V. K. Jhanji, C.J (Acting)
1. The courts, while entering upon controversies brought before them, beyond peaceful settlement of disputes, inter alia, create an important bye-product in the shape of trust and confidence amongst general masses in the supremacy of law and the Judicial system. When a person approaches a court of law with a cause or controversy for its adjudication, he submits himself to all the consequences that might follow the cognizance of the matter by the court and he is legally bound to strictly obey all directions passed by the court to the letter of the word, be those of interim or of final nature. He cannot act, behave or proceed, in any manner or to any extent, contrary to the court orders and directions particularly so when such orders and directions are passed at his instance by the court. If he dares to, it would not only constitute an insult to the court and interference with its judicial authority having the ramification of shattering the trust and confidence of general people reposed in the courts, but would also be demonstrative of his ingenuine and insincere motive behind the cause so brought by him and his temerity to mock at the course of justice. Courts themselves have no machinery for enforcement of the decisions so rendered or orders so passed by them, but they are not absolutely armless or powerless. In the event of violation or disobedience of the orders of the court, apart from initiation of contempt, a court would be within its powers to take appropriate measures to secure restoration of the sanctity of its orders. Every order passed by a court, be it an interim, unless reversed, modified or altered by a superior court, has the force of law and constitutes a step forward in the dispensation of justice and resolution of such disputes. It is a cardinal rule that interim directions cannot be beyond the pale of final relief prayed for in a lis and have to merge in the final orders. Therefore, obeyance of such court orders is fundamental and primary to seeking justice. A litigant found wanting in obeyance to such court orders cannot be allowed to derive any advantage or benefit from any kind of infraction moreso when such orders are passed at his instance. When the infraction of the court orders is voluntary, brazen and grave, forcible methods of enforcemnt and restoration of status-quo-ante become imperative and unavoidable. And when the infraction is with respect to the orders of the High Court and the High Court proceeds to set right the wrong committed, no court, forum or authority subject to the supervisory powers of the High Court, shall have the jurisdiction to interferewith or to circumvent the process so initiated by the High Court to restore the sanctity of its orders.
2. This letters patent appeal is directed against judgment and order dated 17th June 2003 by which, while dismissing three writ petitions, filed almost in quick succession by the appellant, the learned Single Judge has directed the respondents to proceed ahead in accordance with law with the action initiated by them. Sheering off the details irrelevant for our purpose, facts may be noticed.
3. Vide Order No. 08 of 1996 dated 27.04.1996, issued by District Town Planner, Srinagar Municipality the appellant was permitted to restore the first floor a two storeyed building damaged by fire situated at Poloview, Srinagar. He was also permitted to repair the existing two garage blocks adjacent and located in the compound of the aforesaid structure. The aforesaid permission was granted subject to certain conditions and restrictions contained in the sanction order itself. Two of the conditions are quoted hereunder:
1. That no change in its original shape, size and height is made; and
2. That no further addition/alteration is made beyond the sanctioned plan.
The building plan approved by the sanctioning authority contained as under:
'Approved for restoration of 1st floor of the existing 2 st. gutted building at mark (A) and repairs to the garage blocks at mark (B) and (C).
On 15th July, 1996, the appellant filed a writ petition, being OWP No. 230/96, stating therein that, while the construction was nearing completion at mark 'A', respondents 1 to 4 visited the spot and tried to stop the process of construction. In para 13 of the writ petition, the appellant stated that he had reasonable apprehension that respondents 1 to 4 were bent upon to demolish the existing structures raised by him in accordance with the sanctioned building permission. The appellant, inter alia, prayed for the following reliefs in the writ petition:
' issue writ, direction or order in the nature of prohibition restraining respondents 1 to 5 from demolishing the existing two storeyed structures raised by the petitioner at Mouza Kothi-Bagh Srinagar, on landed property bearing survey No: 501/169 and 507/170 as per the building permission granted vide order No. 8 of 1996 dated 27.04.1996 by respondent No. 6 and be also restrained from causing any sort of interference directly or indirectly in the smooth construction activities of the petitioner respect to the construction of above mentioned structure as per the building permission granted by respondent No. 6.'
(underlining supplied)
4. It is seen from the above averments and the prayer made in the writ petition, that the writ petition was filed merely on the basis of apprehensions. It was clearly given out therein that the appellant was strictly adhering to the building permission granted in his favour. When the writ petition came up for consideration of admission before the learned Single Judge on 16th July, 1996, the folowing order was passed:
'Heard Mr. Qadri.
