ORDER
S.S. Kang, C.J.
1. This revision petition is directed against the order dated 3-1-1987, passed by the learned Munsif Sub Registrar, Jammu, whereby he has decided issue No. 3, preliminary issue, against the plaintiff-petitioner.
2. The plaintiff-petitioner had filed a suit for ejectment against Kidar Nath, defendant, in relation to residential premises situated in Raghunath Bazaar, Jammu, on various grounds one of them being that the defendant-tenant had committed three defaults within a period of 18 months in payment of the rent in spite of a notice and had incurred a liability for ejectment under Section 11(1)(i) of the Jammu & Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
3. The defendant appeared and contested the suit. In his defence he raised a number of pleas. He, inter alia, pleaded that the plaintiff had not served a valid notice as contemplated by Clause (1)(i) of Section 11 of the Act because he had given a notice requiring the defendant to pay the arrears of rent within one month of the receipt of the notice whereas under the Act tenant was to be asked to deposit the arrears of rent within 30 days of the receipt of the notice.
4. The learned Munsiff framed 12 issues but we are concerned only with Issue No. 3 which reads as under :
'Whether the notice served by the plaintiff on the defendant is not according to law? If so, the present suit is not maintainable? O.P.D.'
Since it was precisely a legal issue, no evidence was led and recorded thereon and the learned counsel for the parties addressed their arguments in the trial Court on the said issue.
5. The learned Munsiff Sub Registrar, Jammu, recorded his finding that the notice was issued on 1-8-1979. It was served on the defendant on 8-8-1979 and he as thereby required to pay the arrears of rent within one month of the receipt of the notice and not within thirty days thereof as provided under Section 11(1)(i) ibid; the word 'month' having not been defined in the Act had to be construed in accordance with the provisions of the General Clauses Act where 'month' has been defined as 'a' month reckoned according to the Gregorian calandar'. The notice calling upon the defendant to pay the arrears of rent within one month is vague and is not in consonance with the provisions of the Act aforementioned and the defendant cannot be deemed to have committed any default in payment of arrears of rent within the meaning of Section 11(1)(i) of the Act. He, thus, decided issue No. 3 against the plaintiff. Aggrieved, the plaintiff has filed the present revision petition.
6. Shri H.L. Bhagotra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner has argued that the learned Munsiff fell in grave error in holding that: the notice was not valid and in accordance with the relevant provisions of Section 11 (1)(i) of the Act. The requirement of Section 11(1)(i) stands fully complied with. In the notice requiring the tenant to pay the arrears of rent the mention or non-mention of the period within which the arrears of rent were to be paid, is immaterial because the tenant is presumed to be aware of the provisions of the proviso to Clause (1)(i) of Section 11 ibid. He has further contended that the notice was given on 8-8-1979. The month of August consists of 31 days. The notice was rather for more than thirty days and the tenant had 31 days to pay the arrears of rent instead of 30 days.
7. The aforementioned submissions have been controverted by Shri S. C. Subhash, learned counsel appearing for the defendant-respondent. He has submitted that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation enacte to save the tenants from paying exorbitant rents to unscrupulous landlords and also to protect them from eviction on flimsy grounds. The provisions of the Act have, therefore, to be so construed that if two interpretations of a particular provision are possible than the interpretation which is beneficial to the tenant should be adopted thus, viewed the notice served on the tenant was invalid and the suit was liable to be dismissed.
8. The Act, indeed, is a piece of social legislation, the object of which is to ameliorate the conditions of tenants by providing them the security of tenure and regulating the payment of rent. The Rent Control statutes primarily aim at regulating the rent and put restriction on the right to evict under the general law. The scheme of Section 11 is to prevent in the first part all ejectments and then in the proviso to set out the circumstances in which the general protection to the tenants is taken away. The substantive provisions of the Act have, thus, to be strictly construed and if two interpretations of a particular provision are possible, then the one which favours the tenant should be adopted.
9. The provisions regarding the serving of notice contained in the proviso, however, are in the nature of procedure. This provision which enjoins upon the service of a notice on the tenant through registered post, to pay the arrears of rent within 30 days of the receipt of notice, has to be construed in the light of the principles for interpreting the notices for eviction enunciated by the Courts in this behalf. One can do no better than quote the felicitous formulation of Lord Atkinson on the subject in Harihar Banerjee v. Ram Shastri Banerjee -- AIR 1918 PC 102, the locus classics of the subject which have been reiterated and applied by various courts in the country :
'The principles governing the Construction of a notice to quit laid down by English cases are equally applicable to cases arising in India and they establish that notices to quit, though not strictly accurate or consistent in the statements embodied in them, may still be good and effective in law; the test of their sufficiency is not what they would mean to a stranger ignorant of all the facts and circumstances touching the holding to which they purport to refer, but what they would mean to tenants presumably conversant with all those facts and circumstances; and further, they are to be construed not with a desire to find fault in them which would render them defective but to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pareat.....'
A note of caution, however, had been struck ;
'But these principles are applicable to notices containing mistakes honestly but inadvertently made and not to inaccuracies deliberately inserted for fraudulent purposes.'
These principles have been followed by the Gujarat High Court in Soni Mulji Valji v. Babulal alias Mansukhlal Durlabhji 1977 (2) RCJ 49, wherein it was observed at page 52:
'....At the same time it has to be borne in mind that though the terms of the section are to be strictly complied with, it does not mean that in construing the notice in a given case it must be scrutinized in a pedantic manner or in a manner completely divorced from common sense. Therefore, on a reasonable a reading of ' the notice in all its material parts, one must arrive at the conclusion whether or not it is a notice of fifteen clear days expiring with the end of the month of tenancy.....'
