ORDER
A.S. Anand, C.J.
1. Shorn of details, the facts giving rise to the petition are : that a Police report under Section 145 Cr.P.C. was produced by the Police Division, Shaheed Gunj, Srinagar, on28-M984 titled State v. Ghulam Mustaffa Qureshi and Ors., in the court of City Magistrate, Srinagar. The learned City Magistrate took cognizance and drew up a preliminary order under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and also passed an order in terms of Section 145(4) Cr.P.C. directing the attachment of the property in dispute, the parties were directed to produce their written objections in support of their respective claims and such documents and affidavits on which they rely. It transpires from a perusal of the interim order dt. 7-4-1984, that evidence of the parties was closed and the case was adjourned for final arguments to April 9,1984. The case, however, was not taken up on April 9, 1984, and came up on April 11,1984, when respondent No. 3 requested the court for permission to produce some additional documents. The permission was granted as per the interim order with the consent of the counsel for the parties. The case was then listed for final arguments on various dates from April 14 to April 28,1984, when counsel for respondent No. 2 made a request to the court to permit him to produce a Will in support of his case, a formal application supported by an affidavit in this behalf was subsequently made by the counsel on May 1,1984. Objections to the application were invited. On May 2, 1984, counsel for respondent No. 3 submitted his objections and at the same time sought an opportunity to produce fresh affidavits on the ground that the earlier affidavits filed by respondent No. 3 suffered from defects of verification. Objections were filed by the petitioner herein to the applications of respondents 2 and 3 and after hearing learned Counsel for the parties the impugned order was passed on May 8, 1984, permitting respondent No. 2 to produce the Will and respondent No. 3 the fresh affidavits. Aggrieved, the petitioner has challenged the said order through this composite petition under Section 561-A read with Section 435 Cr.P.C.
2. Mr. H.S. Oberoi, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order dt. May 8,1984, amounted to reviewing the previous order of the court by which the evidence had been closed and the case posted for final arguments. learned Counsel submitted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to pass such an order as it was not competent to review its previous order. learned Counsel further complained that while granting the permission the court has neither dealt with the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioner nor has it recorded any satisfaction that the production of the Will was necessary for effective disposal of the proceedings before it. In making this submission learned Counsel relied upon the provisions of Section 369 Cr.P.C. which prohibits every court to review or alter its judgment after it has been signed except to correct a clerical error. Submitted Mr. Oberoi, that the impugned order was not aimed at correcting any clearical error in the earlier order of the court but amounted to altering and reviewing the earlier order which the court was not competent to do. Mr. R.N. Koul learned Counsel for the contesting respondents, on the other hand, submitted that there was no bar for the court to accept any document at any stage under the Code of Criminal Procedure and further that the principle that a court exercising criminal jurisdiction cannot alter or review its judgment, cannot extend to interim orders as in the present case.
3. The short question which, therefore, arises for consideration is : whether the bar contained in Section 369 Cr.P.C. extends to interim orders and interlocutory orders passed by a court while exercising criminal jurisdiction during the course of the proceedings ?
4. With a view to answer the aforesaid question, it is desirable to first notice the provisions of Section 369 Cr.P.C. They read as under:
369. Court not to alter judgment. Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, or in the case of the High Court, by the constitution of High Courts, no Court, when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error.
5. On its plain reading the bar contained in Section 369 Cr.P.C. operates only against a judgment and does not extend to interim or interlocutory orders. Orders which are of purely interim and temporary nature and do not decide or touch the important rights of the parties, cannot be termed as a judgment. It is well settled that orders, for instance of summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, calling reports and for taking such other steps in aid of the pending proceedings are merely interlocutory orders and not judgments. Therefore, the bar on the courts to review or alter its own judgments under Section 369 Cr.P.C. cannot extend to interlocutory orders. In taking this view I am fortified by a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Mirza Moh'd Afzal Beg v. State of J. & K. AIR 1060 J. & K. 1 : 1960 Cri LJ 62. While dealing with somewhat a similar argument though in a different context it was held:
We do not agree that the Magistrate had no right to come to a different conclusion at a later stage on an interlocutory matter like this. The order of the Magistrate dt. 11-6-58 is not a judgment within the meaning of Section 369 of the Code. It is, therefore, not valid to contend that he was absolutely bound by that order and had no right to pass a different order unless his earlier order was set aside by a superior court in appropriate proceedings. The principle applicable to judgment does not apply to interlocutory orders and the Magistrate was entitled to pass a different order at a later stage.
He was entitled to reconsider the position on another application, on the basis of the arguments advanced on either side and come to a different conclusion, as he has done in the present case.
6. Coming now to the facts of the present case. The impugned order only permits the production of a Will and the fresh affidavits by respondents 2 and 3 respectively. That defective verification of the affidavits can be permitted to be rectified at any stage of the proceedings, is no longer res integra and stands settled by this Court (see with advantage 1981 SLJ 345) (sic). No fault can, therefore be found with the permission granted to respondent No. 3 to file fresh affidavits by rectifying the defect in the verification.
7. The next contention of Mr. Oberoi that by the production of the Will the petitioner would be gravely prejudiced also does not bear close scrutiny. By merely allowing the production of the Will no substantial rights of the parties have been adjudicated upon. Mere production of the Will does not touch upon, let alone decide, any of the rights of the perties. Its relevance, effect and value, would considered by the court below at the appropriate time after hearing the parties. In my opinion, therefore, the impugned order is purely an interim or an interlocutory order to which the bar envisaged by Section 369 Cr.P.C. is not attracted. That apart, even the provisions of Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empower a court Svhenever' it considers necessary or desirable for the purpose of any enquiry, trial or other proceedings, to permit the production of a document. The expression 'whenever' which is the opening word of the section implies that it can be done at any stage of the proceedings (see in this connection with advantage 1974 J. & K. LR 622). Thus, the permission to produce the Will by the court before the conclusion of the proceedings has also the statutory sanction of Section 94 Cr.P.C. The provisions of Section 94 Cr.P.C. are almost in pari material with the provisions of Section 540 Cr.P.C. which empowers a court at any stage of enquiry, trial or other proceedings, under the Code to examine, recall or re-examine any person whose evidence appears to the Court to be essential for a j ust decision of the court. An order under Section 540 Cr.P.C, it is now well settled, is only an interlocutory order and not a judgment and the same analogy would apply to an order under Section 94 Cr.P.C. also See 1982 Kash LJ 1 : 1982 Cri LJ 646.
8. The revision petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The record of the case is in this Court. The same is directed to be sent back to the trial court without delay.
9. The parties, through their learned Counsel, are directed to appear before the trial court on Aug. 29, 1987.