Judgment:
A.L. Vaidya, J.
1. All these petitions are being disposed of with this common order, as common questions of law and facts are involved therein.
2. Various claim petitions were preferred before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Shimla, for grant of compensation on account of motor accident which took place on 4.3.1996 wherein bus No. HP-06-1245 was involved. Twenty claim petitions were alleged to have been filed arising out of the same accident. Insofar as the present petitions are concerned, in each case the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded compensation of less than Rs. 10,000. As these awards could not be assailed by preferring appeals, hence the present petitioner, that is, National Insurance Co. Ltd., has filed the present petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The award was given by the Claims Tribunal, Shimla, on 31.7.1997.
3. The main question involved in the present petition(s) is with respect to the maintainability of the petition(s) under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, especially when for assailing the award of present nature, the statutory appeal has been debarred. The other question which has to be gone into in the case is with respect to the scope of interference by this Court in the award made by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
4. All these petitions have been contested on behalf of the claimants.
5. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and the arguments advanced have been appreciated.
6. Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter to be called as 'the Act') provides the right of appeal against the award made by the Tribunal. Section 173, Sub-section (2) of the Act reads as under:
No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees.
The aforesaid provision creates a statutory bar in preferring appeal against any award amounting to less than Rs. 10,000. The purpose behind this provision is that where the Claims Tribunal awards an amount less than Rs. 10,000 the statutory finality should be attached to such an award. The idea behind this provision is that the award for meagre amount specified hereinabove should be considered under the law to be final so far as the parties were concerned. It is with this view that Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Act has been enacted.
7. Article 227 of the Constitution of India empowers the High Court with some limited powers of interference in cases of grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law and there is no dispute to this proposition that these powers are exercised most sparingly, in cases where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. These powers cannot be used as appellate or revisional power. Such power cannot be used to correct an error of fact or of law, not being an 'error of law apparent on the face of the record', of an irregularity or illegality of procedure, unless such error affects the jurisdiction, or involves a breach of the principles of natural justice. The power envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised by the High Court to substitute its own inference and judgment for that of the inferior court, whether on a question of fact or of law or interfere with the intra vires exercise of a discretionary power, unless it is arbitrary or capricious or unless there was no evidence at all on which the inferior court could have come to the conclusion it did, or there was error of finding on a jurisdictional fact. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not an appellate court and as such cannot pass any order of remand, etc.
8. In the present case, in the background of the circumstances, it has to be looked into whether High Court is empowered to entertain a petition of present nature which basically if considered favourably would amount to take away effect of statutory provision of Section 173, Sub-section (2) of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners) has not been successful in making home the aforesaid proposition in favour of the petitioners. Learned counsel's line of argument has been that no doubt appeal has not been provided for the cases of present nature under the Act and there is statutory bar for such an appeal, even then the court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has ample power to interfere in the award made by the Tribunal in the present cases inasmuch as those have been passed illegally without properly appreciating the evidence.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner(s) has tried to take some advantage from decided precedents. In this behalf learned Counsel for the petitioner(s) has cited Purshotam Dass v. Ganesh Bhagti 1976 (3) Criminal Law Times 619; Bimal Kaur Khalsa v. Union of India 1988 XV Cr LT 1; Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Lajwanti Chemicals 1987 (1) PLR 623; Rajeshwari v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 1984 ACJ 273 (Madras); Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat AIR 1970 SC 1; Walaiti Ram Seth v. Krishan Kapoor AIR 1976 Delhi 50; Amar Singh v. Deputy Commissioner, Patiala, 1980 Revenue Law Reporter 412 and Jodhey v. State through Ram Sahai AIR 1952 Allahabad 788. The propositions laid down in these cases have no applicability to the facts of present cases. In these cases the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the background of facts involved in that particular case has been gone into. Not a single cited case decides the situation as prevailing in the present case that this Court can interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to avoid the statutory provisions also.
10. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the claimant(s) has relied upon Surendra Mohan Mathur v. Additional District Judge No. 2, Jaipur City, Jaipur AIR 1983 Rajasthan 167, wherein it has been held that the powers under Article 227 are extraordinary and in a case where any order has been passed by a court in exercise of its jurisdiction, the same cannot be interfered under Article 227. In this case, it was further held that the powers under Article 227 could not be exercised by High Court to hold that secondary evidence should be permitted or not, as the determination of this question lies within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Even if the trial court has committed any error of law in taking such view no interference can be made in exercise of the powers of High Court under Articles 226 and 227. The intention of the legislature in amending Section 115, Civil Procedure Code was to curb the litigation and not to permit revision against the interlocutory orders and if revision against the order is not maintainable under the amended provisions of Section 115, a litigant could not be permitted to circumvent the above provision by taking recourse under Article 227.
11. Thus, taking into consideration the aforesaid facts reflected from the record itself the petitioner(s) right to assail the awards under reference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not there. In case the present petition is entertained and matter is to be argued like an appeal as has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner(s), the provisions under Section 173, Sub-section (2) of the Act would be rendered redundant and infructuous which is not the intention of the legislature.
12. Otherwise, even if, for arguments sake the present petition(s) is maintainable in that event also in view of the limited scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, award(s) under reference cannot be assailed or set aside. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner(s), two grounds have been argued for assailing the award(s). First being application under Order 6, Rule 17 read with Order l, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code has been disposed of illegally and secondly the evidence has not been properly appreciated. I think both these grounds cannot be considered in a petition of present nature inasmuch as the inherent jurisdiction is laid with the Tribunal to dispose of the matter. To hear the petitioner(s) on the aforesaid grounds on merit would amount to decide the petition(s) just like an appeal which would be going against the statutory provision of Section 173 (2) of the Act.
13. Similar question arose in Mittar Singh v. Ashish Kumar 1998 ACJ 1200 (HP), before another Bench of this Court, wherein it has been held that the provisions of Section 173 (2) of the Act have to be read or construed in the manner so that the object of the provisions is not diverted. It has been further held that this Court while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not to sit as a court of appeal or a revisional court so as to correct errors of law or of fact committed by the subordinate authorities. It was further observed that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act being a social legislation for the welfare of the citizens, should be interpreted harmoniously so as to achieve the object for which the provision has been made.
14. Thus, taking into consideration the aforesaid facts, the present petitions at this stage have to be disallowed and accordingly stand dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.