Ld. Counsel submits that the structure of the petitioner situate at Kothibagh gutted in the recent fire and he applied for renovation/restoration of his structure and for that he submitted site plan duly approved by the respondents/functionaries of the Municipality for restoration of first floor to the existing 23 ft gutted building at mark 'A' and repairs to the garage blocks at amrk B and C, as shown in annexure P3 writ petition. Orders to this effect also came to be issued under No. 8 of 1996 dated 27.4.1996 forming annexure P4 to the petition.
Ld. Counsel further submits that in accordance with the orders, he deposited the requisite fee in the chest of the Municipality but now unnecessary hurdles are being created by the functionaries of the Municipality in not allowing the restoration of the gutted building in the manner and to the extent as approved vide order No. 8 dated 27.4.1996, which has constrained the petitioner to file the present petition.
Issue notice to the respondents returnable within six weeks time to show cause as to why this petition be not admitted to hearing.
Issue notice in the CMP also returnable within the same period. In the meanwhile subject to objections, petitioner shall be allowed to go ahead with his restoration of the building as per permission granted vide order dated 27.4.1996.'
(underlining supplied)
The aforesaid order passed by the learned Single Judge unambiguously makes it clear that file appellant was allowed only to carry on with the restoration work of the first floor of the building and repairs to the two garage blocks strictly as per the building permission dated 27th April 1996.
5. It appears that, instead of restoring the first floor of the gutted two storeyed building, by carying out necessary renovations in accordance with the building permission granted in his favour, the appellant dismantled the building as a whole and started re-construction in violation of the building permission as well as the court direction. Consequently, the Prescribed Authority under the Town Planning Act in the Srinagar Municipality issued a notice of show cause under Section 12 of the State Town Planning Act, 1963 to the appellant. The notice read as under:
'1 Whereas permission for restoration of first floor of fire damaged building at the Poloview Srinagar, was sanctioned in your favour vide this office No. 08 of 1996 dated 27.4.1996.
2. Whereas, you were authorised to restore the damaged area of the first floor as per the said permission:
3. Whereas, you have dismantled the ground floor of the said building and started reconstruction of the said structure against the terms of the, permission granted:
4. Whereas, this is clear deviation of the permission order issued to you vide No. 08 of 1996 dated 27.4.1996.
5. Whereas, this act of yours constitute an offence under Section 12 of J&K; State Town Planing Act, 1963;
Therefore, in order to observe the mandate of law, you are hereby directed to show cause within a period of 24 hours, as to why action under Section 12 of the Town Planning Act should not be taken against you'
6. The above notice is dated 30th July 1996. On 31st July 1996, the appellant filed another writ petition, being OWP No. 337. In ground (c) of the writ petition, the appellant specifically stated that the construction of the gutted structures by him was legal, lawful and as per the permission granted by respondent. The appellant, apart from challenging the aforesaid notice issued to him, prayed for a restraint against the respondents from effecting any demolition of the existing two storeyed structure raised by him as per the building permission. This writ petition came up for consideration on admission before the learned Single Judge on 10 August, 1996 and the court passed the following order.
' Issue notice of four weeks.
Issue notice in the CMP also. In the meanwhile and subject to the objections of the otherside the parties are directed to maintian status-quo with regard to ground floor of the building in question'
It be seen that the first court order dated 16th July 1996, passed in OWP No. 330/96, allowed him to proceed ahead with the restoration process in accordance with the permission granted and the second court order dated 10th August, 1996, passed in OWP No. 337/96, ordered maintenance of status-quo with regard to ground floor of the building. A conjoint reading of the averments and prayers made in the two writ petitions and the two orders passed by the court in two different writ petitions, filed within a span of a fortnight makes it abundantly clear that the appellant unambiguously gave out that he was strictly complying with the permission granted in his favour and, at best, the court allowed him to go ahead with the restoration only to the extent it was permitted by the concerned authority. The subsequent court order dated 10th August, 1996 directed the parties to maintain status-quo with respect to the ground floor of the structure, meaning thereby, that the appellant was bound to stop construction or restoration work there.
