1. Being aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal dated 28.2.2003 passed by the Fast Track Court, Dharwad, in S.C.No.137/2001, acquitting the accused for the offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306 r/w 34 IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act ('the Act' for short), present appeal Is filed by the State.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the present case, as per the prosecution story are, as follows:
Accused No.3 Is the son of Accused No.l and 2. Deceased Manjavva, daughter of PWs.15 and 16 Smt.Kashawa and Ssdeppa Kariyappa Madar, was married to accused Mo.3 on S.4.2000. According to the prosecution, at the time of marriage talks, there was demand of dowry both In the form of cash as well as gold ornaments and after negotiations, the accused agreed to accept cash of Rs.5,000/- and gold weighing 2-1/2 tholas. It is the case of the prosecution that though initially, the relationship between the deceased and her husband and in-laws was cordial, later on they started ill-treating and harassing her for not bringing enough dowry as they had demanded and ultimately had resulted in the death of Manjavva on 31.10.2000 by committing suicide by setting herself on fire.
3. Coming to the incident, according to ths prosecution, in the evening of 31.10.2000, when the accused and the deceased were in the house, on hearing the cry of Manjavva, people gathered, relatives went inside, they saw her body engulfed with fire. After extinguishing fire, she was shifted to hospital, wherein she succumbed to the injuries on the same day. In the interregnum, on the information of PW.9 Giriyappa Fakirappa Madar, as it was a case of un-natural death, the jurisdictional police registered a case under UDR No.27/2000 and inquest proceedings was held under Section 174 of Cr.P.C. During the inquest, as it was revealed chat Manjavva died within 7 years of marriage and there was demand, acceptance as well as harassment and cruelty over not meeting the further demands of the accused, the case in Crime No.135/2000 came to be registered against all the accused for the offences under Sections 498-A, 306, 304-B IPC as well as under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Act.
4. The usual procedures like holding of mahazars, sending the dead body for autopsy, gathering evidence including recording the statements of witnesses and neighbours takes place and thereafter charge sheet is filed against the accused for the aforesaid offences.
5. On committal, the learned Sessions Judge charged the accused for the aforesaid offences. As the accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried, they are tried in S.C.No.137/2001.
5. The prosecution has relied upon the evidence of 29 witnesses to bring home the guilt of the accused as well as reliance placed on Exs.Pl to P21 and Mos.l to 6. After completion of the evidence of the prosecution, when the accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C, they have simply denied the prosecution case as false. Neither explanation is offered nor any defense evidence is led except marking Exs.Dl to D4, marked portions from the statements of PWs.ll, 15 and 22 recorded during the investigation. On appreciation of evidence, as already noted, the trial Court giving benefit of doubt, acquitted the accused of all the charges. Hence, the appeal by the State.
7. Smt.Gayathrl, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor for the State taking us through the entire evidence, vehemently contended that the judgment of acquittal passed by the Court below is illegal, contrary to the evidence on record. She submitted that as admittedly, death of Manjavva took place hardly within 6 months of the marriage and as there was cogent evidence regarding demand of dowry, acceptance of the same and harassment caused by the accused, the presumption available under Section 113 A and B ought to have been considered by the trial Court. It is submitted that as the findings an conclusion arrived at by the trial Judge are illegal and perverse, the Impugned judgment and conviction is liable to be set aside and accused be convicted for the said offences.
8. As the accused were indigent persons and had not engaged any counsel, this Court requested Sri S.S.Doddamani, learned advocate to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae. Defending the judgment of acquittal, learned Amicus Curiae contended that the entire prosecution case is full of contradictions and omissions and as such, the trial Court was justified in giving benefit of doubt. Taking us through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, especially, those examined to show the demand, acceptance and further harassments, he contended that, there is total contradictions as to the amount demanded by the accused. According to him, the amount said to have been demanded ranges from Rs.10,000/- to Rs.25,000/- and varies from witness to witness. Similarly, there Is contradictory evidence as to the place of marriage talks as to whether it took place at Mummagatti or Jeeragwada. Few witnesses have spoken to the place as Jeeragwada and others at Mummagatti. Relying upon the evidence of PW.9, the first informant, it is contended that according to him, it is the- deceased who herself informed him that she got fire accidentally while preparing food. According to the learned Amicus Curiae, this is further supported and strengthened by the history recorded by the doctor In the MIC register and as such, as there are two possible views as to the cause of death of Manjavva, wheth&r; suicidal or accidental, the benefit of doubt given by the trial Court is justified. He further submitted that as this is an appeal against the order of acquittal, as is laid down, the appellate Court should be slow in interfering with the finding of acquittal, the benefit of which, was given by the trial Court. On these, among other grounds, he submitted that the appeal filed by the State is devoid of merit and is liable to be rejected.
