Deepak Gupta, J.
1. Interesting questions arise in these matters. The State Government in exercise of the powers conferred on it under Section 2(k) of the H.P.Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (here-inafter referred to as the Rent Act) sometimes declares the area of Kandaghat to be an urban area and sometimes this notification is withdrawn. When the area of Kandaghat was not within the purview of the Rent Act, civil suits were filed for eviction of the tenants. In the mean time, the area was brought within the ambit of the Rent Act. However, before the decrees could be passed or executed fresh notification was issued again bring the area within the purview of the Rent Act. Later this notification was also withdrawn. Now, the area of Kandaghat has again been declared to be an urban area and thus the Rent Act is again applicable. This has given rise to various disputed questions of law with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to pass a decree and also in respect of the executability of such decrees.
2. RSA No. 506 of 2004 was listed before the then Hon'ble Chief Justice on 30th November, 2004 on which date the order of admission was passed, relevant portion of which reads thus:
My attention has been invited to notification No. UDE( 3)-35/97 dated 30th May, 2003 whereby the State Government rescinded the earlier notification of even No. dated 11.11.1998. This was done in purported exercise of the powers vested in the State Government under Clause (k) of Section 2 of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. The suit was filed in the Court of Sub Judge Kandaghat in 1995 when admittedly 1987 Act was not applicable to the property in question. It was during the pendency of the suit that in 1998 vide the aforesaid notification dated 11.11.1998 this Act was made applicable.
As noticed, the aforesaid notification dated 30th May, 2003 has once again made the Act inapplicable to the property in question. Evidently this has been done by rescinding the notification dated 11.11.1998. In the aforesaid background, therefore, what is the extent, if at all, of the enforceability of the decree impugned passed by the learned Trial Court and upheld by the learned first Appellate Court. In the aforesaid background, the appeal is admitted only on the two questions of law being question Nos. 4 and 5 as formulated by the appellant appended to the memo of appeal.
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Because of the important question of law involved touching upon the interpretation given to Section 14(1) of 1987 read with other provisions of the Act with respect to the definition of the urban area as occurring in Section 2(k) of the Act and in the light of the aforesaid two notifications dated 11.11.1998 and 30th May, 2003, the appeal is referred to a Division Bench of this Court.
3. This is how RSA No. 506 of 2004 is before a Division Bench for final hearing.
The appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law:
1. Whether both the Courts below have further acted without jurisdiction in passing a decree of ejectment by ignoring the observations made by the learned District Judge in its order dated 28th October, 2000 in Civil Misl. Appeal whereby the suit of the plaintiff-respondent was remanded to the trial Court with an observation that decree passed by the trial Court would be unexecutable? Were not the said observations made by the learned District Judge, which have attained finality binding on both the courts below?
2. Whether both the courts below have committed grave error of jurisdiction in granting a decree in favour of the plaintiff-respondent on the basis of notice which lost its validity due to enforcement of the HP Urban Rent Control Act? Was not it incumbent for the plaintiff- respondent to have again served a notice on the defendant-appellant before the institution of the suit? Was not the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent lost its validity on account of subsequent proceedings which could not have been revived on account of excluding the area from the operation of HP Urban Rent Control Act? As far as the other four cases i.e. RSA Nos. 206 of 2007, 311 of 2007, 312 of 2007 and 327 of 2007 are concerned, when these cases were listed before a learned Single Judge of this Court they were ordered to be listed before the appropriate Division Bench alongwith RSA No. 506 of 2004.
4. Therefore, by this judgement, we propose to dispose of RSA No. 506 of 2004 and decide the legal questions raised and thereafter sent back RSA Nos. 206 of 2007, 311 of 2007, 312 of 2007 and 327 of 2007 to the Hon'ble Single Judge for disposal in accordance with law.
