V.P. Gupta, J.
1. By this judgment, we are disposing of three Leters Patent Appeals Nos. 3 of 1982, 4 of 1982 and 5 of 1982. All these appeals arise out of a single judgment and one accident of Bus No. HPC-I83 on 18-7-1974.
2. Briefly the facts are that Bus No. HPC-183 was being driven from Chamba to Pathankot with 19 passengers, by the Driver Shri Puran Chand (now deceased). It met with an accident at about 4-15 P.M. on 18-7-1974 at a place about one and half kms from. 'Daredda' when it rolled down into a khud. Several passengers who were travelling in the bus were injured or killed. Shri Puran Chand driver, was also killed. One Ved Parkash (passenger) also died on the spot as a result of the injuries received by him in the accident. Rajinder Lal and Mohiader Lal, were also passengers is the bus aad they also received various iajuries and were hospitalized.
3. Smt. Kusum widow and Sunit Kumar minor son of Ved Parkash (deceased) alongwith Smt. Surmi Devi, mother of Ved Parkash filed an application under Section I10-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter the Act) claiming Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation (M.A.C.T. No. 16 of 1974).
4. Mohinder Lal filed aa applicatioa (M.A.C.T. No. 17 of 1974) claiming Rs. 30,000/- as compensation and Rajinder Lai also filed an application (M.A.C.T. case No. 18 of 1974) claiming Rs. 50,000/- as compensation. All the above mentioned petitioners (hereinafter the respondents) have alleged that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by Puran Chand, driver.
5. The applications were contested by the Himachal Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter the appellant) and it was alleged that the accident was unavoidable because it was the result of sudden breakage of two spring leaves, that is, main and the second leave which resulted in locking up of the steering. The driver tried his best to avoid the accideat and applied the breakes, skid marks of which were visible up to a distance of 4 meters on the road as reported by the inquiry committee. There was no negligence on the part of the driver, who gave his life in that accident and the accideat was solely due to the abrupt breakage of spring leaves, which was purely sudden mechanical failure. If there was any negligence on the part of the driver, then he would have jumped out from the vehicle to save his life.
6. On the pleadings of the parties, issues about the cause of the accident, that is, whether the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by Puran Chand, driver, and compensation and its entitlement were framed in all the three cases.
7. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter the Tribunal) vide his award dated 19-7-1980 held that the accident was a result of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by Shri Puran Chand, driver. The Tribunal also awarded an amount of Rs. 50,000/- to Smt. Kusum and her minor son. Sunit Kumar in M.A.C.T. No. 16 of 1974. An amount of Rs. 5,000/- in lump sum was awarded to Mohinder Lal in M.A.C.T. No. 17 of 1974 and an amount of Rs. 30,000/- was awarded to Shri Rajinder Lal in M.A.C.T. No. 18 of 1974.
8. F.A.O. Nos. 89, 90 and 91 of 1980 were filed on behalf of the appellant against the awards of the Tribunal. The respondents also filed cross objections Nos. 109, 110 and 112 of 1980.
9. A learned Single Judge of this Court vide his judgment dated December 10, 1981 dismissed the appeals of the appellant and accepted the cross objections of Smt. Kusum and her minor son Sunit Kumar with the result that a compensation of Rs, 1,35,000/- was allowed to them with interest from the date of award of the Tribunal till the payment of compensation. The cross-objections in the other two appeals were dismissed.
10. Feeling aggrieved from the judgments dated December 10, 1981, the appellant has now filed the present appeals.
11. We have heard Shri D.K. Khanna, the learned Counsel for the appellant and Shri Chhabil Dass learned Counsel for the respondents.
12. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the accident was not due to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle but was due to the sudden mechanical defect in the vehicle inasmuch as the two spring leaves of the vehicle broke down abruptly. It was contended that the doctrine of res. ipsaloquitur' was not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case and the amount of compensation awarded was excessive. The further contention was that in the cross-objections by Smt. Kusum and her minor son Sunit Kumar, an enhancement by using multiplier of 20 was claimed, but the learned Single Judge had wrongly allowed a multiplier of 22, which was unjust and unreasonable.
