1. By this petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the petitioners challenge the order dated 25.08.1983 passed in Change Report Inquiry No. 612 of 1983 in the matter of a Public Trust. By said orders, the Deputy Charity Commissioner, Nagpur Region, Nagpur, working under Respondent No. 4 herein has held that property shown as property of Public Trust by name Gupta Dharamshala deserved to be deleted from the Register of Public Trust maintained by the office of Respondent No. 4 and has further observed that as there is no property of Trust, the Trust comes to an end. The entries of the Trust made in the Public Trust register were also directed to be deleted. This order was challenged initially before the Division Bench and the petition was entertained as Public Interest Litigation. On 28.12.2004, this Court granted interim relief and restrained present Respondents No. 1 & 2 from carrying on any construction activities on the site of Gupta Dharamshala. This interim order continues to operate even today. On 07.07.2010, Division Bench of this Court found that the litigation was liable to be tried under the provisions of Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and, therefore, it was not inclined to continue to treat it as Public Interest Litigation. Accordingly, the matter was directed to be placed before the Single Judge.
2. In this background, I have heard Shri Shelat, learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri Madkholkar, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 & 2, Shri Thakare, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 and Shri Joshi, learned AGP for respondent No. 4 & 5.
3. The contention of Shri Shelat, learned counsel is, after Trust was registered in the light of dedication effected vide written document dated 16.04.1961, the persons executing that document viz., Gauri Dullayabai and Shamabai did not remain its owner. The trust was registered on 05.12.1961 and Shamabai expired on 28.10.1962. The other lady viz. Gauri Dullayabai expired on 10.05.1971. The present Respondent No. 2 moved Deputy Charity Commissioner by filing an application under Section 22A of the Act and contended that Gauri Dullayabai executed a Will in relation to property of Public Trust on 10.03.1970 and same was bequeathed to Respondent No. 2, hence, the property needed to be deleted from Public Trust register. Without issuing any notice or public advertisement or public enquiry, Deputy Charity Commissioner mechanically granted that request and thereby ordered deregistration of the Trust.
4. Shri Shelat, learned counsel has pointed out that Respondent No. 2 moved Deputy Charity Commissioner in 1983 and thereafter impugned order has been passed on 25.08.1983. His contention is, after registration of Trust on 05.12.1961, Deputy Charity Commissioner had no such jurisdiction and power. He has contended that recourse to Section 22A of the Act for said purpose is arbitrary and "particulars" required to be looked into there must be shown to be in existence at the time when Trust was registered. He has further contended that particulars relevant under said provision are the particulars in favour of the cause of Public Trust and a person claiming adversely to such Trust is not entitled to invoke that jurisdiction. In support of his contention, he has relied upon Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of K.P. Jamadar vs. K.M. Irani, reported at AIR 1973 Bom. 130. In the alternative, without prejudice to his contentions, he has pointed out that Trust was created by two widows together and one widow i.e. Shamabai expired on 28.10.1962 itself. The alleged Will has been executed by surviving widow on 10.03.1970. The said Will, therefore, cannot have any effect insofar as dedication of property to Public Trust by Shamabai is concerned. It is his further contention that on 10.03.1970 Gauri Dullayabai was also not an owner and competent to execute any such Will.
5. To point out to this Court the obligations of the Trustees, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of A.A. Gopalakrishnana vs. Cochin Devaswom Board, reported at (2007) 7 SCC 482. To show that alternate remedy cannot be a bar in such a situation, he has relied upon the judgment in the case of Collector of Customs, Cochin vs. A.S. Bava, reported at AIR 1968 SC 13, Nusli vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., reported at 2010 (2) Mh.L.J. 978, M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corporation Ltd. vs. Jahan Khan, reported at (2007) 10 SCC 88, Maharashtra State Judicial Service Association vs. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, reported at (2002) 3 SCC 244 and Hirday Narain vs. L.T. Officer, Bareilly, reported at AIR 1971 SC 33. To urge that Public Trust cannot fail and at the most doctrine of Cyprus can be applied, he has relied upon the judgment in the case of Trustees of HEH the Nizam's Pilgrimage Money Trust vs. I.T. Commissioner, reported at AIR 2000 SC 1802.