5. For the purpose of deciding this appeal, we may refer to the facts of RSA No. 506 of 2004. In this case, the landlord filed a suit for possession against the tenant and also prayed for recovery of arrears of rent of a three storeyed building situated in the Main Bazar of Kandaghat. According to the landlord, the rent of the premises was Rs. 165/- per month and the tenancy of the tenant was terminated on 30.11.1995 vide notice dated 28.10.1995. Since the defendant-tenant did not hand over possession of the suit land the landlord was constrained to file the suit. Various defences were taken by the tenant. During the pendency of the suit the State issued a notification dated 11.11.1998 whereby the area of Kandaghat was brought within the purview of the Rent Act. Thereafter, the learned Civil Judge closed the proceedings vide order dated 19.5.1999 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. An appeal was filed against the said order by the landlord and the learned District Judge, Solan held that the plaintiff had a right to prosecute the suit to its legitimate conclusion and the suit must proceed and be decided regardless of the fact whether the decree was rendered unexecutable or not. The learned trial Court thereafter proceeded with the suit and came to the conclusion that the tenancy has been validly terminated and passed a decree of possession qua the suit premises in favour of the plaintiff and also passed a decree for recovery of Rs. 495/- as arrears of rent from 1.9.1995 to 30.11.1995 alongwith interest @ 9% per annum. The learned trial Court also held that the landlord could not execute the decree in view of the bar contained in the Rent Act. The tenant filed an appeal in the Court of the learned District Judge, Solan which was assigned to the Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Solan. The main grouse was that during the pendency of the proceedings, the area in which the premises were situate were brought under the purview of the Rent Act and therefore, the suit could not have proceeded. The learned Additional District Judge rejected this appeal and hence the second appeal.
6. It may be noted that when the suit was filed on 8.12.1995, admittedly the Rent Act was not applicable to the Kandaghat town. Vide notification dated 11.11.1998 the area of Kandaghat was declared to be Urban Area in terms of Section 2(k) of the Rent Act. However, vide notification dated 30th May, 2003 the State Government rescinded the earlier notification with the result that the Rent Act ceased to be applicable to the Kandaghat town. During the pendency of this appeal, an application under Order 41 Rule 27 was filed and notification dated 5th May, 2008 has been permitted to be brought on record, which notification clearly shows that now the area of Kandaghat town has again been brought within the purview of the Rent Act. As such, the Rent Act again becomes applicable to Kandaghat town.
7. It would be apposite to refer to certain provisions of the Rent Act-
Section 1(2)
It extends to all urban areas in the State of Himachal Pradesh.
Section 2(j)
'tenant' means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy and in the event of the death of such person such of his heirs as are mentioned in Schedule-1 to this Act and who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectively in Explanation-1 and Explanation-II to this clause, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building of rented land by its tenant, except with the written consent of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been framed out or leased by a municipal corporation or a municipal committee or a notified area committee or a cantonment board.
8. The explanations are not relevant for our purpose. It is, however, apparent that even a tenant who is continuing in possession after termination of his tenancy is deemed to be a tenant in possession in terms of the definition set out here-in above.
Section 2(k) defines Urban Area as follows:
'Urban area' means any area administered by a municipal corporation, a municipal committee, a cantonment board, or a notified area committee or any area declared by the State Government, by notification, to be an urban area for the purposes of this Act.
9. A bare reading of this provision shows that when any area which falls within municipal limits, i.e. either governed by the Municipal Corporation, Municipal Committee or falls within the jurisdiction of a cantonment board or a notified area committee, shall be deemed to be an Urban Area. In addition thereto, the State Government by notification can declare any area i.e. an area not even falling within municipal limits, cantonment limits or notified area committee limits to be an urban area for the purpose of this act.
10. Section 14 of the Act deals with the eviction of tenants. Section 14(1) reads as follows:
A tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted there from in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise, whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provision of this Act.
11. The following questions arise for consideration in these appeals:
1. Whether if proceedings are commenced under the ordinary law before an area is declared to be an urban area should those proceedings under ordinary civil law culminate in the decree or should they be stayed/come to an end on the ground that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree?
2. In case question No. 1 is answered in the negative, whether a decree for eviction passed in such civil proceedings can be executed in respect of the areas falling within the purview of the H.P.Urban Rent Control Act?
