Kamlesh Sharma, J.
1. The following points are referred to this larger Bench of three Judges :--
(i) If in a given case the actual possession of the acquired land is taken before the date of Notification under Section 4 of the Act or from the date of taking possession under Section 16 or 17 of the Act, whether the claimant is entitled to additional compensation under Section 23 (1 -A) of the Act from the date of taking actual possession or from the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act?
(ii) Whether the interest under Section 28 of the Act is to be paid from the date the possession is taken under Section 16 or 17 of the Act?
2. So far first point of reference is concerned, it is no longer res Integra. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Siddappa Vasappa Kuri v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2002) 1 SCC 142 : (AIR 2001 SC 2951) while interpreting the 'expression whichever is earlier in Section 23(1-A) of the Act' have held in para 6 :
'...... the starting point for the purposes of calculating the amount to be awarded thereunder, at the rate of 12 per centum per annum on the market value, is the date of publication of the Section 4 notification. The terminal point for the purpose is either the date of the award or the date of taking possession, whichever is earlier. Inthe present case, possession of the land having been taken prior to the publication of the Section 4 notification, that terminal is not available. The only available terminalis the date of the award. ..............'
And further in para 7 :
'Section 23(1-A) admits of no meaning other than the meaning that we have placed upon it. There is no room here for any construction other than that given above. It is only where a provision is ambiguous that a construction that leads to a result that is more just can be adopted. Having regard to its clear terms, Section 23(1-A) must receive the only construction it can bear. ......'
3. The learned Judges have approved their earlier decision in Special Tahsildar (LA), P. W. D. Schemes v. M. A. Jabbar (1995) 2 SCC 142 : (AIR 1995 SC 762). In the said judgment the learned Judges have said (SCC p. 144, para 3) :
'In other words, the owner of the land who has been deprived of the enjoyment of the land by having been parted with possession, the Act intended that the owner be compensated by awarding an additional amount calculated at the rate of 12 per centum per annum on the enhanced market value for the period between the date of notification and the date of award or date of taking possession of the land whichever is earlier. Admittedly, possession having already been taken on 15-2-1965, before publication of the notification under Section 4(1) on 6-3-1980, the award of additional amount for the period from 6-3-1980 to 30-9-1983, i.e., the date of making the award under Section 11 is perfectly correct.'
4. Therefore, in view of the ratio of above judgment it is finally settled that additional compensation under Section 23(1A) of the Act is payable from the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act and not from the date of taking actual possession up to the dale of award or date of taking possession under the Act, whichever is earlier.
5. So far second point of reference is concerned, in order to answer it we would refer to Sections 16. 17, 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
6. There cannot be any dispute that the land acquisition proceedings start from the date of publication of notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1) and end with the announcement of the award under Section 11 of the Act. After the announcement of the award the Collector has been empowered to take possession of the land under Section 16 of the Act. Section 16 is :
'16. Power to take possession.--When the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.'
7. In cases of urgency, on the direction of appropriate Government the Collector on the expiry of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9. Sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for public purpose under Section 17 of the Act. Section 17 is :
'17. Special powers in cases of urgency.--(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, Sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.
(2) Whenever, owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway Administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a riverside or that station, or of providing convenient connection with or access to any such station, or the appropriate Government considers it necessary to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the purpose of maintaining any structure or system pertaining to irrigation, water supply, drainage, road communication or electricity, the Collector may, immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned in Sub-section (1) and with previous sanction of the appropriate Government, enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances :
Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or part of a building under this Sub-section without giving to the occupier thereof at least forty-eight hours' notice of his intention so to do, or such longer notice as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property from such building without unnecessary inconvenience.
(3) In every case under either of the preceding Sub-sections the Collector shall at the time of taking possession offer to the persons interested compensation for the standing crops and trees (if any) on such land and for any other damage sustained by them caused by such sudden dispossession and not excepted in Section 24; and, in case such offer is not accepted, the value of such offer is not accepted, the value of such crops and trees and the amount of such other damage shall be allowed for in awarding compensation for the land under the provisions herein contained.
(3-A) Before taking possession of any land under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-section (3),--
(a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, and
(b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in section 31. Sub-section (2), and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of Section 31, Sub-section (2), (except the second proviso thereto), shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that Section.
(3-B) The amount paid or deposited under Sub-section (3-A), shall be taken into account for determining the amount of compensation required to be tendered under Section 31, and where the amount so paid or deposited exceeds the compensation awarded by the Collector under Section 11 the excess may, unless refunded within three months from the date of the Collector's award, be recovered as an arrear of land revenue.
