ORDER
M.L. Kaul, J.
1. The appellant/ applicant, Oriental Insurance Company, is seeking the condonation of delay by filing this CMP under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in filing the Appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, with regard to the judgment and award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Ramban, on 23-12-1992.
2. The judgment and award was passed by the Tribunal in presence of the counsel for the parties on the aforesaid date and the counsel for the appellant/ insurance company filed an application for the issue of certified copy of the judgment on 16-1-1993. The said copy was prepared on 20-1-1993 and delivered on 22-1-1993. In the application it has been urged that the copy of judgment was sent by post to the Insurance Company, which was received by it at Jammu on 29-1-1993. As the case was not within the financial competence of the applicant/appellant, therefore, after obtaining legal opinion at Jammu, the case was sent to the Regional Office at Chandigarh on 15-2-1993. The Regional Office after the receipt of the papers secured legal opinion and as the case involved some important legal question, it was returned to the Company's office at Jammu, for filing an appeal before this Court. The papers including the certified copy of the judgment were received by post on31-3-1993 and during the first week of April, 3rd, 4th and 5th April, being holidays, the case was handed over to the counsel for preparation of the memo of appeal. The period of limitation for filing the appeal had expired on 23-3-1993 and thus the appeal was late by 15 days, which delay has been caused, as explained above,
3. Objections were filed and the application for condonation of delay was resisted on the ground that the application is hopelessly time barred, for the fact that the applicant failed to apply for the copy of the judgment and award well in time and it filed the said application after 24 days of the passing of the judgment and the counsel for the applicant/Insurance Company was present when the award was passed by the Tribunal. That the applicant/appellant has failed to explain the delay of every day and their contention is not bona fide. The applicant wants to frustrate the award passed in favour of the poor claimants and that the applicant being a State functionary has not acted fairly. That the delay cannot be condoned or excused, for the fact that no sufficient cause has been shown and therefore the Limitation Act has no application to the appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act.
4. The objections filed by Mr. D. S. Thakur, for respondents 1 to 8, have been adopted by Mr. M.K. Bhardwaj, appearing for the respondents 9 and 10, while arguing the case and he did not want to file any fresh objections to this application for condonation of delay.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties, also went through the record and the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal.
6. At the outset it is suffice to say without any ambiguity that the award passed was announced by the Tribunal in presence of the learned counsel for the parties and Mr. Goja, learned counsel appearing for the applicant-Insurnce Company before the Tribunal, was present when the award was passed against the applicant. Mr. Goja, who is a very Senior Counsel at Ramban, knew the merits of the case and he also knew as to what important questions of law were involved in the matter, for which an appeal was necessarily required to be preferred before the higher forum. But Mr. Goja slept over the matter and did not choose to file an application for issuance of a certified copy of the judgment, for 24 days. No proof is available on the file as to what circumstances restrained Mr. Goja to move such an application before the Tribunal for issuance of a copy of judgment and such an inordinate dely in not filing the application, has not been explained. Neither any affidavit in this regard has been filed by the applicant/ appellant, explaining therein as to why such an inordinate delay was made in filing an application for issuance of a certified copy of judgment before the Tribunal.
7. I had an advantage to go through the judgment passed by the Tribunal and it is found that the applicant/Insurance Co. had during the trial of the claim petition, pleaded that the Sheep and the goods were carried in the offending vehicle at the time of accident and no passenger was allowed to travel in a goods vehicle, which fact was not covered by the Insurance policy and as such the accident has occurred due to driving of the vehicle by an unauthorised person and in contravention of the terms of the Insurance policy.
8. The Insurance Company or the owner of the offending vehicle has not produced any proof that the deceased Gul Mohd was travelling as a trespasser in the vehicle, so much so the Insurance Company did not care to put in service the insurance policy, for the perusal, enabling the Tribunal to assess for itself as to whether the Company was liable to make good the compensation in favour of the person, who was killed while travelling in goods vehicle, insured with the applicant/ Insurance company. Therefore, in absence of the insurance policy there was no occasion for the Tribunal to hold that the liability of the Insurance Company was limited and the deceased Gul Mohd was travelling in the offending vehicle with Sheep and goods, at the time of accident, and he cannot be said to be a passenger. It is in circumstances of the case to be seen whether the delay caused infiling the appeal can be condoned or not.
9. May be for the aforesaid reasons, the learned counsel Mr. Goja, appearing for the applicant before the Tribunal after having assessed this legal position of the case has not chosen to file an application for obtaining certified copy of the judgment immediately and rather waited for 24 days, till he might have been directed by the Insurance Company to get a certified copy of the judgment.
10. Vague and inconsistent pleas have been raised in the application for condonation of delay. It has been averred by the applicant that as it was not within the financial competence of the applicant at Jammu to file an appeal, therefore, the matter was referred to higher authorities, who also after obtaining legal opinion at Chandigarh, directed the Company's office at Jammu, to file an appeal before this Court.