3. Whether a decree passed in such civil proceedings not for eviction but on other grounds can be executed in accordance with law? A number of authorities have been cited before us by both the sides.
12. In Mani Subrat Jain v. Raja Ram Vohra 1980 (1) RCR 325, the Apex Court held that a decree passed under general law before the Rent Act became applicable to the area cannot be executed. The Apex Court in para 3 held as follows:
3. An advocate, under this Act, belongs to a 'scheduled' class of tenants whose dwellings enjoy special protection. The appellant-advocate tenanted a building belonging to the respondent. The later sued for possession and the former, with refreshing realism, entered into a compromise and agreed to vacate by a certain date on certain terms regarding rent which do not bear upon the dispute before us. A decree in terms thereof was passed on 9.10.1972. Then came the Act, which by extension of its operation, applied to Chandigarh with effect from 4.11.1972. Held the decree been passed but a few day's later, the Act would have admittedly interdicted the eviction because of Section 13. Had the decree been made and executed a day before the extension of the Act, the years of litigative procrastination of eviction might have been impossible. These mystic 'might have beens' are gambles of time which spill beyond our jurisdiction and statutory cognizance. The salvation of the appellant is certain if he be a tenant within the meaning of the Act. His eviction is certain if the definition of tenant does not ensconce him in its amplitude.
13. After considering the provision of Section 2(i), definition of tenant, which is similar to the definition of tenant in our Act and the provisions of Section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, which are pari-materia to Section 14 of our Act the Apex Court went on to hold as under:
The expression 'tenant' includes 'a tenant' continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour. It thus includes, by express provision, a quondam tenant whose nexus with the property is continuance in possession. The fact that a decree or any other process extinguishes the tenancy under the general law of real property does not terminate the status of a tenant under the Act having regard to the carefully drawn inclusive clause. Even here, we may mention by way of contrast that Subudhi's case (supra) related to a statute where the definition in Section 2(5) of that Act expressly included 'any person against whom a suit for ejectment is pending in a court of competent jurisdiction' and more pertinent to the point specially excluded 'a person against whom a decree or order for eviction has been made by such a court'. We feel no difficulty in holding that the text reinforced by the context, especially Section 13, convincingly includes ex-tenants against whom decrees for eviction might have been passed, whether on compromise or otherwise. The effect of the compromise decree, in counsel submission is that the tenancy has been terminated. Nobody has a case that the appellant is not continuously in possession. The conclusion is inevitable that he remains a tenant and enjoys immunity under Section 13(1). The execution proceedings must, therefore, fail because the statutory roadblock cannot be removed. Indeed, an application under the Act was filed by the landlord-defendant which was dismissed because the ground required by the Act was not made out.
14. In Narayanan v. Ratnamma 1988(1) RCR 288, a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court held that once the tenant could not be evicted except in accordance with an order passed under the Rent Act and as such a decree passed by a Civil Court when challenged is liable to be set-aside as invalid. With due respect, we are unable to agree with this judgement. There is nothing which debars the passing of the decree. What is barred is the execution of a tenant pursuant to a decree passed in favour of the landlord.
15. Reliance by the tenant has been placed on the judgement of the Apex Court in H.Shiva Rao and Anr. v. Cecilia Pereira and Ors. 1987(1) RCR 273. In that case, the Apex Court held that even if a decree for eviction had been passed and thereafter the tenanted premises were brought within the purview of the Rent Act, the protection of the Rent Act would be available to the tenant and the decree for possession could not be executed.
