V.K. Gupta, C.J.
1. F.A.O. No. 267 of 1993 was an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('Act' for short) wherein the appellant insurer had challenged the correctness of the judgment and award dated 5.7.1993 passed by learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-I, Kangra at Dharamshala in M.A.C.T. Case No. 45 of 1991. Based on the grounds taken in the said appeal, appellant insurer had prayed for setting aside of the aforesaid award. Vide judgment dated 25.5.2004 this court dismissed the aforesaid appeal.
2. In the aforesaid appeal, the claimant Lata filed the cross-objections and sought the relief of enhancement of the compensation amount inasmuch as apparently the claimant-cross-objector was not satisfied with the amount awarded by the Tribunal in the aforesaid claim petition and feeling aggrieved of the awarding of lesser amount than had been prayed for, or was expected, she sought the relief of enhancement of the compensation amount in the aforesaid cross-objections filed in the aforesaid appeal.
3. Whereas vide the aforesaid judgment dated 25.5.2004 this court had dismissed the aforesaid appeal filed by the appellant insurer, insofar as the cross-objections are concerned, vide order dated 26.5.2004, the single Bench of this court seized of the appeal as well as the cross-objections took notice of a preliminary objection raised by and on behalf of appellant with respect to the maintainability of the cross-objections in view of the ratio laid down by a Division Bench judgment of this court delivered on 4.9.1996 in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rukmani Devi, F.A.O. (MVA) No. 88 of 1988 with Cross-objection No. 24 of 1989. Noticing the aforesaid preliminary objection with respect to the maintainability of the cross-objections in the light of the aforesaid Division Bench judgment of this court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rukmani Devi (supra) the single Bench also noticed that two subsequent Division Bench judgments of this court following Rukmani Devi had also taken the same view that the cross-objections were not maintainable in an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Act. However, reliance was placed by learned counsel for the cross-objector upon a Full Bench decision of Karnataka High Court in case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Prema, 2002 ACJ 1889 (Karnataka), in which a view was taken by the Full Bench of Karnataka High Court that cross-objections by the claimant for enhancement of the compensation amount, in an appeal filed by an insurance company, are maintainable. The single Bench accordingly in the aforesaid order dated 26.5.2004 feeling that the aforesaid ratio laid down by the Division Bench judgment of this court in Rukmani Devi required reconsideration by a larger Bench, referred the question of maintainability of cross-objections to a Full Bench of three Judges. It is in this background that this reference with respect to the legal question relating to the maintainability of cross-objections in an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Act has come up before this Bench for consideration.
4, In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rukmani Devi, F.A.O. (MVA) No. 88 of 1988, the Division Bench of this court while dealing with the issue relating to the maintainability of cross-objections filed by the claimants for enhancement of the compensation amount in an appeal filed by the insurance company held that because in the appeal filed by the insurance company the controversy regarding the correctness of the compensation amount cannot be gone into inasmuch as in terms of Section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, an insurance company has limited defences available to it, the cross-objections filed by claimants for enhancement of compensation amount in such an appeal filed by insurance company are not maintainable.
