Sunil Hali, J.
1. This Civil 1st Appeal is directed against judgment dated 31-07-2003 passed by the Principal District Judge, Anantnag.
2. The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 filed a suit for declaration and possession and for seeking mesne profits against the defendants. The suit was filed by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 seeking ownership rights on the basis of gift deed dated 06-11-1968 of land measuring 20 kanals under survey Nos. 410 and 1829 situated at Rambirpora, Anantnag. It is averred that as a consequence of gift deed, the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was put into possession of the aforesaid land. The said gift deed was not challenged by the defendants. The second limb of the suit relates to 3 kanals and 15 marlas of land under survey Nos. 1829, 8 kanals under survey No. 1838 situated at Rambirpora, Aanatnag on the basis of compromise entered into between the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 and one Jalil Khan who was tenant. The basis of this compromise was that an application for resumption was filed by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 belonging to defence category against the tenant under the Agrarian Reforms Act. The said suit was filed by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 being an adopted son of S. Sucha Singh. It is averred in the plaint that he was an adopted son of S. Sucha Singh and entitled to file this suit against the tenant. The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 also claimed l0 kanals of land from survey No. 410 situated at Rambirpora on the basis of compromise arrived at with said Jalil Khan. That the edifice of plaintiff's suit was based on the fact that he was adopted by S.Sucha Singh as his son in his childhood. The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 subsequently amended his suit in which he sought additional relief against the defendants. The additional reliefs claimed by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 were that he be declared entitled to inherit a share equivalent to son's share from the immovable property of his adoptive father measuring 48 kanals 5 marlas of land under various survey numbers and for cancellation of a deed executed in the year 1975 registered on 22-01-1976 as null and void. It is averred in the plaint that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was adopted by S.Sucha Singh. Two wills dated 1,7.09.1964 and 27.04.1973 were executed by S. Sucha Singh. By virtue of which he acknowledged that he adopted the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 who would be entitled to share equivalent to that of son from his property.
In the will deed dated 27-04-1973, the adoptive father by acknowledging the adoption of plaintiff gave another 24 kanals of land along with the residential house to the plaintiff/respondent No. 1. A gift deed was also executed on 06-11-1968 in which 20 kanals of land was gifted to the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 by S. Sucha Singh. He cancelled the aforesaid deeds in December, 1975 which was registered on 22-01-1976. It is further averred by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 that Late S. Sucha Singh had some disputes with his tenant and under law he could not resume the land from the tenant. He got an application filed in the name of present plaintiff/respondent No. 1 who was working in the Army. The said application was filed on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 as being adopted son of S. Sucha Singh and this lead to a compromise between the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 and one Jalil Khan, the tenant. The said compromise was recorded by the Collector and accordingly 3 kanals and 15 marlas and 8 kanals land falling under two different survey numbers 1829 and 1838 were resumed by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 and he was accordingly put into possession as an owner of the aforesaid property. This compromise was acted upon by the parties. The said compromise has not been challenged by the defendants before any Court. That the case set up by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 reveals that he being adopted son of Late S. Sucha Singh lived with him. He had to join army because of bad economical conditions of S. Sucha Singh and continued to serve there till 1983. It is also averred that in his capacity as adopted son, he looked after him and his family. The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 claims that he wanted to sell property and as a consequence of which he issued a notice under Section 18 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act to the defendants. It was during this period, he came to know that the defendants had taken possession of the property and denied his title to the same. The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 also came to know that cancellation deed was executed by the adoptive father on 22-1-1976 by revoking the wills executed in the years 1964 and 1973. It is averred by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 that his title to the property was denied by the defendants/appellants on 12-3-1985 when the defendants took forcible possession.
3. That the appellants/defendants in their written statement denied the adoption of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1. They also denied the execution of gift deed dated 06.11.1968. It is, however, admitted by the appellants/defendants that the will deeds dated 17.09.1964 and 27.04.1973 were cancelled vide cancellation deed dated 04.12.1975 which was registered on 22.01.1976. The possession of the same was also denied and it was stated that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was never in possession of the property..
4. That the trial court after hearing the parties framed the following issues:
1. Is the plaintiff adopted son of S. Sucha Singh? OPP
2. On proof of issue No. 1, is the pedigree table incorrect? OPD.
3. Was a new two storyed house constructed by the plaintiff and S. Sucha Singh out of the earnings of the plaintiff? OPP.