(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) are applicable, the (appropriate Government) may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply, and if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1).'
8. Section 28 of the Act provides for awarding interest on the compensation enhanced by the Court. Section 28 is :
'Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation.--If the sumwhich, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the awardof the Court may direct that the Collectorshall pay interest on such excess at the rateof nine per centum per annum from the dateon which he took possession of the land tothe date of payment of such excess intoCourt: [Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid Into Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into Court before the date of such expiry.]'
9. Section 31 of the Act provides for payment of compensation or deposit of the same in the Court on making an award under Section 11 of the Act. Section 34 of the Act provides for awarding of interest by the Collector. Section 34 is :
'Payment of interest.--When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited ;
[Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which, possession is taken. Interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry.]'
10. Under Section 28 the Court shall direct the Collector to pay interest and under Section 34 the Collector shall pay interest at the rates specified therein from the date of taking possession till the date of payment of, compensation. But by possession the legislature meant actual or physical possession or the possession under the Act as envisaged under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act is the point which is being considered by us. Under Section 16 the possession is taken over by the Collector after making award under Section 11 whereas under Section 17(4) the possession is taken over exercising the urgency powers before making the award.
11. The scope of Section 34 of the Act fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Dr. Sham Lal Narula v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab. Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and Patiala. AIR 1964 SC 1878, in which the learned Judges were dealing with the question whether interest paid under this section is of the nature of capital receipt or of revenue receipt. Referring to Sections 16 and 17 of the Act the learned Judges have observed that under both these Sections the land acquired vests absolutely in the government after the Collector has taken possession in one case after the making of the award and in the other, even before the making of the award. In either case, some time may lapse between the taking of possession of the acquired land by the Collector and the payment or deposit of the compensation to the person interested in the land acquired. Therefore, statutory duty has been imposed on the Collector to pay interest on the amount awarded from the time of his taking possession until the amount is paid or deposited. This amount is not therefore, compensation for the land acquired or for depriving the claim of his right to possession, but is that paid to the claimant for the use of his money by the State. According to learned Judges, the Legislature expressly used the words 'Interest' with its well known connotation under Section 34 of the Act, therefore, it is reasonable to give that expression the natural meaning it bears. In para 9 of the judgment it was observed :
'The scheme of the Act and the express provisions thereof establish that the statutory interest payable under Section 34 is not compensation paid to the owner for depriving him of his right to possession of the land acquired but that given to him for the deprivation of the use of the money representing the compensation for the land acquired.'
12. The same view has been reiterated in a recent judgment by a Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Sunder v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 211 : (AIR 2001 SC 3516). which was a case dealing with the question whether interest is payable on the amount of solatium, payable under Section 23(2) of the Act. It is stated in para 14 of the judgment that:
'Question of payment of interest would arise only when the compensation is not paid or deposited on or before date of taking possession of the land. It is inequitable that the person who is deprived of the possession of the land on account of acquisition proceedings is not given the amount which law demands to be paid to him; and the delay thereafter would only be to his detriment. There must be a provision to buffet such inequity. It is for the purpose of affording relief to the person who is entitled to such compensation when the payment of his money is delayed that the provision is made in Section 34 of the Act. ........'
And in para 16 :
'Thus interest has to accrue as per Section 34 and Section 28 of the Act on the compensation award, whether it is as per the award initially passed by the Collector or by the Court later. ............'
13. Interpreting the words 'awarded amount' used in Section 34 the learned Judges concluded that the amount of compensation would mean the amount worked out in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 including all the Sub-sections thereof. Further referring to the words 'if such compensation' used in the proviso to Section 34, it was observed that the legislature intended to make the aggregate amount under Section 23 of the Act to reach the hands of the person as and when the award is passed and in the case of delay interest is liable to be paid under Section 34 for which splitting up the compensation into different components is not contemplated.
14. The ratio of these judgments is that the interest under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act is to be paid for delayed payment of amount of compensation and not for deprivation of possession taken over as a result of compulsory acquisition under the general Rule. If interest is paid for delayed payment of the amount of compensation the initial date of its payment cannot be before the announcement of the award under Section 11 of the Act whereafter the Collector is entitled, to take possession of the acquired land as envisaged under Section 16 of the Act.
