1. Heard. Admit on the preliminary objection to the maintainability of the letters patent appeal.
2. In the present letters patent appeal there is a challenge to the judgment and order dated 23.2.2010 in W.P. No. 5521 of 2009 by which the writ petition filed by the respondents was allowed. The counsel for the respondents, Mr. A.C. Dharmadhikari, raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the present letters patent appeal in the light of the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in 2010 (7) SCALE 428 decided on 23.7.2010. Since the preliminary objection was raised to the above effect relying on the aforesaid decision of Supreme Court, we have heard both the learned counsel for the parties on the said preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the letters patent appeal.
3. In support of the preliminary objection, counsel for the respondents made the following submissions
(i) The subject matter of the writ petition before the learned Single Judge was purely a dispute between the landlord and the tenant, namely the suit was filed for eviction of the tenant on certain grounds.
(ii) The learned Single Judge thus examined the correctness of the impugned judgment before him and having found a total perverse approach of the said court and incorrect application of law and in a clear error of jurisdiction vested in the appellate court, set aside the appellate judgment and thus allowed the writ petition.
(iii) Mr. Dharmadhikari referred to several paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment of supreme court in order to countenance his preliminary objection. (iv) Perusal of the prayer clause in the writ petition shows that no writ muchless writ of certiorari was even sought by the respondents in the writ petition and the only prayer was to quash and set aside the judgment and order passed by the District Judge3.
4. Per contra, Mr. M.G. Bhangde, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions
(a) Writ petition that was filed by the respondents was admittedly under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with a prayer therein to quash and set aside the judgment of District Judge3 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 140 of 2008. In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675 the ratio decidendi laid down by the Supreme Court is that a writ of certiorari will lie even to demolish the order of civil court, or in the instant case that of District Judge, and that is the present legal position laid down by the Supreme Court and therefore the judgment of the learned Single Judge quashing the judgment rendered by the District Judge, though in a dispute between landlord and tenant, it will have to be held that the learned Single Judge issued a writ of certiorari quashing the said appellate judgment Though it is true that the said issue has been referred by a Bench of Supreme Court to a larger bench in the case of Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath reported in (2009) 5 SCC 616 (Para 32 & 33), fact remains that there is no decision yet taken by the larger Bench of the Supreme Court and therefore the said judgment in Surya Dev Rai, supra, has a binding effect as on the date. The judgment in the case of Surya Dev Rai has been approved and followed in the subsequent judgment in the case of M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax (2009) 1 SCC 8 with reference to the earlier decision of Supreme Court on the issue regarding maintainability of the letters patent appeal. The three Judge Bench of Supreme Court in the case of M.M.T.C. Ltd., supra, approved Surya Dev Rai's judgment and will have to be applied for considering the question in the present appeal. (b) The case of Shalini Shetty and the order of Bombay High Court from which it arose, if seen, show that the Bombay High Court had merely in a few lines dismissed the writ petition holding that the writ petition was not entertained because there were concurrent findings of facts. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge entertained the writ petition and allowed it by setting aside the judgment and order recorded by the District Judge3, Amravati.
(c) The fact that the respondents have lodged crossobjection in respect of certain finding in this appeal indicate that the respondents also wanted to treat the writ petition under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
(d) The question before the Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shetty that was required to be decided was not whether the writ petition was maintainable before the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, that too under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. However, the apex court decided the said issue which did not arise for consideration and therefore the answer given by the Supreme Court on the said issue which did not arise for consideration is merely in the nature of obiter dicta and not the ratio decidendi. As to the obiter dicta, Mr. Bhangde referred to the decisions of Supreme Court in the case of Naresh Shridhar Irajkar v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1 (para 16), Kunju Kutty Sahib v. State of Kerala (1972) 2 SCC 364, Rajput Ruda Meha v. State of Gujarat (1980) 1 SCC 677 (para 6), Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (1983) 1 SCC 147 and the decision of Bombay High Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Murarao Maloji Rao Ghorpade 2009(6) Mh.L.J. 788. Since the ratio decidendi as pronounced in the case of Surya Dev Rai, supra, is presently available as the law of the land the said decision in the case of Shalini Shetty in the form of obiter dicta cannot be preferred and therefore this Court will have to follow the ratio decidendi in the case of Surya Dev Rai, at least, till there is a decision by the larger Bench of the Supreme Court, and thus it will have to be held that the learned Single Judge exercised the power to issue writ of certiorari while quashing the judgment of the District Judge. Consequently the letters patent appeal will have to be held as maintainable. He relied on the decision in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal (2007) 5 SCC 428.