5. The Division Bench in the aforesaid case was specifically dealing with the contention that since in the terms of Section 149 (2) of the Act an insurer appellant is debarred, in an appeal filed by it against an award of the Tribunal, from questioning the correctness of the award with respect to the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the claimant should also be held debarred from filing the cross-objections in such an appeal seeking enhancement of the compensation amount. This view was taken by the Division Bench on the ground that since in the appeal filed by an insurance company it is not necessary to decide any controversy regarding the quantum of compensation, this issue cannot be gone into in the cross-objections filed by the claimants. In Rukmani Devi, F.A.O. (MVA) No. 88 of 1988, however, in an oblique and indirect reference to an appeal, if filed by the owner or driver of the vehicle in question with respect to the correctness of the quantum of compensation, the Division Bench perhaps, without expressing any definite opinion of course on the point, observed that the cross-objections might have been held maintainable because in an appeal if filed by an owner or driver of the vehicle in question the issue relating to the quantum of compensation could have been agitated and, therefore, enhancement of compensation amount, also being an issue relating to the quantum of compensation, could have been gone into in the cross-objections filed by the claimants and, therefore, perhaps the cross-objections might have been held maintainable. We reiterate that the Division Bench in Rukmani Devi (supra), of course, did not express any opinion with respect to this issue as the following observations perhaps point out to only an oblique reference to that issue and we quote with advantage:
'Admittedly, no appeal has been filed by the claimant against the award questioning the correctness of the quantum of compensation awarded by impleading the driver and the owner of the truck as parties, neither any appeal has been filed by the owner or driver of the ill-fated truck in question of the correctness of the quantum of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal. The claimant has filed cross-objections in the appeal filed not by the owner or the driver of the truck but in the appeal filed by the insurance company.'
6. Three subsequent judgments of this court in the following three cases;
(1) National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Satya Devi, 2002 ACJ 1618 (HP).
(2) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kehro Devi, 1997 ACJ 623 (HP); and
(3) Krishan Dutt v. Premi Devi, 1998 ACJ 706 (HP);
relying upon the ratio in Rukmani Devi, F.A.O. (MVA) No. 88 of 1988, took the view that in an, appeal filed by an insurance company the claimant had no right to file the cross-objections. However, in between, in another judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Manjit Singh v. Rattan Singh, 1997 ACJ 1204 (HP), it has been held that Order 41, Rules 22 and 33 of the Civil Procedure Code can be made applicable in appeals filed under Section 173 of the Act to make sure that the award passed by the Tribunal conforms with the provisions of law, namely, Sections 140 and 141 of the Act and the reasoning apparently of taking this view, as can be made discernible from a reading of this judgment is that the High Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction, would also have to take into account Rules of Practice and Procedure of the High Court with regard to its power to entertain and decide the appeals, including the disposal of appeals and the manner of exercise of the High Court's jurisdiction in disposing of the appeals. In other words, the Division Bench in Manjit Singh v. Rattan Singh (supra), by implication applied the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the High Court with a view to derive its power to entertain the cross-objections, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 173 of the Act even though the Act itself does not contain any provision with respect to the cross-objections.
7. In an earlier judgment in the case of H.P. Road Trans. Corporation v. Jai Ram, 1980 ACJ 1 (HP), the Division Bench of this court while discussing various provisions including Rule 22 of Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code took the view that the provision enabling respondent to file cross-objections in terms of Order 41, Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code is in the realm of procedural law under which, even if the respondent has not preferred any appeal against the judgment itself, the court has the power to do complete justice between the parties by allowing the respondent to prefer cross-objections. The following passage in the aforesaid judgment is apposite and we quote:
'(34) The contention of the learned advocate of the Corporation, however, was that the cross-objections which are filed under Order 41, Rule 22 are not filed as part of procedure but are filed on account of the fact that a substantive right to file the same has been created by Rule 22 of Order 41. Such a view is of course taken by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in above referred case of Virendra Singh v. Phoolmati, 1978 ACJ 430 (Allahabad). It should, however, be borne in mind that some procedural rights do possess a substantive character, inasmuch as they are legally enforceable. Nonetheless, they are a part of the procedure cannot be claimed independently of that procedure. On consideration of the scheme of Order 41, Civil Procedure Code, we are of the opinion that though right of a respondent to file cross-objections under Rule 22 of Order 41 may be treated as such an enforceable right, the said right arises out of the procedure contemplated for the disposal of an appeal filed under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code and is not independent of such an appeal. In other words, this right is intrinsically of a procedural character though substantive in its nature, inasmuch as it can be claimed and asserted according to law during the proceedings of an appeal. It should be noted that substantive right to file an appeal independently of the appeal filed by the other party is already created by Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, Therefore, the right to challenge a part of a decree irrespective of the right to file an appeal under Section 96, as contemplated by Rule 22 of Order 41, must be treated as a procedural right for the simple reason that this right to file cross-objections is solely dependent upon the filing of an appeal by the opposite side. Moreover, scheme of Order 41 and especially the wide powers given to the court under Rule 33 of Order 41 suggests that the intention of the legislature is to see that once the court is seized of a matter in its appellate jurisdiction, it is able to do complete justice between all the concerned parties. To us, therefore, it is very clear that the provision enabling a respondent to file cross-objections made in Rule 22 is a procedural provision under which even if a respondent has not preferred any appeal the court is enabled to do complete justice to the parties by allowing the respondent concerned to prefer the cross-objections within the period of limitation. Under these circumstances, with great respect to the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court, we find ourselves unable to accept their view that provision enabling a respondent to file cross-objections is a substantive provision and not a procedural one.'
