and order of July 11, 2003 a Division Bench of this Court held that upon the introduction of Chapter IIB of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 and, in particular, Section 14Z thereof, the power of the State Government to invoke the provision of Section 6(3) of the Act of 1953 stood extinguished. The further proceedings envisaged by the tribunals order stood quashed, but liberty was given to the appropriate authority to take further steps in accordance with law. The State of West Bengal carried the Division Bench order to the Supreme Court by way of special leave petitions. The resultant appeals were dismissed by upholding the order of the Division Bench but by disagreeing with the reasoning of the Division Bench judgment and supplying altogether different reasons therefor. By the order dated February 24, 2009 the Supreme Court held that unless there was an order under the main part of Section 6(3) of the Act of 1953, the intermediary or lessee could not retain the land under Section 6(3)(g) of the Act. The court observed that unlike sub-clauses (a) to (e) of Section 6(1) of the 1953 Act in which retention is automatic, there is no automatic retention in cases covered by sub-clauses (f) and (g) of Section 6(1) of the 1953 Act, and the retention can validly be done only when there is an order by the State Government under Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act.
4. The Supreme Court judgment did not touch upon the right canvassed by the trust through its beneficiary that the trust was entitled to retain possession of both the 40-bigha and the 36-bigha plots covered by the 1950 lease and the tenancy agreement, respectively. Long prior to the Supreme Court judgment, the application carried by the beneficiary to the Company Court challenging the sale of the land as part of the assets of Beni Ltd (in liquidation) was dismissed on September 16, 2003. An appeal from such order is pending. The second appeal in the official trustees suit in respect of the 36-bigha plot stood dismissed by an order of February 13, 2004. A special leave petition from such decree has been allowed on May 7, 2010 and the resultant appeal is pending before the Supreme Court.
5. The petitioners assert their rights in respect of the entirety of the 76-bigha plot under Section 6(1)(b) of the Act of 1953. It is their contention that since the relevant clause, unlike others under the same sub-section, does not envisage actual physical possession to be with the intermediary, the fact that they had a right in respect of the lands would entitle them to retain the same. It is necessary, in such context, to notice some of the relevant aspects of Section 6 of the Act of 1953:
6. Right of intermediary to retain certain lands. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 4 and 5, an intermediary shall, except in the cases mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (2) but subject to the other provisions of that sub-section, be entitled to retain with effect from the date of vesting
(a) land comprised in homesteads;
(b) land comprised in or appertaining to buildings and structures owned by the intermediary or by any person, not being a tenant, holding under him by leave or license; Explanation. For the purposes of this clause tenant shall not include a thika tenant as defined in the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 (West Ben. Act II of 1949;
(c) non-agricultural land in his khas possession including land held under him by any person, not being a tenant, by leave or license, not exceeding fifteen acres in area, and excluding any land retained under clause (a):
(d)
(e) tank-fisheries;
(f) subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), land comprised in tea gardens or orchards or land used for the purpose of livestock breeding, poultry farming or dairy;
(g) subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), land comprised in mills, factories, or workshops;
(h) where the intermediary is a local authority, land held by such authority, notwithstanding such land or any part thereof may have been let out by such authority:
(i)
(j)
(k) so much of requisitioned land as the intermediary would be entitled to retain after taking into consideration any other land which he may have retained under the other clauses;
(l)
(2) An intermediary who is entitled to retain possession of any land under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to hold such land directly under the State from the date of vesting as a tenant, subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed and subject to payment of such rent as may be determined under the provisions of this Act and as entered in the record-of-rights finally published under Chapter V except that no rent shall be payable for land referred to in clause (h) or (i):
(3) In the case of land comprised in a tea-garden, mill, factory or workshop the intermediary, or where the land is held under a lease, the lessee, shall be entitled to retain only so much of such land as, in the opinion of the State Government, is required for the tea-garden, mill, factory or workshop, as the case may be, and a person holding under a lease shall, for the purpose of assessment of compensation, be deemed to be an intermediary:
(3A)
(3B)
(3C)
(3D)
(4)
(5)
6. The prayer made in the present petition is for a direction on the official trustee to sell the trust property on as-is-where-is basis. The petitioners say that for such purpose the court need not adjudicate the question as to whether the trust has any right to the property as it should be left to the purchaser to raise such question since the purchaser would step into the shoes of the trust. The petitioners submit that the school is in dire need of funds and cannot pursue its rights indefinitely. The school, the petitioners suggest, would be content with the lesser amount that the proposed sale would fetch since the rights of the trust are still under considerable cloud. The petitioners are not averse to the order on the present petition even suggesting that the trust may not ultimately be found to be entitled to any rights in respect of any part of the 76-bigha land. The simple order as sought by the beneficiary has been declined on twin grounds: first, since there is an educational institution which is the beneficiary and public interest would demand that its rights were not sold for a pittance; and, secondly, since both the nominee of the auction purchaser at the court sale and firm Ramanlal Madanlal in its present form as a company insist that the trust has no right to the land and even a simple order selling the trusts rights, if any, in respect thereof would subject the auction purchaser and the firm-turned-company to unnecessary legal proceedings.
