ORDER
Muzaffar Hussain Attar, J.
1. Undeterred by their failure to scuttle the criminal proceedings initiated for alleged commission of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short Act of 1881) pending on the files of ld. CJM Srinagar, the petitioners have now again ventured to seek dismissal of the complaint on the basis of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled Harnam Electronics (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. National Panasonic India Ltd. reported in : AIR 2009 SC 1168 : 2009 Cri LJ 1109 which according to petitioners provide that mere sending of notice under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 from a place may not give jurisdiction to the Court of that place to entertain and try the complaint.
2. It is apposite, in order to keep the record straight, to make mention of the earlier petition filed under Section 561, Cr.P.C. No. 90/07 and 95/07 by the present petitioners for quashment of proceedings on the grounds which have been taken again in the present petition. One of the grounds taken in the earlier petitions by present petitioners was lack of jurisdiction of the Ld. C.J.M. Srinagar to entertain and try the complaint against the petitioners. This Court vide its judgment dated 1st Feb., 2008 negatived all the contentions raised by the petitioners which include the ground of jurisdiction. Para 5 of the said judgment is reproduced as under:
That brings me to the question as to whether or not the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and take cognizance against petitioner/company and its directors. While there is no doubt that the cheque was drawn on 'Bharat Overseas Bank' but that per se would not shift jurisdiction to New Delhi for the simple reason that as a matter of fact, it would have been presented for encashment at respondent/bank's Air Cargo branch at Srinagar who further transmit it to concerned bank through their Regional Collection Centre, New Delhi, but the refusal having been conveyed to respondent/bank at Srinagar, the local Court would not cease to have the jurisdiction. No other ground has been urged at bar except that the respondent/bank has also exercised its option of having the mortgaged properties at Delhi attached under 'Realization of Securities Act' which, however, does not appear to have any bearing on this matter pertaining as it is strictly to the criminal aspect under N.I. Act.
3. The said judgment was followed in petition under Section 561-A No. 90/07 and the petition was also dismissed by this Court vide its order dated 7-7-08. The Xerox copy of the earlier petitions and copies of judgments produced by Mr. Roshan Khayal, at motion/hearing stage are taken on record. The respondent No. 2 who figures as accused No. 5 has challenged proceedings initiated against him before this Court reportedly on the ground that when the petitioners obtained financial assistance/loan from respondent No. 1 he was not in any manner whatsoever, involved in the affairs of the petitioners' company. This Court has stayed the proceedings against respondent No. 2. Likewise, it is stated that on similar grounds the Hon'ble Supreme Court stayed proceedings against the respondent No. 3 who figures as accused No. 6 in the complaint. The proceedings are thus, being conducted against the petitioners, in the complaint, pending on the files of the ld. C.J.M. Srinagar.
4. The record reveals that petitioners have obtained financial assistance from respondent No. 1 way back in the year 2001 which was enhanced initially to 25 crores of limit as post shipment limit and 25 crores as forward exchange etc. The financial assistance was obtained at different times. In the complaint filed by respondent No. 1, it is further alleged that in liquidation of the part of the debt the petitioner No. 2 executed a post dated cheque No. 329836 dated 19-1-2007 for an amount of Rs. 51- crores under cover letter No. POPL 2006 dated 26-12-2006 to meet part liability of loan, letter of credit, (overdraft-current account No. 3126). It is further alleged in the complaint that on Dec. 8th 2006 the petitioner company sent a communication to DGM J. & K. Bank, Unsel, New Delhi in which the factum of handing over the cheque towards discharge of debt/liability of over draft account was admitted. It is further alleged that on 8th June, 2007 the
respondent No. 1 deposited the cheque in Air Cargo Srinagar Branch of the complainant bank. It is further alleged that cheque along with memo dated 14th June, 2007 was returned unpaid by the bankers of the accused on account of insufficiency of funds. The memo of the petitioners bank was received back by the respondent No. 1 at Srinagar with the observation 'cheque unpaid'. As the cheque could not be encashed, the respondent No. 1 issued notice under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 through M/s. Zaffar Law Associates on 3rd July, 2007 and the petitioners were served with the notices on different dates. It is further stated in the complaint that the petitioners replied the notice through their counsel M/s. Rawal Advocates, 249 Lawyers Chamber, High Court of Delhi. In the said reply the factum of issuance of the notice was admitted. The respondent No. 1 accordingly filed the complaint under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 in the Court of ld. C.J.M. Srinagar, which Court after applying mind to the allegations contained in the complaint and statement of complainant, took cognizance of offence and issued process against the petitioners for allegedly and having committed the offence under Section 138/142 of the Act of 1881.
