Y.P. Nargotra, J.
1. One of the defendants, Madan Lal in the suit instituted by respondent-Ravi Kumar has filed this Civil 1st Appeal for challenging the judgment and decree dated 31st October 1996 passed by the learned District Judge, Kathua. The plaintiff filed the suit for restoration of possession of Single Storey Pacca Shop situated at village Chhan Datyal (Chadwal Morh) Tehsil Hira Nagar and for recovery of damages to the tune of Rs. 20,000/- against the appellant and respondent No. 2 under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, on the allegations that the plaintiff was in possession of the said shop described in the plaint as a tenant on monthly rent of Rs. 125/- with effect from February 15, 1986 and agreement in this behalf stood executed between the plaintiff and the father of defendant No. 1. Despite the expiry of period of tenancy, the plaintiff continued to be in possession of the suit shop till night of 16/17th March 1992, on which, date the defendant No. 1 tress-passed into the shop during the night and unlawfully removed and caused damage to the property of the plaintiff lying in the shop. The plaintiff lodged the FIR, upon which the defendant No. 1 was arrested and put on trial also and convicted. The plaintiff further alleged in the suit that defendant No. 1 forcibly and otherwise than in due course of law dispossessed him from the aforesaid shop, therefore, prayed for a decree of restoration of possession of the suit shop and payment of Rs. 20,000/- as damages by the defendant No. 1. The suit was brought admittedly within six months from the date of dispossession of the plaintiff. The suit was contested on various grounds before the learned Trial Court. The learned Trial court framed the following issues :-
'(1) Whether the defendant-1 in the garb of filing a revision petition got interim order and before the visit of the Commissioner on 23-7-92, by force affected the entry into the suit shop against the plaintiff's consent and depriving the plaintiff of the possession of the suit shop unlawfully? -O.P.P.
(1-A) If issue No. 1 is not proved whether the plaintiff has been dispossessed from the suit shop otherwise in due course of law by defendant No. 1 within six months prior to the filing of the suit? -O.P.P.
(2) In case issue 1 or 1-A are proved in affirmative, whether the plaintiff is entitled to get restoration of possession of the suit shop and also damages to the tune of Rs. 20,000/-.
(3) Relief.'
The parties to the suit led evidence; Learned Trial Court, after appreciating evidence of the parties, vide his judgment dated 31st October 1996 held:-
'...... Thus in totality of the facts disclosed by the witnesses and the circumstances, it is established that till 16th March 92, the plaintiff was in possession of the suit shop and it is during the night of 16th and 17th March 1992, the defendant-1 got into possession of the suit shop without the consent of the plaintiff by making entry from the rare side and throwing out his articles and since then is in its possession. But this is not proved that it is during the night of 20th and 21st of July 1992 that he (defendant) got into possession of the suit shop. The suit having been filed on 15-9-92 and dispossession of plaintiff having taken place during the night of 16/17 March, 1992, the suit is within six months from the date of dispossession and issue No. 1 and 1-A are decided accordingly.'
On issue No. 2, learned Trial Court has not held plaintiff entitled to the damages. Consequently, learned Trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff by holding him entitled to a decree for restoration of the possession of the suit property under the provisions of Section 9 of the Specific relief Act.
Aggrieved by the Judgment of the learned trial Court, the appellant-Defendant No. 1 has filed this appeal.
Learned counsel for the defendant/respondent No. 1 has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal. He has submitted that in view of the provisions contained in Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, no appeal is maintainable against the decree passed in another suit instituted under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. Section 9 of the Act reads as follows:
'9. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property. -- If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in that suit.
Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof.
No suit under this section shall be brought against the Government.
No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed.'
Mr. S.D. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, when confronted with the above said provision of law fairly conceded that appeal against the decree passed under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act is not maintainable nor any review of the judgment permissible. However, he prayed that even if the appeal is not maintainable his appeal be treated as revision.
The prayer was allowed and consequently, this appeal was directed to be registered as revision. This revision has been taken on board and learned counsel for the parties have been heard.