7. On 5th May, 1997, the petitioner presented another writ petition, being OWP No. 693/97, before the court. In paragraphs 14 and 15 of the writ petition, while referring to the ad-interim order dated 10th August 1996 passed by the learned Single Judge in OWP No. 337/96, whereby the parties were directed to maintain status-quo regard to ground floor of the building, the appellant stated that the structure had been completed. This averment by itself and without any shadow of doubt exhibited the boldness of the appellant to have transgressed the order of status-quo passed by the court. In paragraph 16 of the petition, the appellant expressed an apprehension that the respondents were likely to demolish the building. The prayer clause of the writ petition is startling shocking and surprising. It reads as under:
'It is, therefore, prayed that in view of above submissions, Hon'ble court may be pleased to:
(i) issue a writ of prohibition restraining the respondents from demolishing four storeyed structure with attic over the leased land bearing survey No. 501/169 and 507/170 situated at Kothi Bagh, Srinagar.
(ii) to issue writ, direction or order in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to demolish the four storeyed structure with attic existing on plot of land bearing survey Nos. 501/169 and 507/170 situated at Kothibagh, Srinagar, directly or indirectly by any means and petitioner be allowed to complete the said structure without any interference or obstruction.'
8. The aforesaid writ petition came up for consideration on admission before the learned Single Judge on 14th May, 1997 and the court passed the following order:
'Despite the fact that petition came to be filed as far back as on 15th July, 1996 numbering OWP No. 230/96 wherein, besides the issuance of notice to file objections, the petitioner was allowed to go ahead with his restoration of the building as per permission granted vide order dated 24.4.96. Respondents have been served but till date no objections have been filed. The petitioner has been constrained to file a fresh petition because the respondents are coming to the petitioner without following the procedure that the construction has been made in violation of the sanctioned plan and are threatening the petitioner for alleged deviation in the construction.
Issue notice to the respondents to show cause why the petition be not admitted to the hearing.
Issue notice in interim application also. In the meanwhile, the parties are directed to maintain status-quo on spot. This order is, however, subject to objections from the otherside.'
9. A perusal of the aforesaid order reveals that the learned Single Judge, before passing the order of status-quo, made reference to the earlier order passed by the same Bench on 16th July, 1996 in OWP No. 230/96 whereby the appellant was allowed to go ahead with restoration of the building as per permission granted vide order dated 27.4.1996. At the cost of repetition, it may be observed that the permission was only for restoration of the fire damaged first floor of the two storeyed building. While referring to the earlier order, as aforesaid, the court observed that the respondents had not filed objections in that earlier petition and were threatening the appellant for alleged deviation in the construction. The status-quo order passed in the OWP No. 693/97, therefore, has to be read in conjunction with the earlier order passed by in the very same Bench on 16th July, 1996 in OWP No. 230/96, meaning thereby that the status-quo was ordered only with respect to the restoration of the building in terms of the building permission granted in favour of the appellant.
10. It appears that when the three writ petitions filed by the appellant came up for consideration before the learned Single Judge, a statement was made by counsel for the appellant that the respondents were contemplating settlement of the controversy outside the court. On such statement, the counsel sought withdrawal of the writ petitions with liberty to file a fresh one in case respondents backed out. The counsel appearing for the Srinagar Municipality, besides controverting the statement made by the learned counsel for the appellant, resisted unconditional withdrawal of the writ petitions. The prayer for withdrawal of the writ petitions made by the appellant, in the back-drop of the facts narrated above, obviously was to wriggle but of inter-alia, the fall out of the consequences of blatant infraction of orders of the court committed by the appellant. The learned Single Judge did not accede to the prayer of withdrawal and instead disposed of the three writ petitions in terms of his judgment and order dated 17th July, 2003 directing, among other things, as under:
'In the facts and circumstances of this case, I find no fault with the action initiated by the respondents. Accordingly, these writ petitions are disposed of along with CMPs with the direction to the respondents to proceed ahead in accordance with law with the action initiated. Interim directions shall be deemed to have merged in this judgment.'