(e) In paragraphs 79 in the case of Shalini Shetty, supra, it has been held that the writ court can interfere if there is any infraction of statute or when a private individual is acting in collusion with the statutory authority. In the case of landlord and tenant now under the present Rent Act, relief was claimed by the landlord in terms of statutory provisions of Section 16 of the Rent Act regarding the grounds for eviction and, therefore, it can be said that the complaint was of infraction of statute.
5. Having heard learned counsel for the rival parties on the preliminary question, we proceed to record our finding . Prayer clause (A) in W.P. No. 5521/09 reads thus :
"It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to :
(A) Quash and set aside the impugned judgment, order and decree passed by the Hon'ble District Judge3, Amravati in Regular Civil Appeal No. 140 of 2008 dated 31.10.2009 and confirm the judgment and order and decree passed by the 3rd Joint Civil Judge, Jr.Dn., Amravati, in Small Causes Suit No. 16/2007 dated 3.7.2008."
6. From the above, it is clear that the prayer does not show that any writ was at all sought and what was sought was only to correct the judgment of the District Judge on the ground that the same was perverse and not in accordance with law and that the District Judge committed error of jurisdiction in not correctly applying the law. With reference to the decision in the case of Shalini Shetty, supra, we find that before the apex court it was urged that the petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are filed against the orders of Civil Court and even disputes between landlord and tenant under the Bombay High Court Rules are called writ petitions. We quote below para 16 and 17 therefrom : " (16) It was urged before this Court that petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution are filed against orders of Civil Court and even in disputes between `landlord and tenant'. Under the Bombay High Court Rules, such petitions are called writ petitions. (17) This Court is unable to appreciate this submission. First of all this Court finds that the petition which was filed before the High Court was a pure and simple writ petition. It was labeled as W.P. No. 7926 of 2008 (page 75 of the SLP paper book)."
7. It is thus clear that in the said case the said question was specifically raised before the apex court. We, therefore, do not agree that the said question did not fall for consideration before the Supreme Court. It is further seen that though the apex court had seen the prayer vide para 19 of the judgment in the aforesaid case, which was for issuance of writ of certiorari, it still held that the said writ petition was not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution. We quote relevant portion from para 19, which reads thus :
"(19) (a) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari and or any other writ, order or command and call upon the papers and proceedings of Appeal No. 314 of 2007 ..."
Referring to Rule 2B of the Bombay High Court (Appellate Side) Rules, 1960, the apex court in para 21 and 22 held that even according to the said rules, petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution are not called writ petitions. We quote para 21 and 22, which reads thus : " Now coming to the Bombay High Court Rules, this Court finds that in Chapter I Rule 2B of the Bombay High Court (Appellate Side) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as rules) it is provided : "2B Petitions/applications under Article 226 an/or 227 of the Constitution of India, arising out of/or relating to an order of penalty or confiscation etc. passed under any special statute. All petitions/applications under Article 226 an/or 227 of the Constitution of India, arising out or relating to an order of penalty or confiscation or an order in the nature thereof an order otherwise of a penal character and passed under any special statute shall be heard and decided by a Division Bench hearing writ petitions. It does not appear from the said Rules that petitions under Article 227 are called writ petitions. What has been provided under the said Rules is that petitions under Article 227 filed in respect of certain category of cases will be heard by a Division Bench hearing writ petitions. That is merely indicative of the forum where such petitions will be heard."
