Bhawani Singh, J.
1. This appeal arises out of the judgment of Additional District Judge, Mandi, in Civil Appeal No. 77 of 1978 decided on 20-3-1979 whereby the under of Additional Sub-Judge (III Class), Mandi, in Civil Suit No. 34 of 1967 has been set aside and the case was remanded with directions as contained in the penultimate care, of this judgment. The appellants have a grievance against this judgment and, therefore, they assail it by way of this appeal.
2. Briefly, the facts are that the plaintiffs instituted a suit for possession of certain lands mentioned in the title as well as in para 1 of the plaint on the assertion that the same was allotted to them in consolidation proceedings carried out in that area but at the time then the possession thereof was delivered to them, it was a possession on papers only and the defendants remained in possession thereof; thus making their possession over this land totally illegal.
3. The defendants in their written statement stated that the land in question was probably allotted to the plaintiffs but the land that was allotted to the defendants in lieu of this land, was not delivered to them nor was the 'suit land taken out of their possession and delivered to the plaintiffs. In this way, they contend, they remained in continuous possession of the suit land uninterruptedly.
4. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues:
'1. Whether the land in suit has not fallen into the share of plaintiffs' father in the consolidation operations of 1959 nor was the possession delivered to him? OPD
2. Whether the defendants were in possession of the suit land as occupancy tenants? OPD
3. Whether the defendants were in illegal possession of the suit land? OPD
5. After sometime, the defendants moved an application for the amendment of their written statement to enable them to include the plea that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and that the suit was not legally mantainable in the present form. This application was allowed. Similarly, the plaintiffs also moved an application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the supersession of the contents of para 4 of the plaint and add the following para :
'(sic) haza ka kabza mahe Besakh, 1959 ko (sic) Consolidation of Holdings ki or se din gaya prantu kuchh arsa ke bad hi pratibadigan 1 ta 5 ne phir jabran wa ger kanuni tor par kebza kar lia jis par ab tak wahi kabaz hen jis ke ki wah hakdar nahin-unka kabza sarasar najaij hai.'
6. The trial Court dismissed this application on 25-11-1976 observing that the application was moved simply to save the suit from dismissal on the ground of want of jurisdiction and thus the same was not bona fide. It was also observed that the plaintiffs wanted to introduce entirely a different case for saving the suit. The trial Court proceeded to frame some more issues in the following forms :
'1. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear this suit? OPP
2. Whether the plaintiffs were given the physical possession of the suit property by the Consolidation authorities, as alleged? If so, its effect? OPP
3. Whether the plaintiffs have any cause of action? OPP
4. Relief.'
Climax in the matter reached when the trial Court accepted the preliminary objection and rejected the plaint. This decision was assailed before the first Appellate Court where an application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure to include the same amendment was sought from the trial Court was moved and the order of the trial Court rejecting the similar prayer was also challenged. Obviously, the defendants supported the trial Court order and pressed into service the provisions of Section 40 of the Himachal Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.
7. After hearing the parties, the Appellate Court accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the trial Court. The suit was remanded with the direction that the trial Court would afford the parties an opportunity to adduce their evidence on all the issues and then decide the suit in accordance with law. The Appellate Court also allowed the Application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure and a further direction was issued to the effect that the trial Court would afford an opportunity to the plaintiffs to file an amended plaint. The defendants were also allowed to file a fresh written statement to the amended plaint and thereafter the Court proceed to frame such issues as would arise out of the pleadings of the parties, although, it observed, no such situation may arise since issue No. 2, already framed on 15-3-1970, was already framed in the matter.
8. The question is whether this approach of the Appellate Court, in this matter, is legally permissible? I proceed to examine the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, who made their contentions for and against this proposition -- one assiling and the other defending the same.
9. Shri M. L. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellants-defendants, contends that the approach of the Appellate Court has been absolutely wrong and, therefore, its judgment deserves to be setaside. It is also contended that the Appellate Court has enabled the plaintiffs to rectify a statement based on admission in the plaint and thus changing the very nature of their case and assertion in the defence. I am not convinced by this submission of Shri M. L. Sharma. It appears that the case of the plaintiffs was not either understood properly by the petition writer who drafted the plaint or it was intended to be conveyed that it remained a possession in papers only since the plaintiffs never remained in possession thereof having been dispossessed by the other party. The pleadings were, of course, vague here and, if not so, then also the plaintiffs had every right and justification to seek an amendment thereof and place the pleadings in a proper form.
10. In AIR 1983 SC 462 (Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v. Km. Joyti Sahay), the Supreme Court said in para 3 of the judgment as under (at page SC 462):
'3. Even if the High Court was justified in holding that the deletion of the word 'Uterine' has some significance and may work in favour of either side to a very great extent yet that itself would not provide any justification for rejecting the amendment in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. We may, in this connection, refer to Genesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, (1978) 2 SCR 614: (AIR 1978 SC 484), wherein this Court after a review of number of decisions speaking through Beg, C.J., observed that procedural law is intended to facilities and hot to obstruct the Court of substantive justice. But the learned counsel for the respondent contended that by the device of amendment a very important admission being withdrawn. An admission made by a party may be withdrawn or may be explained away. Therefore, it cannot be said that by amendment an admission of fact cannot be withdrawn. The learned trial Judge, granting the application for amendment was satisfied that in order to effectively adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties, amendment of the pleading was necessary. The High Court in its revisional jurisdiction for a reason which is untenable ought not to have interfered with the order made by the trial Court. The learned counsel for the respondents in this connection read one unreported decision of this Court in which this Court upheld the decision of the High Court setting aside the order granting amendment in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. We have gone through the judgment. The decision does not lay down any particular principle of law and appears to be a decision on its own facts. And ordinarily, it is well settled that unless there is an error in exercise of jurisdiction by the trial Court, the High Court would not interfere with the order in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.'
11. The order of the Appellate Court in setting aside the order of the trial Court and allowing the application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure is justifiable and legally permissible.
12. It is relevant to deal with one more submission raised by Shri H. M. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants. It is stated that the proceedings under the Himachal Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 had been over before the filing of the present suit. Therefore, the suit was maintainable. I see substance in this submission. Consolidation proceedings remain in operation till the parties are put in possession of the lands which have fallen to their shares under the Consolidation Scheme and it is the duty of the authorities under the Act to put the parties in the physical possession of the lands in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules and no symbolical possession has been envisaged nor can the same be inferred being totally foreign to the object and Implementation of the consolidation of holdings scheme. Even otherwise, official acts are presumed to have been done in the manner prescribed and that very presumption is applicable to the present case. Therefore, the assertion of the plaintiffs that they were put in possession of the property and immediately dispossessed by the defendants cannot be considered to be of without any substance. Moreover, if the provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 and the Rules are seen, it is apparent that as soon as the consolidation proceedings are over, as has happened in the present case, the consolidation authorities have no power and jurisdiction to hand over the lands to the respective owners and the only authority that can do so is the Civil Court. All these facts are still to be proved by the parties before the trial Court by production of appropriate evidence, they deem just and proper. The order of the Appellate Court, in the circumstances of this case, cannot be considered to be wrong and impermissible as asserted by Shri M. L. Sharma. The same is upheld and accordingly the appeal is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The matter will proceed further in accordance with the directions of the Appellate Court.
13. Before parting with the case, it is made clear that none of the observations made in this judgment will in any way affect the parties in this case. The trial Court will proceed to determine and decide the matter strictly in accordance with law.