ORDER
Bhawani Singh, J.
1. The petitioner, a Transport Corporation constituted under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, petitions through Shri Y. D. Sandhya, its Additional General Manager (A. & LL), and appeals to expunge para 13 of the judgment passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi, in Criminal Case No. 1981/82 decided on 31-1-1986 under Section 279/337/338/ 304A of the Indian Penal Code, thereby passing certain remarks against the Corporation in general and its officers working at various places in the hierarchy of service in particular and further observations to take suitable action against the concerned officials/officers posted at the relevant place during the period of accident. These remarks, for the facility of reference, will be reproduced in extenso in the later part of this judgment. However, it is enough to say that the petitioner feels aggrieved by these remarks; being hit and adversely affected in reputation and working zeal; so desires this Court to exercise powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India for expunction of these remarks in the interest of justice.
2. The facts, in brief, are that driver Shri Durga Singh was a driver in bus No. HPM-650. On 11-7-1981, while driving this bus from Mandi to Gopalpur, near Suketi Bridge, Mandi, an accident occurred when the bus struck against a telephone pole and thereafter fell into the khud at about 3.45 p.m. this tragedy took away 13 lives and left 55 injured.
3. The present case under Section 279/337/ 338/304A of the Indian Penal Code was initiated against the driver. After trial, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, on 31-1-1986 acquitted the accused, but before concluding the judgment, remarks against the petitioner and its officials were recorded in; the following manner:
'13. Before parting with this judgment it would be pertinent to comment upon the poor and haphazard working of the Transport Deptt. which has resulted in the aforesaid accident in which as many as 13 innocent lives were lost while 55 persons got multiple , injuries and became invalid in their life. As ; held above, the accident took place because of the mechanical defect, i.e., failure of the brakes for which officials/ officers of the Tpt. Deptt. who were primarily responsible for keeping the vehicle in a fit and pliable condition, prior to their putting them on the road cannot escape their responsibility and have to be held liable for such accidents. In this case, in my opinion, the entire responsibility for this accident is that of the concerned Bus Stand In charge/Service Manager of the workshop and the Head Mechanic In charge whose duty it was to test the bus before deputing it on the road. It was on account of the lapse and negligence, the present accident took place. Even the Supervisory Officers, i.e., the then Regional Manager, and the Divisional Manager, HRTC, Mandi, are also equally responsible for their lack of supervision and control over the working of the fleet of vehicle operating under their control. In my opinion, all these officers/officials should be suitably punished for their lapse and lack of supervision. It has been invariably noted that Drivers of the buses are oftenly forced to ply buses on the road even if they are having defects which ultimately result in large number of accidents. It would, therefore, be desirable to send a copy of this judgment to the General Manager, HRTC, Shimla, for taking suitable action against the concerned officials/officers who remained posted at Mandi during the period of accident.'
4. Shri Deepak Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-Corporation, submits that these remarks of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate are unwarranted, sweeping and in violation of the principles of natural justice as, the learned counsel contends, no opportunity was ever given by the learned trial Judge to hear the petitioner and its officers before recording these remarks. Shri Deepak Gupta further asserts that in case an opportunity had been given to his client, it would have clearly demonstrated before the Court that services being rendered by the petitioner and its officers to the general public in the State of Himachal Pradesh are one of the best in the country and the rate of accidents is comparatively small. It is further contended by the learned counsel that even if the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the accident was due to the sudden failure of the brakes without any fault of the driver, these remarks, on the basis of the evidence that the vehicle was inspected on 10-7-1981 and all its defects were removed, were not justified. Particular reference is made to the statement of Gunparkash (P.W. 10), Roop Lal, Head Constable (P.W. 13), and Rama Shankar, Head Mechanic, HRTC (P.W. 14), to show that the bus was mechanically examined and no defects were found. The learned counsel further made submissions as to the system of working in the petitioner-Corporation.