13. The learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand contended that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle and was not due to any sudden mechanical defect in the vehicle. It was contended that there was no proof that the spring leaves broke down prior to the accident and the possibility of their breakage after the accident was not ruled out. It was also contended that the principle of res ipsa loquitur was applicable and the compensation was rightly awarded. The learned Judge was justified in allowing multiplier of 22.
14. We have considered the contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the records.
15. Both the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge have found that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by Shri Puran Chand, driver. After perusal of the evidence, we find that there are no grounds to interfere with this finding of fact.
16. Mohinder Lal respondent (petitioner in M.A.C.T. N6. 17 of 1974) was a passenger in this bus. He states that the accident was the result of negligence of the Driver, who could not negotiate the curve due to rash driving. The drive was driving with one hand and was smoking with the other hand. He was also talking with the conductor by turning back and was scolding the conductor about the checking which was done by the conductor. He further states that the bus fell down about 250 feet below the road and he became unconscious and was admitted in Civil Hospital, Chamba.
17. This witness was going to Chandigarh to seek admission in M.Sc. Geology and also to compete for the Indian Foreign Service competition. His statement was not challenged in the cross examination about the cause of the accident,
18. Rajinder Lal respondent (petitioner in M.A.C.T. No. 18 of 1974) was also travelling in this bus. He states that the driver was driving the vehicle with great speed and rashly. The bus was checked by an Inspector, who got down from the bus after covering 2 kms. The driver thereafter began driving with one band and with the other hand he was smoking. He was talking with the conductor by turning back. The speed of the vehicle was about 50-60 kms per hour and the vehicle fell down about 250 feet below the road. He became unconscious and found himself admitted in the Civil Hospital, Chamba on the next day. This witness, after passing his B.A. examination in 1974, was going to Chandigarh to seek admission in the law college. His statement regarding the rash and negligent driving was not challenged in the cross-examination.
19. Jai Dayal witness was also travelling in this bus. He states that Puran Chand driver drove the bus at high speed and while driving the bus he was looking back and was talking with the passengers. Thereafter the bus met with an accident and he (witness) sustained injuries and remained in hospital for 9 days. He could not say as to how the accident happened because he became senseless,
20. Rocha witness was also a passenger in this bus. He states that the bus was being driven rashly by Puran Chand driver and after the checking of the bus by the Inspector, the driver began to talk loudly with the conductor of the bus. The driver was driving the vehicle with one hand and was smoking with the other. He was looking back-side and was talking with the conductor. So the bus fell down. He sustained injuries and was given medical aid in Bathari Civil Hospital.
21. It may be mentioned that Jai Dayal is PW 1 in M.A.C.T. No. 16 of 1974 while Locha is PW 7 in M.A.C.T. No. 16 of 1974, PW 5 in M.A.C.T. No. 17 of 1974 and PW 6 in M.A.C.T. No. 18 of 1974.
22. The next witness of the. occurrence is Shri Kishori Lal, who was conductor in this bus. He states that he heard a sound of 'thud' and the driver immediately applied the brakes, but the accident took place. He received injuries and became unconscious. He regained consciousness after about 3-4 days in Civil Hospital, Chamba. He further states that the road where the accident took place was straight and the bus was being driven at the proper speed. He did not know about the enquiry conducted with regard to this accident and never appeared before any authority to make a statement. He also states that the driver had already negotiated a curve when he heard the sound of 'thud'. This witness was disbelieved by the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge. He did not appear in any enquiry although an inquiry committee was set up by the Government soon after the accident. In these circumstances we are also of the view that the oral statement of this witness who was not associated in the enquiry at any time cannot be believed. This witness was produced by the appellant.
23. The appellant also produced some more witnesses whose existence will now be discussed. Shri S.K. Aggarwal Executive Engineer states that he was a member of the enquiry committee along with S/Shri R.L. Mehta, S.D.M., Kali Charan, Dy. S.P. and P.D. Abrol, Regional Manager of Himachal Government Transport. According to him the road at the place of accident was wide and pacca, but prior to the place of accident there were a number of turns. He found that the driver had applied brakes before the vehicle fell down and the enquiry committee found that the accident took place on account of mechanical defect. He has also proved the enquiry report Ex. R-I, and states that skid marks were visible in a portion of four meters on the road which indicated that brakes were applied. He further states that the Assistant Engineer Mechanical (P.W.D.) conducted a separate enquiry about the accident, but the said Assistant Engineer was not present before the enquiry committee although his report was available to the enquiry committee.
