V.K. Gupta, C.J.
1. This is an appeal filed under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by the claimants in M.A.C. Petition No. 7-S/2 of 1992 against the judgment and award dated 29.4.1993 passed by learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Solan seeking enhancement of the award amount as also the relief of interest on the award amount from the date of the filing of the claim petition because the learned Tribunal did not grant the relief of interest in favour of the claimants.
2. Claimants-appellants are the minor children, son and daughter of deceased Shabnam Aggarwal, who died in a road accident. Truck No. PJV 3293 belonging to respondent No. 2 and driven by respondent No. 1 met with an accident with Maruti van No. HP 03-0036 on 10.8.1991 at about 1 p.m. when Maruti van was being driven by one Parvesh Aggarwal near Parwanoo barrier and was overtaking truck No. PJV 3293 which was parked there on the roadside. Respondent No. 1 Ram Karan, the driver of the truck, all of a sudden drove the truck towards the hillside of the road as a result of which it struck against Maruti van and crushed the said Maruti van, as a result of which Parvesh Aggarwal and his wife Shabnam Aggarwal sustained injuries and ultimately succumbed to the same and died. Following four issues were framed by the Tribunal in the course of the trial:
(1) Whether Shabnam Aggarwal died in the accident as a result of the rash and negligent driving by respondent No. 1.
OPP
(2) To what amount of compensation, if any, are the petitioners entitled, if so, from whom and to what extent?
OP Parties
(3) Whether the petition is bad for nonjoinder of necessary parties? OPR-3
(4) Relief.
3. Insofar as issue No. 2 is concerned even though one witness had appeared (Yash Pal Aggarwal, PW 2) and had deposed about the income of the deceased Shabnam Aggarwal to be in the range of Rs. 4,000-5,000 per month being realized from the tuitions that deceased Shabnam Aggarwal was allegedly giving, the Claims Tribunal has not believed and relied upon this piece of evidence and perhaps rightly so because this piece of evidence is a mere bald testimony totally uncorroborated in material particulars by any other evidence. Claims Tribunal, therefore, came to the correct conclusion that there was no evidence worth the name with respect to the income of the deceased. The deceased was 30 years old at the time of her death, she was holding the academic qualification of postgraduation but she was admittedly a housewife. Being a housewife, for the services rendered to the household the Tribunal estimated her income at Rs. 1,200 per month and this was the basis ultimately of determining the compensation amount.
4. Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar : (2001)IILLJ1559SC , with respect to the estimation of the income of a housewife. Para 10 of that judgment being apposite to our case is quoted verbatim. It reads thus:
So far as the deceased housewives are concerned, in the absence of any data and as the housewives were not earning any income, attempt has been made to determine the compensation, on the basis of services rendered by them to the house. On the basis of the age group of the housewives, appropriate multiplier has been applied, but the estimation of the value of services rendered to the house by the housewives, which has been arrived at Rs. 12,000 per annum in cases of some and Rs. 10,000 for others, appears to us to be grossly low. It is true that claimants, who ought to have given data for determination of compensation, did not assist in any manner by providing the data for estimating the value of services rendered by such housewives. But even in the absence of such data and taking into consideration the multifarious services rendered by the housewives for managing the entire family, even on a modest estimation, should be Rs. 3,000 per month and Rs. 36,000 per annum. This would apply to all those housewives between the age group of 34 and 59 and as such who were active in life. The compensation awarded, therefore, should be recalculated, taking the value of the services rendered per annum to be Rs. 36,000 and thereafter applying the multiplier, as has been applied already and so far as the conventional amount is concerned, the same should be Rs. 50,000 instead of Rs. 25,000 given under the report. So far as the elderly ladies are concerned, in the age group of 62 to 72, the value of the services rendered has been taken at Rs. 10,000 per annum and the multiplier applied is eight. Though, the multiplier applied is correct, but the value of services rendered at Rs. 10,000 per annum, cannot be held to be just and we, therefore, enhance the same to Rs. 20,000 per annum. In their case, therefore, the total amount of compensation should be re-determined, taking the value of services rendered at Rs. 20,000 per annum and then after applying the multiplier, as already applied and thereafter adding Rs. 50,000 towards the conventional figure.