5. The petitioners, thereafter, challenged the proceedings pending on the files of ld. C.J.M. Srinagar in two separate petitions before this Court on the grounds which have been summarized in the present petition, which petitions as already stated, were dismissed by this Court and petitioner's effort to further challenge the said proceedings and orders of this Court before Hon'ble Supreme Court also did not bear any fruit as the petition was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
6. Record reveals that an application was filed by respondent No. 1 before the Ld. CJM Srinagar requesting him to proceed in the matter and the accused be examined in terms of Section 242 of Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioners filed objections to the said application through their counsel wherein they have prayed for dismissal of the application on the plea that the proceedings pending on the files of ld. CJM Srinagar cannot be split. While the said application was still pending, the petitioners filed another application seeking dismissal of the complaint on the basis of the judgment handed down by the Hon'ble Supreme-Court in 'M/s. Harnam Electronics Pvt. Ltd.' case (supra). To this application respondent No. 1 filed objections stating therein that the issue of jurisdiction to try and hear the case at Srinagar having been finally concluded by this Court and by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which judgment is binding on the parties, the issue of jurisdiction of the Court to try and hear the complaint at Srinagar cannot in law be reopened.
7. Ld. CJM Srinagar considered the matter and vide its detailed order dated 23rd of May 2009 rejected the application of the petitioners and directed the petitioners to remain present for recording of statement under Section 242 of Code of Criminal Procedure. This petition is filed seeking quashment of the complaint as also the order dated 23rd May 2009.
8. This petition is almost replica of the earlier petitions filed by petitioners seeking quashment of proceedings which petitions as already stated have been dismissed by this Court and the appeal filed there against is also dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
9. Heard ld. Counsel for petitioners. Considered the matter.
10. The ld. Counsel for petitioners Mr. M.A. Qayoom, in order to seek quashment of the proceedings and dismissal of the complaint placed whole-hog reliance on 'M/s. Hamam Electronics case' (supra) and has submitted that in view of the law Laid down the ld. CJM Srinagar has no jurisdiction to proceed with the complaint. Before considering the effect of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Harnam's case (supra), one important aspect requires focused attention of the Court, viz., what will be effect of the judgment of this Court in the earlier round of litigation between same parties on the issue of competence and jurisdiction of ld. CJM Srinagar to try and hear the case, which judgment has attained finality as the SLP filed against same has been dismissed by Hon'ble Supreme Court. This Court has specifically held that CJM Srinagar has jurisdiction to hear the case, which finding has attained finality. The issue of jurisdiction of the Court at Srinagar having been settled by this Court and SLP having been dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in law the petitioners are precluded from again raising the same question in these proceedings. Judgment of this Court binds the parties and none of the parties thereof can wriggle out of the final conclusions arrived at by this Court and confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the earlier round of litigation.
11. The power and jurisdiction of the Ld. CJM Srinagar to hear the proceedings has attained finality between the parties in view of the earlier judgments. This view is supported by judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Vallapally Plantations Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala reported in : AIR 1999 SC 1796, paras 23 to 25 are reproduced as under:
23. Considering the question regarding applicability of Section 85(9) to the case in hand in the conspectus of statutory provisions we are of the view that answer to the question is in the negative. The provision in Section 85(9), as we see it, is intended to enable the Board to set aside its order under Sub-section (5) or Sub-section (7), as the case may be. The power vested in the Board under the provision is in wide terms, and therefore, the necessity for circumspection in exercise of the power. The provision is intended to empower the Board to correct errors in its orders and not to upset judgment/order/decree of competent Courts which are binding on the parties. To hold otherwise will amount to vesting powers to reopen any proceeding disposed of by a competent Court at any point of time (there is no period of limitation provided in the section) which may result in unsettling positions settled between the parties. On a fair reading of the provision it is to be held that the power to set aside its order and reopen a proceeding should be exercised by the Board in a fair and reasonable manner. In a case where the dispute on being determined by the Taluk Land Board was carried in revision to the High Court by the person affected or by the Government and the revisional order passed by the High Court was not challenged before superior Court and thus attained finality, to vest the power in the Taluk Land Board to ignore such an order and reopening the proceeding will not only result in unsettling settled positions between the parties but also go against judicial discipline.