7. Upon AOT No. 1 of 2009 being instituted, two applications were filed therein. GA No. 1526 of 2010 was brought by the auction purchaser at the court sale and its nominee seeking leave to intervene in AOT No. 1 of 2009. GA No. 1527 of 2010 was brought by the firm-turned-company claiming rights in respect of the 36-bigha plot. The auction purchaser and its nominee were allowed to intervene in the proceedings by an order of August 27, 2010 by which GA No. 1526 of 2010 was disposed of by directing the application to be treated as anaffidavit-in-opposition of the applicants to AOT No. 1 of 2009 in respect of the 40- bigha land. The application relating to GA No. 1527 of 2010 was not disposed of since the applicant could not immediately satisfy court as to its rights in respect of the 36-bigha plot since it was the firm that was a defendant in the official trustees suit and not any company bearing a similar name. By the order of August 27, 2010 the application relating to GA No. 1527 of 2010 was directed to be treated as the affidavit-in-opposition to AOT No. 1 of 2009 in relation to the 36-bigha plot, subject to the applicants interest in such land being decided at the final stage. In view of the preliminary issue raised, GA No. 1527 of 2010 could not be disposed of by the order of August 27, 2010. Several decisions have been cited on, inter alia, the scope of Section 6(1) of the Act of 1953 and how the present assessment should be made in view of the perceived difference of opinion evident from the reports. Considerable time has been spent in, particularly, the interpretation of the expression khas possession in the Act of 1953 since such expression is not defined in the statute. Involved submission has also been made on the irrelevance of khas possession in the context of Section 6(1)(b) of the Act of 1953. In view of the clear legal position that emerges on the basis of the orders passed in proceedings to which the present petitioners were parties, it is not necessary to assess the authorities brought in any detail save to record the same. The following judgments have been cited: 67 CWN 12 (Gour Gopal Mitra v. State of WB); 70 CWN 653 (Tara Prasad Mukherjee v. Ganesh Chandra Mondal); (2003) 9 SCC 253 (WB Govt. Employees (Food & Supplies) Coop. Housing Society Ltd v. Sulekha Pal (Dey)); (2009) 4 SCC 453 (State of WB v. Ratnagiri Engineering Pvt Ltd); 1983 (2) CHN 98 (Benode Behari Ghosal v. Shew Kamal Singh); AIR 1977 SC 5 (Gurucharan Singh v. Kamla Singh); (2000) 7 SCC 686 (State of WB v. Scene Screen (Pvt.) Ltd); (1976) 2 SCC 152 (Gurucharan Singh v. Kamla Singh); ILR 1969 (2) Cal 315 (Ratindra Nath Pal v. Subodh Gopal Bose); 61 CWN 607 (Lalji Agarwalla Jain v. Jhingu Goala); 62 CWN 505 (M.L. Dalmiya & Co v. Chinta Haran Mukherjee); AIR 1962 SC 1230 (Haji Sk. Subhan v. Madhorao); AIR 1962 SC 914 (Raja Sailendra Narayan Bhanj Deo v. Kumar Jagat Kishore Prasad Narayan Singh); 2001 (2) CHN 762 (Ahamed Hossain Sk. V. State of West Bengal); AIR 1921 Cal 169 (Virjiban Dass Moolji v. Biseswar Lal Hargovind); and (2002) 4 SCC 188 (State of W.B. v. Karan Singh Binayak). Irrespective of the circumstances in which Section 6(1)(b) of the Act of 1953 permits an intermediary to retain the land comprised in or appertaining to buildings and structures owned by the intermediary, for such sub-section to come into operation, there must first be some building or structure and then an assessment as to whether the building or structure is owned by the intermediary or by a person other than a tenant holding under the intermediary by leave or licence. The moot point is that if there is no building or structure, there is no question of retention of any land appertaining thereto and, consequently, no need to embark on any further assessment. The original deed of conveyance of 1938 did speak of some buildings and structures. The deed of lease of 1950 relating to the 40-bigha land, however, is conspicuous in its silence as to buildings and structures thereon and, indeed, the schedule thereto only speaks of land and carries no reference to any building or structure. The position under Section 6(1)(b) of the Act is that for an intermediary to be entitled to retain the land comprised in or appertaining to buildings and structures, it is the intermediary who must be the owner thereof and not any tenant of the intermediary; or the building or structure may be owned by any person holding under leave or licence of the intermediary. What is clear from the provision is that if an intermediary had granted a tenancy in respect of any land and the tenant had made any construction thereon, the intermediary was not entitled to retain any land on which the construction was made or the land appurtenant to the construction. What the petitioners here show is that the deed of lease of 1950 gave some rights to the trust in respect of any construction put up by the lessee on any part of the land but Section 6(1)(b) reckons the date of vesting as the relevant date and the ownership of buildings and structures to be reckoned as on the date of vesting and not as what may be by agreement at a future date. Since it does not appear that there was any building or structure on the 40-bigha plot at the time of the deed of lease relating thereto being executed and since the ownership of any building or structure put up thereat, as on the date of vesting was with the lessee albeit the contractual term that the title therein would pass to the lessor trust upon the expiry of the tenure of the lease Section 6(1)(b) of the Act can have no manner of operation so far as the 40-bigha plot is concerned. For whatever reason, the question had once been answered against the trust (at the instance of the beneficiary) in the application for setting aside the company sale being dismissed. Though the pending appeal from such order has left the issue res sub-judice, there is no merit in the petitioners assertion that the trust has any right in respect of the 40-bigha plot which the trust can be permitted to sell or otherwise transfer.
