K. Balakrishnan Nair, J.
1. The third respondent in the Writ Petition, the High Court of Kerala, represented by its Registrar, is the appellant. The 1st respondent herein was the writ petitioner.
2. The brief facts of the case are the following:
The 1st respondent, while working as Judicial First Class Magistrate, Palakkad, was suspended from service on 12.2.1994, in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. It appears, the suspension was preceded by certain preliminary enquiries held by the High Court through its Vigilance Wing. The preliminary enquiry against him was held based on a report filed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palakkad, who noticed some irregularities committed by the 1st respondent. Later, the 1st respondent was served with Ext.Pl memo of charges on 5.3.1994. The allegations in Ext.Pl memo were to the effect that he tampered with the depositions of PWs.3, 4 and 7 in C.C. No. 73/1991, a case tried by him, so as to help the accused. The 1st respondent submitted Ext.P2 reply to the said charge-sheet. He admitted the existence of tampering in the depositions, but contended that he was not responsible for it. Later, he was served with Ext.P3 memo of charges dated 26.10.1994. The allegations against him in the said memo of charges were more or less identical to those in Ext.P1. Those charges related to C.C. No. 225/91, which was tried by him. The 1st respondent submitted Ext.P4 reply, not disputing the existence of the irregularity, but denying his involvement in it. The High Court found the replies of the 1st respondent not satisfactory and therefore, the Additional District Judge, Palakkad was appointed as the Enquiry Officer, to enquire into the charges. The learned Additional District Judge, after holding enquiry, submitted Exts.P7 and P8 reports, wherein the 1st respondent was held to be guilty for making the tampering/corrections. The Administrative Committee of the High Court, which considered the enquiry reports, decided to accept them. It was also tentatively decided to impose the punishment of dismissal from service. Thereafter, Ext.P9 show cause notice dated 5.8.1996 was issued to him, calling upon him to show cause why the said penalty should not be imposed on him. Along with Ext.P9, copies of the enquiry reports were also furnished to him. The 1st respondent submitted Ext.P10 reply. In that reply, he has dealt with the findings in the enquiry against him and pleaded that they are not based on the evidence on record and therefore, should not be made the basis for the action against him. He also pleaded that the imposition of the proposed penalty was not warranted. The Administrative Committee considered Ext. Pl0 reply of the 1st respondent and decided to reject it. It was also decided to dismiss him from service. When the matter was placed before the Full Court, the decision of the Administrative Committee was approved with a modification that the punishment shall be removal from service. Thereafter, the Registrar of this Court addressed the Government by letter dated 21.5.1997, requesting to remove the 1st respondent from service. The Government, by Ext.Pl1 order dated 14.8.1997, accepted the recommendation of this Court and removed the 1st respondent from service with effect from the date of his suspension. The 1st respondent, thereupon, filed Ext.P12 review petition on 28.10.1997, praying to review Ext.P11. The Government considered the review petition and forwarded Ext.P13 note to the High Court, suggesting that the punishment is liable to be reviewed, according to it. The Administrative Committee of the High Court considered the matter first and thereafter, a Sub Committee of Judges was appointed to look into the matter and still later, based on the report of the subcommittee, the matter was considered by the Full Court and Ext.R3(a) note was sent to the Government, recommending to dismiss the review petition. The Government accepted the views of the High Court and by Ext.P14 order, dismissed the review petition on 27.01.2004. Later, the 1st respondent filed another review petition before the Government. This time also, the views of the High Court were sought and it replied, inter alia, stating that a second review petition is not maintainable. On merits also, the High Court informed the Government that there is no reason to reconsider the matter. In the light of the said advice, the Government dismissed the second review petition by Ext.P15 order dated 7.6.2005. The 1st respondent filed the Writ Petition, challenging Exts.P11, P14 and P15.
3. The 1st respondent contended that before accepting the report of the Enquiry Officer, the High Court should have furnished a copy of the same to him and considered his views on the report. In support of that submission, reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Managing Director, E.C.I.L v. B. Karunakar : (1993) 4 SCC 727. The 1st respondent also contended that the Government being the appointing authority and therefore, the competent authority to impose the punishment of removal from service, should have issued show cause notice to him and heard him. Since the Government did not do that, the impugned orders are vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice and therefore, liable to be quashed. The 1st respondent further contended that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are not supported by the evidence on record and therefore, should not have been accepted by the High Court or the Government.