6. Because of the objections on account of delay and laches, the learned counsel has invited attention to contents of writ petition particularly paras 1, 11 and 14. He argues that the moment impugned order came to the notice of the petitioners, present writ petition has been filed.
7. Shri Thakare, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 Municipal Council has relied upon reply affidavit as filed to show that though Respondent No. 1 claims that on the strength of Will, the property came to be mutated in her name, there are no records with the Municipal Council.
8. Shri Madkholkar, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 & 2 has raised preliminary objection about tenability of present writ petition. He points out that the order passed in 1983 has been questioned 21 years thereafter. Writ Petition was initially entertained as PIL and after order dated 07.07.2010, treating it as an individual grievance, there are no amendments made in it. The petitioners do not have any status and locus to challenge the impugned order as they have not shown themselves to be interested persons. He has further urged that there is no allegation of any deceit or fraud in the matter and hence in such writ petition, this Court should not interfere after expiry of more than 27 years.
9. He has also invited attention to subsequent events. He points out that the structure standing on plot and to be utilized as Dharamshala is burnt completely and is no longer available after 1993. He has further stated that Petitioner No. 2 before this Court is signatory to resolution passed by Respondent No. 3 Municipal Council approving mutation of property in dispute in the name of Respondent No. 1. He has further contended that property was never used as Dharamshala and was always seen as her private property by Gauri Dullayabai and Shamabai. Therefore only a Will was executed by Gauri Dullayabai. The rent from tenants was also collected by Gauri Dullayabai and there was no dedication to charity at all. He has further pointed out that alleged document constituting Trust required a Scheme to be framed by Trustees but no such Scheme was framed by them. The petitioners had a remedy of filing revision before the Joint Charity Commissioner (Respondent No. 4) and as that remedy has not been exhausted, present writ petition should not be entertained.
10. In his brief reply, Shri Shelat, learned counsel has again invited attention to paras 1, 11, 12 and 14 to show the status and locus of the petitioners. He has further urged that as grievance is being made against an order which is without jurisdiction and Trust still exists as Public Trust, there is no question of any delay or laches in the matter. He has invited attention to rejoinder as filed to show that petitioner No. 2 was never associated with any resolution allegedly passed by the Municipal Council. He has pointed out that petitioner No. 1 was never a member of Standing Committee.
11. The perusal of Trust deed executed by Gauri Dullayabai and Shamabai shows a dedication in presenti for Dharamshala. The execution or contents of this document dated 16.04.1961 are not in dispute between the parties. The registration of Gupta Dharamshala as desired therein vide Public Trust registration No.P47(A) on 05.12.1961 is also not in dispute. The death of Shamabai on 28.10.1962 and death of Gauri Dullayabai on 10.05.1971 is also not being questioned by anybody. The fact that Respondent No.1 sought deletion of said property as trust property from the register maintained by the office of Respondent No. 4 in 1983 is also not in dispute. Respondent No. 1 sought that deletion on the strength of a Will executed by Gauri Dullayabai on 10.03.1970. The perusal of impugned order dated 25.08.1983 shows that Change Report Inquiry No. 612 of 1983 under Section 22A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, was registered after Respondent No. 1 sought deletion of said property. The authority has found that there were no opponents before it. It noted that in 1971 there were seven persons as Trustees and out of them only trustees at Sr. Nos. 3, 4 and 6 were alive. It appears that said authority recorded their statements and there trustees deposed that they were not in possession of Trust property at all and they never acted as trustees and property in question was never used as Dharamshala. The authority thereafter has found that Trust is not complete until and unless Trust property vests in trustees for the purpose for which Trust is constituted. In view of this position, it has considered some judgments delivered under the provisions of Indian Trust Act and then recorded a finding that property registered as property belonging to registered Trust in fact does not belong to Public trust in question. Because of this finding, it has passed the impugned order. By the impugned order, it deleted that property as property of public trust and simultaneously as the purpose of trust could not have been achieved, it also declared that Trust has come to an end.
