ORDER
R.L. Khurana, J.
1. 'Whether a Court in a suit for rendition of account can pass a final decree exceeding its pecuniary limit of jurisdiction' is the question involved in the present reference made by the learned Additional District Judge, Solan.
2. Briefly, the facts giving rise to the present reference may be thus stated. A suit. being Civil Suit No. 31-S/1 of 1995/993 was filed by Messrs. Mohan Meakin Limited. Solan against Messrs. Internations Trade. New Delhi and another for rendition of accounts. Such suit was valued for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction at Rs. 4,00,000/- and requisite Court-fee was affixed on the plaint. An ex parte preliminary decree for rendition of accounts was passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Solan, on 13-8-1999 in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.
3. On 6-10-1999 an application was made by the plaintiffs praying for appointment of a local Commissioner to go into the accounts of the parties and to report regarding the amount due, and for passing a final decree in terms of the report of such local Commissioner. Such application came to be registered as C.M.A. No. 212-S/6 of 1999. On 11-5-2000, an ex parte order came to be passed by the learned Additional District Judge, whereby Shri Dinesh Gautam, Chartered Accountant, Solan, was appointed as Local Commissioner to go into the accounts after due notice to the parties and to report regarding the amount due to the plaintiff.
4. The Local Commissioner, after having gone through the accounts, submitted its report dated 3-7-2000 whereby he found a sum of Rs. 27,51,664.44 paise as due to the plaintiff from the defendants. Since the amount due was for beyond the pecuniary limit ot jurisdiction of the learned District Judge, the matter was referred to this Court tor opinion on the question posed above.
5. Notice of the reference was issued to the parties. None appeared on behalf of the defendants/respondents. Since the question involved was of importance, in order to have proper assistance in the matter, Shri Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri Neeraj Gupta, Advocate was requested to act as amicus curiae.
6. Section 7(iv)(f), H. P. Court-fees Act, 1968, provides that the amount of fee payable under the Act for suits for accounts shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal,
7. Section 11, H. P. Court-fees Act, 1968, which deals with the procedure in suits for mesne profits or account when the amount decreed exceeds amount claimed, provides :--
'(1) In suits for mesne profits or for immovable property and mesne profits, or for an account, if the profits or amount decreed are or is in excess of the profits claimed or the amount at which the plaintiff values the relief sought, the decree shall not be drawn up until the difference between the fee actually paid and the fee which would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the profits or amount so decreed shall have been paid to the proper officer.
(2) Where the amount of mesne profits is left to be ascertained in the course of the execution of the decree, if the profits so ascertained exceed the profits claimed, the further execution of the decree shall be stayed until the difference between the fee actually paid and the fee which would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the profits so ascertained is paid and if the additional fee is not paid within such time as the Court shall fix, the suit shall be dismissed.
8. In Hotchand v. Tejumal Mulchand, AIR 1925 Sind 324, a preliminary decree for rendition of account was passed by the Joint Subordinate Judge, Sukkar, having limited jurisdiction to try suits not exceeding Rs. 5000/- in value. The Commissioner appointed for taking the accounts found the plaintiff therein to be entitled to Rs. 8200/-including interest. A question arose, whether in a suit for settlement of accounts the subordinate Judge was competent to pass a decree for an amount exceeding the limits of his pecuniary jurisdiction
9. Answering the question in the affirmative, it was held that in a suit for settlement of accounts, a Court is competent to pass a decree for an amount exceeding the limit of its pecuniary jurisdiction, provided it had jurisdiction at the inception of the suit to try the same. In coming to the above conclusion, the Division Bench of the Sind High Court did not agree with the view of the Calcutta High Court in Golap Sundari v. Indra Kumar, (1909) 13 Cal WN 493 holding that a Court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction cannot pass a decree for an amount in excess of such limits.
10. In Putta Kannayya Chetti v. Rudrabhatla Venkata Narasayya, AIR 1918 Madras 998 (2), a Full Bench of the Madras High Court dealing with a similar question, has held that a Court can award such sum as it finds due to the plaintiff, although such sum is above the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction. Such can happen only in suits for mesne profits or for accounts.
11. A Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Ishwarappa Malleshappa Manvi v. Dhanji Bhanji Gujjar, AIR 1932 Bom 111 dealing with Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (the provisions of which are analogous to the provisions contained in Section 7(iv)(f) of the H. P. Court-fees Act, 1968) and Section 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure has held that in a suit for accounts, the valuation for the purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction shall be that which has been fixed by the plaintiff in the plaint. It is the plaintiffs valuation that fixes the jurisdiction of the Court and not the amount which may be found and decreed by the Court. The jurisdiction of the Court in a suit for accounts is not ousted after preliminary decree for accounts is passed by the fact that on taking accounts a sum more than the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court has been found to be due.
12.It was further held that Section 6.Code of Civil Procedure does not interfere with power of the Court to pass any decree in a suit for accounts although it might exceed its pecuniary jurisdiction. Section 6, Code of Civil Procedure, saves any express provision to the contrary and must be read subject to provisions of the Suits Valuation Act.
13. The abovesaid ratio was reiterated in G.L. Thokal v. R.J. Deshmukh, (1975) 77 Bom LR 580.
14. A Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in A.K.A.C.T.V. Chidambaram v. A.L.P.R.S. Muthia Chettiar, AIR 1937 Rangoon 320 following the Bombay view has held that in a suit for accounts, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court is governed by the value of the suit as stated by the plaintiff in his plaint and not by the amount which may be found and decreed by the Court. Therefore, a decree can be passed when an amount has been ascertained even though that is in excess of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court.