Mr. S.D. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner has primarily contended that respondent-1 was tenant and his tenancy stood expired ; therefore, he had no right to continue in suit premises. Even if it is held that he was ousted by the Landlord having a valid title to the property, even then he could not be put back into possession as his right to continue in possession stood forfeited. In support of his contention, he has relied upon a Full Bench Judgment of this Court in case Bhagat Rajinder Kumar Sawkney and Anr. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Anr., reported in, AIR 1960 Jammu and Kashmir 50, in case Sarswati Gir v. Dhanpal Singh reported in, (AIR 1992 Punjab And Haryana 13) and in case M.C. Chockaligam and Ors. v. V. Manickavasagam and Ors. reported in, (AIR 1974 SC 104).
On the other hand, contention of Mr. Raghu Mehta, learned counsel for the respondents is that the plaintiff being a tenant of the premises was in peaceful possession thereof and if the landlord i.e. defendant-appellant had to evict him, he could take resort to legal action and not to illegal force. According to him, the law protects the peaceful possession and rejects as forcible dispossession by resorting to unlawful means opposed to the principles of due process of law. He has urgued that since the original tenancy is admitted from the evidence produced before the learned trial court, the tenant-respondent has fully established that he was dispossessed forcibly by the appellant and therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in ordering the restoration of possession in his suit filed under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act within the statutory period of six months.
Before appreciating the rival contentions of the parties, it will be apt to take note of the legal principles enunciated in the authorities relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord.
In AIR 1960 J&K; 50, a Full Bench Judgment of this Court, it was argued that right of the lessor to remain in possession is a fundamental right and can, therefore, be protected by the Court under Articles 19, 226 and 32 of the Constitution (Application to J&K; Order).Their Lordships of the Full Bench did not accept the argument and held:
'The words liable to resumption in Rule 25 of the Wasidari Rules connote that after the lessee commits a breach of the terms of the lease, the lessor (i.e. the State Government) is entitled to resume the property, i.e. to re-enter the property and take possession of it. It is well settled that a lessor while enforcing his right of forfeiture has every right Co take possession of the premises without his having to resort to court to obtain an order for possession provided it is done peaceably and without actual resistence.'
In AIR 1992 Punjab and Haryana 13, High Court of Punjab and Haryana after noticing the above quoted Full Bench Judgment of this Court held:
'10. The lessor defendant having enforced his right of forfeiture has every right to take possession of the disputed premises. He has been found to be in possession of the leased out premises. His possession cannot be termed either illegal or unlawful and the defaulting lessee whose lease already stood terminated on breach of express covenants of the lease deed could not move the Court for restoration of possession to him so that he could remain in possession for the enexpired lease period.
In my view, both the Judgments referred to above, do not apply in the present case. The Full Bench Judgment of this Court does not apply firstly, because in that case the dispossession was caused by the Government and this being so, there was a express bar contained in Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act for filing suits for restoration of possession under this Section against the Government and secondly, because that the proposition of law referred to by their Lordships did not pertain to forcible dispossession. It referred only to peaceful dispossession and that too without any resistance. The Judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court (Supra) also does not apply to the present case because that case too was not of forcible dispossession. In the present case. It has not been established that lease of the lessee stood terminated by a flux of time and thereafter the principle of holding over did not apply to the case of the plaintiff-tenant. It is the positive case of the plaintiff that he was forcibly dispossessed by the defendant and therefore, he had claimed restoration of possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, within a period of six months from the date of his dispossession. Therefore, on these facts, the said two authorities have no application. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon on a case in M.C. Chockaligam and Ors. v. V. Manickavasagam and Ors., (AIR 1974 SC 104). This authority, infact, goes against the contention of the petitioner itself when we read Para 13, of the Judgment. Their Lordships held that: '13. We are concerned in this case with the concept of 'lawful possession' in the context of the Act with which we are concerned. As stated earlier, Rule 13 has got two parts and we are concerned in this case with the second part. A great stress has been given by Mr. Setalvad upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh's case (1968) 2 SCR 203 : AIR 1968 SC 620 (supra) where this Court considered the possession of tenant after expiry of the lease, as in this case, as a juridical possession in the context of a provision similar to Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. He emphasizes that such a juridical possession would be a lawful possession, as law, namely, protects it under Section 6 (new) of the Specific Relief Act. Mr. Setalvad submits that since even with the best of title to the property the landlord cannot forcibly dispossess a tenant after expiry of the lease, his possession is not only protected by law but also recognized by law and, therefore, his possession is lawful possession and the licensing authority was right in renewing the licence which the Board of Revenue had wrongly interfered with. After giving anxious consideration, we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Setalvad. All that Section 6 (new) of the Specific Relief Act provides is that a person, even if he is a landlord, cannot take the law into his own hands and forcibly evict a tenant after expiry of the lease. This section has relevance only to the wrongful act of a person, if it be by the landlord, in forcibly recovering possession of the property without recourse of law. Section 6 frowns upon forcible dispossession without recourse to law but does not at the same time declare that the possession of the evicted person is a lawful possession. The question of lawful possession does not enter the issue at that stage. All that the Court is then required to consider is whether an evicted person has been wrongfully dispossessed and he has come to the Court within six months of the dispossession. The various civil rights between the landlord and the tenant will have to be adjudicated upon finally in a regular civil suit if filed.....'