4. The appellant herein filed a detailed counter affidavit, resisting the prayers in the Writ Petition. It was pointed out that in matters of disciplinary action concerning judicial officers, the Government are absolutely bound by the views expressed by the High Court. Secondly, it was pointed out that since the enquiry reports were furnished to the 1st respondent along with Ext.P9 show cause notice and since he has shown cause not only against the proposed punishment, but also against accepting the findings of the Enquiry Officer, no prejudice has been caused to him. Other contentions were also taken. But, the learned Single Judge upheld the contentions of the 1st respondent and allowed the Writ Petition, quashing Exts.P11, P14 and P15. The learned Single Judge found that the 1st respondent should have been given an opportunity of being heard by the Government before issuing Ext.P11 order. Since that opportunity was not given, Ext.P11 is issued in violation of the guarantees under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Finally, the learned Judge directed the Government to consider the matter regarding the punishment afresh in accordance with law, after affording an opportunity of being heard, bearing in mind the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Managing Director, E.C.I.L (supra). The learned Judge did not deal with the contention of the 1st respondent that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are not based on any evidence, for the reason that the matter was being remitted to the Government. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment, the High Court has preferred this appeal.
5. We heard the learned senior counsel Sri. K.R.B. Kaimal for the appellant, Sri. P.S. Biju for the 1st respondent and the learned senior Government Pleader Sri. Benny Gervasis for the State. The learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that in matters of disciplinary proceedings against judicial officers, though the Government, being the appointing authority, alone are competent to pass orders of dismissal or removal from service, in view of the constitutional guarantee under Article 311(2), they are absolutely bound by the views expressed by the High Court concerning the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent. All the decisions of the Apex Court, including those in State of Haryana v. Inder Prakash Anand : (1976) 2 SCC 977, T. Lakshmi Narasimha Chari v. High Court of A.P. : (1996) 5 SCC 90 and Registrar (Admn.) v. Sisir Kanta Satapathy : (1999)7 SCC 725 support the above proposition. If that be so, the views expressed by the High Court being binding on the Government, no purpose will be served by the Government hearing the 1st respondent. It is going to be only an empty formality or a futile exercise. The Government cannot take any independent decision based on the evidence on record. So, the interference made by the learned Single Judge with the impugned orders, for the reason that the Government did not hear the delinquent, is unsustainable in law. The learned senior counsel also submitted that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are fully supported by the evidence on record and they were rightly accepted by the High Court.
6. Sri. P.S. Biju, learned Counsel for the 1st respondent, on the other hand, pointed out that the learned Single Judge did not properly appreciate the purport of the contention made by the 1st respondent relying on Managing Director, E.C.I.L (supra). The contention urged was that before accepting the enquiry reports, the High Court should have furnished copies of them to him and his views should have been obtained and considered. The learned Counsel, relying on the decision in Managing Director, E. C. I. L (supra), contended that the acceptance of the enquiry report, without giving the 1st respondent an opportunity to represent against it, vitiates the entire proceedings. Thus, the learned Counsel tried to sustain the judgment of the learned Single Judge on this ground.
7. In answer, the learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that along with Ext.P9 show cause notice, the 1st respondent was served with Exts.P7 and P8 enquiry reports also. Going by Ext.P10 reply, it can be seen that the 1st respondent had made an elaborate representation against the findings of the Enquiry Officer and stated his reasons why those findings should not be accepted. He also represented against the proposed penalty. So, no prejudice has been caused to the 1st respondent. In the absence of any prejudice, there need not be any interference with the impugned orders, it is pointed out. Further, in Ext.P10 reply he did not raise any grievance regarding non-furnishing of the copies of the enquiry reports. He must be taken to have waived the said objection. A point not taken before the disciplinary authority or Government cannot be permitted to be taken before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is submitted.
8. We also heard the learned senior Government Pleader, who did not dispute the position that in disciplinary matters concerning judicial officers, the Government are bound to follow the recommendations of the High Court. He also submitted that the orders impugned in the Writ Petition have been passed by the Government in conformity with the views of the High Court.
9. Now, it is well settled that in matters relating to disciplinary proceedings against judicial officers, the Government are bound to follow the views expressed by the High Court. The independence of the judiciary is one of the basic features of the Constitution. That means, there cannot even be any valid constitutional amendment, which will have the effect of tinkering with the independence of the judicial wing of the Government. If the executive Government are given a free hand to decide whether the findings in the disciplinary enquiry against a judicial officer are sustainable and whether the choice of penalty is proper, the same will definitely compromise on the independence of the judicial officer concerned. He will be trembling, when he has to take decisions concerning persons with political clout, because during his career at one stage or the other, such person can mar his prospects. But, the constitutional provisions from Article 235 onwards and the relevant rules in the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules firmly insulate the judiciary from the executive arm of the Government.