24. Buggar Singh is a Garrage Supervisor in H.R.T.C. (Appellant). He states that the accident took place at about 4.15 P.M. and he reached the spot at 5.30 P.M. He found marks of application of foot brakes on the road. It appeared that the driver had tried his best to avoid the accident but due to the breaking of two spring leaves of the right side, the accident could, not be avoided. He. further states that the spring leaves could be broken due to the fall and he could not say whether the spring leaves were broken prior to the accident of after the accident.
25. Shri R.S. Sonkhla Assistant Engineer Mechanical inspected the bus and issued the certificate Ex. R-2. He opined that the accident was due to a mechanical defect as the first and second spring leaves of the vehicle were found broken. He further states that the leaves can be broken in a fall of the vehicle like. this. According to his opinion the leaves were broken first and then the vehicle wept off the road. He also states that at or about the place of accident the road was zigzag and even if the leaves are broken the brakes can be applied and they work effectively.
26. The certificate Ex. R-2 issued by Shri R.S. Sonkhla on 22-7-1974 reads as follows:
The actual cause of the accident could not be known but as per site inspected by me on 22-7-1974, it can be presumed that the vehicle met with an accident due to mechanical defect. The vehicle was going to Patbankot from Chamba. Suddenly the main leaves and the second leave and broken and due to this the steering jammed and the vehicle became out of control resulting in. driving the vehicle towards the outer edge of the road in spite of applying the brakes resulting the vehicle fell down into the Khad.
Shri Sonkhla is not definite in his opinion about the actual cause of the accident. He does not rule out the possibility of the breaking of the spring leaves due to the fall of the vehicle. He has admitted that the road was zigzag at or about the place of the accident. In Ex. R-2 he has not given the reasons as to why he presumed that the accident was due to a mechanical defect.
27. Without reasons it is not possible to accept the opinion of this witness specially when the witness himself states that the spring leaves could be broken due to fall of the vehicle. He admittedly inspected the vehicle after the accident when it had fallen into the khad. Hence the evidence of Shri Sonkhla that the accident was due to the breakage of the spring leaves before the fall of the vehicle cannot be accepted.
28. The enquiry report Ex. R-1 is mainly based upon the enquiry report of Shri Sonkhla. In view of the fact that we are not inclined to accept the version given by Shri Sonkhla and his report Ex. R-2, therefore, we do not attach much importance to the enquiry report Ex. R-1.
29. The next question for consideration is as to whether the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by Shri Puran Chand driver. The respondents have produced evidence to prove that the vehicle was being driven at a high speed. The driver was driving with one hand and was smoking with the other hand. He was looking back side and was talking to the conductor when the accident took place. There is no reason to disbelieve the respondents and their witnesses who were passengers in this vehicle and had escaped death.
30. The driver himself also died in the accident but it cannot be considered to be a circumstance for proving that he was not driving the vehicle rashly and negligently. In the absence of any cogent evidence from the side of the appellant it can safely be believed that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle.
31. It is not possible to believe that the two spring leaves of the vehicle broke down prior to the accident or that the accident took place due to breaking of the spring leaves which caused the jamming of the steering wheel thus resulting in the dragging of the bus on to the side to which it tilted.
32. The onus to prove that the accident was due to a mechanical failure is very heavy on the appellant. The skid marks on the road can only prove that the driver Puran Chand had applied the brakes, but they cannot prove that the accident was due to breakage of spring leaves. It appears that the driver applied the brakes when he lost the control of the vehicle which had crossed some zigzag portion of the road.
33. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the principle of 'reships loquitur' was not applicable in the present case. In view of the fact that the accident has taken place and the eye witnesses have deposed that the driver was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently, it is not necessary to go into this question. It might have been a different matter if there were no eye witnesses of the occurrence/accident.
34. Further the appellant could rebut the evidence of the claimants by proving that the accident was due to some latent mechanical defect in the vehicle which defect could not be detected at the time when the vehicle was put on the road. The appellant in this case has, however, failed to prove that there was a latent mechanical defect in the vehicle and the accident was purely due to breakage of the spring leaves or the jamming of the steering. The appellant has failed to prove the cause of the accident as it mentioned in the written statement.