11. It is quite strange that although the delay was caused by the applicant in seeking copy of the judgment and award from the Tribunal, but even then applicant did not care to send the copy of judgment immediately through a special messenger to higher authorities at Chandigarh or to get it immediately from Ramban. Rather the copy of judgment, after obtaining it from the Tribunal at Ramban, was being despatched through mail from one place to another, and as such the time spent in the transit, could have been saved and the appeal filed within time. Rather inter-departmental consultations on administrative reasons have been raised as a plea for not filing the appeal in time, but the same, in no manner, will constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Such an explanation offered by the applicant/Insurance Company comes within the meaning of inter-departmental correspondence and such a period spent in controversy between the departments, as to whether the appeal is to be filed or not, does not constitute sufficient cause, for condonation of delay. The very fact that the copy of the judgment was received by the applicant/ Insurance Company on 29-1-1993 at its Jammu Office, in which the date of judgment was given as 23-12-1992, but even then the Regional Office of the Company at the Headquarter, sought the legal opinion as to whether the appeal could be filed or not. It shows that some unnecessary departmental wrangles have taken place in the matter and nobody has shared the responsibility for causing delay in the matter, so much so no affidavit is filed on behalf of the learned counsel for the Company, Mr. Goja, before the Tribunal, and the Regional Manager of the Insurance Company at Chandigarh, intimating as to what were the circumstances under which Mr. Goja could not apply for a copy of judgment for some 24 days and for what reasons the Regional Manager of the Insurance Company could not file the appeal within the period of limitation.
12. No explanation is offered by the applicant/Insurance Co. at whose behest delay at the outset has occurred in the matter and neither the application does constitute sufficient ground nor cause for condonation of the delay.
13. In taking the above view I am supported by a judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court, of which I was the author, in C.M.P. 539 of 1993 and LPA No. 289 of 1993 titled: Union of India v. C.L. Sehgal: on 15-3-1994.
14. The matter in question has been threadbare dealt with by another judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, reported in 1993 Kash LJ 150, of which also I was the author, wherein it has been held that sufficient cause in every case is sine qua non for condonation of delay and liberal construction is required to be placed when substantial justice and technical grounds are pitched against each other. It was further observed in that judgment that it has often been settled by the Apex Court and different High Courts of the Country that the expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice, where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. Such a view was takenby the Division Bench on the basis of AIR 1988 SC 897 and in that judgment it was held that:
'There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time barred appeal.'
15. I am motivated to rely on the aforesaid ruling, and on the merits of the present case, I am convinced that no sufficient cause has been put forth by the applicant/ Insurance Company to justify that as to why its lawyer at Ramban did not apply for certified copy of the judgment immediately after the judgment and award was passed in his presence and why the Company did not take pains and efforts to file an appeal within time, when the copy of judgment was received by its office at Jammu at least two months earlier before the time for filing of an appeal was to expire.
16. In nut-shell the only ground taken by the applicant was that as the Company's office at Jammu was not having financial competence in filing the appeal, therefore, a direction was sought in this regard from the higher authorities at Chandigarh. It appears that a vain attempt has been made by the applicant to seek advice in filing the appeal. Rather if the applicant could have been cautious, it would have sent the copy of judgment through some special messenger to the higher authorities and also sought concurrence for filing the appeal, before the time was over.
17. Each case has to be tested on the particularities of its own special facts and the expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to receive a liberal construction, so as to advance substantial justice in favour of parties, where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.
18. In the case on hand the petitioners have not made a bona fide effort to seek the directions of the higher authorities in filing the appeal within time, when do delay was caused to them in receiving the judgment from the court, for the fact that they applied for copy of the judgment on 16-1-1993 and it was ready on 20-1-1993 and received by the applicant's counsel at Ramban on 22-1-1993. So there is no ground or any reason that the delay of 16 days in filing the appeal, can be condoned. It is not the period of delay which is to be taken into consideration, but the courts have to consider the bona fides of a party seeking condonation of delay, as to whether delay for any period was caused not due to negligence or on account of any mala fides of the party seeking condonation of delay, but there was sufficient cause for such a delay, which can be condoned within the purview of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose to advance substantial justice to the party concerned.
19. In the case on hand, as I have already discussed, the only point which was worth consideration was as to whether the applicant/Insurance Company stood as an indemnifier for a third party, and the same has been already explained by the Tribunal holding that no insurance policy was filed by the Company to show that they were not the indemnifier for the deceased Gul Mohd and the risk was not covered as per the insurance policy. As this matter has already been taken care by the Tribunal, therefore, in such circumstances the delay caused in filing the appeal, for the reasons mentioned above, cannot be deemed to have been reasonable and there is no sufficient cause to the applicant for not filing the appeal well within time.
20. Before concluding, it is also observed that it is a social welfare legislation under which the compensation is provided by way of Award to the people who sustain bodily injuries or get killed in the vehicular accident. These people who sustain injuries or whose kith and kins are killed, are necessarily to be provided such relief in a short span of time and the procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the just purpose of the Act, under which such compensation is to be paid to such claimants.
21. For this reason, the delay caused in filing the appeal by the Insurance Company is not given credence, for the fact that theclaimants/respondents have already suffered for a long time and they have not been paid the award money although the judgment and award was passed in their favour by the Tribunal on 23-12-1992. It appears that there is a wilful delay on the part of the applicant/ Insurance Company, in filing the appeal beyond limitation. Hence delay caused cannot be condoned,
22, The application, therefore, being without any substance is rejected, and consequently CIMA No. 48/93 also stands dismissed, for being time barred.