Apparently, therefore, in H.P. Road Trans. Corporation v. Jai Ram (supra), the Division Bench took the view that the right to file cross-objections under Order 41, Rule 22 is not a substantive right but is a matter of procedure and, therefore, with a view to do complete justice between the parties the court seized of an appeal under Section 173 of the Act has the power to permit the respondent in the appeal to file cross-objections.
8. A noticeable aspect, however, in H.P. Road Trans, Corporation v. Jai Ram, 1980 ACJ 1 (HP), is that this was a case in which the appeal was filed by a Road Transport Corporation against the award of the Tribunal and as a Road Transport Corporation, unlike an insurance company, does not suffer from any disability or constraint with respect to the nature of defences available to it under Section 149 (2) of the Act, meaning thereby (in other words) that a Road Transport Corporation has unlimited right of challenging an award in an appeal on all grounds, including the right of challenge based on the quantum of compensation, there is no discussion in this judgment with respect to any distinction between the right to file cross-objections by a claimant in an appeal filed by the insurance company and the extent of such right in an appeal filed by an owner/driver of the vehicle involved in the accident, such as a Road Transport Corporation, when the vehicle of such an owner is not insured.
9. In case of Charan Singh v. Joginder Singh, 2002 ACJ 1250 (HP), the Division Bench while dealing with the question of maintainability of cross-objections in para 33 has relied upon the judgment in Manjit Singh v. Rattan Singh, 1997 ACJ 1204 (HP) and in para 34 has relied upon the judgment in H.P. Road Trans. Corporation v. Jai Ram, 1980 ACJ 1 (HP), with respect to the applicability of Order 41, Rule 22 and Rule 33. In para 35, however, the Division Bench has interestingly held and observed that under the Motor Vehicles Act or under the Civil Procedure Code there is no prohibition with respect to the applicability of Order 41, Rule 22 or 33. The Division Bench actually has gone to the extent of observing and holding that the procedure in an appeal filed under Motor Vehicles Act is by and large governed by Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code even though the Division Bench has noticed that the right of appeal is provided for in Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In doing so, the Division Bench did not take note of Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act under which limited application of the provisions of Civil Procedure Code has been made to proceedings in the Claims Tribunal only nor has it taken note of Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which gives power to the State Government to frame Rules especially Clause (d) thereof, which gives power to frame Rules with respect to 'form' and 'manner' of the appeal filed under the Act.
10. The aforesaid is a bird's eye view of some of the leading judgments by this court, taking views on both the sides, about the maintainability or non-maintainability of cross-objections filed by a claimant in the appeals filed under Section 173 of the Act.
11. In the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2004 ACJ 934 (SC), their Lordships of the Apex Court have observed that although the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a beneficial and welfare piece of legislation and, hence, it deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the said legislative intent, at the same time where the legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt in such a scheme, the court should not and cannot travel beyond the parameters of such a scheme and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefits even to such persons who are not covered by it. Para 53 of this judgment which is relevant for our purposes reads thus:
'(53) Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby. [See Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation, Trichur v. Ramanuja Match Industries, AIR 1985 SC 278].'
12. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, our only endeavour in this reference, therefore, should be to find out as to whether there is any right of filing cross-objections in an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Act against an award passed by the Tribunal irrespective of who the appellant is and what is the form and content of the appeal. But, what is the nature of the right to file cross-objections? What, after all is this right and what is its source, genesis as well as extent? This has to be viewed with respect to, and in the perspective of, legislative scheme of the Act with the sole purpose of culling out from the Act itself whether any such right exists, is created therein or stands vested in any one to file cross-objections. In short, the purpose is to find out as to how does one trace the right to file the cross-objections?
13. In a recent judgment in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. International Security and Intelligence Agency Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 250, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with the issue as to whether in an appeal filed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the respondent had a right of filing cross-objections. Section 41 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, clearly laid down and stipulated that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code shall apply to all proceedings before the court and to all appeals under the said Act. After clearly taking a view that the right of appeal is the creation of a statute and that there is no inherent right of appeal in any one and that no appeal can be filed, heard or determined on merits unless the statute confers a right upon the appellant as well as the corresponding duty upon the court to do so, no appeal is maintainable. It has accordingly been held by their Lordships that a bare reading of Section 39 read with Section 41 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, clearly showed that in all appeals filed under Section 39 of this Act the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply, which would also include naturally the applicability of Order 41 in its entirety. The following observations are apposite and we quote:
'(14) Right of appeal is creature of statute. There is no inherent right of appeal. No appeal can be filed, heard or determined on merits unless the statute confers right on the appellant and power on the court to do so. Section 39 of the Act confers right to file appeal, insofar as the orders passed under this Act are concerned, only against such of the orders as fall within one or other of the descriptions given in Clauses (i) to (vi) of Sub-section (1) of Section 39. Parliament has taken care to specifically exclude any other appeal being filed, against any order passed under the Act but not covered by Clauses (i) to (vi) above said, by inserting the expression 'and from no others' in the text of subsection (1). Clause (a) of Section 41 extends applicability of all the provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to (i) all proceedings before the court under the Act, and (ii) to all the appeals, under the Act. However, the applicability of such of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code shall be excluded as may be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and/or of the Rules made thereunder. A bare reading of these provisions shows that in all the appeals filed under Section 39, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, would be applicable. This would include the applicability of Order 41 including the right to take any cross-objection under Rule 22 thereof to the appeals under Section 39 of the Act.'
14. Elaborating on the scope of the right to file cross-objections by highlighting that this right partakes of the right to prefer an appeal, their Lordships went on to clearly observe and hold that taking/filing cross-objections to a decree or order impugned in an appeal is in the nature of the exercise of the right of appeal itself, though such right is exercised in the form of taking cross-objections. According to their Lordships, the substantive right is the right to appeal; and the form of cross-objections is a matter of procedure. The following observations are very relevant to demonstrate how their Lordships clearly took the view that the right to file cross-objections is a substantive right. We quote:
'(15) Right to prefer cross-objection partakes of the right to prefer an appeal. When the impugned decree or order is partly in favour of one party and partly in favour of the other, one party may rest contended by his partial success with a view to giving a quietus to the litigation. However, he may like to exercise his right of appeal if he finds that the other party was not interested to burying the hatchet and proposed to keep the lis alive by pursuing the same before the appellate forum. He too may in such circumstances exercise his right to file appeal by taking cross-objection. Thus taking any cross-objection to the decree or order impugned is the exercise of right of appeal though such right is exercised in the form of taking cross-objection. The substantive right is the right of appeal; and the form of cross-objection is a matter of procedure.'
