ORDER
V.K. Mehrotra, Actg. C.J.
1. Applicant Roshan Lal Pokta is landlord of a building called 'Overvale Cottage' at Shimla. Earlier, he was a tenant in it. He purchased it in April 1982. The applicant is in occupation of the first floor. Respondent Roshan Lal Chauhan is a tenant in the ground floor. He was inducted by the previous owner in the year 1980.
2. On May 5, 1984, the landlord made an application seeking ejectment of the tenant on the ground of personal requirement under Section 14(3) (a)(i) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 (for brief, 'the Act') The application was allowed by the Rent Controller on June 28, 1986, whereafter the tenant filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority. A caveat petition was filed by the landlord under Section 148-A CPC.
3. When the matter was taken up on June 12, 1987 before the Appellate Authority, a statement was made by the tenant saying, inter alia, that a compromise had been entered into between him and the landlord to the effect that the order of eviction would not be executed against him till March 31, 1989 and further that he (the tenant) undertook to deliver vacant possession of the premises to the landlord on or before March 31, 1989. He also stated that in case the undertaking given by him to deliver vacant possession of the premises to the landlord was violated, the tenant would be liable for contempt of court. Upon it, the landlord also made a statement that he had no objection if the tenant was given time till March 31, 1989 to vacate the premises provided the undertaking which had been given by the tenant was accepted by the Court.
4. The Appellate Authority passed an order on June 12, 1987 accepting the undertaking given by the tenant. It said that it had been made clear that in case he violates the undertaking given by him to the court, the tenant would be liable for contempt of court. It also said that in case the tenant violated the undertaking, the order passed by the Rent Controller (1), Shimla, would become executable at once.
5. About a year later, on June 17, 1988 this Court decided the case of Gauri Shankar v. Tilak Raj Sharma 1988 (2) Rent Control Reporter 279 holding, amongst other things, that any proceedings initiated by a landlord for regaining possession of a demised premises on the ground of personal need by making an application before expiry of a period of five years from the date of acquisition by him of the premises by transfer were void. The decision, presumably, led the tenant into making an application dated March 8, 1988 before the Appellate Authority under Section 151, CPC on March 9, 1989 seeking discharge from the statement made by him before the Appellate Authority on June 12, 1987 undertaking to handover vacant possession of the premises to the landlord by March 31, 1989. This application was, eventually, rejected by the Appellate Authority on August 17, 1990. The Appellate Authority felt that legally speaking the tenant could not be permitted to withdraw or resile from the statement made by him with a view to discharge himself from the undertaking because no person, after making a statement on oath in the Court could later claim a withdrawal from it else the entire sanctity of proceedings before the Court would be lost. The tenant thereafter approached this Court, seeking relief in the matter, by filing a revision petition purporting to be under Section 115, CPC on September 11, 1990.
6. The landlord had, in the meanwhile, presented the instant petition (Contempt Petition (Civil) 16 of 1989) before this Court on April 21, 1989 alleging that, inasmuch as, the tenant had not stood by the undertaking given by him to the Appellate Authority on June 12, 1987 he should be punished for having committed a breach of the undertaking. Notice was directed to issue to the tenant on this application by this Court on May 4, 1989. The tenant has filed a reply in this petition and the landlord has also filed an affidavit-in-rejoinder to it. The contempt application was heard along with the revision (Civil Revision No. 202 of 1990) filed by the tenant.
7. An undertaking given before the Court, upon which the court passes an order after accepting it, amounts to an injunction restraining that party from acting in breach thereof, where the undertaking is broken, it would amount to a breach of an injunction.The legal position is settled that breach of an injunction or breach of an undertaking given to a court by a person in civil proceedings, on the faith of which the court sanctions a course of action, is misconduct amounting to contempt. (See : Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Shetty : 1990CriLJ316 ). But, before a party can be committed for contempt there must be wilful or deliberate or reckless disobedience of the orders made by the Court. (See : Jiwani Kumari Parekh v. Satyabrata Chakravorty : 1991CriLJ471 .
8. Contempt proceedings, against a person who has failed to comply with an undertaking, serve dual purpose : (1) Vindication of the public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct; and (2) coercion to compel the contemner to do what the law requires of him. (The Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union : 1970CriLJ1520 .
9. Section 2 (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines 'civil contempt', inter alia, as wilful breach of undertaking given to a court. The essence of contemptuous conduct consists in its wilful nature. Wilful connotes the idea of deliberate or intentional as opposed to unintentional or bona fide conduct. The conduct need not necessarily be contumacious nor is it necessary that an element of mens rea should be present on the part of the contemner. The act complained of should have been a conscious one and not 'casual' or 'accidental' or 'unintentional' (Kuldip Rastogi v. Vishva Nath Khanna : AIR1979Delhi202 ; V.C. Govindaswami Mudali v. B. Subha Reddy 1986 (3) Crimes 170; and Contempt Appeal (Civil) No. 6 of 1981, Mohinder Lal v. Hari Dev decided on November 12, 1990, (H.P. High Court, D.B.)
10. Ultimately, it would depend upon the circumstances of a case whether the conduct of a party to a civil proceeding is such which calls for punishment being awarded to him for going back upon an undertaking given solemnly before a Court. No hard and fast rule can be laid down about it. If the court feels that the conduct of the party, in going back upon the undertaking given by it, is wilful in the sense that it is deliberate or intentional or reckless, it may punish him for commission of a civil contempt. The element of rnens rea or contumacy on the part of the party may affect the quantum of punishment which the court chooses to impose.
11. The basic facts in the instant case have been noticed earlier. Do they suggest a wilful conduct, as understood in the context of contempt of law, on the part of the tenant is the question. The answer appears to be in the negative. The tenant, undoubtedly, gave an undertaking to vacate the premises by March 31, 1989 when he made a statement on oath to that effect before the Appellate Authority on June 12, 1987. There is nothing on the record of these proceedings to prove that he did not wish to fulfil the obligation so undertaken. It was only after the decision of this Court in Gauri Shankar that he appears to have been advised that the proceedings in which the obligation was undertaken by him were non est, inasmuch as, the landlord had made an application for his ejectment from the premises before the expiry of a period of five years from the date when he acquired the premises by transfer. The tenant made an application on March 9, 1989, sufficiently in advance of March 31, 1989 for being relieved of the undertaking. He made the application before the Appellate Authority, before whom he had given the undertaking, bringing to its notice the legal position and praying that he be relieved of the obligation which he had undertaken on pain of contempt of court. He was candid in his submission for he did not attribute the undertaking given by him to any element of inducement, coercion or intimidation. This Court has found it to be in the interest of justice, in its judgment of date in Civil Revision No. 202 of 1990, to relieve him of the undertaking. The circumstances of the present case make it inexpedient to punish the tenant for having committed civil contempt. The decision in Kruthiventi Kutumba Rao v. Muthi Venkata Subba Rao : AIR1969AP47 upon which great emphasis was placed by the learned counsel for the landlord, does not assist him in the circumstances of the instant case. More so, when the learned Judges of the Division Bench deciding the case themselves found it unnecessary to consider the various decisions cited before them for the proposition that where an order of the Court is without jurisdiction no contempt can be said to have been committed, on their view that they had found that the order in question before them had been passed by the Court which had jurisdiction to do so.
12. The notice issued to the tenant-respondent is discharged. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs of these proceedings.