10. To buttress the point concerning supremacy of the views of the High Court in disciplinary matter of judicial officers, it is not necessary to refer to any precedent. But, for the sake of completeness, we will refer to some of the important decisions. First, we refer to the decision of the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Inder Prakash Anand : (1976) 2 SCC 977, wherein it was held as follows:
11. The decisions of this Court in State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi : AIR 1966 SC 447 and High Court of Punjab and Haryatia v. State of Haryana (sub nom Narendra Singh Rao) : (1975) 1 SCC 843 are that Article 235 vests in the High Court control over District Courts and courts subordinate thereto. The Governor appoints and dismisses and removes judicial officers. Control which is vested in the High Court is complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment including dismissal, removal, reduction in rank and the initial posting and of the initial promotion to District Judges. There is nothing in Article 235 to restrict the control of the High Court in respect of Judges other than District Judges in any manner. Article 311 has taken away the power of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank from the High Court and the Governor has been given that special power referred to in Article 311(3).
12. This Court in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab : (1974) 2 SCC 831 held that when a case is not of removal or dismissal or reduction in rank any order in respect of exercise of control over the judicial officers is by the High Court and no other authority. There cannot be dual control. If State Government is to have the power of deciding whether a judicial officer should be retained in service after attaining the age of 55 years up to the age of 58 years that will seriously affect the independence of the Judiciary and take away the control vested in the High Court. Compulsory retirement is neither suspension nor dismissal nor removal nor reduction in rank. It is unsound to contend that the Governor and not the High Court has the power to retire a judicial officer compulsorily under Section 14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act. The suggestion that the High Court recommends and the State Government is to implement the recommendation in the matter of compulsory retirement is to destroy the control of the High Court.
In T. Lakshmi Narasimha Chari v. High Court of A.P. : (1996) 5 SCC 90, the Apex Court held as follows:
16. In our opinion Rule 21(2) can be interpreted in conformity with Article 235 without the requirement of reading any limitation therein as indicated by the High Court. The second part of Article 235 enables the framing of such a rule to confer a right of appeal. Such a provision for appeal must be construed to mean that the appeal to the Governor against the order of the High Court provides for reconsideration of the High Court's order by the Governor, but in keeping with the requirement of Article 235 that the power of control over persons belonging to the judicial service of a State vests in the High Court, and that the appeal must be decided by the Governor only in accordance with the opinion of the High Court. In other words, such an appeal has to be forwarded by the Governor to the High Court for its opinion, which would enable the High Court to reconsider its earlier decision and give its opinion to the Governor, in accordance with which the Governor must decide the appeal. In short, the remedy of such an appeal provided by the Rules which have been framed in consultation with the High Court is in the nature of a provision for reconsideration or review by the High Court of its earlier decision. The High Court on reconsideration of the matter has to give its opinion to the Governor and the Governor must invariably act in accordance with the opinion so given by the High Court. The Governor has no option to act in a manner different from that recommended by the High Court, This procedure requires reconsideration by the High Court of its earlier opinion and the opinion given by the High Court after reconsideration indicates the manner of decision of that appeal. There is thus no erosion in the control vested in the High Court over persons belonging to the judicial service of a State; and the requirement of an appeal i.e. reconsideration of the earlier decision is also satisfied. In this process, any comments by the Governor on the merits of the case would also receive consideration of the High Court before it forms the final opinion and forwards its recommendation to the Governor for decision of the appeal in accordance with that opinion. This is the scheme and requirement of Article 235. We are informed that similar provision exists for appeal in the case of persons belonging to the judicial service in some other States and the Rule is worked in the manner indicated. Such a construction of the Rule gives effect to the provision for appeal consistent with the right of appeal available under the second part of Article 235 and is consistent with the vesting of control in the High Court over the subordinate judiciary.
Again, in Registrar (Admn.) v. Sisir Kanta Satapathy : (1999) 7 SCC 725, the Apex Court held as follows:
15. On going through the judgments of this Court right from Shyamlal v. State of U.P. : AIR 1954 SC 369 down to High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal : (1998) 3 SCC 72 one cannot but reach one conclusion regarding the power of the High Court in the matter of ordering compulsory retirement. That conclusion is that the High Courts are vested with the disciplinary control as well as administrative control over the members of the judicial service exclusively, but that does not mean that they can also pass orders of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination from service while exercising administrative and disciplinary control over the members of the judicial service. Undoubtedly, the High Courts alone are entitled to initiate, to hold enquiry and to take a decision in respect of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination from service, but the formal order to give effect to such a decision has to be passed only by the State Governor on the recommendation of the High Court. It is well settled again by a catena of decisions of this Court that the recommendation of the High Court is binding on the State Government/Governor (vide para. 18 in Inder Prakash Anand case).