35. In : [1977]2SCR886 Minu B. Mehta and Ors. v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan and Ors. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan was driving his car towards Port side on Dr. Annie Besant Road Bombay. When the car approached Lotus Cinema, the truck of Miss Minu B. Mehta came from the opposite direction and dashed against the right side of the car. Due to the impact the car was damaged and Balkrishna and his nurse Malati M. Deshmukh, who was sitting in the car were injured. A claim petition was filed by Balkrishna Ramachandra and Malati M. Deshmukh on the allegation that the truck was being driven rashly and negligently. This was resisted by the truck owners who alleged that all precautions had been taken to keep the lorry in road worthy condition and that at the material time the axle brake ring of the motor lorry came out and the driver therefore lost control of the vehicle and because of this defect which was developed in a running car, the driver lost control of steering wheel. It was alleged that the accident did not occur on account of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver. The Claims Tribunal after discussing the evidence came to a finding that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the lorry and did not accept the defence version that it was due to mechanical failure of the lorry. As a consequence, compensation was awarded to Dr. Balkrishna Ramachandra and Malati M. Deshmukh. An appeal was filed in the High Court by the non-claimant and the High Court concurred with the reasonings and findings of the Claims Tribunal. It further held that in the circumstances of the case the principle of 'reships loquitur' applied. The High Court also held that the accident was not due to any mechanical defect and relied upon the evidence adduced by the claimants. The non-claimants preferred an appeal in the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court, it was contended that the accident was not due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle and it was due to a sudden mechanical defect in the vehicle. In this context the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court made the following observations in para 12 of the judgment:.we may also point out that in order to succeed in a defence that the accident was due to a mechanical defect the owners will have to prove that they had taken all necessary precautions and kept the lorry in a roadworthy condition. No such attempt was made to establish that all necessary precautions were taken to keep the lorry in roadworthy by condition and that the defect occurred in spite of the reasonable care and caution taken by the owners.
In para 13 of the judgment it is observed as follows:
In order to sustain a plea that the accident was due to the mechanical defect the owners must raise a plea that the defect was latent and not discoverable by the use of reasonable care.
In para 14 of this judgment it is again stated:
The burden of proving that the accident was due to a mechanical defect is on the owners and it is their duty to show that they had taken all reasonable care and that despite such care the defect remained hidden. In this case in the written statement all that is pleaded is that the axle brake ring of the lorry came out and the driver lost control of the motor lorry and that the defect can develop in a running vehicle resulting in the driver's losing control of the steering wheel. Though it was stated that all precautions were taken to keep the lorry in a roadworthy condition it was not specifically pleaded that the defect i.e. the axle brake ring coming out is a latent defect and could not have been discovered by the use of reasonable care. This lack of plea is in addition to the lack of evidence and the fact that the defence set up has been rightly rejected by the Tribunal.
36. In 1972 ACJ 266 Hindustan Aeronautics v. P. Venu and Anr. a contention was raised that the claimants had failed to establish the negligence on the part of the driver and that the principle of 'res ipsa loquitur' was not applicable. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the parties had led evidence and, therefore, the question of onus of proof was not material. It was further held that the evidence established that while passing over the pit the bus was dragged to the right side of the road to a distance of about 20 to 25 feet from the direction in which the driver was proceeding and dashed against a tree which gave way and then it dashed against another tree. It was held that these circumstances were indicative of the fact that the speed of the bus was excessive and the driver was negligent.