The learned Single Judge also referred to the insensibility of the concerned authorities towards the breach committed by the appellant and, apart from initiating suo moto contempt against the appellant, directed the Chief Secretary to fix responsibility on the erring authorities and officials. The appellant has come in appeal against the aforesaid judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. 11. The grounds taken in the present appeal are that on 3rd October, 2002 the counsel for the appellant had made prayer that he did not want to press the writ petitions and the same be dismissed as withdrawn. It is contended that the counsel did not make any request for permission to file any fresh petition, but he sought unconditional withdrawal of the writ petition and the learned Single Judge, therefore, ought to have rejected the prayer for withdrawal and afforded an opportunity to the appellant to argue his case on merits. Instead, the learned Single Judge proceeded to dispose of the three writ petitions, as a result he was not able to show that the Divisional Town Planner had the competence and jurisdiction to grant the permission. It is contended that in terms of the show cause notice dated 30th July, 1996, issued by the respondents, the appellant was required to show cause within a period of 24 hours as to why action should not be taken against him under Section 12 of the Town Planning Act which provides for punishment of fine which may extend to one thousand rupees etc.
The appellant contends that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the provisions of the Town Planning Act of 1963 and, therefore, the judgment is liable to be set-aside. It is stated that a court of law is to deliver justice in accordance with the facts projected before it. It has to see as to whether any provision of law has been violated and, if so, by whom. If it comes to the conclusion that the appellant had no right to claim any relief from the court, it is then within its, power to dismiss his petition. However, when it finds that any action taken by any authority against the appellant is not waranted, it has to strike down that action. It is contended that the show cause notice dated 30th July, 1996 was issued without any authority if law, therefore, the court has to return a finding on this aspect of the matter. According to the appellant, since that has not been done, the impugned judgment is manifestly erroneous. It is further submitted that appellant can ask for the composition of the breach or contravention of any conditions subject to which the permission was granted. That apart, the appellant has right of appeal before the Minister or any authority appointed by him against any order of the prescribed authority directing demolition, alteration or pulling down the building or any part thereof. The appellate authority can compound the offence. According to the appellant, the impugned order has the effect of depriving him of the legal remedies available to him under law. With regard to violation of status-quo orders passed by the learned Single Judge, referred to in this judgment, it is submitted that the same did not direct that the appellant could not raise any construction beyond the ground floor.
12. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record of the three writ petitions.
13. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel reiterated the grounds taken by him in this appeal. We have already noticed the relevant facts. In terms of the building permission, the appellant was to restore the fire damaged first floor of the two storeyed building on the conditions that no change in its original shape, size and height was made and that no further addition/alteration was made beyond the sanctioned plan. Reading between the lines, the appellant appears to have demolished the building and started reconstruction. This, in fact, was averred by the respondents in paragraph 8 of their reply-affidavit filed on 6th May, 2000 in OWP No-230/96. Since this constituted a violation and deviation of the approved site plan and the building permission granted in his favour, the concerned authorities appear to have advised him to adhere to the terms of the building permission. Apprehending action by the concerned authorities, the appellant filed OWP No. 230/96 claiming therein that the construction in accordance with the building permission was nearing completion. The court, in terms of its order dated 16th July, 1996, allowed the appellant to go ahead with the restoration of the building as per the permission granted in his favour. This interim direction was granted on the basis of the specific averments made in the petition and pleas raised before the court that the appellant was strictly abiding by the terms of the sanction order. The import and essence of this interim direction therefore, and unambiguously, was that the appellant could not go beyond the building permission granted in his favour and that, if any deviation was made by him till then, he was required to set it right and bring the restoration work in consonance with the terms of the sanction order.
The order of the court was not intended at regularising or granting a license to the appellant to commit, any deviation of the terms and conditions of the building permission during the course of carrying on the restoration work and / or to carry on with the construction at his whim and wish. The order of the court cannot be interpreted in a manner as would go beyond the scope of the building permission granted in favour of the appellant. This Court is not the building permission granting authority to order deviations in the permissions, so granted by the concerned authority. That being so, till the filing of the writ petition, OWP No-230/96, it the appellant committed my breach of the terms and conditions of the sanction order, he could be said to have done so at his own risk and cost, and subject to such action by the concerned authorities, as would be permissible under law, but given the import of the first court order dated 15th July, 1996, as mentioned above, he was required to set right the deviations made and bring the restoration work, strictly in consonance with the permission so granted in his favour any deviation therefrom and thereafter would constitute violation and infraction of the court direction. It appears that the appellant did not abide either by the binding permission or the court direction, he proceeded to dismantle the ground floor of the said building and started reconstruction of the said structure in total disregard of the building permission and the court direction. It is immaterial whether the dismantling was done before filing of the writ petition or thereafter. The fact remains that both, the building permission as well as the court order dated 16th July, 1996, were not obeyed, but were, in fact, violated.
