Judgment:
P.K. Palli, J.
1. All these Miscellaneous Petitions (CMP (M) Nos. 669 to 672 of 1997) are proposed to be disposed of by a common order. All these petitions are directed against the award given by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Nahan, dated 25.9.1997.
2. The facts and the accident are not disputed. On analysis, the Tribunal has awarded an amount of less than Rs. 10,000/- in each of these petitions on account of compensation for the injuries sustained by the applicants/claimants in the course of the accident. Liability has been fastened on respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, i.e., the owner as well as the driver of the offending bus, jointly and severally. Admittedly, the remedy of statutory appeal is barred when the amount of compensation is less than Rs. 10,000/-.
3. It is in this manner that challenge to the award has been made by the petitioner by way of petitions filed under Section 227 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Kuldip Singh has referred to the cover note Exh. R-1, letter dated 14.11.1996, Exh. R-2, draft dated 23.11.1996, Exh. R-6, letter dated 26.11.1996, Exh. R-8 and it is being urged that these documents have been misconstrued and misinterpreted. It is further sought to be urged that the acceptance of the deposit on 26.11.1996 and the policy document having been issued later becomes valid from the date of the cover note dated 19.10.1996.
4. Mr. Kuldip Singh is further at pains to argue that the provisions of law have not been properly appreciated and the award stands vitiated on that account and it is a fit case where this Court should entertain these petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
5. Mr. Ravi Bakshi, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 3, in reply, has raised an objection that the present petitions are not maintainable and this Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to look into the validity or otherwise of the award which otherwise, according to the learned Counsel, is a valid award having been given on appreciation of the evidence and keeping the relevant provisions of law in view.
6. Both the learned Counsel have relied upon a number of judgments in support of their respective contentions.
7. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties at length, I am of the view that a wholly unjustified order, a perverse order or an order with no evidence can certainly be interfered with while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This Court is invested with judicial superintendence and invested with special jurisdiction to see that the Courts and Tribunals which are functioning within the jurisdiction of this Court, act within their authority and in the manner required by law.
8. Where a case is made out that the authorities or the Tribunals have exceeded their authority or have otherwise acted in capricious and arbitrary manner transgressing their limits, this Court can certainly interfere. The case-law on the subject over the years have repeatedly said that the power by this Court has to be exercised with utmost caution and in extreme situations most sparingly and with requisite care and circumspection.
9. It is, thus, to be seen whether the petitioner in the present case has been able to make out a case for interference keeping in view the aforesaid principles. As I look at the matter, the Motor Vehicles Act is aimed to provide relief by way of compensation to the injured or the deceased in the given situation. The exercise of the powers by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should not be so exercised in order to circumvent the statutory provisions contained in a particular Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act clearly lays down that no appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than Rs. 10,000/-. The above said provision, thus, has to be read or construed in the manner so that the object of the provisions is not diverted.
10. This Court while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not to sit as a Court of appeal or a revisional Court so as to correct errors of law or of fact committed by the subordinate authorities. As pointed above, the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act being a social legislation for the welfare of the citizens, should be interpreted harmoniously so as to achieve the object for which the provision has been made. It has been held in a number of judgments on the point that an error of law or of fact cannot be made a ground for interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It can safely be added that even if a decision arrived at by a subordinate authority is found to be erroneous in law, there would not be a case for interference under this provision.
11. The owner gave a cheque to the insurance company on 18.10.1996 and insurance cover note Exh. R-1 was issued. Admittedly, the cheque was dishonoured and premium was not paid. The cover note, thus, stood cancelled automatically on account of the non-receipt of the premium. The company was, admittedly, not on risk under the said note.
12. On 14.11.96, the insurance company informed the owner about the dishonouring of the cheque as well as cancellation of the cover note from inception. It was, however, added that in case of fresh remittance within seven days of the receipt of the letter, the policy/cover note could be considered to be effective from the date and time indicated in the cover note. This was further subject to declaration by the owner that no loss had occurred in respect of risk insured under the cover during the period of cancellation and renewal of the cover note.
13. As per the owner, he received the letter on 23.11.96 and obtained a demand draft, placed on record as Exh. R-6, from the bank in favour of the insurance company and delivered it at their Jagadhri office on 23.11.1996 itself. The contention of Mr. Kuldip Singh is that in the light of the draft, the cover note became valid from its inception.
14. It may be noticed here that the vehicle met with an accident on 25.11.1996 and according to the learned Counsel, the insurance company is liable to indemnify him in respect of his liability. Having gone through the impugned award, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal that the insurance company denied that the demand draft was received by its office at Jagadhri on 23.11.1996. It has been found on appreciation of evidence that the bank draft Exh. R-6 was actually delivered by the owner at the office at Jagadhri on 26.11.1996 concealing the fact of the accident having taken place a day earlier, i.e., on 25.11.1996. Letter Exh. R-8 fully makes out that the draft was delivered on 26.11.1996 and was further directed to be delivered for transmission to the branch at Nahan. It just cannot be believed that the draft was delivered on 23.11.1996 itself. Had it been so, the owner should have obtained a receipt of acknowledgement.
15. It has been further found on appreciation of evidence that insurance company had no knowledge of the accident having taken place on 25.11.1996 when letter Exh. R-8 was issued on 26.11.1996. The contention of Mr. Kuldip Singh that insurance cover became effective from the date it was issued, is thus rejected. Since the cheque was dishonoured, the cover note became ineffective automatically.
16. In view of what has been said above, no case is made out for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and all these petitions are ordered to be dismissed.