37. In 1983 A.C.J. 397 Jai Singh v. Garwat Motor Owners and Ors. it was alleged that the accident was due to breaking of the spindle of front left wheel of the motor bus and that it was a mechanical defect. In these circumstances, after appreciating the pleadings and the evidence, the learned Judge in paras 16 and 17 observed as follows:
The present case before me is conspicuous by the absence of any plea or evidence to show that the spindle broke down due to a latent defect and that the defendants could not prevent it in spite of all the reasonable care and caution which they took for the maintenance of the vehicle. All that has been shown is that a month and 24 days before the accident occurred, the motor bus had been certified fit by the Technical Inspector of the Motor Vehicles Department by the grant of a certificate of fitness. That of course is only a statutory formality and it cannot be said that the mere fact that a motor vehicle is certified fit by the grant of a certificate of fitness under the Motor Vehicles Act, the existence of such certificate of fitness discharges the owner of motor vehicle of all responsibility of maintaining it properly with all reasonable care and caution to prevent an accident on account of any mechanical defect or failure of the vehicle. The lower appellate Court has clearly placed the entire burden of proof on the plaintiff and in doing so it committed a manifest error of law. It was not for the plaintiff to summon the spindle. It was for the defendants to show by evidence that the spindle broke down in spite of all the reasonable care and caution taken by them in main taining the vehicle, and that in spite of that care and caution, they could not know of the condition of the spindle. It is true that the defects said to have been complained of by the plaintiff before the commencement of the journey were such as did not have any direct relation with the spindle, but the fact remains that the pointing out of those defects showed that the motor bus was not being maintained properly and that its general condition was not good. That was good evidence to show that the minor bus was not being maintained with all the reasonable care and caution and that the driver of the motor bus and the booking clerk or agent of G.M.O.U. acted rashly in booking the motor bus and allowing it to proceed on journey in spite of its poor condition. A spindle of a motor bus does not break down every day and if it does break down, it is reasonable to infer that the motor vehicle was not properly looked after and maintained by being oiled and greased at proper intervals. It the wheel of a motor vehicle is run on a spindle without proper oiling and greasing the spindle is likely to be damaged by excessive wear caused by friction and may break down at a place where its circumference is narrowed down by excessive wear and tear caused by such friction. The defendants could of course escape the liability by showing that although they took good care of the vehicle and the spindle was properly oiled and greased and was not worn out when the accident occurred that it broke down on account of a latent manufacturing defect which they could not foresee.
17. It is in this view of things that the maxim reships liqueur, that is, the thing speaks for itself, applies. The lower, appellate Court is in error in saying that the maxim did not apply to the present case. The conditions for applying the maxim are, as enunciated in Salmon on the Law of Torts, Sixteenth Edition, Chapter IX Sections 84, 241 at page 242 : '(i) that the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants', and (ii) that 'the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care'. The motor bus was undoubtedly under the management of the defendants and spindles of motor buses do not in ordinary course of things break down unless of course the case is of negligence in running the bus. It follows that the fact that the accident was caused by the breaking down of the spindle speaks for itself and shows that the defendants must have been negligent, and defendants can rebut that inference only by showing that they used all the necessary care arid caution and that the accident could not be prevented in spite of the same.
38. In 1982 A.C.J. 69 Radha Devi and Anr. v. Aaluman Gyanchand and Ors. after discussing the law with respect to the onus of proof and the principle of 'res ipsa loquitur', it was found that the driver was driving the vehicle rashly at an excessive speed and that the owners of the bus had failed to prove that all care and caution was taken by them in maintaining the bus and that they have also failed to prove that the breakage of king pin resulted into going of the bite out of control and that the brakes could be ineffective and were ineffective do account of breakage of king pin. The following passage from (1948) 2 All E.R. 460 Barkway v. South Wales Transport laying down the principles applicable as to onus of proof is quoted in the following terms:
(i) If the defendant's omnibus leaves the road and fell down an embankment, and this without more is proved, then res ipsa loquitur, there is presumption that the event is caused by negligence on the part of the defendants, and the plaintiff succeeds unless the defendants can rebut this presumption, (ii) it is no rebuttal for the defendants to show, again without more, that the immediate cause of the omnibus leaving the road is a tyre burst, since a tyre-burst per se is a neutral even consistent, and equally consistent, with negligence or due diligence on the part of the defendants. When a balance has been tilted one way, you cannot redress it by adding an equal weight to each scale. The depressed scale will remain down. This is the effect of the decision in Laurie v. Raglan Building Co. (1942)1 KB 152 where not a tyre burst but a skid was involved, (iii) To displace the presumption, the defendants must go further and prove for it must emerge from the evidence as a whole, whether (a) that the burst itself was due to specific cause which does not connote negligence on their part but points to its absence as more probable, or (b) if they can point to no such specific cause, that they used all reasonable care in and about the management of their tyres.