24. No doubt in the present case the order that was sought to be set aside was of the Board. But the said order was passed in pursuance to the directions of the High Court in the revision petition. In other words in substance and in effect, in passing the order the Board was only complying with the direction of the High Court. To vest jurisdiction in the Board to set aside such an order will be permitting the Board to interfere with the decision of the High Court which has attained finality inter-parties.
25. A somewhat similar question arose before this Court in the case of Authorised Officer (Land Reforms) v. M.M. Krishnamurthy Chetty : (1998) 7 JT (SC) 503. In that case about 4.81 standard acres of land belonging to the respondent were declared surplus. Ultimately the matter came to the High Court. The learned Judge of the High Court set aside the order and remanded the case for fresh consideration in the light of the judgment of the High Court in the case of Nagartath Aiyer v. Authorised Officer (1970) 84 Mad LW 69. While the matter was pending before the authorised officer the Supreme Court reversed the aforesaid judgment in the case of Authorised Officer v. S. Naganatha : AIR 1979 SC 1487. The authorised officer decided the proceeding in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court. The land holder went in revision before the High Court challenging the order of the Authorised Officer. A stand was taken before the High Court that the order of remand passed by the High Court directing the authorised officer to decide the dispute in respect of the ceiling area in the light of the judgment of the High Court was not challenged by the Authorised Officer before the Supreme Court and as such it had become final. In other words the Authorised Officer was bound by the order of remand passed by the High Court and it was not open to the Authorised Officer to consider the dispute in respect of the ceiling area in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court. The High Court accepted this contention and allowed the civil revision filed by the land holder-the respondent. This Court confirming the order of the High Court observed as follows:
The order passed by the High Court directing the Authorised Officer to examine the dispute in the light of the judgment of the High Court in the case of Naganatha Ayyar v. Authorised Officer became final although the judgment on which the grievance had to be examined itself was reversed later by this Court. We find no fault with the reasoning of the High Court. It is well settied that even orders which may not be strictly legal become final and are binding between the parties if they are not challenged before the superior Courts. In the result the appeal fails and it is dismissed.
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in yet another case titled Authorised Officer (Land Reforms) v. M.M. Krishnamurthy Chetty : (1998) 9 SCC) 138 has taken the same view, para 2 of the judgment is reproduced as under:
2. According to the appellant once the judgment on the basis of which the High Court had directed to dispose of the dispute relating to the excess land had been reversed by this Court, the Authorised Officer was justified in following the judgment of the Court instead of the judgment of the High Court. It need not be pointed out that the order passed by the High Court attained finality as it was not challenged before the Supreme Court. The order passed by the High Curt directing the Authorised Officer to examine the dispute in the light of the judgments of the High Court in the case of Naganatha Ayyar v. Authorised Officer 1970 (84) Mad LW 69 became final although the judgment on which the grievance had to be examined itself was reversed later by this Court. We find no fault with the reasoning of the High Court. It is well settled that even orders which may not be strictly legal become final and are binding between the parties if they are not challenged before the superior Courts. In the result the appeal fails and it is dismissed. No costs.