15. In Kalyandas Anantlal v. Gangabai, AIR 1961 Madh Pra 67, a learned single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that where in a suit for accounts the plaintiff tentatively fixes a sum for the purpose of valuation of the suit for Court-fee and jurisdiction, the pecuniary jurisdiction is governed by the value stated by the plaintiff in the plaint and such jurisdiction is not ousted by the Court finding that a decree for a sum exceeding the limits of the ordinary pecuniary jurisdiction should be given to the plaintiffs.
16. In Banudhar Jena v. Prabir Chandra Mazumdar, AIR 1985 Orissa 117, one of the questions arising for determination was --Whether the Court of Munsif could give relief in a suit for accounts beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction
It was held that a suit for accounts is an exception to the ordinary rule that a Court cannot grant a decree for an amount beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction. In such suit the Court of Munsif, on account being taken, can grant a relief for an amount beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction when the final decree is passed.
17. In Tirath Ram v. Chaudhary Mal Mangat Ram, AIR 1961 Him Pra 22, in a suit in which rendition of account was also involved, the suit for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction was valued at Rs. 767 one anna. Ultimately a sum of Rs. 5323-11 annas was found due to the plaintiff and a decree for the said sum was passed by the Subordinate Judge. An appeal was preferred by the defendant therein before the learned Judicial Commissioner. An objection was raised on behalf of the plaintiff that the appeal lay before the District Judge as the value of the subject matter was less than Rs. 5000/-.
18. Upholding the objection it was held that in a suit for accounts or mesne profits the value stated in the plaint should be considered to be the value of the subject matter of the suit for determining the forum of appeal also in view of the provisions contained in Section 7(iv)(f), Court-fees Act, 1870 and Section 8, Suits Valuation Act.
19. Be it stated, that the question involved in the present case was not directly involved in the case before the learned Judicial Commissioner. However, it was observed that in a suit for accounts the trial Court is competent to pass a decree even for an amount in excess of its pecuniary jurisdiction.
20. A similar question as involved in Tirath Ram v. Chaudhary Mal Mangat Ram (AIR 1961 Him Pra 22) (supra) also arose before a Division Bench of this Court in Municipal Committee, Shimla v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1973 Him Pra 64. It was held :--
'... Section 7(iv)(f), and reads as under : '7(iv)(f) -- for accounts -- According to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal.'
From a plain reading of this Section it would appear that the plaintiff is authorised in law to give his own valuation for purposes of court-fees. Under Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, where in suits other than those referred to in the Court-fees Act, 1870, Section 7, paragraphs 5, 6 and 9 arid paragraph 10, Clause (d), court-fee are payable ad valorem under the Court-fees Act. 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees, and the value for purposes of Jurisdiction shall be the same. Under Section 11 of the Court-fees Act, the plaintiff, in whose favour a decree for an enhanced amount has been passed cannot execute the same unless he pays the additional fee. But there is nothing in this Section about the jurisdictional value for appeal, nor the Suits Valuation Act provides for any such thing. For court-fee in appeal it is the subject matter of the appeal, changed by the Court by its decree, on which the court-fee is to be paid. But insofar as the jurisdictional value is concerned it would remain the same irrespective of the fact what is the value of the subject matter of the appeal, because for that purpose we have to advert to the subject matter of the suit. If the amount decreed is to determine the forum of appeal then it can also be said that a Court cannot pass a decree exceeding its pecuniary jurisdiction. In that event the moment the Court comes to a conclusion that on accounts having been settled, an amount due from the defendants exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, the Court shall have to return the plaint for presentation to the competent Court and if that Court also comes to a decision that the accounts have not been properly settled and the amount due is less which can be decreed by the lower Court then it would mean that it also would return the plaint and there would be no end or finality and, therefore, on that basis it can be concluded that it is the valuation, which is fixed by the plaintiff in the plaint which should determine the forum of appeal and the Court is not precluded from passing a decree exceeding its pecuniary jurisdiction in such cases.'
21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245 has held that if the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable in all suits covered by the several sub-sections of Section 7, Court-fees Act, 1870, is considered, it would be clear that in respect of suits falling under Sub-section (iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purpose of court-fees. The theoretical basis of this provision appears to be that in cases in which the plaintiff is given the option to value his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with any precision or definiteness.
22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that the question as to what would be the value for the purpose of jurisdiction, has to be decided by reading Section 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act, 1870, along with Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887. The latter section provides that, where in an suits other than those referred to in Court-fees Act, Section 7, paras 5, 6 and 9 and para 10, Clause (d), court-fee are payable ad valorem under the Act, the value determinable for computation of Court-fees and value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. In other words, so far as suits falling under Section 7(iv), Court-fees Act, are concerned. Section 8, Suits Valuation Act provides that the value determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. There can be little doubt that the effect of Section 8, Suits Valuation Act, is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value as determinable for computation of court-fees and that is material enough. The computation of court-fees in suits falling under Section 7(iv), Court-fees Act, depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for purposes of court-fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for court-fees and the value for jurisdiction must, no doubt, be the same in such cases, but it is the value for court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for purposes of court-fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit falling under Section 7(iv). Court-fees Act, and not vice versa.
23. In view of the above settled proposition of law, the question referred has to be answered in the affirmative and it is held that in a suit for rendition of accounts a Court can pass a final decree for a sum exceeding the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction.
24. The reference is answered accordingly.
25. The matter shall now go back to the learned Additional District Judge, Solan, for proceeding in the matter in accordance with law and in the light of the answer given to the question referred to this Court for opinion.
26. The plaintiff, through its counsel, is directed to appear before the learned Additional District Judge, Solan, on 10-10-2002. The records be returned to the said Court forthwith so as to reach well before the date fixed.
27. Before parting, this Court places on record its appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by the amicus curiae in answering the reference. Order accordingly.