Consequently, the Municipality served notice dated 30th July, 2003 on the appellant requiring him to show cause within 24 hours as to why action under Section 12 of the Town Planning Act should not be taken against him. In para 3 of the notice, it was specifically stated that the appellant had dismantled the ground floor of the building and had started reconstruction of the said structure. The appellant filed second writ petition, OWP No. 337/96. Accompanying the writ petition, a civil miscellaneous petition for interim relief was also filed in which a restraint was sought against the respondents from demolishing the existing structures stated to have been restored on the gutted building. The court, vide order dated 10th August, 1996, directed the parties to maintain status-quo with regard to the ground floor of the building in question. In both the petitions it was specifically pleaded by the appellant that the building was nearing completion in terms of the building permission granted in his favour. But, apparently, that was not so. When the court in the second writ petition passed status-quo order with respect to the ground floor only, the appellant did not seek any modification of this order, nor did he file any appeal against the said order. He was rather quite satisfied with it. The only inference that can be drawn from the conduct of the appellant is that the statement made in para 3 of the notice dated 30th July, 1996 was correct and that the averments made by the appellant in the two writ petitions were actually aimed at playing a mischief with the course of Justice and seeking intervention of this court before he had started the actual construction. In any case, reading the two court orders conjointly, it is clear that the appellant was debarred not only in terms of the building permission but also by the court orders from proceeding with the restoration work beyond what he was permitted by the relevant sanction order.
Not caring even a fig for the orders of the court, the appellant not only deviated from the building permission, but also flouted to the hilt the court orders passed at his instance and raised a five storeyed concrete building. Then the courage of the appellant is to be seen. He filed another writ petition, OWP No-693/97, clearly stating therein that he had completed the construction of a five storeyed building and that the respondents should be restrained from demolishing the same. We have already referred to the order dated 14.5,1997 passed by the court on that petition and the import thereof, i.e, the status-quo was ordered with respect to the restoration of the building in terms of the building permission granted in favour of the appellant and that the appellant was bound not to deviate from the same. That was the crux of the orders of the court. It has been the admitted case of the appellant all through that he was permitted to restore the fire damaged first floor of the building. On his own showing, he has instead raised a five storeyed building apart from other deviations committed vis-a-vis the building permission. In face of that fact, this is not merely a case of deviations from the terms and conditions of the building permission, but a total disregard shown by the appellant to the orders of this Court. Had it been a case of mere deviations from the sanction order, probably, this Court would leave the appellant to be dealt with in accordance with with the provisions of the law governing the subject. But the facts, as narrated, clearly demonstrate that the appellant has taken this Court for a ride and has ventured upon not only to transgress with impunity the court orders but also to derive a premium thereon which in itself is unpardonable and uncompoundable. This Court will not act as a mute spectator. That would tantamount to comrpomising the dignity of this Court which, in turn would surely and severely take its toll on the whole judicial system in the State. This Court cannot also lose sight of the fact that the glaring violation of the court orders has taken place in an exhibitory and inflating manner in the heart of the city of the Srinagar. In such a fact, scenario in order to restore the sanctity of the orders of the court, the only option left to the court is to order restoration of Status-quo-ante.
We respectfully disagree with the learned Single Judge in sofar as the respondents have been directed to proceed ahead in accordance with law with the action initiated. When there is such a huge consistent and persistent violation of the orders of this Court, proudly and brazenly admitted by a litigant in writing before the court, supported by affidavits, it is not only within the powers, but also the duty, of the court to take appropriate measures to set the clock back and order for reversion of the wrong done. While ordering so, this Court has not to ask the concerned respondents or authorities to have recourse to law. The court in such situations has to come down with a heavy hand and give a clear cut direction to the concerned authorities to act at once in order to restore status-quo-ante. Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that executing agencies have their own ways and methods and sometimes, even compulsions to restore to official wrangling, whereby execution of court orders, if left to their discretion is defeated and frustrated. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has noticed in some detail the slackness on the part of the respondents, strongly suggestive of their active connivance in the whole affair. Therefore it becomes all the more important that no such further scope is left for them to mishandle the matter. Further more, when action is directed on account of violation of court orders, resort to any other law otherwise providing for similar action in the matter is not warranted at all.