9. We have perused the records and the entire evidence available.
10. At the outset, it is to be noted that the basic requirements for proving the evidence under Section 304-B, viz., death of newly married woman within 7 years of marriage, is established and is unquestionable. Each one of the witnesses have admitted that within just 6 months of the marriage, Manjavva met with un-natural death. But the question further to be considered is, whether her death was accidental or suicidal and if suicidal, whether the accused were responsible for the same.
11. So far as accidental theory is concerned, except the Interested version of the accused suggested In the cross examination, we find absolutely no supportive material. It is the case of the accused through some of the witnesses suggestively that while Manjavva was preparing food on a kerosene stove, accidentally her polyster sari caught fire and she succumbed to the injuries. This story of accidental fire is belied by the scientic evidence available on record. PW.18 Mallesh, Forensic expert examined by the prosecution speaks that after the spot mahazar, the articles lying near the scene of offence viz., the burnt sari pieces, hair pieces, mud and beeds worn by the deceased were subjected to forensic test and in chromography test, out of 4 items sent, half burnt pieces of sari and other pieces of half burnt clothes with ash, there was positive presence of kerosene residue on these articles. That indicates that there was presence of kerosene on the clothes of the deceased which ultimately caught fire. To find as to whether there was even possibility of accidental fire due to kerosene stove as suggested by the defence, when one peruses the spot mahazar, the photographs of the scene of offence, (though not marked), immediately taken by PW.8, we do not find any present of kerosene stove. On the other hand, the scene of offence consists of a small kitchen with traditional stove made by arranging 3 stones. Neither the photogtraphs nor the mahazar show that there was any preparation made or in progress for cooking the food and as such, the story that Manjavva caught fire while preparing food on a kerosene stove receives its first dent. Moreover, if It was an accidental fire, as the presence of all the 3 accused in the house at the time of incidence, is not much in dispute, their silence and in fact denial of the entire prosecution case, goes against them.
12. Keeping aside this silence or the false explanation of the accused, if one peruses the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, viz., P^Vs.2, 3 11 who are totally Independent persons, In the sense, they have no axe to grind against the accused, have cogently and consistently stated before the Court that during the marriage talks, there was demand of cash and gold ornaments and when the parents of the deceased pleaded their inability to meet such a demand, at the intervention of village elders, it was reduced to Rs.5,000/- cash and 2-1/2 tholas gold. In this regard, though as rightly pointed out by the learned Amicus Curiae, certain variation as to the figure of cash amount viz., whether It is Rs. 10,000/-Rs.15,000/- or Rs.20,000/-, in our considerate view, that hardly makes any difference. The concept of higher demand as spoken to by these witnesses may be even exaggeration to some extent. It is well settled that mere exaggeration to some extent, would not be held against the witnesses to hold them as totally rise, especially, when there is admitted anxiety on the part of the witnesses to highlight their case. One has to keep in mind, the doctrine of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not applicable to the criminal cases. If the witnesses are partly truthful and partly untruthful or exaggeration, it is the duty of the Court to separate grains of truth from the chaffs of falsehood or exaggeration. It Is well settled that when the grains of truth are acceptable and move, the Court has to accept the same and further If chaff or falsehood is more than the grains of truth, benefit of doubt can be given to the accused.