16. Shri Ajay Kumar, learned Counsel for the landlord, has placed reliance on the judgement of the Apex Court in Nand Kishore Marwah and Ors. v. Samundri Devi : (1987) 4 SCC 382. In that case newly constructed buildings in U.P. were exempted from the provisions of U.P.Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 for a period of 10 years. The landlord filed a suit for possession under ordinary law. During the pendency of suit the period of 10 years expired and it was contended that the tenant got the right of protection under the Rent Control Act and therefore the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the case. The Apex Court after considering a number of judgments held as follows:
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This is put in Chapter IV with the heading 'Regulation and Eviction' and the section starts with title which is printed in bold 'bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds' and again in the wording of the section itself it provides: 'No suit shall be instituted for eviction.' This clearly indicates that the restriction put under Section 20 is to the institution of the suit itself and therefore it is clear that if the provision of this Act applies then no suit for eviction can be instituted except on the grounds specified in the Sub-sections of this Section. Keeping in view the language of this section if we examine the provisions contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 2 it will be clear that for a newly constructed building the provisions of this Act will not apply for 10 years and therefore so far as the restriction under Section 20 is concerned they will not apply and therefore it is clear that within 10 years as provided for in Sub-section (2) of Section 2 restriction on the institution of suit as provided for in Section 20 Sub-section (1) quoted above will not be applicable and it is thus clear that during the pendency of the litigation even if 10 years expired the restriction will not be attracted as the suit has been instituted within 10 years and therefore restriction as provided for in S. 20 cannot be attracted.
15. In the light of the discussions above, therefore, in our opinion, the contention advanced by learned Counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. The appellant-tenant could not be given the advantage of the provisions contained in this Act. In this view of the matter therefore the appeal is without any substance and is dismissed.
17. The Apex Court in Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Panja 1988 (2) RCR 423 also dealt with a similar question. Similar exemption of 10 years was granted to newly constructed buildings in Haryana under the Rent Control Act for a period of 10 years. The Apex Court held as follows:
8. It is well-settled that no man should suffer because of the fault of the Court or delay in the procedure. Broom has stated the maxim 'actus curia neminem gravibit' an act of Court shall prejudice no man. Therefore, having regard to the time normally consumed for adjudication, the 10 years exemption or holiday from the application of the Rent Act would become illusory, if the suit has to be filed within that time and be disposed of finally. It is common knowledge that unless a suit is instituted soon after the date of letting it would never be disposed of within 10 years and even then within that time it may not be disposed of. That will make the 10 years holiday from the Rent Act illusory and provide no incentive to the landlords to build new houses to solve problem of shortages of houses. The purpose of legislation would thus be defeated. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything else.
9. Judicial time and energy is more often than not consumed in finding what is the intention of the Parliament or in other words, the will of the people. Blackstone tells us that the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law. (Underlined by the Court). See Commentaries on the Laws of England (facsimile of 1st edition of 1765, University of Chicago Press, 1979) Vol. 1, p. 59). Mukherjea, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, in Popatlal Shah v. State of Madras : 1953 SCR 677 : AIR 1953 SC 274 said that each word, phrase or sentence was to be construed in the light of purpose of the Act itself. But words must be construed with imagination of purpose behind them said Learned Judge Hand, long time ago. It appears, therefore, that though we are concerned with seeking of intention, we are rather looking to the meaning of the words that the legislator has used and the true meaning of what words as was said by Lord Reid in Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof- Aschaffenburg A.G. 1975 AC 591 at p. 613. We are clearly of the opinion that having regard to the language we must find the reason and the spirit of the law. If the immunity from the operation of the Rent Act is made and depended upon the ultimate disposal of the case within the period of exemption of 10 years which is in reality an impossibility, then there would be empty reasons. In our opinion, bearing in mind the well- settled principles that the rights of the parties crystalise on the date of the institution of the suit as enunciated by this Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta AIR 1982 SC 12302 (supra), the meaningful construction must be that the exemption would apply for a period of 10 years and will continue to be available until suit is disposed of or adjudicated. Such suit or proceeding must be instituted within the stipulated period of 10 years. Once rights crystalise the adjudication must be in accordance with law.
18. A similar view was taken by the Apex Court in Shri Kishan @ Krishan Kumar v. Manoj Kumar 1998 (1) RCR 283 decided on 12.2.1998.