14. We may observe here that the learned counsel has advanced certain arguments touching the factual and legal aspects of the matter. Keeping in view the facts narrated by us coupled with the conduct of the appellant, all these submissions, legal or otherwise, would be cast into oblivion. Nevertheless, we proceed to deal with those aspects as well.
15. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the counsel for the petitioner had prayed for an unconditional withdrawal of the writ petitions and, therefore, the learned Single Judge ought not to have disposed of the same and that, in the event the prayer was to be declined and the petitions were to be finally disposed of, the appellant out to have been given an opportunity of advancing arguments. The question that arises is as to what would be the effect of withdrawal of a writ petition, whether unconditional or with permission to file a fresh writ petition. When a person files a writ petition and the court grants an interim relief at his instance in pursuance of which he derives any benefit or advantage, the withdrawal would relegate him to the state or position when the petition was filed, as if no interim orders were passed. When a writ petition is withdrawn, legally speaking, the petitioner concerned withdraws from the claims he has made therein. As a necessary corollary, he cannot claim a right to the usufructs of the interim relief, whether obtained in obeyance or on violation of such court orders. If that be not so, the necessity and the act of seeking the permission for withdrawal of the petition from the court would be rendered a mere redundant formality. The object of seeking permission of the court to withdraw a writ petition is to enable the court to, inter alia, see and ascertain from the case file itself that the litigant has not been ingenuine and insincere in his cause, that he has not approached the court with mala fide intentions; that the respondents in the petition have not been disadvantaged in course of pendency of that petition and that he has not derived any illegal and uncalled for benefit and advantage in consequence of filing of the case before the court. While considering the prayer for permission to withdraw a lis, if the court comes to the conclusion that all these factors are missing, the court may grant the permission. If the court thinks that any of these factors are attendant to the case, the court, while granting the prayer, would order taking of appropriate measures, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, to relegate the parties to their original state. For example, as in the instant case, the petitioner concerned might have taken some advantage, undue or otherwise from the interim orders of the court. The court, while dismissing the writ petition as withdrawn, can order setting the clock back. In fact, when a writ petition is permitted to be withdrawn, it has to be dismissed as such. The interim orders, if any, passed merge in such a dismissal order. They cannot remain after dismissal of the writ petition. Consequently, and as a necessary corollary, the effect of these interim orders during their subsistence has to go unless otherwise directed by the court, And if a court comes to the conclusion that any action taken pursuant to interim direction has to be reversed, no fault can be found in that course adopted by the court. That being so, even assuming that the appellant had sought unconditional withdrawal of the writ petitions, the result would not have been different, more so, when it was brought to the notice of the court by the appellant himself on affidavit that he had blatantly transgressed the interim orders of the court. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge. The court has noticed the latent, illicit and nefarious design behind the filing of the writ petitions and the prayer for permission to withdraw the same. Therefore, even if the prayer for withdrawal simplicitor was accepted, the result would have been the same. It may be mentioned here that the appellant has not withdrawn from the prayer for withdrawal of the three writ petitions. In fact, he is aggrieved of the judgment of the learned Single Judge wherein, among other things said, this prayer was declined. Therefore, even in this appeal, this Court can grant that prayer and while doing so, this Court will not allow the appellant to derive a premium on the willful disobedience of the orders of court shown by him. In any case, the result would not be different. There is another aspect of the matter; if a writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn on the prayer of the writ-petitioner, the order so passed by the court would not be appealable.
16. In regard to the submission of learned counsel that the writ petitions were disposed of without hearing him, it would suffice to say that he could not have improved upon the facts averred the three writ petitions, supported by affidavits, particularly his averment made in the third writ petition that he had completed construction of five storeyed building. The appellant, therefore, cannot claim any prejudice.
