Judgment:
H. Imtiyaz Hussain, J.
1. The point which arises for determination in the present Letters Patent Appeal is whether a revision under Section 30-A of the Jammu and Kashmir Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 2006 (for short the Act) is maintainable against an order against which right of second appeal is available under Section 30 of the Act.
2. The brief facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal are that appellant's father namely, Roshan Din R/o Tehsil Bishna applied to the Custodian under Section 8 of the Act for restoration of 168 kanals of land situated Mahmoodpur, at Tehsil Bishna. It was pleaded that the land belonged to one Chura who had died in the State during 1947 riots leaving behind Roshan Din as the sole claimant of his property. The Custodian vide order dated 09.11.1976 rejected his claim. On an appeal the Custodian General on December 20,1977 set aside the order of the Custodian with the direction to conduct fresh enquiry in the matter. Respondent Charan Dass filed an appeal before this Court against the order of Custodian General bearing CIMA No. 31/1978 which was heard and disposed of by this Court on 02.01.1989. The court made certain observations and directed the Custodian General to decide the appeal afresh. In compliance to the directions of this Court, Custodian General re-heard the matter and allowed the appeal vide its order dated 22nd of May 1993 and restored the evacuee property in favour of the present appellant (his father Roshan Din had died during the proceedings). Respondent Charan Dass felt aggrieved of the order of the Custodian General and, filed a revision petition under Section 30-A of the Evacuee Act before the Special Tribunal. The Special Tribunal considered the matter and found that since a remedy of second appeal was available, to the aggrieved person under Section 30 of the Act, a revision Under Section 30-A of the Evacuees Act was not maintainable. The said respondent challenged the order of the Tribunal before this Court through a petition OWP No. 30/1995 which was decided by the learned Single Judge on 21.10.1999 holding that the view taken by the Special Tribunal was not in accordance with the provisions of law and that a revision under Section 30-A of the Evacuees Act was maintainable, notwithstanding the fact that a remedy of appeal was available to the aggrieved party under the provisions of the Act. Learned Single Judge found that Section 30-A is in para-materia with Section 27 of the East Punjab Evacuee Act and that the Apex Court had settled the issue in AIR 1956 SC 77.
3. The appellant is aggrieved of the judgment of the learned Single Judge and through the medium of present appeal has challenged the same on various grounds inter-alia that the interpretation given by the learned Single Judge to Section 30-A of the Evacuees Act is wholly unsustainable and that the authority of the Apex Court as well as the provisions of Central Evacuees Administration of Property Act referred to and relied upon by the learned Single Judge to arrive at the aforesaid conclusions were not relevant and applicable to the present case as such the finding returned by the learned Single Judge was not in accordance with the law.
4. Heard. We have considered the matter. We have gone through the judgment of the learned Single Judge impugned in the present appeal.
5. Section 30 of the Evacuees Act deals with the appeal, review and revision and provides as under:
30. Appeal, review and revision. - (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made under Section 8, Section 14 (section 25 or Section 29-A) may prefer an appeal-
(a) to the Custodian where the original order has been passed by a Deputy or as assistant Custodian;
(b) (b) to (the Custodian General) where the original (or appellate) order has been passed by the Custodian in Additional Custodian or an authorized Deputy Custodian;
(c) to the High Court, against the order of the Custodian General;
Provided, that no appeal shall lie to the High Court against concurrent finding of the Custodian and the Custodian general.
(2) the appeal shall be presented in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed.
(3) the custodian to whom the appeal is preferred under clause (a) of Sub-section (1), may dispose of it himself, or may make sit ever for disposal to an Additional Custodian or to a Deputy Custodian authorized by the Custodian in writing in this behalf (in this section referred to as the authorized Deputy Custodian)
Provided that no appeal from an order of a Deputy Custodian shall be made over for disposal to the authorized Deputy Custodian.
(4) The Custodian General or the Custodian may, as any time, either on his own motion or on application made to him in this behalf, call for the record of any proceeding under this Act which is pending before, or has been disposed of, by an officer subordinate to him, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed in the said proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit;
Provided that the Custodian General or the Custodian shall not under this sub-section pass an order revising or modifying any order affecting any person without giving such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard;
Provided further that the custodian General shall not call for the record of any proceeding to which Custodian has with his previous approval under Section 10 or Section 25, passed an order.
(5) The Custodian General, Custodian, Additional Custodian or authorized Deputy custodian but not a Deputy or an Assistant Custodian, may, after giving notice to the parties concerned, review his own order.
(6) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this section, any order made by the Custodian General, Custodian, Additional Custodian authorized Deputy Custodian, Deputy Custodian or Assistant custodian shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court by way of appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceeding.