8. The situation is slightly different in respect of the 36-bigha plot. The report of the commissioner in the suit filed by the official trustee against Beni Ltd and firm Ramanlal Madanlal found that there were several buildings and structures on such land which had been constructed prior to the tenancy in respect of such land being created. There are a number of structures that find mention in the commissions report and only some of them were found to have been built prior to 1950. The next question that arises is as to the meaning of the expression land comprised in or appertaining to. It is possible that there is a huge tract of land and there are stray structures thereon. Surely, in the context of the Act of 1953 and the mischief that it set to right, a few stray structures on a large piece of land would neither entitle the intermediary to retain the entire plot under Section 6(1)(b) of the Act nor may the provision be reasonably interpreted to suggest that the intermediary would retain small islands in the lands comprised in and appertaining to the stray structures. The scheme of the Act, its purpose and the limited rights under Section 6 thereof have all to be assessed before arriving at any conclusion. The word appertaining implies connected with and, in the context, conveys the sense of the land being subservient to the buildings or structures. In other words, the right of the intermediary to retain land comprised in or appertaining to buildings or structures owned by the intermediary or by a person holding under the intermediary by leave or licence would be in respect of such of the land as is necessary for the meaningful use of the building or the structure. In some case a garden could be appertaining to a bungalow; in another case a flagpole would not be considered as any structure for any land around it to be claimed by the intermediary.
9. Section 5 of the Act of 1953 is the defining provision of the statute. It commands that as on the date of due publication of the notification contemplated by Section 4 of the Act, the estates and rights of intermediaries specified in Section 5 would vest in the State. The effect of such provision is that the title of the intermediaries was lost by operation of law as on the date of vesting. The non-obstante clause in Section 6(1) of the Act notwithstanding, all that Section 6(1) conferred on intermediaries was the right to retain certain lands in certain circumstances. Section 6(1) of the Act of 1953, despite its non-obstante clause, does not have the effect of restoring to the intermediary any title to the land that stood vested in the State by operation of Section 5 thereof. Section 5 is brutally clear: the guillotine qua title falls as on the date of vesting. Section 6 only permits some land to be retained notwithstanding the intermediary being divested the title therein by operation of law.
10. In the present case in respect of both the 40-bigha plot as lessor and the 36-bigha plot as landlord, the trust lost its title therein to the State as on the date of vesting. It was for the State thereafter to assert its rights as the lessor, in place and stead of the trust, in respect of the 40-bigha land; and it was for the State as landlord, in place and stead of the trust, to assert its rights in respect of the 36-bigha plot. The scheme of the Act is to vest the ownership in the State and to permit retention of certain lands by the intermediary in circumstances detailed in Section 6(1). Despite its non-obstante clause, Section 6(1) of the Act does not dilute, far less obliterate, the act of vesting of the land under such statute. The issue as to whether the trust is entitled to the 36-bigha plot or entitled to the land comprised in or appertaining to any buildings or structures owned by the trust has been answered against the trust in the second appeal. In view of the appeal therefrom admitted by the Supreme Court, the decision has not reached finality. Yet when a bench of coordinate jurisdiction in this Court has decided the question against the trust, notwithstanding the pending appeal it would be improper to take a contrary view. It is possible that the trust succeeds in the appeal before the Supreme Court. Rather than allow the beneficiary of the trust to sell the rights embodied in the hope of success in the pending Supreme Court appeal, it would be better to permit the petitioners to seek the same leave that is now sought in respect of the 36-bigha plot upon the trust succeeding in the Supreme Court appeal.
11. One cannot but part with a note of regret. After all, it is an educational institution which is the beneficiary of the trust and the educational institution was set up for a once thriving but now dwindling community in this metropolis. The sweep of the Act of 1953 and the greater good that it was enacted to serve has resulted in the present piquant situation of an industrial concern being the beneficiary of a land reform legislation at the expense of a more deserving educational institution. It would do well for both the State and the present fortuitous recipient of the legislative command to consider the plight of the educational institution which has fallen prey to the Act of 1953. AOT No. 1 of 2009 and GA No. 1527 of 2010 are disposed of by giving leave to the trust and the beneficiary to seek appropriate orders upon the appeal from the second appellate order in Title Suit No. 71 of 1960 being decided in favour of the trust in respect of the 36-bigha land. There does not appear to be any right that the trust or the beneficiary thereunder has in respect of the 40-bigha land. It is recorded that in the circumstances it has been found unnecessary to conclusively decide on the locus of firm Ramanlal Madanlal which has now apparently turned into a company to assert any rights in respect of the 36-bigha plot.
12. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.