In the light of the above decisions, it is futile to contend that the Government have any independent power in these matters. If the Government cannot take any decision on its own, there is no point in asking the Government to hear the delinquent and take a decision. Therefore, the direction issued by the learned Single Judge in this regard is plainly untenable.
11. The next point to be considered is whether the disciplinary proceedings are vitiated for not furnishing a copy of the enquiry report to the 1st respondent and obtaining his views before accepting the views of the Enquiry Officer, Before the 42nd amendment to Article 311, a reasonable opportunity of showing cause to the proposed action in disciplinary proceedings was found to contain a right to represent against the proposed penalty also. When the proposed penalty is put to the delinquent, he will be served with a copy of the enquiry report. Thus, he got an opportunity to represent against the findings of the Enquiry Officer also. The above view was holding the field, which is re-stated in the decision of the Apex Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India : AIR 1958 SC 300. In the said decision, it was held as follows:
It is true that the provision does not, in terms, refer to different stages at which opportunity is to be given to the officer concerned. All that it says is that the Government servant must be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. He must not only be given an opportunity but such opportunity must be a reasonable one. In order that the opportunity to show cause against the proposed action may be regarded as a reasonable one, it is quite obviously necessary that the Government servant should have the opportunity, to say, if that be his case, that he has not been guilty of any misconduct to merit any punishment at all and also that the particular punishment proposed to be given is much more drastic and severe than he deserves. Both these pleas have a direct bearing on the question of punishment and may well be put forward in showing cause against the proposed punishment. If this is the correct meaning of the clause, as we think it is, what consequences follow? If it is open to the Government servant under this provision to contend, if that be the fact, that he is not guilty of any misconduct then how can he take that plea unless he is told what misconduct is alleged against him? If the opportunity to show cause is to be a reasonable one it is clear that he should be informed about the charge or charges levelled against him and the evidence by which it is sought to be established, for it is only then that he will be able to put forward his defence. If the purpose of this provision is to give the Government servant an opportunity to exonerate himself from the charge and if this opportunity is to be a reasonable one he should be allowed to show that the evidence against him is not worthy of credence or consideration and that he can only do if he is given a chance to cross-examine the witnesses called against him and to examine himself or any other witness in support of his defence. All this appears to us to be implicit in the language used in the clause, but this does not exhaust his rights. In addition to showing that he has not been guilty of any misconduct so as to merit any punishment, it is reasonable that he should also have an opportunity to contend that the charges proved against him do not necessarily require the particular punishment proposed to be meted out to him. He may say, for instance, that although he has been guilty of some misconduct it is not of much a character as to merit the extreme punishment of dismissal or even of removal or reduction in rank and that any of the lesser punishments ought to be sufficient in his case.
To summarise: the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provision under consideration includes:
(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based;
(b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross- examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally
(c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the Government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the Government servant. In short the substance of the protection provided by rules, like Rule 55 referred to above, was bodily lifted out of the rules and together with an additional opportunity embodied in Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 so as to give a statutory protection to the Government servants and has now been incorporated in Article 311(2) so as to convert the protection into a constitutional safeguard.
The above interpretation of the phrase 'a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him' became untenable after the 42nd amendment of the Constitution of India, as per which a proviso was added to Article 311(2), taking away the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. The above constitutional amendment was upheld by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in its decision in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel : AIR 1985 SC 1416. As a result of the amendment and the above decision, the delinquent employee will be unaware of the result of the enquiry until he is served with the order of punishment. That means, against the charges he will file his written statement of defence. Thereafter, witnesses will be examined in support of the charges and he will be given an opportunity to cross-examine them. He will also be given an opportunity to examine his own witnesses. Once the enquiry is over, he will be totally in the dark as to what will be the conclusions of the enquiry officer and the decision of the disciplinary authority on them. Taking note of this situation, the Apex Court held that at the appellate stage the delinquent should be given an opportunity of being heard. In Ram Chander v. Union of India : AIR 1986 SC 1173, it was held as follows:
24. ...