15. It is also held by the learned Judges of Supreme Court in State of H. P. v. Dharam Das, (1995) 5 SCC 683 : (AIR 1996 SC 127) that when a statute provides for the rate of interest and manner of payment of interest, the equitable considerations, as per the general rule, have no relevance. In para 3 of the judgment it is observed :
'.............. It is settled legal position that when the statute deals with payment of interest to the claimants either under Section 31 or Section. 28 of the Act, the Court has no power to award interest in a manner other than the one in which the statute prescribes payment. It is seen that in a case where decision has been taken exercising the urgency power under Section 17(4) of the Act and the award was made subsequent to the taking over possession, obviously the claimant would be entitled to payment of Interest under Section 31 from the date of taking possession till the amount Is deposited pursuant to the award of the Collector under Section 11. On reference, if the compensation is enhanced under Section 28 of the Act and the proviso thereto the claimants would be entitled to the rates of interest specified therein. Apart from these twp provisions, there is no Other provision under the Act empowering the Court to award interest on equitable grounds in addition to statutory rates of interest prescribed under the Act, Equitable consideration has no role to play in determination of the compensation and the manner of awarding interest as enjoined under the Act. The Act is to be administered in the manner laid in the Act and in no other way. As a concomitance, the equity Jurisdiction of the Court is taken out and the Act enjoins the Court to grant interest as per the statutory rates specified in the Act.',
16. In Union of India v. Budh Singh (1995) 6 SCC 233, the learned Judges have further made it clear that the Court has no jurisdiction to award interest in excess of the rate prescribed under the Act and also for the period anterior to the publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. It is observed in para 5 :
'The other provision relevant for this purpose is Sectton 28 of the Act. which empowers the reference Court or the High Courtfor awarding interest on the enhanced compensation from the date of taking possession till date of payment as referred to hereinbefore. Thus, it could be seen that the statute covers the entire field of operation of the liability of the State to make payment of interest and entitlement thereof by the owner when land has been taken over and possession in consequence thereof, the land owner was deprived of the enjoyment thereof. Thus, it could be seen that the Court has no power to impose any condition to pay interest in excess of the rate and manner prescribed by the statute as well as for a period anterior to the publication of Section 4(1) notification under the Act. The parameter for initiation of the proceedings is the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act In the State Gazette or in an appropriate case in District Gazette as per the local amendments. But the condition precedent is publication of the notification under Section 4(1) in the appropriate gazette. That would give legitimacy to the State to take possession of the land in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Any possession otherwise would not be considered to be possession taken under the Act. In fact, a situation has been envisaged under Section 48(2) of the Act. namely, that when proceedings under the Act were initiated and in the midstream the proceedings were dropped, the owner who has been deprived of the enjoyment of the property, the statute prescribes the remedy of determination of the amount of compensation due to the owner for the damages suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice of the proceedings under the Act. The statute also imposes liability on the State to reimburse the costs incurred by the owner to defend the proceedings under the Act. The Act is a self-contained code and common law principles of justice, equity and good conscience cannot be extended in awarding interest, con-trary to the provisions of the statute.'
17. It was further held that the decision of Privy Council in Vallabhdas Naranji v. Development Officer (AIR 1929 PC 163) (supra) is of no assistance since there was no decision to pay interest for a period anterior to the issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. The learned Judges have approved their earlier judgment in State of Punjab v. Raminder Kaur (1988) 1 ACC 610 (sic) by observing that, 'since the possession was taken in exercise of the powers pursuant to the notification under Section 4(1), direction for payment of interest from the date of taking possession is also consistent with the Scheme of the Act'.
18. Similar view was taken in Astekar Naganaatha Rao v. Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer (1996) 2 SCC 369 : (AIR 1996 SC 1041) the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have held that the claimants are entitled to interest on the award amount from the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act i.e. 24-2-1983 at the rate of 9% for one year and thereafter at the rate of 15% till the date of deposit, though the physical or actual possession was taken as far back as on 31-12-1942. Similar view was also taken in the judgment of this Court in Land Acquisition Collector v. Satya Bhushan (2000) 2 Shim LC 69.
19. In view of the ratio of above cited judgments of Supreme Court there remains no doubt that the possession as envisaged under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act is under the Act and in no case before the notification under Section 4 of the Act. Though under Section 16 the Collector may take over possession of the acquired land after making the award and under Section 17(4) of the Act the possession is taken over before making the award in exercise of the urgency powers, yet taking over the possession of the acquired land even before the award would definitely be after the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act and in that eventuality the interest is payable from the date of taking over physical or actual possession under the Act.
20. On the other hand, in support of their submission that by possession, as envisaged under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act, the legislature meant physical or actual possession even before the issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, learned Counsel for the claimants have also relied upon catena of case law.