8. After referring to the judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of Jhaman Karamsingh Dadlani v. Ramanlal Maneklal Kantawala (AIR 1975 Bom.182), and in particular para 4 thereof, the apex court in para 27 and 28 observed thus :
" (27) From a perusal of paragraph 4 of Jhaman (supra) it is clear that to a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution of India only the appellate side rules of the High Court apply. But to a proceeding under Article 226, either the original side or the appellate side rules, depending on the situs of the cause of action will apply. (28) Therefore High court rules treat the two proceedings differently in as much as a proceeding under Article 226, being an original proceeding, can be governed under Original Side Rules of the High Court, depending on the situs of the cause of action. A proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution is never an original proceeding and can never be governed under Original Side Rules of the High Court."
Thus the Apex Court held that to a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution, only appellate side rules apply but to a proceeding under Article 226, both namely Original as well as Appellate Side Rules will apply depending on situs of the cause of action; and further that the proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution is never an original proceeding. Consequently, in para 32, the apex court concluded about the nature of the proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution.
9. As regards the controversy raised before us about the ratio decidendi in the case of Surya Dev Rai and about the obiter dicta, the apex court held that the question referred to the larger Bench related only as to whether writ of certiorari could be issued to quash the orders of civil courts. We quote below para 54 therefrom
" (54) In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675, a two judge Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by High Court under Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai (supra) this Court held that a writ of Certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil court, subordinate to the High Court (para 19, page 668 of the report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam and anr. v. Chhabi Nath [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But in so far as the formation of the principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of views."
10. In Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath (2009) 5 SCC 616, supra, while giving reasons for disagreement to part of the ratio in Surya Dev Rai, the Court said thus in para 23, 24, 26 and 32 : " (23) In Mirajkar AIR 1967 SC 1 a nineJudge Constitution Bench considered the history of writ of certiorari and after considering the various English and Indian decisions came to the conclusion "certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction". (emphasis supplied) (See SCC p.18, para 63). The learned Judges in saying so followed the law relating to certiorari as prevalent in England and held that in England the judicial orders passed by the civil courts of plenary jurisdiction in relation to matters brought before them are not amenable to the jurisdiction of certiorari.
(24) The learned Judges in Surya Dev Rai, however, opined that the Judges never held in Mirajkar that the law relating to certiorari in England was accepted by the Supreme Court. But this observation in Surya Dev Rai appears to have been made without properly considering the concurring and a separate opinion given by Sarkar, J. in Mirajkar wherein His Lordship clearly held : (SCC p. 23, para 82)
"82...... As certiorari is a technical word of English law and had its origin in that law, for determining its scope and contents we have necessarily to resort to English law."
(26) The TwoJudge Bench in Surya Dev Rai did not, as obviously it could not overrule the ratio in Mirajkar, a Constitution Bench decision of a nineJudge Bench. (32) The essential distinctions in the exercise of power between Articles 226 and 227 are well known and pointed out in Surya Devi Rai and with that we have no disagreement. But we are unable to agree with the legal proposition laid down in Surya Dev Rai that judicial orders passed by a civil court can be examined and then corrected/reversed by the writ court under Article 226 in exercise of its power under a writ of certiorari. We are of the view that the aforesaid proposition laid down in Surya Dev Rai is contrary to the ratio in Mirajkar and the ratio in Mirajkar has not been overruled in Rupa Ashok Hurra." It is thus clear that the principles laid down regarding scope of interference under Article 227 have been found to be consistent. The apex court then in para 62 of the said judgment formulated the parameters after deducing from various earlier judgments including the case of Surya Dev Rai, for interference under Article 227.