5. In Lata Wadhwa : (2001)IILLJ1559SC , their Lordships of the Apex Court, as is evidently clear, on a 'modest estimation' held that in view of the multifarious services rendered by the housewives for managing the entire families, Rs. 36,000 per annum or Rs. 3,000 per month should be estimated as their income and that too only in cases where the claimants have not given any data with respect to the deceased housewife. Even though in the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court has not discussed the parameters of the data which the claimants were required to give for estimating the value of services rendered by such housewives, in my considered opinion, the parameters of such data should include amongst other items the academic qualifications of the housewife as well as her age at the time of the death. In Lata Wadhwa, in the absence of any data, their Lordships of the Supreme Court had estimated the income of the housewives in general at Rs. 3,000 per month, who were in the age group of 34 years to 59 years. Admittedly in the present case, deceased Shabnam Aggarwal was aged 30 years on the date of her death and she was holding the academic qualification of postgraduate. This data, therefore, should be enough to enable me to come to a conclusion that the income of this housewife for multifarious services rendered by her in managing the family in the household should be assessed slightly more than Rs. 3,000. I accordingly hold that Tribunal was totally wrong and fell in grave error in estimating the income of the deceased Shabnam Aggarwal at Rs. 1,200 per month and, based on the aforesaid discussion and applying the ratio in Lata Wadhwa (supra) I estimate the income of deceased Shabnam Aggarwal at Rs. 3,500 per month, i.e., Rs. 42,000 per annum. Insofar as the division of the income in six units is concerned, I agree with the formula applied by the Tribunal that the income should be divided into six units and out of those six units, two units each should be earmarked for the adult members of the family, namely, deceased Shabnam Aggarwal herself as well as her deceased husband, who also died in the same accident and one unit each for the minor claimants, children of the deceased. However, I do not fully agree with the approach of the Tribunal in taking out the two units of the deceased father from the purview of the children's dependence because at least half of that amount should have gone in favour of the children. Accordingly, I hold that three units in all should have been awarded in favour of the minor children, claimants and the Tribunal by awarding only two units fell into an error. Had the father been alive undoubtedly the children would have been held entitled to only two units, but because of the death of the father a part of that should have gone to the children and in my estimation half of that amount should be expended for the benefit of the children. Rs. 21,000 per annum accordingly is thus calculated as the annual dependence of claimants-minor children of the deceased and applying multiplier of 15 as has been done by the Tribunal in the present case, total amount of compensation comes to Rs. 3,15,000.
6. The cruel hands of destiny had snatched Shabnam Aggarwal, mother from her minor children, Mr. Gupta, the learned Counsel appearing for appellants, submits that even as on date, the children continue to be minor. Accident had occurred almost 13 years back. That means, as on the date of the accident, the children were practically infants. For all these years they have been deprived of the love and affection of their mother. On that reckoning, therefore, estimating Rs. 8,000 as lump sum amount of compensation on account of loss of love and affection is ridiculously on the lower side. In my considered opinion this amount should have been at least Rs. 50,000. Actually in Lata Wadhwa (supra), even their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also come to the conclusion that insofar as the conventional amount is concerned, it should be Rs. 50,000 instead of Rs. 25,000 as was indicated in the 'report' filed in that case. Adding Rs. 50,000 to the aforesaid amount of Rs. 3,15,000, the total amount of compensation comes to Rs. 3,65,000. The award, therefore, shall stand modified in the sense that instead of Rs. 80,000 as awarded by the Tribunal, the award shall now carry the compensation amount of Rs. 3,65,000.
7. Claims Tribunal has not awarded any interest on the compensation amount in favour of the claimants. It only passed a conditional order that the amount of compensation (Rs. 80,000) should be paid within 45 days from the date of passing of the award, failing which the claimants would be entitled to interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of the filing of the petition. The Claims Tribunal committed an error of law in not awarding interest in favour of the claimants because Section 171 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, clearly casts an obligation on the Tribunal to award interest when it allows the claim of compensation. I am fortified in this view of mine by a judgment of this court delivered on 19.9.2003 in F.A.O. Nos. 277, 278 and 280 of 1995.
8. Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the insurance company, respondent No. 3, has submitted that he be permitted to assail that part of the judgment under challenge in this appeal, even though respondent No. 3 has neither filed any independent appeal nor filed any cross-objections, in which the Tribunal has negatived the contention of respondent No. 3 that since the State of Himachal Pradesh and its officers were not impleaded as party respondents in the claim petition, the claim petition was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Before the Tribunal the contention of respondent No. 3 was that as on the date of accident, truck in question was seized by the police and, therefore, on that ground the State of Himachal Pradesh and its officers were necessary and proper parties. The Tribunal has come to a clear finding that even though the truck may have been seized by the police as on the date of accident, the truck was in the actual physical possession of respondent No. 1, its driver and that it was a proven fact that the truck was being driven by him at the time of accident and it was because of his rash and negligent driving that the accident occurred. This being the factual background, there was no question at all that either the State of Himachal Pradesh or its officers could be held to be necessary or proper parties in this case because no rashness or negligence was attributed or alleged against them either by the claimants or by anyone else including respondent No. 3. No other point was urged.
9. Based on the aforesaid discussion, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and award of the Tribunal is modified to the following extent:
(1) The award amount is enhanced from Rs. 80,000 to Rs. 3,65,000.
(2) Aforesaid enhanced award amount shall carry with it the element of interest which was wrongly disallowed by Claims Tribunal.
(3) Accordingly, the appellants shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on the aforesaid enhanced award amount from the date of filing of the claim petition till the amount is paid.
(4) Insurance company, respondent No. 3, shall be liable to pay the entire enhanced awarded amount along with the entire interest thereupon, of course, minus the amount already received by the claimants.
(5) Respondent No. 3 accordingly is directed to deposit in this court the difference in the amount thus awarded by virtue of this judgment, inclusive of the interest liability within six weeks from today.
After the amount is thus deposited, the Registry shall invest the same in fixed deposit automatically renewable. The amount shall be disbursed to claimants only after they attain majority and on their making an application for this purpose at that stage. The Registrar General on receiving such an application after the appellants have attained majority, shall satisfy himself about the fact of the appellants attaining majority and only after recording his satisfaction shall disburse the amount in favour of the claimants in equal shares.
The appeal is disposed of. No order as to costs.