21. The first judgment referred to by the learned Counsel for the claimants is the Judgment of the Privy Council in Inglewood Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd. v. New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, AIR 1928 PC 287 in which it was held :
' 'Upon the expropriation of land under statutory power, whether for the purpose ofprivate gain or of good to the public at large, the owner is entitled to interest upon the principal sum awarded from the date when possession was taken, unless the statute clearly shows a contrary intention.'
Dealing with the agreement that the expropriation with which Privy Council was concerned was not effected for private gain, but for the good of the public at large, it observed
'but for all that, the owner is deprived of his property in this case as much as in the other, and the rule has long been accepted in the interpretation of statutes that they are not to be held to deprive individuals of property without compensation unless the intention to do so is made quite clear. The right to receive the interest takes the place of right to retain possession and is within the rule.''
22. The ratio of this Judgment is that the claim for interest proceeds on the assumption that when the owner of the immovable property loses possession of it he is entitled to claim interest in place of right to retain possession.
23. This judgment of the Privy Council was considered in Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh, AIR 1961 SC 908 and in para 18 of the judgment it is observed that:
'...... It would thus be noticed that theclaim for interest proceeds on the assumption that when the owner of the immovable property loses possession of it he is entitled to claim interest in place of right to retain possession. The question which we have to consider is whether the application of this rule is intended to be excluded by the Act of 1948, and as we have already observed, the mere fact that Section 5(3) of the Act makes Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 applicable we cannot reasonably infer that the Act intends to exclude the application of this general rule in the matter of the payment of Interest. That is the view which the Punjab High Court has taken in Surjan Singh v. East Punjab Government, AIR 1957 Pun 265, and we think rightly.'
24. In this judgment the learned Judges of Supreme Court were considering the application of the general rule intended to be excluded by the East Punjab Requisition of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act (48 of 1948). While answering in negative the learned Judges observed in para 19 that:
'....... When a claim for payment ofinterest is made by a person whose immovable property has been acquired compulso-rily he is not making claim for damages properly or technically so called: he is basing his claim on the general rule that if he is deprived of his land he should be put in possession of compensation immediately: if not, in lieu of possession taken by compulsory acquisition interest should be paid to him on the said amount of compensation. In our opinion, therefore, the fact that Section 5(1) deals with compensation both for requisition and acquisition cannot serve to exclude the application of the general rule to which we have just referred.'
25. The ratio of this judgment has no bearing in the case in hand as we have already held that in view of the specific provisions of Sections 28 and 34 of the Act the general rule has no application.
26. Learned Counsel for the claimants have heavily relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi (1996) 6 SCC 44 ; (1996 AIR SCW 4020) stating that this being the latest judgment of a larger Bench consisting of three Judges should be followed to hold that interest under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act is payable from the date of physical or actual possession which might have been taken even before the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act. The relevant observations are in para 11 of the judgment. These are :
'Taking the question of entitlement to interest as a first question as vehemently argued by Shri Vaidyanathan, broadly speaking, the act of taking possession of immovable properties generally implies an agreement to pay interest on its consideration for deferred payment. In a Court of equity, when the seller, parts with possession of immovable property the purchaser becomes its owner while the sellers receives money as consideration in lieu of the property. The seller, therefore, is entitled to claim interest in place of his retaining possession of the property from the date the purchaser takes possession of the property till the date of payment. On this premise, claim for interest is sought against the State when it exercises its power of eminent domain and acquires the property of a citizen for public purpose. This principle was extended in equity to compensate the owner for deprivation of his possession and enjoyment thereof in accordance with law, It was therefore held in equity that the owner is entitled to interest on the principal amount of award from the date of taking possession unless the statute, under which the land was acquired expresses its contrary intention, It is on this premise that the right to receive interest takes the place of right, to retain possession and its enjoyment. It is equally settled law that equity operates where statute does not occupy the field. Conversely, when statute occupies the held the equity yields place to the statute,'
27. In this judgment the question before the learned Judge was whether the claimants were entitled to solatium and interest under Jammu and Kashmir Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1968 (15 of 1968) which did not contain any provision for award of solatium and interest. Though the learned Judges approved the general rule that the seller is entitled to claim interest in place of his retaining possession of the property from the date the purchaser takes possession of the property till the date of payment, yet held that in the absence of incorporation of this general rule in the statute providing for award of interest or solatium in addition to compensation the solatium and interest cannot be awarded by following the general rule and held that in view of deliberate omission by the Legislature to provide for the payment of solatium and interest in the statute, these cannot be awarded by following the general rule.