11. From the perusal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge we find that the learned Single Judge found perverse approach on the part of the District Judge in appeal having found the appellant being in joint mess and residence, large area of premises were available other than the one occupied by the tenant for the occupation by landlord and therefore comparative hardship was required to be decided in favour of the tenant in accordance with the object of Section 16(2) of the Maharashtra Rent Act. In nut shell, the ratio in the decision in Shalini Shetty, in a case of pure dispute between landlord and tenant, is that a writ petition under Article 226 is not maintainable but an application (not writ petition) under Article 227 of the Constitution would be maintainable, that too in the light of the parameters laid down in para 62 of the said judgment. We quote below para 62 and 63 therefrom
"On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of powers by High Court under these two Articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the order of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the order of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'.
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.
(i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & ors. Reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provisions, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act,1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.
(m) Th object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. In the facts of the present case, we find that the petition has been entertained as a writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant amongst private parties."
12. The submission made by Mr.Bhangde with reference to para 79 of the said judgment hardly appeals to us. There is no question of infraction of statute when a landlord or a tenant seeks remedy under the provisions of the Rent Act and the infraction of statute referred to in para 79 is about the infraction while performing public duty under the provisions of the enactment by a public officer or the statutory authority. The said submission cannot apply in a case of civil suit between the landlord and a tenant filed on the grounds available under the provisions of Section16 or any other provision of Rent Act. In our opinion, all the submissions made by Mr. Bhangde stand answered in the light of the above discussion and various paragraphs of the apex court judgment which we have quoted from the judgment of Shalini Shetty.
13. As regards the observations made in the said decision by the Supreme Court about the entertainment of writ petitions in case of pure property disputes between the landlord and tenant, we first quote para 79 which reads thus :
" (79) However, this Court unfortunately discerns that of late there is a growing trend amongst several High Courts to entertain writ petition in cases of pure property disputes. Disputes relating to partition suits, matters relating to execution of a decree, in cases of dispute between `landlord and tenant' and also in a case of money decree and in various other cases where disputed question of property are involved, writ courts are entertaining such disputes. In some cases High Courts, in a routine manner, entertain petition under Article 227 over such disputes and such petitions are treated as writ petitions. Thus from reading of paragraph 79 it is clear that in Shalini's case the apex court expressed anguish regarding the trend of entertaining writ petitions in routine course in relation to the landlord and tenant and the said expression was made by the Hon'ble supreme court in response to the point that was raised before it in para 16 of the judgment. Paragraphs 81, 82 and 83 of the said judgment read thus : (81) As a result of frequent interference by Hon'ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the administration of justice.
(82) This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, Hon'ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the highest courts of justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly.
(83) For the reasons aforesaid, it is held that the High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant and where the only respondent is a private landlord. The course adopted by the High Court cannot be approved."
14. From the above paragraphs and over all reading of the judgment in Shalini's case, it is seen that petitions under Article 227 can be filed and entertained but should be within the parameters stated in paragraphs 62 and 63 of Shalini's judgment. Reading of paragraphs 82 and 83 clearly shows that there is authoritative pronouncement from the Hon'ble Supreme Court which has to be followed, giving strict meaning and not any loose meaning. It is thus the ratio decidendi that is laid down by the Supreme Court in Shalini's case and not the obiter, as contended by Mr.Bhangde. To reiterate, the same is a direct pronouncement on the issue regarding the petitions arising out of disputes between `landlord and tenant' and entertaining the same under Article 227 of the Constitution. Even otherwise, considering the submission made by Mr.Bhangde that the same is obiter, we find that in para 26 of the judgment in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal (2007) 5 SCC 428, in para 26, side indicator `c' at page 445 of the reports reads `an obiter dictum of this court may be binding only on the High Courts in the absence of any direct pronouncement on that question by this Court.' We have therefore no hesitation in rejecting the submissions made by Mr.Bhangde on the issue of obiter in Shalini's case.
15. It is thus clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court while being emphatic in para 81 and 82, reposed trust as expressed in the said paragraph. In our opinion, we are duty bound to follow the said dictum laid down by the apex court and we do respectfully follow the same. In the result, we uphold the preliminary objection raised by the respondents and hold that the present appeal is not maintainable. We, therefore, dismiss the letters patent appeal.