12. The perusal of judgment of Full Bench of this Court in the case of K.P. Jamadar vs. K.M. Irani (supra), is important here. In para 6, three questions which fell for determination before the Hon'ble Full Bench are noted and the important observations are contained in paras 18, 24, 27, 28 and 29. In para 18, the Hon'ble Full Bench has found that provisions of Section 79 of the Bombay Public Trust Act are too clear to admit any doubt or difficulty as regards the description of questions which the Assistant Charity Commissioner has to decide or deal with under the Act. A little later, it is observed that authorities under the said Act have to decide whether the Trust is valid and lawful and can, therefore, be said to exist. A deed of Trust is held to be normally enough proof of existence of such Trust. In para 22, Full Bench has found that provisions under Bombay Public Trust Act were too summary for appropriate adjudication of title disputes. It is also noticed in para 24 that it is no part of their function under Section 19 of the Bombay Public Trust Act to decide the claims which are adverse to the trust. In para 25, the same findings are again recorded more emphatically. In para 28, the provisions of Section 22A of the Act are looked into. Pre condition for its exercise is found to be that a particular relating to a public trust must have remained to be inquired into. The Hon'ble Full Bench found that it takes one back to Section 19. If the Act and the Rules contemplated in terms that the inquiry must be limited to the contentions of persons interested in the trust, there is no place in that inquiry for a person who wants to set up a title which is hostile to the trust. Such a claim is not a "particular relating to" public trust nor can it be said that "has remained to be inquired into". In para 29, again it is noted that facts pertaining to history of title to public trust do not find a place in the provisions of Section 18(5) and Rule 6 as they do not constitute particulars in sense in which the word is used therein.
13. The Full Bench, therefore, leaves no manner of doubt that a person who wants a declaration or direction to the prejudice of Public Trust cannot approach the authorities under Section 22A of the Bombay Public Trust Act. Here, as already noted above, the registration of Trust has already taken place on 05.12.1961. Respondent No. 1 in her application for deleting the property has not pointed out any "particular" as required by Section 22A of the Act. On the contrary, she has relied upon a subsequent event which has taken place on 10.03.1970 i.e. a Will executed by Gauri Dullayabai in her favour. The effort before the Deputy Charity Commissioner was to show that though Trust was registered and property was recorded against its name, Trust never came into being. It is apparent that such subsequent events cannot form a subject matter of enquiry under Section 22 A of the Act at all. Thus, Respondent No. 1 who wanted a finding adverse to public trust could not have taken recourse to Section 22A of the Act and in any case the material which she pressed into service as "particular" was not a legal and valid material under the said provision. As already noted above, the entire consideration of controversy by Deputy Charity Commissioner runs counter to scheme of Section 22A of the Act as explained by the Hon'ble Full Bench and his application of mind as also approach, therefore, is unsustainable. It appears that the position in law as prevailing and explained by the Hon'ble Full Bench was not pointed out to Deputy Charity Commissioner when he passed the impugned order.
14. The Trust had already come into existence on 05.12.1961. It was registered only under the Bombay Public Trust Act. In view of this position, Gauri Dullayabai as also Shamabai ceased to have any title to the property dedicated to charitable purpose. Shamabai the other party to document settling trust expired shortly thereafter i.e. on 28.10.1962. Thus, when two persons had created a public trust and it was accordingly registered, one fails to understand how because of Will executed by only one of them, the property has been held to devolve upon present respondent No.1. It is apparent that in view of the limited scope of enquiry available under Section 22A of the Act and also the finding that Deputy Charity Commissioner has exercised jurisdiction not available to him in the matter, this issue cannot be answered conclusively in present matter. However, this fact again has material bearing if the alleged claim of Respondent No. 1 is to enquired into.
15. Shri Shelat, learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ignatius Louis vs. The C.B.E. and Trustees Co. Ltd., reported at 1986 (1) Bom. C.R. 377, where this Court has found that a Will subsequently executed insofar as it bequeathed the property subjected to Trust to plaintiff before it, cannot confer any benefit on him since the settler of trust had lost power to bequeath it by Will. The observations apply with full force even in present circumstances.