6. Section 30-A of the said Act deals with the revisional powers of the Minister and provides as under:
30-A. Powers of revision of the Minister Incharge.- The Minister In-charge of the Evacuee's Property Department may at any time, either on his own motion or on an application made to him in this behalf, call for the record of any proceedings in which any Custodian or Custodian General has passed an order under the provisions of this Act for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any such order and may pass such order in revision therein as he thinks fit.
7. On the revision filed by the respondent Charan Dass before the Special Tribunal under Section 30-A of the Act, the Tribunal found that since a remedy of appeal under Section 30 of the Evacuees Act was available to the respondent, the revision under Section 30-A of the Evacuees Act was not maintainable. The Tribunal observed as under:The right to file the second appeal in the High court where the findings of the Custodian and the Custodian General are not concurrent is couched with the right to be re-heard on questions of law and facts and that right cannot be curtailed by any other provision of the act which only gives a right to a party to move the Minister-in-charge of the Evacuees Property Department (now the Tribunal) to have a discretion for satisfying himself (itself) as to the legality of propriety of any order. Looking at the situation under which these provisions were inserted simultaneously by one amendment (substituted by act XVIII of 1978, dated 9.5.1978), the intention of the legislature seems to be that mischiefs arising from the enquiries conducted under Section 8,14 and 25 may be redressed in a thorough and wider way when the opinions of Custodian and Custodian General are divergent. The Hon'ble High Court has been vested with the powers of, re-hearing the case both on law and on facts.
The concerned parties have a statutory right to be re-heard, This right cannot be taken away by discretionary remedy which is available to the parties Under Section 30-A of the Act. In this view of the matter, the statutory right vested in the parties of a case to file the second appeal in the High court under Section 30 prevails and the discretionary remedy available Under Section 30-A which is of limited nature yields...
8. The learned Single Judge has reversed the findings of the Tribunal on the ground that the ambit and scope of the revisional powers vested in the Minister (which are at present being exercised by the Special Tribunal) were wider as it is legality and propriety of any order passed by the Custodian or Custodian General which has to be examined. The learned Single Judge found that it is not only the jurisdiction or lack of it and irregularity but propriety of the order which can be examined by the revisional authority under Section 30-A of Evacuees Act. Learned Single Judge also found that the revisional powers vested in the Minister under Section 30-A of Act were not affected by the powers of appeal as contained in Section 30 of the Act as Section 30-A of the Act vests much wider powers as are available to the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
9. The learned Single Bench has further found that Section 30-A of the Evacuees Act is in pari-materia with Section 27 of East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 as it has been bodily lifted from the said Act. The learned Single Judge relying on Indira Sohan Lal v. Custodian E.P. AIR 1956 SC 77 an authority on the interpretation of Section 27 of the Punjab Act, found that since the Apex Court has settled the matter, the same principle will apply to the present case and the Tribunal would get revisional powers to examine the legality or otherwise of the order of Custodian General.
Section 27 of the East Punjab Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 referred to by the learned Single Judge provides as under:
27.(1) The Custodian General may at any time, either on his own motion or on application made to him in this behalf, call for the record of any proceeding in which any district Judge or Custodian has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any such order and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit;
Provided that the Custodian-General shall not pass an order under this sub-section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
10. While interpreting the said section, the Apex Court in Indira Sohan Lal's case (supra) found that the section is very wide in its terms and cannot be construed as being subject to any such limitations. The court held as under:
It is next contented that the revisional power cannot be exercised when there was an appeal provided but no appeal was filed, that it was open to the Assistant Custodian who appeared before the Custodian General in support of the notice for revision or to the allottees of the property in whose interest the revisional order appears to have been passed, to file an appeal under the Act as person aggrieved.
Section 27 however, is very wide in its terms and it cannot be construed as being subject to any such limitations. Nor can the scope of revisional powers be confined only to matters of jurisdiction or illegality as is contended, because under Section 27, the Custodian-General can exercise revisional powers 'for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or 'propriety of any order of the Custodian.'
We are thus clearly of the opinion that the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the exercise of revisional powers in this case by the Custodian-General is without jurisdiction or is illegal, must fail.
11. Section 30-A of the Evacuees Act, as reproduced above would show that the section, which is in para-materia with Section 27 of the Punjab Act, is very wide in its terms as it vests revisional powers in the Minister for purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order of the Custodian or Custodian General. Under the section the Minister Incharge of Evacuee Property Department (at present the Special Tribunal) may either on his own motion or on an application made in this behalf, call for the record of any proceedings, where the Custodian/Custodian General has passed an order to determine its legality or propriety.