15. If any doubt was left, in the following observations in the same judgment it has clearly been held that the right to take the cross-objections is the exercise of a substantive right to appeal and this right, for its exercise, has to be conferred by the statute only:
'(18) We have, therefore, no doubt in our mind that the right to take a cross-objection is the exercise of substantive right of appeal conferred by a statute. Available grounds of challenge against the judgment, decree or order impugned remain the same whether it is an appeal or a cross-objection. The difference lies in the form and manner of exercising the right; the terminus a quo (the starting point) of limitation also differs.'
16. The available grounds of challenge against a judgment, decree or order impugned, remain the same whether these grounds are taken in an appeal or in cross-objections. The difference lies in the form and manner of exercising the right; the right continues to be substantive in nature. It is only the form and the manner in which the right is exercised, whether by filing the appeal or the cross-objections.
17. In Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there is no provision corresponding to Section 41 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 whereby the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code have been made applicable to appeals filed under this Act. The ratio, therefore, in International Security and Intelligence Agency Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 250, in a way lays down the law, in the manner of conversely speaking, that the right to file cross-objections partakes of the right to prefer the appeal and since the filing of the cross-objections is an exercise of a substantive right of appeal, such a substantive right can be availed of only if the statute specifically provides for and creates such a right because undoubtedly right of appeal being the creation of a statute in the absence of such a right, the filing of cross-objections is not legally permissible.
18. Whether, therefore, an appeal is filed by an insurance company within the confines of Section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, or otherwise, or an appeal is filed by any one else, against a judgment and award of the Tribunal, since the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does not lay down, provide for, or say that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code shall be applicable to appeals filed under the Act, even though there is a right of appeal against the judgment and award passed by a Tribunal as prescribed in Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in the absence of any stipulation in the Act of the applicability of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to appeals filed under Section 173 of the Act, the substantive right of filing cross-objections cannot be availed of by any one as such a right does not exist in the statute. The right of appeal is a creature of statute and that right has been conferred upon a person aggrieved of an award in Section 173 of the Act. Neither in Section 173 of the Act nor elsewhere in the Act has it been provided that there shall be a right of filing cross-objections. In other words, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does not by itself, under its scheme, in its own body, contain any provision similar or identical to Rule 22 or Rule 33 of Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code, nor does the Act anywhere provide that Order 41, Rule 22 or Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code or the principles flowing therefrom, shall apply to appeals filed under the Act nor does the Act provide that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code shall apply to appeals filed under the Act.
19. We have very carefully perused the Full Bench judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Prema, 2002 ACJ 1889 (Karnataka), which was noticed by us in the earlier part of this judgment as it was relied upon very strongly by the learned counsel for the cross-objector with a view to canvass about the maintainability of the cross-objections. First and foremost, the Full Bench of Karnataka High Court even while very elaborately dealing with Rules 22 and 33 of Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code, did not at all examine or consider the applicability of these Rules on the touchstone of the specific provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, nor did this judgment at all deal with any issue as to whether in an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the provisions of Order 41 are attracted or not. This judgment actually was dealing with only the generality of Order 41, Rules 22 and 33 and not with respect to any question touching upon the specific applicability to appeals filed under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Apparently, the judgment gives an impression that their Lordships of the Full Bench were examining the applicability of Order 41 as if it were to apply only to the appeals filed under Civil Procedure Code. Actually in para 13 of this judgment their Lordships referred to an earlier Division Bench judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V. Balasubramanyam, 1990 ACJ 736 (Karnataka), in which, of course, while dealing with the scope of an appeal filed under Section 110-D of 1939 Act (which is in pari materia to Section 173 of 1988 Act) it was clearly held that in an appeal presented by an insurer the cross-objection was not maintainable. In any event since now the law has been well settled by their Lordships of the Apex Court in International Security and Intelligence Agency Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 250, we are of the opinion that the Karnataka High Court Full Bench cannot be of any avail or help to the cross-objector.
20. Section 169 of the Act talks of the applicability of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code but only to a limited extent specified therein and that too relating to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. This section reads thus:
'169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals.--(1) In holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.
