Kamlesh Sharma, J.
1. This appeal under paragraph 32 of the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948, is against the decree and judgment dated 28-9-1976 passed by the District Judge, Solan and Sirmaur Districts at Solan whereby the appeal of respondents-plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3, S/Sh. Gita Ram, Mansha Ram and Jawala Dutt, was accepted, the decree and judgment dated 23-4-1975 of Senior Sub-Judge, Solan, District Solan, was set aside and a decree for possession of the suit land by way of redemption of mortgage was passed in their favour and against the appellants-defendants. Out of appellants-defendants, appellants-defendants Nos. 1 to 7, S/Sh. Ranbir Singh, Raghubir Singh, Balbir Singh, Kumari Asha Devi, Kumari Manju, Smt. Amar Devi, Smt. Munna and appellant-defendant No. 9, Smt. Kamla Devi, are the legal representatives of original defendant Sh. Devi Ram son of Sh. Mast Ram alias Mastia son of Surat Ram, original mortgagee. Similarly, appellant-defendant No. 10, Smt. Dropti Devi, is the daughter of Smt. Sobhni Devi, original defendant, widow of Sh. Janki Ram son of Sh. Surat Ram, original mortgagee. Appellant-defendant No. 8 Bharat Ram is son of Mast Ram son of Surat Ram, original mortgagee.
2. The present appeal has a chequered history. On 1-9-1969, respondents-plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3, S/Sh. Gita Ram, Mansha Ram and Jawala Dutt filed civil suit against Smt. Sobhni widow of Janki Ram, Devi Ram son of Mast Ram, predecessor-in-interest of appellants-defendants Nos. 1 to 7, 9 and 10 and appellant-defendant No. 8 Bharat Ram, for possession of suit land by way of redemption of mortgage. It was alleged in the plaint that respondents-plaintiffs S/Sh. Gita Ram, Mansha Ram and Jawala Dutt and pro forma respondents-defendants, S/Sh. Jamna Dutt, Leela Dutt and Nandu were the owners of the suit land which had been mortgaged with possession by their predecessor-in-interest with the predecessor-in-interest of Smt. Sobhni widow of Sh. Janki Ram, original defendant No. 1 and father of original defendants Nos. 2 and 3, S/Sh. Devi Ram and Bharat Ram, in equal shares vide mutation, Ex.P-A, dated 26-2-1910 for Rs. 450/-. The further case of respondents-plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 was that Smt. Sobhni widow of Janki Ram original defendant without the consent of the mortgagors had inducted S/Sh. Devi Ram and Bharat Ram, original defendants Nos. 2 and 3, as tenants on her half share of the mortgaged land who had further inducted respondents-defendants Nos. 4 to 6, Department of Agriculture, Sh. Puran and Smt. Surmi as tenants on part of the suit land without the permission of the mortgagors. It was claimed by the respondents-plaintiffs that these tenancies were not binding on them and would automatically come to an end on redemption of mortgage. The suit was resisted by the original defendants Nos. 2 and 3, S/Sh. Devi Ram and Bharat Ram, who inter alia raised the objection that the suit was barred by limitation and the mortgagees had become owners of the suit land (sic). This defence weighed with the trial court and the suit was dismissed vide decree and judgment dated 28-1-1970 holding that the suit was beyond the period of limitation of sixty years.
3. In appeal, the then District Judge, Shimla vide his order dated 6-7-1971, allowed amendment of the plaint, set aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court and remanded the suit for possession on merits after taking the amended plaint on record, giving an opportunity to the defendants to file their written statement to the amended plaint and giving an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence on Issue No. 4 which was 'whether the suit was within limitation'. By way of amendment of the plaint, the following additions were made in para 6 of the plaint:--
'That the suit is within time as Mastia son of Surat Ram and Surat Ram mortgagee and Mst. Khairi mortgagor all have signed the said report and acknowledged the factum of mortgage and this suit under Section 18 of Indian Limitation Act is within limitation.'