4. Did S. Sucha Singh during his life time execute a gift deed in favour of plaintiff on 06.11.1968 whereby ownership of orchard land measuring 20 kanals in survey Nos. 410 and 1829 at Rambir Pora was conferred on the plaintiff and possession was delivered to him? OPP
5. Has S. Sucha Singh executed will deeds on 17.09.1964 and 27.04.1973 in favour of the plaintiff and both these wills were revoked by Sacha Singh in his last will dated 4.11.1995 registered on 22.1.1976.
6. Is the plaintiff owner in possession of the land measuring 3 kanals 15 marlas from Sr. No. 1829/min, 8 kanals from survey No. 1836/min and 10 kanals from Sr. No. 410 situate at Ranbir pora on the basis of compromise between the plaintiff and one Abdul Jalil? OPP.
7. Has the defendant No. 1 occupied the suit property without any right or power by taking forcible possession of the same? OPP.
8. Has the defendant No. 5 died prior to the institution of the suit and the suit is liable to be dismissed on that account? OPD.
9. Has not the plaintiff paid proper court fee and the suit is liable to be dismissed on that account also? OPD.
10. Has the plaintiff undervalued the suit property? If so, what is the correct valuation of the suit? OPD.
11. Relief.
5. The issues Nos. 1,2,5 and 7 were decided in favour of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1.
6. Being aggrieved of the findings of the trial court, the appellants/defendants preferred this appeal on the following facts:
a) That the trial court has wrongly relied upon the compromise entered into between the respondent and one Jalil Khan whereby respondent No. 1 has been held entitled to the land measuring 11 kanals 15marlas.
b) That the trial court has wrongly held that respondent No. 1 was in possession of 11 Kanals and 15 marlas of land falling under survey Nos. 1829 and 1838 and admitted the compromise. The compromise arrived at between the parties was nullity in the eyes of law, as the land in question was non-agricultural and in the nature of orchard and maidani, as such it was beyond the purview of Agrarian Reforms Act. The alleged compromise and the order passed in pursuance to the said compromise was not enforceable as it was void abinitio. In essence no right could accrue in favour of respondent No. 1 on the basis of non-est and void abinitio compromise;
c) That the findings recorded by the trial court that respondent No. 1 was in possession of the land measuring 11 Kanal 15 marlas are not correct, as the same were in total disregard of the material available on the record and law on the point.
d) That respondent No. 1/plaintiff was not adopted by S.Sucha Singh and any such adoption was in violation of law.
7. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. The controversy in this appeal rests only on one question as to whether respondent No. 1 is entitled to be declared as owner of the land measuring 11 kanals 15 marlas on the basis of the compromise arrived at between respondent No. 1 and one Jalil Khan. Even though the trial court held that plaintiff/respondent No. 1 is the adopted son of Sucha Singh, no relief has been given to him in respect of other property owned by Sucha Singh. It has frankly been conceded by Mr. Qayoom learned Counsel for the respondents that in essence dispute relates to 11 kanals 15 marlas of land only.
8. Now coming to only question required to be decided in respect of 11 kanals 15 marlas of land falling under survey Nos. 1829 and 1838 regarding which plaintiff/respondent No. 1 has been held entitled to the same on the basis of compromise arrived at between plaintiff/respondent No. 1 and Jalil Khan. The case set out by the respondent No. 1 is that he had filed an application for resumption of the aforementioned land as being the defence personnel against the tenant. This application was filed by him as owner of the said property seeking resumption of the land. The compromise was arrived at between respondent No. 1 and Jalil Khan who was tenant. Said compromise deed was signed by Sucha Singh, late adoptive father of plaintiff/respondent No. 1. After the compromise was affected, necessary correction was recorded in the revenue record, in which respondent No. 1 has been shown to be the owner of land measuring 11 kanals 15 marlas. It is not in dispute that this compromise deed has not been challenged by the appellants/defendants in any court.
9. Coming to the contention raised by Mr. Haqani learned Counsel for appellants/defendants that there is no valid adoption in favour of respondent No. 1 and more so it has not been proved. Besides plaintiff/respondent No. 1, the trial court has examined other witnesses namely, Abdul Majid Wani, Lab Singh, Sucha Singh, Balwant Singh, Inder Singh, Shamseer Singh, Mohammad Magrey, Suba Singh, Ghulam Rasool Lone. While scanning through the statements of these witnesses, they have clearly stated that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was adopted by Sucha Singh.
10. The genesis of the statements is that Sucha Singh and his wife came to Baramulla and asked the natural father of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 that they had only two daughters and wanted to take Prethipal Singh in adoption. It is also stated by the witnesses that all the religious ceremonies were performed. There was proper give and take of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1. The marriage of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was also performed by the adoptive mother and he lived with the family for more than 35 years. After adoption, the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was brought and educated in Ranbirpora. It has come in evidence that at the time of adoption Sucha Singh had no male son.