(2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry.'
21. Section 176 of the Act empowers the State Government to make Rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Sections 165 to 174 of the Act and in particular with respect to the form and the manner in which and fees (if any) on payment of which, an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal. For ready reference, Section 176 may be quoted which reads thus:
'176. Power of State Government to make rules.--A State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Sections 165 to 174, and in particular, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:
(a) the form of application for claims for compensation and the particulars it may contain, and the fees, if any, to be paid in respect of such application;
(b) the procedure to be followed by a Claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry under this Chapter;
(c) the powers vested in a civil court which may be exercised by a Claims Tribunal;
(d) the form and the manner in which and the fees (if any) on the payment of which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal; and
(e) any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed.'
As is apparently seen, Clause (d) of Section 176 of the Act clearly empowers the State Government to make rules with respect to the form and the manner in which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal. The expressions 'form' and 'manner' are wide enough to include a possible stipulation about the applicability of the provisions of Order 41, Rules 22 and 33 of the Civil Procedure Code to appeals filed under Section 173 of the Act. In exercise of this power, amongst various other powers, the State Government did frame Rules called 'Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1999'. Rules 232 and 233 of these Rules are relevant for our purposes and these read thus:
'232. The Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases.--The following provisions of the First Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall so far as may be, apply to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, namely, Order V, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; and Order IX; Order XIII; Rules 3 to 10; Order XVI; Rules 2 to 21; Order XVII, Order XXI and Order XXIII, Rules 1 to 3.
Sections 169 and 176 (b)
233. Form and manner of appeals against the award of Claims Tribunal.--An appeal against award of a Claims Tribunal shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum stating concisely the ground on which the appeal is preferred, it shall be accompanied by a copy of the judgment and the award appealed against.
Sections 173 and 176 (c)'
22. As is seen, whereas under Rule 232 certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code have been made applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal, under Rule 233 it has only been laid down as to how the appeals are to be filed against the awards of the Claims Tribunal. Rule 232, of course, does not relate to appeals, as it refers only to the proceedings before the Tribunal. In Rule 233, of course, the State Government could have incorporated a provision about the applicability of Order 41, Rules 22 and 33 of the Civil Procedure Code to the appeals under the Act but this not having been done, we cannot import either into the Act or into the aforesaid 1999 Rules any provision with respect to the aforesaid applicability of Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code to the appeals filed under the Act with the result that we have to hold and declare that there is no right of filing cross-objections, same not having been created by any statute and hence it not being in existence. It shall, however, be open to the State Government to consider effectively the desirability of suitably amending 1999 Rules to incorporate appropriately in these Rules, for example, in Rule 233 by way of its own amendment, or otherwise by introducing a new rule, that Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code shall apply to the appeals filed under the Act, as it applies to appeals filed under the Civil Procedure Code. We accordingly direct the State Government to consider this issue, in its true perspective and in best public interest and, if it at all decides to carry out the above indicated amendment in 1999 Rules, to do the needful in that direction within two months from today. The decision has to be of the State Government in the exercise of its rule making power and we have no intention of issuing any direction, much less a binding direction as to how and in what manner this decision should be taken. Only that the decision, one way or the other, has to be taken in a time bound manner. We, therefore, direct Law Secretary, Government of Himachal Pradesh to inform the Registrar General of this court about the action taken, one way or the other, before 31.12.2004. A copy of this judgment shall accordingly be sent to the Law Secretary, Government of Himachal Pradesh for his information and compliance.
23. Based on the aforesaid reasoning and in the light of the aforesaid observations accordingly, in this reference we lay down, hold and declare that in no appeal filed under Section 173 of the Act by any appellant, can cross-objections be permitted to be filed/entertained since the cross-objections, under the scheme of the Act read with the aforesaid 1999 Rules as these presently exist, are not maintainable.
24. In the result accordingly the cross-objections are dismissed.