17. As regards the arguments advanced touching the questions whether the building permission was issued by the competent authority or whether the notice dated 30th July, 1996 was issued by the competent authority, or who is the authority competent to take action, it is observed that, though all these questions pale into insignificance in this case because of the outrageous disobedience of the orders of the court exhibited by the appellant yet, assuming that the building permission was issued by the competent authority, though there are orders contrary to that, that sanction or approval of site plan did not permit the appellant to dismantle the structure and raise a five storeyed concrete building thereon. Let us further assume that the notice issued to the appellant was by an incompetent authority, that by itself did not entitle the appellant to go beyond the sanctioned site plan or show glaring disrespect to the orders of the court. As to who is the authority competent to proceed with demolition is not the question involved in the present case. We agree with the appellant that justice is to be done on the basis of facts put forth before the Court, We are not budging even an inch from those facts which have brought on record by the appellant himself from time to time and we are proceeding with what justice demands. It is also preposterous to say that status-quo orders passed by the court did not mean a restraint on the appellant to proceed ahead with the construction at his choice. The argument is noted only to be rejected.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to various provisions of the State Town Planning Act, 1963. He has particularly laid stress on Section 12 thereof under which notice dated 30th July, 1996 was served on the appellant, and contended that the appellant could at best be subjected to the punishment prescribed in the said provision of the Act. For facility of reference we quote hereunder Section 12 of the aforesaid Act.
'12 Penalties: -- Any person who erects or proceeds with any building, structure or work in contravention of the scheme or without the permission referred to in Section 10 shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees and in the case of continuing offence with further fine which may extend to fifty rupees for every day during which the offence continues after conviction for the first commission of the offence.'
A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision of law makes it clear that the punishment prescribed therein is in addition to the action to be taken under Section 13 of the Act. Section 13 of the Act prescribes the procedure to be followed in demolishing the illegally constructed buildings. Second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 prescribes for composition of the offence by the Minister or the authority appointed by him in this behalf. But this provision would not come into play where the High Court is seized of the matter and the offence is against the orders of the High Court. This remedy was available to the appellant when he first came to the High Court. After the High Court took cognizance of the matter, no authority would be competent to enter into same controversy. In that view of the matter, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant that the impugned judgment has the effect of depriving him of the statutory remedies.
19. It was next argued by learned counsel for the appellant that the building in question is presently under the occupation of tenants who are carrying on their business there, therefore, third party interests are involved in the matter and that demolition of the building would render these tenants jobless, besides constituting a punishment on them without they being heard. We do not accept proposition. No person can claim any interest in an illegality committed by his principal. Before taking the accommodation on rent it was for them to ascertain whether the accomodation they hired was legally being raised or not. Ignorance of law cannot be an excuse. This, in any case, does not constitute a mitigating circumstance to condone the conduct of the appellant or to compound the blatant transgression of the orders of the court.
20. As to the initiation of contempt by the learned Judge, that course was available to the court independent of the prayer for withdrawal of the writ petitions and, given the facts and circumstances, no exception can be taken to the course adopted by the learned Single Judge.
21. In view of all what has been said above, while disposing of this appeal in terms of above, we direct:
(i) that the respondents shall take immediate steps to restore status-quo-ante as it existed on 15th July, 1996 on the spot, that is, the date when the appellant presented the first writ petition, OWP No. 230/96 before the court. Status-quo-ante, as ordered above, has to be understood in light of our finding that the whole structure has been raised by the appellant contrary to and in glaring violation of the orders of this court passed from time to time as well as the building permission, as discussed in this judgment. Action as directed above, shall be started forthwith and at once. Any further dithering attitude by the respondents shall be viewed seriously;
(ii) The Senior Superintendent of Police, Srinagar, shall render all required assistance to the respondents as may be asked for by them in executing the above direction without any fail and that may include deployment of sufficient force on the spot.
(iii) The Deputy Commissioner, Srinagar, shall supervise the execution of this order and the demolition process, in co-ordination with the Senior Superintendent of Police and Municipal authorities;
(iv) Expenses incurred on the demolition of the structure shall be recoverable from the appellant as arrears of land revenue; (v) The Deputy Commissioner, Srinagar, shall submit weekly progress reports to this court through Registrar Judicial,High Court, Srinagar, regarding the demolition process on every Monday till the execution of the direction is completed, the first such report to be filed on Monday, the 1st September, 2003;
(vi) In the event the appellant, or any person through him or on his behalf, creates any let or hind-ranee on the, spot in the execution of this order, he or they as the case may be, shall be dealt with in accordance with the law by the concerned SHO of Police, who shall remain available on the spot on all the days the execution of this order is carried out;
(vii) Copies of this order shall forthwith be sent to all the concerned authorities through the learned Advocate General, who may call all these authorities to his office for delivery of the copies of this order today itself.