13. A Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case the State of Punjab v. Jogindersingh reported in : AIR 1963 SC 913 has taken the view which supports case of the respondent No. 1, in as much as the issue of jurisdiction of the Court at Srinagar to hear and try the complaint having been earlier decided by this Court which has attained finality as the SLP there against has been dismissed, cannot be reopened between the same parties. Para 9 of the judgment is reproduced as under:
9. This will be a convenient stage where we might summarise briefly the provisions of the impugned rules and their impact on the right to promotion of the respondent and the other Junior teachers of the 'provincialised' service to which he belongs. Before however, doing so it is necessary to mention a preliminary objection that was taken to the hearing of appeal. Along with the respondent Joginder Singh there were three others who had filed similar petitions and sought the same relief. Writ petitions 161 and 162 of 1961 were by 'junior teachers' like the respondent, while Amrik Singh petitioner in the remaining petition (Petition 163 of 1961) was a Head Master among the 'provincialised' teachers. All the four petitions were dealt with together and were disposed of by a common judgment so that relief accorded to Joginder Singh the respondent before us in Writ Application 1559 of 1960 was also granted to the other three petitioners. The State however has preferred no appeal against the orders in the other three petitions, and Mr. Agarwala, learned Counsel for the respondent raises the contention that as the orders in the other three petitions have become final any order passed in this appeal at variance with the relief granted in the other three petitions would create inconsistent decrees in respect of the same matter and so we should dismiss the present appeal as incompetent. We, havever, consider that this would not be the legal effect of any order passed by the Court in this appeal and that there is no merit in this objection as a bar to the hearing, of the appeal. In our opinion, the true position arising, if the present appeal by the State Government should succeed, would be that the finality of the orders passed in the other three writ petitions by the Punjab High Court would not be disturbed and that those three successful petitioners would be entitled to retain the advantages which they had secured by the decision in their favour not being challenged by an appeal being filed. That however would not help the present respondent who would be bound by our judgment in this appeal and besides, so far as the general law is concerned as applicable to everyone other than the three writ petitioners (who would be entitled to the benefit of decisions in their favour having attained finality), the law will be as Laid down by this Court. We therefore overrule the preliminary objection.
14. In view of the above referred discussions, this petition being meritless does not survive and deserves to be dismissed.
15. However, there is an another facet to these proceedings which need to be unveiled. Harnam Electronics Pvt. Ltd. case which is referred to and relied upon by the Id. Counsel for the petitioner proceeded on the facts which are narrated in the said judgment. For appreciating the same, paras 12, 13, and 22 are reproduced as under:
12. Indisputably, the parties had been carrying on business at Chandigarh, The Head office of the complainant-respondent may be at Delhi but it has a branch office at Chandigarh. It is furthermore not in dispute that the cheque was issued and presented at Chandigarh. The complaint petition is totally silent as to whether the said cheque was presented at Delhi. As indicated hereinbefore, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant-respondent contended that in fact the cheque was put in a drop box but as the payment was to be obtained from the Delhi Bank, it was sent to Delhi. In support of the said contention, a purported certificate issued by the Citi Bank NA has been enclosed with the counter-affidavit, which reads as under:
This is to confirm that M/s. National Panasonic India Pvt. Ltd. (NPI) having registered office at AB-II, Company Centre, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi-110029 are maintaining a current Account No. 2431009 with our Bank at Jeevan Bharti Building, 3, Parliament Street, New Delhi-110001 only and not at any other place in India including Chandigarh.
Further confirmed that CITI Bank has provided the facility for collection of cheques/Demand Drafts from branches of NPI located at various places/cities in India. However, at amounts of cheques/Demand Drafts so collected on behalf of National Panasonic India Private Limited are forwarded and debited/credited to the aforesaid Current Account No. 2431009 without our Bank at Jeewan Bharti Building, 3, Parliament Street, New Delhi-110001.
13. The complaint petition does not show that the cheque was presented at Delhi. It is absolutely silent in that regard. The facility for collection of the cheque admittedly was available at Chandigarh and the said facility was availed of. The certificate dated 24.6.2003, which, was not produced before the learned Court taking cognizance, even if taken into consideration does not show that the cheque was presented at the Delhi Branch of the CITI Bank. We, therefore, have no other option but to presume that the cheque was presented at Chandigarh. Indisputably, the dishonour of the cheque also took place at Chandigarh. The only question, therefore, which rises for consideration is that as to whether sending of notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action for taking cognizance under the Negotiable Instrument Act.