28. The other judgments cited by the learned Counsel for the claimants were delivered by this Court. In Land Acquisition Collector, H. P., P. W. D.. Solan v. Jeet Ram. AIR 1987 Him Pra 71. and L. A. C.. H. P. P. W. D., Kullu v. Smt. Dugli Devi (1997) 2 Shim LC 461 relying upon the judgment of Supreme Court in Satender Singh v. Umrao Stngh (AIR 1961 SC 908). Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Revenue Divisional Officer, Guntur v. Varireddy Rama Bhanu Bhupal (AIR 1970 Andh Pra 262) and the judgment of learned single Judge in Land Acquisition Collector. H. P., P. W. D.. Solan v. Jeet Ram (supra), it was held that interest under Ss. 28 and 34 of the Act is payable from the date of possession and date of possession has been held to be 'physical or actual possession'. Same view was taken in the recent judgment in Bhubnesh Banga v. Land Acquisition Collector, 2000 (2) SLJ 1707 and The Collector. Land Acquisition v. Revat Ram deceased through his legal representatives Tikamu Devi and others (RFA No. 32 of 1988) decided on 1-7-1997. The learned Judges in The Collector. Land Acquisition v. Revat Ram deceased through his legal representatives Tikamu Devi and others (supra) have given the reason that physical and actual possession of the land taken before the issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act is also permissible under the Act as it gets regularized after the issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. These observations are in para 9 : 'The Land Acquisition Act does not anywhere say that possession should be taken only after a particular date contemplated by the Act. The Act itself contemplates taking of possession even before the Award is passed and even on a prior date before a declaration is made under Section 6. Section 17 provides an instance where possession could be taken immediately after Section 4 notification is made. Section 23(1-A) talks of possession having been taken before the passing of the award. Under Section 23(1-A) interest is payable on the market value of the land for the period commencing on and from the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in respect of such land till the date of the Award by the Collector or by the date of taking possession of the land whichever is earlier. If possession had been taken prior to the is-sue of notification under Section 4(1) with a view to acquire the land it could be regularized by a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Thus, when the government took possession in 1972 and issued notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in 1980, it did so only to regularize the taking of possession by acquiring the land and awarding of compensation to the owners of the land as per the provisions of the Act. The taking of possession, even if it could be said, was not in accordance with law in 1972, it had been regularized by the subsequent notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in 1980. Hence it is not open to the government to contend that original taking of possession was unlawful and, therefore, it could not be treated as taking of possession by virtue of the provisions of the Act.' And In para 10 :
'Secondly, when Section 28 uses the expression 'he took possession of the land', it only means that the possession of the land, had been taken by the Government which acquires the land. After all, the Collector is only an official of the Government acting on its behalf. It is not as if he takes possession actually by himself. It is only a subordinate Revenue official who takes possession on his behalf which, in turn, is on behalf of the Government. Thus, if the Government had taken possession through one of its officials and had issued notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in order to pay compensation to the claimants, it meant that the taking of possession by the other officials was on behalf of the Collector appointed under the Act to conduct the proceedings under the Act and it would mean in the eye of law that the Collector had taken possession of the land prior to issue of notification under Section 4(1). The possession was and had always been that of the Government. Thus, the requirement of Section 4(1) of the Act remains satisfied.'
And also in para 11 :
'Thirdly, there is no presumption of illegality. When the Government officials took possession of the land in 1972 for constructing a road, it was for a public purpose and when a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, the two can be linked together. It was always open to the Government to legalize its possession of the land taken in 1972 and it was done by the notification under the Act. It must also be noted here that after the initiation of the proceedings under the Act, the Collector never purported to take or record formally the possession of the land. Admittedly, no entry has been made in the revenue records after the acquisition. Can it be said that the Collector has not taken possession of the land even now and he will do so hereafter? Necessarily, the acquisition proceedings have to be tacked on to the possession taken in 1972. In that view also, the provisions of Section 28 can be and have been rightly invoked.'
29. But in view of law laid down by the 'Supreme Court in Budh Singh's case (1995 (6) SCC 233) (supra), the view taken by this Court in the above cited judgments cannot be upheld. On the other hand, the Judgment of this Court in Satya Bhushan (2000 (2) Shim LC 69) (supra) lays down the correct law.
30. Therefore, in view of above discussion our answer to reference No. (ii) is that the interest under Section 28 of the Act is to be paid from the date the possession is taken over under the Act, which in no case can be before issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act.