Deepak Gupta, J.
1. This appeal by the insurance company has been filed against the award of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Shimla in M.A.C. Petition No. 54-S/2 of 1996 decided on 15.1.1997 whereby the claim petition filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') has been allowed and compensation of Rs. 5,19,500 awarded in favour of the claimants.
2. The facts necessary for decision of the case are that deceased Sanjay Kumar was the husband of Kavita Chhabra, respondent No. 1 and father of Master Mohit, respondent No. 2. His father, respondent No. 3 was the owner of a jeep bearing No. HP 06-0031. This jeep was insured with appellant insurance company. On 17.7.1994 Sanjay Kumar was driving the aforesaid jeep. It is alleged that suddenly stones fell from the hillside. As a result thereof, jeep went off the road and fell into Sutlej river. Sanjay Kumar died on the spot itself.
3. The claimants-respondent Nos. 1 and 2 being the widow and minor child of deceased Sanjay Kumar filed a petition under Section 163-A of the Act for grant of compensation.
4. Insurance company raised various pleas and took up the plea that the provisions of Section 163-A of the Act are not applicable to the facts of the case.
5. The Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 163-A of the Act were applicable and awarded a sum of Rs. 5,19,500 as compensation.
6. Mr. Lalit Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant insurance company has submitted that in view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 2004 ACJ 934 (SC), the claim petition was not maintainable. As per the claimants the deceased Sanjay Kumar was earning much more than Rs. 40,000 per annum. According to them the salary of the deceased was more than Rs. 45,000 per annum. Therefore, even the petition under Section 163-A was not maintainable. He further submits that the accident in question had occurred on 17.7.1994 prior to the promulgation of Section 163-A of the Act which was introduced by way of amendment with effect from 14.11.1994. Therefore, also the claim petition under Section 163-A of the Act was not maintainable.
Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act reads as follows:
163-A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis.-(1) Notwithstanding anything, contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, 'permanent disability' shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
(2) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.
(3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule.
7. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant that the provisions of Section 163-A can only be invoked if the annual income of the person injured/deceased qua whom compensation is being claimed is less than Rs. 40,000 per annum. On behalf of respondent Mr. Jagdish Vats has argued that there is no limit provided under Section 163-A and even if a limit is to be taken then the income of the deceased can be taken at Rs. 40,000 per annum and compensation can be awarded under Section 163-A.
8. This question is no longer res integra. The Apex Court in Deepal's case, 2004 ACJ 934 (SC), has held as follows:
(42) Section 163-A was, thus, enacted for grant of immediate relief to a section of people whose annual income is not more than Rs. 40,000 having regard to the fact that in terms of Section 163-A of the Act read with the Second Schedule appended thereto; compensation is to be paid on a structured formula not only having regard to the age of the victim and his income but also the other factors relevant therefor...
(53) Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby. See Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation, Trichur v. Ramanuja Match Industries : (1985)ILLJ69SC .
The Apex Court finally held as follows:
(67) We, therefore, are of the opinion that Kodala's case : [2001]2SCR999 , has correctly been decided. However, we do not agree with the findings in Kodala (supra), that if a person invokes provisions of Section 163-A, the annual income of Rs. 40,000 per annum shall be treated as a cap. In our opinion, the proceeding under Section 163-A being a social security provision, providing for a distinct scheme, only those whose annual income is up to Rs. 40,000 can take the benefit thereof. All the other claims are required to be determined in terms of Chapter XII of the Act.
The Supreme Court has clearly held that the provisions of Section 163-A can only be invoked if the income of the person who has died or in case of injury the income of the person injured is less than Rs. 40,000 per annum. The Supreme Court has specifically disagreed with the finding in Kodala's case : [2001]2SCR999 , that if a person invokes provisions of Section 163-A the income of Rs. 40,000 per annum shall be treated as a cap.
9. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court it is clear that since the deceased was earning more than Rs. 40,000 per annum the petition filed under Section 163-A was not maintainable.
10. As noticed above the accident occurred prior to the promulgation of Section 163-A. It is well settled law that the rights of the parties are to be decided on the basis of the law as it stands on the date of the accident. The amended provisions cannot be made retrospective.
11. A Division Bench of this Court in Kashmiri Lal v. Doaba Roadways 1998 ACJ 1314 (HP), following the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Padma Srinivasan v. Premier Insurance Co. Ltd. 1982 ACJ 191 (SC); Ramesh Singh v. Cinta Devi : [1996]2SCR1036 and M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty 1987 ACJ 872 (SC), held that the provisions amending Section 92-A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 cannot be applied retrospectively. Therefore, Claims Tribunal has erred in awarding compensation under Section 163-A of the Act which has no application in case of accidents occurring prior to the enactment of the said section.
12. Mr. Jagdish Vats, appearing on behalf of the respondents has contended that at least the amount payable under Section 140 of the Act should be ordered to be paid to the heirs of the deceased. He has relied upon the directions given by Apex Court in para 71 of the Deepal's case 2004 ACJ 934 (SC), whereby it was ordered that the claim application of the appellant under Section 163-A of the Act should be treated as an application under Section 140 thereof. I cannot accept this argument. The Apex Court has clearly indicated that it has issued this direction under Article 142 of the Constitution. This Court does not enjoy any such jurisdiction. Therefore, this Court has no authority to direct that the application under Section 163-A be treated as an application under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
13. In view of the above discussion, the appeal is allowed. The award of Tribunal dated 15.1.1997 is set aside with no order as to costs. The petition filed by claimants under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act is dismissed as not maintainable. The claimants will be at liberty to avail of any other remedy available to them under law.