22. In Y.A. Ajit v. Sofana Ajit : AIR 2007 SC 3151, this Court held:
The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused.
While in civil cases, normally the expression 'cause of action' is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression 'cause of action' is therefore not a stranger to criminal cases.
16. Reading all the above reproduced paras in-conjunction what emerges is that the transactions in the said case were carried at Chandigarh alone. The cheque was issued and presented at Chandigarh. The complainant was silent as to whether the said cheque was presented at Delhi. Facility of collection of cheque admittedly available at Chandigarh was availed of. The certificate dated 24th June 2003 was not produced before ld. Court and same did not show that the cheque was presented at Delhi branch of City Bank. The Hon'ble Supreme Court presumed in this fact situation that the cheque was presented at Chandigarh and admittedly dishonor of the cheque took place at Chandigarh.
17. Another fact to be noticed from the said judgment is that not only the issuance of the notice but the service thereof was also said to be imperative.
18. The present case on facts has admittedly differential features, like admittedly the cheque was presented at Srinagar, the memo stating that cheque could not be encashed was also received at Srinagar, the notice was also issued at Srinagar, the service whereof has been admitted by the petitioners.
19. In the M/s. Harnam Electronics Pvt. Ltd.'s case it was only the notice which was sent from Delhi which claim was also under cloud and it was not also sure as to whether the notice was received by the accused and all other acts had taken place at Chandigarh. It is in this factual scenario that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Court at Delhi had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and it was Court at Chandigarh which alone had the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. These discernible distinguishing factors in the two cases make it writ large on the face of the record that judgment in 'M/s. Harnam case' would not govern the facts of this case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. reported in : (2003) 2 SCC 111 : AIR 2003 SC 511 has ruled that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. A little difference in facts or additional facts may make lot of difference in a precedential value of a decision to make it binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution. Para 59 of the said judgment is reproduced as under:
59. A decision, as is well known, is an-authority for which it is decided and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It is also-well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. (See Ram Rakhi v. Union of India : AIR 2002 Delhi. 458, Delhi Admn. (NCT of Delhi) v. Manohar Lal : AIR 2002 SC 3088, Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagdamba Oil Mills : AIR 2002 SC 834 and Nalini Mahajan (D.) v. Director of Income-tax (Investigation) : 2002 (257) ITR 123.
20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in yet another case titled Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey reported in : AIR 1976 SC 1766 has taken same view and relevant para 7 is reproduced as under:
7. We think that the principles involved in applying Article 311(2) having been sufficiently explained in Shamsher Singh's case (AIR 1974 SC 2192)(supra) it should no longer be possible to urge that Sughar Singh's case : (AIR 1974 SC 423)(supra) could give rise to some misapprehension of the law. Indeed, we do not think that the principles of law declared and applied so often have really changed. But, the application of the same law to the differing circumstances and facts of various cases which have come up to this Court could create the impression sometimes that there is some conflict between different decisions of this Court. Even where there appears to be some conflict, it would we think vanish when the ratio decidendi of each case is correctly understood. It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts.
The conclusions of the judgment in M/s. Harnam's case (supra) will thus not be applicable and extended to the present case.
21. The case in hand is squarely covered by judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled Smt. Shamshad Begum v. B. Mohammed reported in : 2008 (II) JT (SC) 428 : 2009 Cri LJ 1304. The said judgment is based on law Laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in an earlier judgment reported in : 1999 (7) JT (SC) 558 : 1999 Cri LJ 4606. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while referring to the earlier judgment in K. Bhaskaran's case has concluded that the offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts. The acts which are to be components of offence were delineated as follows:
i) Drawing of the cheque;
ii) Presentation of the cheque to the bank;
iii) Returning of cheque unpaid by drawee bank;
iv) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount;
v) Failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days from receipt of the notice.
In the said case the jurisdiction of the Mangalore Court was challenged inter alia on the grounds that agreement between the parties was entered into at Bangalore and the parties lived in Mangalore, cheque was returned from the banks at Bangalore, therefore, Bangalore Court had jurisdiction to try the case. In the said case the notice was issued from Mangalore and the reply was received at Mangalore, the challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court at Mangalore was thus negatived.