It was further held:
'.....What is required as earlier stated is a fair reading of the notice in all its material parts and the ascertainment of the intention of the person serving the notice by adopting an approach in the matter of its construction which is not actuated by a desire to find faults in it so as to render it necessarily defective. On a true construction of the relevant expressions used in the notice, the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner that the notice is invalid is devoid of merit. Further it is well settled that merely because notice claims more amount than was due, it does not become in effective or invalid. The next contention was that the notice required the petitioner to pay up the amount claimed therein within a period of eight days and that, therefore, it was invalid. Here again the High Court is unable to agree. Despite the requisition contained in the notice it was open to the petitioner to tender the amount claimed within a period of one month from the service of the notice and had he done that he would have been able to claim the protection of Section 12 (1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The very fact that the notice directed him to pay the amount within eight days cannot take the notice invalid.'
This view was again reiterated by a Division Uench of that High Court in 1980 (2) RCJ 525 -- Sakerlal Nathubhai and others v. Chhotu-bhai Navalbhai.
10. It is, thus, apparent from the above-mentioned decisions that the notice has not to be scrutinised in a pedantic manner completely divorced from common sense. The correct approach in construing a notice is not to look at the matter actuated by a desire to find faults in the notice so as to render it unnecessarily defective. Even if the notice claims more amount than as due it does not become ineffective or invalid. Similarly if the notice demanded the amount due earlier than the prescribed period, it was open to the tenant to tender the amount claimed within the time prescribed and if he had done that, he would be entitled to claim the statutory protection. The very fact that the notice directed him to pay the amount within a period less than the prescribed period would not make the notice invalid.
11. In fairness to Shri Subhash, it must be mentioned that he brought to my notice the decision of the final court in Tamal Lahiri v. Kumar P.N. Tagore -- AIR 1978 SC 1811 : (1979 Cri LJ 1). It was a case under the Bengal Municipal Act. The concerned Municipality had served a notice on a citizen alleging therein that he had erected an obstruction over main municipal drain without permission. He was served a notice on 5-12-1987 to remove the encroachment within 15 days. The citizen did not comply with the directions in the notice and consequently a complaint was filed against him under Section 240 (1)(b) read with Section 500(1)(b) of the Bengal Municipalities Act. He took a plea that the complaint was barred by limitation as the same had not been instituted within six months next after the commission of the offence. This objection was overruled by the trial magistrate. On a revision filed by the citizen, the High Court allowed the same holding that the complaint was barred by time because the period begins to run on 5-12-1987 when the notice was given by the Municipality. The Municipality, aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, went up in appeal to the apex court. The finding of the High Court that the period of limitation started running from 5-12-1987 when the notice was issued, was set aside and it was held that the period of limitation would start running from 20-12-1967, the time prescribed by the statute for removal of the encroachment. It was also held that the complaint filed on 19-6-1968 had been filed within six months from 20-12-1967 when the offence was committed by the citizen.
12. Mr. Subhash drew our pointed attention to the observations of their Lordships in para 6 wherein it was observed :
'..... The only question which then requires examination is whether the prosecution which was filed on June 19, 1968, was instituted as required by Section 533, 'within six months next after the commission' of the offence. An argument was raised in the High Court 'six months' must be construed to mean 180 days and not six calendar months. The High Court does not appear to have accepted that submission. There the High Court is right because Section 3(27) of the Bengal General Clauses Act of 1899, defines 'a month' to mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar. The expression 'six months' which occur in Section 533 of the Act must accordingly be construed to mean six calendar months and not 180 days.'
13. These observations do not help the learned counsel for the respondent. In the aforementioned case the complaint had been filed even within 180 days after the completion of the offence i.e. 20-12-1968. It was, indeed, within six calendar months after that date also, The High Court had committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the offence was completed on 5-12-1967 when the notice was issued and several upon the citizen and the limitation started running from that date. This was the real issue in the case before their Lordships. I am aware that even an obiter of the final Court is binding on this Court. In the above case the final Court was interpreting the provisions of a statute incorporating the period of limitation for launching the criminal prosecution. In the very nature of things such a provision has to be strictly construed.
14. However, even if we accept that a month does not always mean 30 days, it is of no help to the defendant-respondent/tenant. The notice was given in August; that month was of 31 days and even the, next month of September was required to pay the arrears of rent within a period of not less than 30 days. The tenant could raise a grievance if he had been required to pay the arrears of rent within a period of less than 30days. If it had been the month of February some thing may have been said in support of the impugned order. However, since the notice had been given in August the use of expression 'one month' in the notice, fully complied with the proviso to Clause 1(i) of Section 11 of the Act in letter and spirit.
15. In this view of the matter this revision petition is allowed and the impugned order of the learned Munsiff Sub-Registrar, Jammu, dated 3-1-1987, to the extent aforementioned, is set aside. The remaining part of the order shall remain intact.
16. The parties, however, shall bear their own costs. The parties through their learned counsel are directed to appear before the learned Munsiff Sub-Registrar, Jammu, on April 23, 1991. The record of the case be also remitted to that Court immediately. It is an old case, therefore, the learned Munsiff Sub-Registrar shall take personal interest and effective steps to dispose of the same expeditiously without granting any avoidable and unnecessary adjournments.