Another passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 23, at page 671 is also quoted as under:
An exception to the general rule that the burden of proof of the alleged negligence is in the first instance on the plaintiff occurs where ever the facts already established are such that the proper and natural inference immediately arising from them is that the injury complained of was caused by the defendants negligence, or where the event charged as negligence tells its own story of negligence on the part of the defendant, the story so told being clear and unambiguous. To these cases the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies. Where the doctrine applies, a presumption of fault is raised against the defendant, which, if he is to succeed in his defence, must be over come by contrary evidence the burden on the defendant being to show how the act complained of could reasonably happen without negligence on his part. Where, therefore, there is a duty on the defendant to exercise care and the circumstances in which the injury complained of happened are such that with the exercise of the requisite care no risk would in the ordinary course of events ensue the burden is in the first instance on the defendant to disprove his liability. In such a case, if the injurious agency itself and the surrounding circumstances, are all entirely within the defendant's control, the inference is that the defendant is liable, and this inference is strengthened if the injurious agency is inanimate.
39. In the present case, the appellants in their written statement, have only alleged that the bus met with a sudden mechanical failure with the sudden breakage of two spring leaves. This breaking abruptly locked up of the steering which resulted in dragging the vehicle upto the distance of 4 meters on the road, when the bus reached the outer edge of the road, it went down the road, despite the driver's applying the brakes as early as possible he could do. This accident is purely due to the sudden mechanical failure. In other paras of the written statement, the appellants have denied that the driver was driving the bus rashly and negligently or at a high speed.
40. There are no pleadings that the appellants had taken all reasonable care in the maintenance of the vehicle and that despite such care the defect remained hidden. It is also not alleged that the breaking of the spring leaves was a latent defect which could not be discovered by the use of the reasonable care on the part of the appellants. The appellant has also not alleged that it had taken all precautions to keep the bus in a roadworthy condition.
41. From the evidence already discussed, it is not proved as to when the vehicle was checked/inspected, prior to the date of the accident. The only evidence available is of Bugger Singh, who states that the vehicle had travelled 40,000 Kms. upto the date of accident and a bus ordinarily travels three lakhs kilometers. He further states that it was a new bus and there was hardly any necessity to check it and that it only required minor repairs or service which was done. He is silent on the point as to when and where the minor repairs or the service to this bus was done. He states that Shri P.K. Mahajan was the Service Manager but Shri P.K. Mahajan has not been produced. No log book or any other books maintained by the defendants with respect to the checking or the service of the vehicle have been produced. These books should normally be in possession of the appellant, but for reasons best known to the appellant, the same have not been produced. Thus it is not proved as to what reasonable care and caution was taken by the appellants to keep the vehicle in a roadworthy condition. No inspection report of the vehicle has also been produced by the appellants.
42. The Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge after appreciating the evidence have given a concurrent finding of fact that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by Shri Puran Chand driver and after discussion of the evidence we do not find any reasons to differ with this conclusion,
43. As a result of the above discussion, we hold that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by Puran Chand driver and not one to any mechanical defect as alleged by the appellants.
44. The learned Single Judge has allowed a compensation of Rs. 1,35,000/- to Smt. Kusum and her minor son in M.A.C.T. No. 16 of 1974. In the remaining two claim petitions the award of the Tribunal was upheld by the learned Single Judge.
45. While enhancing the compensation in M.A.C.T. No. 16 of 1974, the learned Single Judge has allowed a multiplier of 22 to the claimants. We have given our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and we find that the multiplier of 20 which was claimed by the respondents-claimants in their cross-objections should have been allowed and the multiplier of 22 allowed by the learned Single Judge is on the higher side. The respondents themselves had claimed a multiplier of 20 only and in our view this multiplier is reasonable for determining just compensation. Thus we are of the view that to this extent the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge should be varied in the case pertaining to M.A.C.T. No. 16 of 1974.
46. As a result of the above discussion, L.P.A. Nos. 3 of 1982 and 5 of 1982 are dismissed. L.P.A. No. 4 of 1982 is accepted to the extent that the claimants Smt. Kusum and her son Sunit Kumar are allowed a compensation of Rs. 1,23,000/-instead of Rs. 1,35,000/-allowed by the learned Single Judge and the judgment of the learned Single Judge is modified to this extent only. These claimants will also be entitled to interest etc as has been allowed by the learned Single Judge. Except for this variation in the amount of compensation, the judgment of the learned Single Judge is upheld. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs in these appeals.