It is not necessary for our purposes to go into the vexed question whether a post-decisional hearing is a substitute of the denial of a right of hearing at the initial stage or the observance of the rules of natural justice since the majority in Tulsiram Patel's case : AIR 1985 SC 1416 unquivocally lays down that the only stage at which a Government servant gets 'a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him' i.e. an opportunity to exonerate himself from the charge by showing that the evidence adduced at the inquiry is not worthy of credence or consideration or that the charges proved against him are not of such a character as to merit the extreme penalty of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank and that any of the lesser punishments ought to have been sufficient in this case, is at the stage of hearing of a departmental appeal. Such being the legal position, it is of utmost importance after the Forty-Second Amendment as interpreted by the majority in Tulsiram Patel's case that the Appellate Authority must not only give a hearing to the Government servant concerned but also pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised by him in the appeal.
In the context of the above legal position, the Apex Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan : AIR 1991 SC 471 held that the enquiry report being an adverse material pressed into service against the delinquent, before accepting the said report by the disciplinary authority, the employee should be given an opportunity to submit why the report should not be accepted. The said decision was further explained and clarified in Managing Director, ECIL (supra). The Apex Court, in the latter decision, held that even if the enquiry report is not served, unless prejudice is shown by the delinquent, interference with the disciplinary proceedings is not warranted. It was also held that even if prejudice is shown, the court should hear on his objections against the enquiry report. Unless the court is impressed by the objections, the matter need not be remitted, as the same is going to be an empty formality. The relevant portions, where the Apex Court dealt with the above aspects, are the following:
30. Hence the incidental questions raised above may be answered as follows:
(i)....
(v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him....
31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present...
Recently, in Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy : 2005 (4) KLT SN 31 (C. No. 42) SC : (2005) 6 SCC 321, it was held as follows:
6. Additionally, there was no material placed by the employee to show as to how he has been prejudiced. Though in all cases the post-decisional hearing cannot be a substitute for pre-decisional hearing, in the case at hand the position is different. The position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar SCC at p.758, para 31 which reads as follows:
31. Hence, in all cases, where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.It is to be further noted that in the appeal before the Appellate Authority findings of the inquiry officer and disciplinary authority were challenged and, therefore, the question of any prejudice does not arise. Since the employee had the opportunity to meet the stand of the Bank, it was to his advantage, and opportunity for personal hearing was also granted. Keeping in view what was observed in B. Karunakar case there was no question of violation of principles of natural justice.
12. In this case, we notice that in Ext.P10 reply, the 1st respondent did not raise any objection regarding the acceptance of the enquiry report without giving him a chance to object to that. He raised his objections only against the merits of the findings of the enquiry officer. In Ext.P12 review petition also, he did not demur against the acceptance of the enquiry report before giving him a copy of the same and getting his views. In Ext.Pl0, we notice that the 1st respondent elaborately raised his objections against the enquiry report. He also stated why the proposed punishment should not be imposed on him. In fact, the opportunity to represent at the later stage, that is, at the stage of imposing punishment, has benefitted him. If he represents against the enquiry report before the same is considered by the disciplinary authority, he will not be able to know the views of the disciplinary authority and disabuse it. He will not get an opportunity to know about the proposed punishment also. In this case, when the 1st respondent filed Ext.P10, he had the advantage of knowing the views of the disciplinary authority on the enquiry report and also about the proposed punishment. Therefore, we are of the view that the 1st respondent did not suffer any disability or prejudice. So, we think, this is not a fit case where this Court should interfere with the disciplinary proceedings, for the reason of non-furnishing of the enquiry report before its acceptance by the disciplinary authority.
13. The next point to be considered is whether, in fact, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent, the findings of the Enquiry Officer are perverse. We went through Exts,P7 and P8 reports. The learned Additional District Judge (Enquiry Officer) has given cogent reasons for arriving at the conclusions. The evidence on record has been analysed meticulously and only thereafter, the Enquiry Officer has entered a finding regarding the guilt of the 1st respondent. The said finding has been accepted by the disciplinary authority also. We find it difficult to endorse the view canvassed by the 1st respondent that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are based on no evidence. Further, it is well settled that this Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact entered by the competent authorities, which are supported by some evidence, in disciplinary proceedings, There is no complaint regarding any procedural impropriety. In the result, the judgment of the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained. We allow this Writ Appeal, reverse the judgment of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the Writ Petition.
W.P.(C) No. 20161/2007:
14. In this case, the High Court challenges Ext.P11 order passed by the Government pursuant to the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 22829/2005, which we have now reversed in W.A. No. 1560/2007. Ext.P11 being a dependent proceeding, it cannot survive after the reversal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and Ext.P11 is quashed.