19. In Mansoor Khan v. Motiram Harebhan Kharat and Anr. : AIR 2002 SC 2396, the landlord had filed a suit for eviction of the tenant appellant from the suit premises after terminating his tenancy. This suit was filed on 2.5.1985. The area in which the building was situated was brought within the municipal limits on 9.10.1989. The Civil court passed a decree of eviction against the tenant. The tenant challenged the decree of eviction on the ground that the area having been notified as a municipality, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the suit or pass an eviction order. This plea was not accepted by the Apex Court. The Apex Court held as follows:
5. So long as the provisions of the order are not applicable to any premises, the rights and obligations of landlord and tenant are governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Once the order becomes applicable, a landlord cannot give notice to a tenant determining the lease nor can initiate proceedings for recovery of possession from the tenant except with the previous written permission of the controller in accordance with Clause 13 of the order. What is prohibited by the order is initiation of the proceedings by the landlord. In the present case, the proceedings were initiated by filing suit before a civil court, much before the provisions of the order became applicable to the suit premises. There is nothing in the order which makes it applicable to the pending suit for eviction of tenant.
6. The learned Counsel for the tenant-appellant has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Nandlal and Ors. v. Motilal : AIR 1977 SC 2143. The said decision is an authority for the proposition that the order becomes applicable to any area which is notified to be a municipality from the date of such notification because the order was already applicable in the province of C.P. and Berar. However, this Court has very specifically held that the provisions of the order would become applicable from that date, i.e. the date on which a particular area within which the suit premises are situated, is notified to be a municipality. The order is not retrospective in operation in operation.
7. It does not affect the validity of the proceedings initiated before the date on which the order became applicable. Clause 13 of the order does not restrain the court from exercising its power to pass a decree of eviction. All that Clause 13 provides is to impose a restriction on the right of the landlord to initiate the proceedings for eviction. Inasmuch as the proceedings for eviction were already initiated and the order is not retrospective in operation, it does not affect the validity of the previously instituted proceedings nor does it take away the power of the court to pass a decree of eviction in the pending suit.
20. A reading of this judgement shows that the Apex Court has held that the Civil Court can pass a decree but the same cannot be executed.
21. Shri Ajay Kumar, learned Counsel for the landlord, has also placed reliance on a judgement of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Satish Kumar v. Om Parkash and Ors. 1997 (1) All IRCJ, wherein the learned Single Judge held that once a suit had been filed the rights of the parties were governed by the law existing on the date of filing of the suit and even if the premises were later brought within the ambit of the Rent Act the protection of the Rent Act was not available to the tenant. We are not at all in agreement with this judgement since this is contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Mani Subrat Jain's case (supra). The Apex Court in that case clearly held that the statutory road block cannot be removed and even if a decree was passed the same could not be executed.
22. The other cases of the Apex Court deal with the protection granted to the landlord under the Rent Act itself. The Apex Court in all these cases has held that the landlord should not suffer because of the fault of the Court or delay in the procedure. But we must remember that the judgements were passed in the context of the provisions contained in the Rent Act itself which provided that for 10 years the buildings would not be covered by the Rent Act. The legislature in its wisdom decided to exempt such buildings from the operation of the Rent Act. Therefore, when proceedings under the general law were initiated for eviction of tenants they had to be governed by the general law. However, these judgements cannot be applied to the cases in hand where the Rent Act itself places a bar on the execution of the decree.
23. The difference between the two situations is that in the cases relating to Allahabad and Haryana the legislature in its wisdom to encourage construction of new buildings had legislated that for a period of 10 years these buildings would not be governed under the Rent Act. Therefore, any litigation filed before the expiry of the period of 10 years under general law had to be taken to its logical conclusion. In the present case, the facts are totally different. The rent legislation which is a special legislation and will have precedence over general law clearly lays down that no tenant in possession of a building shall be evicted in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of the Act or otherwise, except in accordance with the provision of the Act. It, therefore, contemplates three situations: (1) where the decree is passed before the commencement of the Act. (2) where the decree is passed after the commencement of the Act and legislature also used the word 'otherwise'. The word otherwise has not been used insignificantly. A meaning has to be given to it. The only meaning given which can be given to it is that when areas are brought within the purview of the Act by issuing notification under Section 2(k) as in the present case this word 'otherwise' comes into operation.