16. Once it is found that the order of Deputy Charity Commissioner of Trust is without jurisdiction, the other questions like locus and status of present petitioners and the delay or laches on their part in approaching this Court need to be looked into. Judgments shown by Shri Shelat, learned counsel show that alternate remedy does not always bar the recourse to extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India. In some judgments, revision has been found to be not an equally effective alternate remedy. Here, it is important to note that initially this Court had entertained the grievance of the petitioners as Public Interest Litigation. The facts also show that the Deputy Charity Commissioner did not issue any public notice before conducting enquiry under Section 22A of the Act and on recording of statement of Trustees produced before him, a finding that Trust never came into existence has been recorded. The Hon'ble Apex Court has in the case of A.A. Gopalakrishnan vs. Cochin Devaswom Board, reported at (2007) 7 SCC 482, found that the properties of deities, temples and Devaswom Boards are required to be protected and safeguarded by their Trustees. It is also noticed that in many circumstances, persons entrusted with the duty of managing and safeguarding the properties have usurped and misappropriated property by setting up false claims or ownership or tenancy, or adverse possession. The Hon'ble Apex Court has found that this has become possible only because of passive or active collusion of the authorities concerned. Such acts of "fences eating the crops" are directed to be dealt with sternly. The Hon'ble Apex Court has expressed that the Government, members or trustees of boards/ trusts and devotees have to be vigilant to prevent such usurpation or encroachment. It is also held to be the duty of the Courts to protect and safeguard the properties of religious and charitable institutions from wrongful claims or misappropriation. In this situation, I find that the argument that remedy of filing revision was available to the petitioners is misconceived and it cannot stop the petitioners from invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. Said order dated 22/25.08.1983 in Change Report Inquiry No. 612 of 1983 is, therefore, void and of no legal consequences.
17. As already stated above, the petitioners were not parties to proceedings before the Deputy Charity Commissioner. They did not get any opportunity to oppose those proceedings and they have submitted that they have approached this Court after getting the knowledge.
18. The perusal of para 1 of the petition shows that the petitioners have stated that they were approaching this Court in general public interest to preserve and safeguard the properties which are dedicated to the members of the general public and specially to residents of Narkhed town. They have also alleged that the property has been usurped by Respondent No. 1 with active connivance of Respondent No. 2 and other respondents who are public authorities, though duty bound to preserve the public interest, have miserably failed to perform their duties. It is stated that petitioner No. 1 is residing in Narkhed town, the place where Dharamshala is there since his birth and forefathers were also residing in that town. He is interested and concerned in welfare of the Narkhed town. Petitioner No. 2 is also stated to be residing there and similarly interested. It is urged that if cheap accommodation is available for persons at Narkhed, the business of the town can increase.
19. In para 21, the petitioners have stated that after purported release of trust property by Deputy Charity Commissioner a fire occurred, which destroyed it. The debris and material on the plot was cleared and plot was made open. The petitioners then noticed commencement of construction activity on this open plot 15 days prior to filing of petition. Hence, they made inquiries and learnt that property of public trust was fraudulently being converted as private property. The petitioners stated that they were applying for relevant documents and same would be placed before this Court. In the entire petition, the petitioners have not stated that the establishment or public trust by name Gupta Dharamshala had started working. The order of Deputy Charity Commissioner shows a finding that such Dharamshala never came into being. The surviving trustees also deposed accordingly. The petitioners who claimed to be residents and challenge the said order, therefore, could have been aware of the fact that the property is dedicated to Dharamshala even before fire. Story pleaded by them is, therefore, an eye wash and unsatisfactory. It is apparent that they have not approached with clean hands to this Court. The explanation for delay and laches given by them is not acceptable.
20. However, the facts emerging show that public trust by name Gupta Dharamshala still exists. Illegal and void order passed under section 22A cannot have the effect of wiping it out. There is no provision in the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, for its de registration. The trust has got open plot as its property. Same can be put to appropriate charitable purpose. The law of the land records Respondent No. 4 as custodian of the Trusts and trust properties. When in 1983 Respondent No. 1 approached Deputy Charity Commissioner with application for deletion of the property from register of public trust, said authority was duty bound to take steps to protect the interest of the trust and to protect the trust property. Those steps have not been taken. Respondent No. 4 is now party before this Court and he is aware of the controversy and also of the orders passed. Respondent No. 4, therefore, can take appropriate cognizance of the matter and act in accordance with law.
21. With these observations and findings, writ petition is disposed of. Rule accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.