12. It is now well settled law as has been held by the Apex Court as well as by this Court in a number of authorities that the meaning and intention of a statute must be collected from the plain and unambiguous expression used therein. The interpretation put on a particular provision should be such which does not render the provision redundant but makes it workable. By reading Section 30-A of the Act as a whole and giving the ordinary and natural meaning to the provisions contained therein, we have no doubt that the legislature intended to provide vast powers of revision to the Minister against any order passed by the Custodian or Custodian General under the Act.
13. Clause (C) to Section 30 of the Act gives right of second appeal and provides that the aggrieved person may prefer an appeal to the High Court, against the order of the Custodian General. The clause was inserted by Act XXIII of 2007 (Svt) while as Section 30-A which provided the powers of revision was substituted by Act XVIII of 1978. Thus when the provision of revision was inserted, the clause relating to second appeal was already present; the legislature was thus aware of it and by substituting Section 30-A it consciously vested the Minister with the powers.
14. Section 30 and 30-A provide remedies of appeal and revision which are independent of each other. Since remedy of revision under Section 30 A has been provided consciously by the legislature, it cannot be made redundant by holding that a remedy of section appeal is provided before a much higher forum (i.e. the High Court) by Section 30(c). Where an order suffers from an illegality or impropriety, nothing bars a person to invoke revisional jurisdiction, even if it means by passing of remedy of appeal in the process. This issue was examined by a Single Bench of this Court in Sattar Din v. Mir Mohammad and Ors. 1991 JKLR 308 : 1992 SLJ155 and it was held:
Even a cursory glance at Section 30 and 30-A would show that the remedies of appeal and revision arc independent of each other. In the very nature of things they are different from each other. An appeal is the continuation of the proceedings and the appellate authority has power to review the evidence subject to the statutory provisions. But in case of revision, the revisional authority has to satisfy himself as to the legality or propriety of an order suomoto or on an application. Therefore, where an order suffers from an illegality or impropriety, nothing bars a person to invoke revisional jurisdiction, even if it means by passing of remedy of appeal in the process. A conjoint reading of relevant provisions only leads to this irresistible conclusion, conclusion
15. Mr. S.A. Salaria, learned Counsel for the appellant contends that since the remedy of second appeal is also provided it may lead to anomalous situation if one of the party avails the remedy of appeal before the High Court and another party, if aggrieved of any portion of order of the Custodian General may file a revision before the Tribunal. In such case the situation will become more complicated if the two forums i.e. the High Court and the Tribunal return different or inconsistent findings. The argument on the face of it appeared to us very attractive. Learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, tried to convince us, by placing reliance on M/s Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1964 SC 1372, Behari Lal and Anr. v. M.M. Gobardhan Lal and Ors. AIR 1948 All. 353 and Velegalapudi Savitramma v. K. Satyanamyanamurthy AIR 1960 A.P. 81 that situations do arise where two independent remedies become available to an aggrieved party but any of the two remedy cannot be made redundant by holding that an alternate or more efficacious remedy is available to such a party.
16. On careful appreciation of the issue raised we find in view of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 30-A we need not to go to hypothetical issues as raised by Mr. Salaria. A Full Bench of this Court in Shubra Bagchi v. P.K. Bagchi AIR 1975 J&K; 83 has held as under:
Where the language of the provisions of a statute is absolutely clear and unambiguous, it is not open to interpret it by importing into it something which is not there or by doing violence to the language of the section mainly because certain anomalous results might follow or because the interpretation may lead to complicated consequences.
17. On consideration of the matter, we find the interpretation of Section 27 as made by the Apex Court in Indira Sohan Lal's case (supra) squarely applies to the provisions of Section 30-A of the Evacuees Act in the present case. The Minister (now the Special Tribunal) would get powers of revision notwithstanding the fact that a remedy of appeal is available, to the aggrieved party, whether or not such remedy is availed.
18. In view of it, we find the interpretation given by the learned Single Judge to Section 30-A is in accordance with the principles of interpretation of statute and this being the only interpretation which can make Section 30-A workable, there is no illegality in the conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge.
19. The result is that this appeal is dismissed. Before concluding we may observe that though the learned Single Judge has kept revisional powers of Special Tribunal in tact, he has not said anything about the revision petition which was filed by the respondent before the Special Tribunal. The learned Single Judge has allowed the petition and quashed the order of Special Tribunal dated 25.01.1995 and stopped there. In the circumstances, we direct that the Tribunal shall now take up the revision petition filed by the respondents under Section 30-A of the Evacuees Act and dispose of the same in accordance with law.
Ordered accordingly.