22. Section 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Svt. 1989 is reproduced as under:
Place of inquiry or trial where scene of offence is uncertain or not in one district only; or where offence is continuing, or consists of several acts.
When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or
where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another; or
where an offence is a continuing one; and continues to be committed in more local areas than one; or
where it consists of several acts done in different local areas;
it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
23. The said provision provides that an offence can be enquired into and tried by the Court having jurisdiction over in all such local areas where, inter alia, any of the acts is performed. The offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 having been held to be concatenation of number of acts some of which have taken place at Srinagar, Court at Srinagar has thus jurisdiction in terms of the statute to hear and try the complaint.
24. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has, however, stated that directing the petitioners to appear before the Court so that substance of the accusation is put to the accused under Section 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, would result in splitting of the trial which is not countenanced in law. Section 242 of the Code is reproduced as under:
242. Substance of accusation to be stated.
When the accused appears or is brought, before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him, and he shall be asked if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted; but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge.
25. The ld. Counsel placed reliance on judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled State of Karnataka v. Narsa Reddy reported in : (1987) 4 SCC 170 : 1987 Cri LJ 1925. The present case in stricto sensu is not a case of the split of the trial and by following the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure under Section 242, aggrieved party has not stated that miscarriage of justice will occasion in the case. In the present case it is the prosecution who are seeking compliance with the provisions of Section 242, whereas, in the case relied upon by the ld. Counsel for the petitioners it was ruled that serious prejudice would be caused to the prosecution. It is further made clear that respondents 2 and 3 have challenged the initiation of proceedings against them on the grounds that they were not in any manner whatsoever affiliated with the petitioners company. The ground of challenge to the impugned order is also rendered inconsequential.
26. For what has been stated above, this petition being meritless, is dismissed.
27. Before parting with the case the observations made by this bench in case title Sunil Choudhary v. Alisha Enterprises in petition 561-A Cr. MP 69/07 decided on 22nd May 2009 are profitably reproduced as under:
The amendment in Section 138 of the Act of 1881 was inserted by Act 66 of 1988 which made dishonor of the cheque for insufficiency etc. of funds in the account to be an offence. The purpose of making the said amendment is to achieve the solemn object of preventing fraudulent acts by borrowers of money. It is a common knowledge that when a person borrows money or incur debt and on refusal to re-pay the same, the only legal course open to the lender was to institute a civil original suit for seeking recovery of the borrowed money. It is also common knowledge that civil suit take some time in getting settled for variety of reasons. In order to ensure that the borrowed money is repaid without creating any hassles the amendment was made in the Act of 1881. The said amendment in the Act of 1881 reveals one other facet viz. to enthuse and instill morale behavior in business dealings. Economy of nations and countries can survive only when the people follow morale values in economic dealings. If a person, for whatsoever, reasons advances money on the promise that it will be repaid, may himself be reduced to a pauper in case the money is not paid back. Assume a situation that business man is persuaded to advance substantial part of his money to another person as loan and the borrowed money is not repaid, it has the potential of collapsing the business of the lender. The immoral activities in economic field, has potential of not only collapsing business concern but has the monstrous power of destabilizing economic strength of countries. Such efforts of the unscrupulous borrowers have to be dealt with strenuously and law has to come down with heavy hand on such elements of the society.
Viewed thus, the purpose to be achieved by amendment incorporated in the Act of 1881 cannot be sought to be defeated on the technical grounds. A person who borrows money and thereafter in the discharge of the debt or liability issues a cheque, and subsequently by any mode frustrates payment thereof, cannot be permitted to wriggle out of his liability to discharge the debt and commitment to repay the same on pure technical pleas. If the hyper-technical pleas are accepted then it will be not only protecting a fraud and an immoral act but would also tantamount to perpetuating the same through process of the Court.
The provisions of law are to be interpreted in a manner which allow to achieve the purpose underlying such statute or provisions of Statutes.
Dismissed in limini along with CMP.