1. The appellants/defendants have directed this appeal under Section 100 of the CPC being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 25.3.2005 passed by Additional District Judge Maihar, District Satna in regular civil appeal No.101-A/03 whereby, upholding the judgment and decree dated 10.7.03 passed by Civil Judge Class-I Maihar in original civil suit No. 40-A/95, the suit of the respondents for eviction with respect of a shop on the grounds of bonafide, genuine requirement enumerated under Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (In short 'the Act'), has been decreed against the appellants.
2. The facts giving rise to this appeal in short are that the predecessor-in-title of the respondents, namely, Smt Savitri Devi, filed the above-mentioned suit against the predecessor-in- title of the appellants, namely, Shri Rambalak for eviction with respect of a shop situated at H.No.324/5 in the main market of Katra Bazar, Maihar contending that the appellants, being their monthly tenant, was in occupation of such shop at the rate of Rs.100/- per month for non-residential purpose. As per further averments, the deceased/plaintiff was in bonafide, genuine requirement of the alleged shop for the business of her son Ramesh Kumar, respondent No.2 for which they did not have any alternate vacant accommodation of their own in the town of Maihar. It is also pleaded that the disputed shop is convenient and suitable for the business of said Ramesh respondent No.2. With these averments, the suit for eviction is filed on the grounds available under section 12 (1)(f) of the Act. It is noted that in pendency of the suit, the principal plaintiff and defendant, both had died, on which, their legal representatives were brought on the record in the trial court itself.
3. In the written statement of the principal defendant, which was later adopted bythe appelants, by admitting the tenancy in the disputed premises on the terms stated in the plaint, the alleged bonafide genuine requirement of such shop to the principal plaintiff for the business of his elder son Ramesh is denied. In addition it is stated that such Ramesh is doing his business of Readymade Garments in some shop situated at Chandi Devi road. The same is also the main market of Maihar and, in such premises, accordingly such Ramesh Kumar respondent No.2 is not an unemployed person. It is also stated that the principal plaintiff the predecessor of the respondents had constructed six shops in some complex. Besides this at the back side of the disputed shop at Galla Mandi road, a shop is also constructed by the plaintiff and, in such premises if there was any need of the plaintiff, the same has been satisfied, thus the alleged need could not be termed to be bonafide and genuine. The suit is filed with intention to induct some other person on some enhanced rent with the huge sum of goodwill (Pagdi) after getting it vacated from the defendant. As per further averments, in the month of August, 1994, the defendant went to the husband of the plaintiff to deposit the rent at the rate of Rs.100/- per month, on which, he made a demand of Rs.50,000/- as Pagdi and Rs.1000/- towards monthly rent for which the defendant was not prepared and, due to such reason, the impugned suit is filed. With these pleadings prayer for dismissal of the suit is made.
4. In view of the pleadings of the parties, after framing the issues and recording the evidence, on appreciation of the same, by holding that the respondents have successfully proved their alleged need of the shop for the hardware business of respondent No.2 Ramesh, decreed the suit, on which, appellant preferred the appeal. On consideration, by affirming the decree of the trial court, the same was dismissed, thereafter, the appellants have come forward to this court with this appeal.
5. Shri S.K.Garg learned appearing counsel of the appellants, after taking me through the pleadings of the parties, evidence available on the record and the exhibited documents said that in view of the availability of sufficient alternate vacant accommodation with the respondents of their own in the same town for the alleged need as proved by the appellants, the courts below ought to have dismissed the suit but under wrong appreciation of the evidence, the decree of eviction has been passed against them on the ground of bonafide genuine requirement under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. In support of this contention, he also referred the depositions of some witnesses examined by the parties as well as some paras of the impugned judgment and prayed for admission of this appeal on the proposed substantial questions of law mentioned in the appeal memo.
6. After hearing the counsel, I have carefully gone through the record and also perused the impugned judgments. It is apparent from the record that on appreciation of evidence that courts below concurrently decreed the suit of respondents against the appellants on the ground of bonafide genuine requirement under section 12 (1)(f) of the Act. After going through the evidence, I have found that the findings of the courts below on the above-mentioned grounds are in consonance with the same and, in such premises, the alleged need of the respondents have been concurrently found to be proved by the courts below. It is apparent from the impugned judgments that after considering the question of availability of alternate vacant accommodation in exhaustive manner, the same were not found suitable and convenient for the alleged need of the respondents and the suit has been decreed. In such premises, the approach of the courts below based on evidence, being findings of fact, I have not found any substance or circumstance in this appeal giving rise to question of law rather than substantial question of law in the matter requiring any consideration under section 100 of the CPC at this stage.
7. Even otherwise, the concurrent findings of the courts below based on appreciation of the evidence on the ground of bonafide genuine requirement being findings of fact could not be interfered under section 100 of the CPC at the stage of second appeal as laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Dr. Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal-(1995) 6 SCC 580 in which it was held as under :-
13...............The trial court and the first appellate court on a close analysis of the evidence also recorded a definite finding that the plaintiff's requirement of the suit premises was genuine and bona fide but the High Court set aside the same on unreasonable grounds. 6 14. Sub-section (1) of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates that an appeal shall lie to the High Curt from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Curt is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Sub section (4) of section 100 further provides that when the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. But it may be pointed out that the High Court formulated no such question of law on basis of which it proposed to interfere with the findings of facts. It has been the consistent view of this Court that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the grounds of erroneous finding of fact, based upon an appreciation of the relavant evidence. There is a plethora of case law in support of this view. To quote a few, references may be made to the decision in V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar wherein this court took the view that even if the appreciation of evidence made by the lower appellate court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure and the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower appellate court. This view has been reiterated by this court in Bhagwan Dass v. Jiley Kaur. This being the position, the High Court was not justified in reappreciating the evidence and substituting its own conclusions for the well-reasoned findings recorded by the courts of fact."
On arising the occasion, such principle was also followed by this court in the case of Machla Bai v. Nanak Ram- 2006(2) MPLJ-484. So, in view of such earlier dictum of the courts, this appeal is not involving any substantial question of law for its admission.
8. The law is very settled on the question that whenever and where there is concurrent findings of the courts below based on appreciation of the available evidence howsoever the same are erroneous on facts even then in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitri Bai Sopan Gurjar-AIR 1999 SC 2213, the same could not be interfered at this stage in second appeal under section 100 of the CPC.
9. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I have not found any material or substance in this appeal giving rise to substantial question of law for admission of the same. Consequently, the appeal being devoid of any such question, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed at the stage of motion hearing.
10. However, taking into consideration that the appellants are in possession of the disputed accommodation since long, therefore, it would not be possible for them to vacate the same within short period. Therefore, subject to some conditions, I deem fit to extend some time to them for vacating the disputed premises. Hence, it is directed that on depositing the entire decreetal sum including the arrears of the rent, if any, and on furnishing appropriate surety to the satisfaction of the trial court within thirty days from today along with an undertaking that the appellants shall vacate the disputed premises and hand- over its peaceful possession to the decree holder on or before 30.04.2011, then subject to payment of regular monthly mesne profit of the disputed accommodation at the rate of the monthly rent as held by the courts below within 15 days from the end of such tenancy month, the appellant is extended the time to vacate the premises up to 30.4.2011. Failing in compliance of any of the aforesaid condition, the respondents/decree holder and the executing court shall be at liberty to execute the decree of eviction forthwith with all aspects.
11. The appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid observations for extending the time to the appellants for vacating the premises as stated above.