5. Before examining these submissions of Shri Deepak Gupta, it is necessary to see the legal position relating to recording of adverse observations by the Courts in matters coming before it. In the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nairn, AIR 1964 SC 703 : (1964 (1) Cri LJ 549), S. K. Das, J., speaking for the Court, observed in para 10 of the judgment as under:
'......... If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody, even by this Court. At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair-play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before Courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the Court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve,'
6. Further, equally important and fundamental are the observations of the Court in AIR 1986 SC 819: (1986 Cri LJ 911), (Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar), wherein the Court in para 23 said as under:
'23. It is, therefore, settled law that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against persons and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before Courts of law unless it is really necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct. We hold that the adverse remarks made against the appellant were neither justified nor called for.'
In para 24 of this judgment, the Court further observed that:
'24........ Even assuming that a serious evaluation of the evidence of the appellant was really called for in the appeal the remarks of the learned Appellate Judge should be in conformity with the settled practice of Courts of observe sobriety, moderation and reserve. We need only remind that the higher the forum and the greater the powers, the greater the need for restraint and the more mellowed the reproach should be.'
7. A Division Bench of this Court in Dr. M. L. Ahuja v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1975 Cri LJ 330, observed in para 4 of the judgment in the following manner:
'4. It is abundantly clear that a trial Court is expected to give only such remarks which are necessary to sustain a judicial finding. In other words, only such remarks need be made in the judgment which are in furtherance of the ends of justice and not to fulfil any other object except deciding the case in a correct perspective so that appropriate finding is given. It is undisputed that the remarks should be borne out from evidence and must not be pure surmises and conjectures made by the Court. If the intention is to harm any public servant, or even if that intention is missing but the remarks made are reckless and are likely to jeopardise the interest of public service and endanger the prospect of a public servant and even injure his reputation or harm his official carrer, such remarks require to be expunged as they are no longer necessary. In other words, the remarks made by the trial Judge should be bona fide and should be directed only to one and the only end, namely, the dispensation of justice in trial.'
8. Applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments to the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the opinion that the remarks recorded by the learned trial Judge are sweeping, unfair and unnecessary. It is true that the Court has every power or jurisdiction to record observations in cases coming before it, whether relating to the conduct of any witness or any party or a matter of general nature or importance, but such a power has to be exercised with care, caution, circumspection and within the tenor and spirit of the principles laid down by the apex Court from time to time. The Court has also to see that its remarks do not unnecessarily offend, hurt and seriously erode the confidence of the people who are concerned with the person, body or authority. Its remarks should not have the tendency to cripple-the service and its functioning unless some observations are really necessary to do some real public good. There also, care has to be taken to see that while having such a thing in mind, the remarks- may not do more harm than good intended to be achieved by the Court. Sometimes instead of embarking upon making unwarranted and sweeping remarks, the object can be achieved by making advisory observations which may prove to be load star in the functioning of any one concerned in the issue.
9. Now, adverting to the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, I am of the opinion that these remarks were not at all necessary in the facts and circumstances of this case, Nor were they essential for the decision of the case, so integral part thereof. In case these remarks are deleted, there is no effect of crippling the judgment or changing its content or effect. On the other hand, allowing them to exist has the effect of condemning anyone without affording an opportunity of explaining and defending, which is against the canons of justice and fair-play besides having a clear tendency to diminish public confidence in the service and the services of the petitioner. I hope, even otherwise, by such accidents the petitioner-Corporation' and its. management, obviously, will gain experience for more efficient service to the people in future.
10. Similarly, the observations of the learned trial Judge for initiating action against erring officials do not, in my opinion, in this case, fall within the domain of the trial Judge. The same should be left to the care of the Corporation as to how it deals with such like situations.
11. In view of the discussion and observations made above, the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation are aptly met, concluded and decided accordingly.
12. Therefore, in view of the examination of this matter, as above, I feel that the remarks recorded in para 13 of the judgment of the trial Judge dated 31-1-1986 are ordered to be expunged to that extent and treated as if these never formed part of the judgment of the trial Court.