11. In rebuttal, the defendants while disputing the claim of adoption examined Kuldeep Singh, Mohammad Ramzan Haji, Raj Kaur. Muma Bhat, Abdul Razak Khan, Deedar Singh as his witnesses.
12. PW-Raj Kaur stated that on the death of natural mother of the plaintiff in the year 1947, the plaintiff was brought there by the adoptive father and mother. It has been admitted by the witnesses including adoptive mother that he done his schooling in Ranbirpora. It has also come in evidence that there is no custom of adoption in their family. Smt. Raj Kaur has stated that she had no knowledge about the landed dispute with Jalil Khan. She however admits that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was studying at their house and joined army after the completion of his matriculation. The witness further stated that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 lived in the house of the adoptive father for pretty long time and was married in the house of Sucha Singh. It is important to mention that the natural father of the plaintiff is brother- in- law of Sucha Singh. The sister of the natural father of the plaintiff is married to Sucha Singh.
13. Most of the witnesses examined by the parties are relatives of both defendants and plaintiff.
14. There is other aspect of the case also that Sucha Singh had executed three wills in favour of plaintiff/respondent No. 1, where he had acknowledged that the plaintiff was his adopted son and in lieu of that he had gifted some immoveable property in his favour. The said gift deeds were, however, revoked in January, 1976 whereby he has categorically stated that the earlier gift deeds executed in favour of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 are rescinded. Even though they have denied the adoption but has relied upon the revocation deed executed by Sucha Singh wherein he has declared the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 as adopted son. He educated him and got employed but as the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 did not render any service to him therefore he revoked the previous gift deeds. By virtue of revocation deed, he declared his legal heirs as rightful owners of the property.
15. Perusal of the statements would clearly reveal that plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was taken by Raj Kaur and Sucha Singh. It has also established that he lived in the house of Sucha Singh for a considerable period of time. He had basic education and was married in the house of father of appellant No. 1. The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 says that he was adopted while appellant No. 1 says that due to death of his mother, there was no body to look after as such he was given shelter by his parents. The admitted position is that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 has been living in the house of the parents of appellant No. 1. Now the question arises for consideration is that as to whether he was adopted or was provided shelter by the parents of appellant No. 1.
16. Mr. Haquani states that it is well settled law that a person who seeks to displace the natural succession to property by alleging an adoption must discharge the burden that lies upon him by proof of the factum of adoption and its validity. According to him, adoption has not been proved. Moreso, there is no document of adoption. It is also averred that under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, presumption under the Act can be raised only when an adoption is made under the Act and cannot be raised with regard to the adoption made before the Act came into force.
17. In support of his contents, Mr. Haquani has relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1968 kar 309 : AIR 1952 SC 231 : : : AIR 1973 J&K; 89 : and .
The import of the judgments (supra) is as under:
. This judgment deals with the proof of adoption. It states that onus of proof lies on the claimant. In case of an adoption, which is claimed on the basis of oral evidence and is not supported by a registered document or any other evidence of a clinching nature, if there exist suspicious circumstances, the same must be explained to the satisfaction of the conscience of the court by the party contending that there was such an adoption.
. This judgment states that for a valid adoption, performance of 'datta homam' was imperative/subject to just exceptions.
AIR 1973 SC 89 This judgment states that under Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, presumption can be raised only when an adoption is made under the Act and cannot be raised with regard to the adoption made before the Act came into force.
. In this judgment it is stated that in absence of registered document adoption cannot be said to be proved unless there is clinching evidence.
AIR 1953 SC 231. This judgment deals with the question whether adoption is made under the custom and the principles to be kept in view in dealing with questions of customary law stated.
AIR 1968 Mys 309, This judgment deals with question regarding reliability of witnesses and when adoption is to be proved on oral evidence. Dealing with the aforementioned judgments in the present case, it is stated that plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was admittedly adopted prior to 1956, i.e., before the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act came into force. So there was no statute dealing with the mode of adoption. Even if no statutory law was in force even then the customs regarding the adoption were already in existence. Appellant has not produced anything to the contrary to show that how the mode of adoption is to be proved before coming into force of the Act. He has frankly stated that the custom could be one of the basis for the proof of adoption. The evidence produced by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 clearly reveals that there was handing over and taking over of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 by the natural father and the adoptive father. The religious ceremonies were also performed at the time of adoption. Handing over and taking over of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 by his adoptive father is one of the recognized modes of adoption provided under Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 has also proved that after his adoption he remained with his adoptive parents for a considerable period of time. His marriage was also performed by them. The principles enunciated in the Act (supra) were being followed prior to coming into force of the same. Handing over and taking over is one of the recognized mode of making adoption in Hindu religion. It received statutory recognition after 1956 when the Act came into force. Mr. Haqanee has not shown anything to suggest that this mode of adoption was not permissible under law. He has also not disputed this question that the custom of adoption did not prevail prior to coming into force of the Act. His only grievance is that the adoption as such has not been proved. The judgment produced by the learned Counsel for the appellants does not cover the case in hand.
18. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was taken by the parents of appellant No. 1. The only ground which is being disputed is that there is no valid adoption. The evidence which has come on record clearly suggests that there was proper handing over and taking over and religious ceremonies were also performed. The contention of appellant is that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was not adopted but was only provided shelter by his parents. It is difficult for this Court to accept the plea of the appellant that there was no adoption once it has come on record that handing over and taking over has taken place which is legal mode of making adoption. While taking into consideration, the evidence led by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1, it categorically proves that handing over and taking over has taken place. The witnesses produced by the plaintiff have categorically stated that handing over and taking over had taken place by performing the religious ceremonies in this regard.
19. This contention of plaintiff/respondent No. 1 has not been rebutted by the appellants/defendants. They have only stated that it was not a valid mode of seeking adoption.
20. The appellant No. 1 on the other hand states that even though the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 lived with his adoptive parents, but he later on left their house. All the judgments which have been cited by the learned Counsel for the appellants relate to the fact that the evidence produced was not clinching one. I am of the view that the plaintiff has proved his adoption and the evidence is clinching.
21. There is 2nd aspect of this case also. The adoptive father of the plaintiff vide cancellation deed has revoked the wills dated 17.09.1964 and 27.04.1973 executed in favour of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1. In the said wills, Sucha Singh admitted that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was his adoptive son and, therefore, he transferred his immoveable property in his favour. The said wills were got rescinded by Sucha Singh by virtue of cancellation deed dated 04.11.1975 which is a registered deed. The factum of the execution of the cancellation deed is not denied by the appellant No. 1. As a matter of fact, he has admitted that there was cancellation deed executed by his father in which it was acknowledged that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was adopted by his father. The said adoption deed has been cancelled by the father. The appellant No. 1 he cannot escape the legal consequence of the cancellation deed which acknowledges the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 as adopted son of Sucha Singh. What is the effect of this cancellation deed is a different issue. Since the court is dealing with the factum of adoption, I have no reason to disagree with the findings recorded by the trial court.
22. The next question is with respect to the rights of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 to be owner and in possession of the land measuring 3 kanals 15 marlas under survey No. 1829 min and 8 kanals under survey No. 1838 min and 10 kanals under survey No. 410 situated at Rambirpora on the basis of compromise arrived at between the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 and one Abdul Jalil. In fact this is the actual controversy involved in this appeal.
23. It is not in dispute that the application was filed by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 for resumption of land which was in possession of the tenant Jalil Khan at the behest of Sucha Singh adoptive father of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1. The application for resumption of land filed by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 acknowledges the fact that the father of appellant No. 1 had admitted the ownership of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 on the said land also. I say so because only son could have filed the application for resumption of the land. Since the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 belongs to defence category, he become entitled to file the application of resumption of land which resulted in compromise between the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 and Jalil Khan. By virtue of the compromise deed, the possession of respective land was handed over to the parties and correction was made in the revenue record. As per this compromise deed, 11 kanals 15 marlas of land was to be owned and possessed by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1. The contents of the compromise deed were admitted by S. Sucha Singh being adoptive father of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1. The said compromise deed was executed on 18.12.1975. In pursuance to the execution of the compromise deed, the Deputy Commissioner, Anantnag passed the order dated 24.12.1975 and dismissed the appeal of the applicant Jalil Khan.
24. In pursuance of the compromise and order of the Dy. Commissioner, Anantnag, necessary corrections were effected in the revenue records indicating that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was to be in possession of the property. In respect of other 10 kanals of land, the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 could not prove the title over the said property, accordingly, this plea was rejected by the learned trial court.