13- Keeping these principles In mind, on analyzing and re-assessing the entire evidence, we find that even though there are minor discrepancies as to the place of marriage talk or the exact amount demanded by the accused, the fact remains that there was a demand and that was partially satisfied by the parents of the deceased by paying a dowry of Rs.5,000/- in cash and gold worth 2-1/2 tholas. So far as later part is concerned, absolutely there is unanimity in the prosecution evidence. As such, it can be safely held that there was demand of dowry by the accused and the parents met the same to the smaller extent. Thereafter, there Is consistent version of the parents and close relatives as well as elderly villagers whom the deceased met after coming to the village to celebrate her first festival (Nagarapanchami), she had complained to them about the cruelty or harassment meted by the accused for not bringing the dowry as demanded by them. There is absolutely no inconsistency in this regard and as their evidence is unanimous, cogent and consistent, has to be accepted. At this stage, we would like to point out that the trial Court has rejected the evidence of all these witnesses solely on the ground that they are interested as they are related to the deceased. Mere relation with the deceased or the victim cannot be a sole ground to discard the evidence of these relatives. They would be the last persons to falsely implicate the accused and unless the accused even by preponderance show that these or each one of these witnesses had personal enmity with them, there Is absolutely no bar for accepting the evidence of the relative witnesses as long as it is corroborated and free from doubt. It is relevant to note that the trial Court has lost sight of this well settled principle. Even otherwise, apart from the relatives, the prosecution has led evidence of independent villagers, neighbours of the deceased and her parents regarding the demand, accpetance of dowry as well as the further harassment for not meeting the demands in entirety. Strangely, the trial Court has ignored their evidence. We find that the reasoning of the trial Court and the conclusion arrived at viz., (a) the witnesses are all related and hence interested (b) discrepancy as to the dowry amount demanded, appears to be not only illegal but perverse finding. Similarly the conclusion of the trial Court at para 13 of the judgment that PWs.15 and 16 belong to lower strata in the society and as such are unable and pay dowry, is far from reality. The devil of dowry Is present irrespective of the people belonging to the different strata of life, whether they are poor or rich and hence on re-assessment of the entire evidence, we find that the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court being illegal and perverse, are liable to be interfered with.
14.0n assessment of the evidence, we find that the prosecution has succeeded in showing that when woman died by un-natural death within 7 years of her marriage, there was demand and acceptance of dowry by the accused as well as further demand and harassment seen before the death, the husband and/or his relatives responsible are guilty of dowry death. Ail these aspects taken together will lead to no other conclusion, but to draw the adverse inference against the accused under Section 113 A and B of the Evidence Act. More over, as already noted, the accused are absolutely silent as to what happened to the woman who was in their house and in their presence. This silence of the accused and the denial of the prosecution case, in its entirety as false, also supply the missing link in the chain of circumstances. Hence, we find that the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court is liable to be interfered with. At this stage, it is to be noted that the trial Court has charged the accused both for the offences under Sections 306 and 304-B IPC, which do not go together. Either the offence must fall under Section 306 or 304- B because the requirement of proof, evidence of these individual offences is quiet distinct.
15. Accordingly for the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of acquittal is set aside and it is held that the accused are guilty of the offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC. For the very same reasons, we also hold the accused guilty of the offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. In the absence of any acceptable evidence as to the offence under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, we give the benefit of doubt to the accused. At this stage, the learned Amicus Curiae contended that the offence has taken place in the year 2000 and as the accused come from poor strata of the society, leniency in sentence be shown. Taking into consideration the over ail circumstances of the case, in our view, ends of justice would be met if the accused are sentenced to undergo minimum imprisonment of 7 years R.I. prescribed for the offence under Section 304-B IPC and sentence of one year with fine of Rs.1, 000/-each, In default, further R.I. for one month for the offence under Section 498-A IPC. So far as the offence under Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition Act Is concerned, we sentence tfcsm to under go R.I. for one year and for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, we sentence them to undergo R.I. for two months. We are awarding the lesser sentence in view of the fact that they belong to lower strata of the society and are villagers as well as the offence has taken place almost 8 years back. For the same reason, we do not propose to impose the prescribed minimum period for the offence under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Ail the sentences now imposed shall run concurrently. While considering the length of Imprisonment, the period during the trial for which the accused were in custody shall be given its proper set of. As the accused are acquitted by the trial Court, we direct the jurisdictional police to arrest them and place them in jail to undergo the sentences. Before concluding, placing on record our word of appreciation for the assistance rendered by the learned Amicus Curiae, we direct the registry to pay an honorarium of Rs.3,000/-.