24. It would be pertinent to mention that in Raj Kumari and Ors. v. Jyoti Swaroop, Latest HLJ 2008(HP) this Court considered a converse situation wherein the landlord had filed a petition under the Rent Control Act and thereafter the building was taken out from the Municipal area. It was held that the parties would be governed by the rent proceedings. The reason for doing so was that rent proceedings give protection to the tenant and if even despite the protection the tenant is liable for eviction. There is no reason why the landlord should be made to file fresh proceedings under the ordinary civil law leading to multiplicity of litigation. It would also be pertinent to mention that whereas the Rent Act contains a bar to the executability of a decree of eviction passed by any Court, there is no such bar against an order of a Rent Controller being executed in accordance with law.
25. The H.P. Urban Rent Control Act does not debar the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts by any specific section. The bar, if any, is contemplated in Section 14(1) only. It is obvious that the Act does not prohibit the initiation or prosecution of proceedings under general law. Therefore, if a suit is filed for eviction of the tenant under the general law the same can proceed and must be decided in accordance with law. However, the decree for possession of the building or rented land shall not be executed and the tenant will not be evicted therefrom in execution of such decree. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the Rent Act only prohibits the eviction of the tenant pursuant to a decree passed by a Civil Court but does not debar the Civil Court from entertaining or deciding a suit.
26. We may add that there can be various situations where a landlord may be entitled to file a suit. Supposing the landlord does not want to evict the tenant and only wants to recover the rent, there is no bar to the filing of a suit. A landlord may file a suit restraining the tenant from making material additions and alterations in the building. There are various other situations like this. Even with regard to eviction under general law he may be entitled to file a suit but the only bar is that he cannot execute the decree.
27. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the Courts below had jurisdiction to pass the decree in question. However, the decree for eviction cannot be executed.
28. Accordingly, we answer the substantial question No. 1 by holding that the Courts below were well within their jurisdiction in entertaining and deciding the suits and passing decrees therein. We answer question No. 2 by holding that the enforcement of the H.P.Urban Rent Control Act will not affect the validity of the notice issued by the landlord terminating the tenancy of the tenant. Under ordinary law, the tenancy gets terminated but the tenant continues to be treated as a tenant under the Rent Act alone. We also hold that in case the area is withdrawn from the Rent Act, such a decree can be executed because decree itself is not void but has been only rendered unexecutable. As far as the three questions framed by us are concerned, we answer the same as follows:
Q.1 We answer this question in negative. The Civil Court can entertain, proceed with and decide the cases filed before it even in respect of premises which fall in the definition of urban area.
Q.2 & 3. We answer these questions jointly by holding that the decree of eviction passed by the Civil Court cannot be executed in respect of the area falling within the purview of H.P.Urban Rent Control Act but if a decree has been passed granting some other relief the same can be executed.
29. To sum up we hold that the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain a suit even in respect of an area where the Rent Act is applicable. We also hold that in case the area was not within the purview of the Rent Act and during the course of legal proceedings area where the disputed premises are situate is brought within the ambit of the Rent Act then also the proceedings can continue and taken to their logical conclusion but the decree of eviction will not be executable. We also hold that the decree passed by a Civil Court shall be executable in respect of other matters except in regard to eviction of a tenant. Therefore, if the Civil Court passes a decree for payment of rent/mesne profits/damages and also a decree for possession, it is only the decree for possession which is unexecutable but the decree for payment of rent/mesne profits/damages is executable in accordance with law. The Rent Act only gives protection from eviction and not on other counts.
30. In view of the above discussion, we find no error in the judgements and decrees of the learned Courts below and accordingly dismiss the RSA No. 506 of 2004.
31. RSA Nos. 206 of 2007, 311 of 2007, 312 of 2007 and 327 of 2007 have not been referred to us by the Hon'ble Chief Justice. They were only connected with the main appeal. We have heard the main appeal and decided the questions of law. The appeals may be sent back to the learned Single Judge to decide the same in accordance with the law laid down by us above.