Thus, in this authority, the Apex Court has not disputed the legal proposition that Landlord cannot take law into his hands and forcibly evict the tenant after the expiry of the lease and, therefore, if the Landlord does so under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, restoration of the possession can be ordered. In my opinion law respects the peaceful possession and frowns at forcible dispossession of a person who may have lost the right to continue by which he acquired the, possession. That is the reason the Legislature has not given any right to appeal or review to a person who has been proved to take the law into his own hands for dispossessing the other party. The only remedy available to such a person is that of revision, the scope of jurisdiction of which is limited and not large as that of appeal. In revisional jurisdiction the person who has forcibly dispossessed the other party who was peacefully enjoying the possession, cannot be allowed to justify his action by urging that such dispossessed person has forfeited his right of possession under law. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard and finding of learned Trial Court that respondent No. 1, i.e. plaintiff was entitled to a decree of restoration of possession, cannot be faulted with.
It has next been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a Commissioner was also sent in a revision petition filed in this Court to go on spot, who has reported that there is no shop existing and there is only a house on the spot, therefore, restoration of possession of the shop could not be ordered by the learned Trial Court, as the property which was claimed in the suit was not existing on the spot in the shape it was earlier in possession of the plaintiff. There is no merit in the contention because after dispossession of the tenant forcibly, if the petitioner has converted the property into a house, the decree cannot be rendered unexecutable. He is bound to hand over the possession of the property in the shape he took it from the plaintiff forcibly as no one can be permitted to defeat the law by his wrongful acts. In the event of restoration of the possession, if on spot the opening made by the petitioner in the shop for changing its nature has to be closed, it can be closed by the plaintiff also at the cost of the defendant. Respondent No. 1, if at all has to recover the possession on the ground of forfeiture of lease agreement; he can do so by filing a regular suit.
It has also been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the suit of the plaintiff ought to have been rejected under Order 7 Rule 11, as the plaintiff had not specifically stated in his plaint as to when cause of action accrued to him, if at all had accrued. Similar objection was raised by the petitioner before the learned Trial Court and the learned Trial Court repelled the objection raised by saying that'
'The plaint though not happily worded as regards para-10, but in totality it has disclosed the cause of action and circumstances in which it has accrued and as such the plea of the learned Advocate for the defendant that it does not disclose the cause of action, does not hold good. Though no issue in this regard has been framed, but being issue of law it can always be taken up for consideration at any time and learned Advocate have conceded that even without framing the issues, the Court can decide the matter after hearing the parties, It is as such held that the objections of learned Advocate for the defendant that this is non disclosure of cause of action, is misconceived and plaint cannot be rejected.'
I am in full agreement with the learned Trial Court. Cause of action may consist of bundle of facts narrated in the plaint. There is no legal bar in considering the averments made in the plaint to find out whether any cause of action is available to the plaintiff. A plaintiff cannot be non-suited merely for not specifically stating so in one of the paras of the plaint. Learned Trial Court was right in saying that the cause of action stood disclosed on the facts and circumstances of the case stated in the plaint. Therefore, There is no merit in the revision petition and the Judgment and decree of learned Trial Court does not call for any interference. The revision petition, is, therefore, dismissed.