25. Mr. Haquani, learned Counsel for the appellants states that this compromise was nullity in the eyes of law as the land in question was not covered under the Agrarian Reforms Act and any application having been made for restoration of the resumption of the said land was nullity in the eyes of law. He has further stated that the Dy. Commissioner, Anantnag could not have passed any order on the said compromise. In essence, he says that the title of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 on the said piece of land was nullity in the eyes of law when admittedly provisions of Agrarian Reforms Act were attracted in the present case. The contention of Mr. Qayoom counsel for other side is that this finding has not been questioned by the appellants and it has assumed finality. His further contention is that even if it is illegal, it is required to be set aside in a proper proceedings.
26. Arguments of Mr. Haquani is catchy in the first instance. There is no dispute in this proposition of law that order which is nullity is nonest in the eyes of law. But the question is that if order has been complied with and acted upon by the parties and it is not being questioned, no benefit can be given to the person who claims that it is nullity.
27. Mr. Qayoom, learned Counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court titled Pune Municipal Corporation v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in . This judgment states that it is well settled that no order can be ignored altogether unless a finding is recorded that it was illegal, void or not in consonance with law. The principle must be equally true even where the 'brand of invalidity' is plainly visible for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court. The truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The genesis of this authority is that unless the necessary proceedings are taken at the law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders. This judgment clearly deals with the question involved in the present appeal. The order passed by the Dy. Commissioner, Anantnag regarding compromise between the parties and same having been acted upon, cannot be treated as nonest/void in the eyes of law unless it is questioned in some proceedings in order to declare it as illegal. The contention of the appellants that the order is void cannot be accepted as the same has not been questioned in any proceedings.
28. I accordingly agree with the findings of the trial court that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 is owner of land measuring 11 kanals 15 marlas falling under survey Nos. 1829 and 1838. The delivery of possession is confirmed by the revenue entries.
29. The next question that arises is that what is the effect of cancellation deed executed by the adoptive father whereby adoption of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 has been cancelled. It is well settled law that the adoption once made cannot be cancelled. However, the trial court has not given any relief to the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 in respect of other property of Sucha Singh. However, in respect of 11 kanals 15 marlas of land revocation deed executed by the father of appellant No. 1 after he acknowledged that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 is owner of the said property, cannot sustain in law. The trial court has given elaborate version that as to in what manner this deed was sought to be revoked. On 04.11.1975, the father of appellant No. 1 executed a deed canceling the adoption of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1. The papers were prepared somewhere in December, 1975, however, on 24.12.1975, the father of appellant No. 1 put his signatures on the compromise deed and presented the same before the Dy. Commissioner, Anantnag. He has acknowledged the compromise deed and admitted that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 to be owner of the said property. Impliedly in such a conduct is the effect that the cancellation deed executed by Sucha Singh on 04.11.1975 was not capable of being acted upon. The father of defendant as a matter of fact, did not act upon this because he admitted the ownership of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 over the said piece of land by acknowledging the compromise deed. The said deed was registered in January, 1976. It has to be presumed in law that said deed execution came into force in January, 1976 and it would not effect the rights of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 on the said land as property already stood transferred in his name and he was to be in possession of the same. The trial court has rightly stated that the said cancellation deed has no effect over the rights of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1. The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was declared to be the owner of the land mentioned above. The trial court held that the appellants/defendants have forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 from the said piece of land when he was performing his duties outside the State. It has also come on record that land measuring 11 kanals 15 marlas was recorded in the name of plaintiff/respondent No. 1 and mutation No. 1431 was attested in his favour. Taking the benefit of the plaintiff's absence, the appellants/defendants dispossessed him from the piece of land and got the mutation No. 4133 of the said land attested in his favour in the year 1978. The existence of dispute with Jalil Khan has not been denied by the appellants/defendants. As a matter of fact revenue record reveals that Jalil Khan was in possession of the property till 1973. Plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was dispossessed when he was in the active service in the army. He remained in army up to the year 1983. After his retirement, he wanted to sell his land which was given by his adoptive parents and only at that point of time, he came to know that the appellant No. 1 has taken the possession of the said land and denying the same to plaintiff/respondent No. 1.
30. For what has been stated hereinabove, I do not find any merit in appeal bearing CIA No. 117/2003 and the same is dismissed along with connected CMP(s). It is made clear that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 is found entitled to be owner in possession of the property measuring 11 kanals 15 marlas falling under survey Nos. 1829 and 1838 and as a consequence of that he is held entitled to be put in possession of the said property. Accordingly findings of the trial court declaring the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 to be entitled and owner in possession of 3 kanals 15 marlas of land falling under survey No. 1829 min and 8 kanals falling under survey No. 1838 situated at Rambirpora, are hereby confirmed,
31. Other pleas of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 raised by him in the Cross Appeal bearing No. 72/2004 are dismissed as he has not pressed the same.