4. Civil Revision No. 31 of 1971 filed in this Court by the appellants-defendants challenging the order dated 6-7-1971 of the District Judge was also dismissed vide judgment dated 30-8-1973. Thereafter, the trial of the suit was held in accordance with the directions of the District Judge but again the suit was dismissed on the ground of limitation vide decree and judgment dated 23-4-1975. The trial court took the starting point of limitation from 13-6-1908 when Surat Ram mortgagee himself, his son Mastia and Mst. Khairi mortgagor had made a report to the ratwari that the land in dispute had already been mortgaged with Surat Ram and it was held that the period of limitation of sixty years expired on 12-6-1968 whereas the suit was filed on 1-1-1969. These findings of the trial court were set aside in appeal by the District Judge, Solan and Sirmaur Districts at Solan vide decree and judgment dated 28-9-1976 and the suit was decreed. According to the District Judge, the period of limitation stood extended from 26-2-1910 when mutation of mortgage was attested by the Revenue Officer as it is signed by Sh. Janki Ram, another son of Surat Ram mortgagee, which amounts to acknowledgment of subsisting mortgage and liability of its redemption by the mortgagors. These findings of the District Judge have been challenged in the present regular second appeal.
5. Earlier a learned single Judge of this Court, (V. K. Mehrotra, J.) had heard this appeal and allowed it vide his decree and judgment dated 5-10-1988. The decree and judgment dated 28-9-1976 was set aside on the ground that the District Judge had committed an error in taking into account the date of attestation of mutation of mortgage, that is, 26-2-1910 as acknowledgment of mortgage by Janki Ram, another son of Surat Ram, original mortgagee. According to V. K. Mehrotra, J., the respondents-plaintiffs had never put forward the acknowledgment by Janki Ram, another son of Surat Ram, for contending that the suit filed by them on 1-1-1969 had been filed within the prescribed period of limitation. Feeling aggrieved by the decree and judgment of this Court, the respondents-plaintiffs filed S.L.P. (Civil) No. 15207 of 1988 in the Supreme Court of India which has been allowed on 9-3-1990 and the appeal has been remanded to this Court for decision afresh. The operative portion of the judgment dated 19-3-1990 is as under :--
'We have been taken through the pleadings and we are satisfied that a plea that an acknowledgment (in the form of attestation by one of the sons of the mortgagee Janki Ram) saved limitation in this case had been taken even in the first appellate court. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court erred in treating this point as a fresh point which could not be raised before the High Court. Since the High Court did not deal with this point of limitation, we set aside the order of the High Court and direct that the High Court proceed to dispose of the second appeal on the question as to whether there was any acknowledgment which saves limitation so far as the suit is concerned. We may make it clear that no further evidence is to be admitted at this stage and the matter is to be disposed of in the light of the original evidence already on record.'
6. In view of the above findings of the Supreme Court, the controversy on the point of limitation is limited to the extent whether the acknowledgment dated 26-2-1910 extends the period of limitation for redemption of mortgage or not. Now, this Court cannot consider the argument raised by Sh. Bhup-ender Gupta on behalf of the appellants-defendants that the acknowledgment dated 26-2-1910 by Janki Ram, another son of Surat Ram, may not be taken into account for want of pleadings. His further submission is that attestation of mutation dated 26-2-1910, which is signed by Janki Ram, one of the sons of Surat Ram mortgagee is not an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act which may extend the period of limitation for redemption of mortgage. According to him, Janki Ram had no authority to sign on the mutation order on behalf of his father and thereby acknowledge the acceptance of mortgage and liability of its redemption by the mortgagors. On the other hand, Sh. Sanjiv Kuthaila vice Sh. K. D. Sood, learned counsel for respondents-plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 and Sh. Kuldip Singh, learned counsel for respondent No. 10, Sh. Madan, have urged that Janki Ram being the son of Surat Ram was the best person to sign on the mutation order and authority in his favour can be inferred from the course of his conduct and the conduct of Surat Ram and his other son as well as the surrounding circumstances on record. According to them, signature by the mortgagee or his authorised agent/ representative on the order of mutation of mortgage amounts to acknowledgment of existing mortgage and liability of its redemption by the mortgagors which extends the period of limitation for redemption of mortgage under Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
7. There is no dispute that mutation No. 6, a copy whereof is Ex.P-A on record, pertains to the mortgage in question. It bears the report of the then Patwari made on 13-6-1908 that Sh. Mastia son of Sh. Surat Ram mortgagee and Mst. Khairi mortgagor had stated that the land comprised in the Khata stood mortgaged with Surat Ram, therefore, necessary orders were solicited for attestation of mutation in favour of Surat Ram. Below the signatures of the Patwari, in the end of this report, Mst. Khairi, Surat Ram and Mastia son of Surat Ram had appended their thumb impressions. Further, on this mutation No. 6, Ex.P-A, there is an endorsement of attestation made by the then attesting authority on 26-2-1910 which was also signed by Janki Ram. The endorsement was that :
'Today Shri Janki Ram, son of Surat Ram, mortgagee, who is present has stated that the land comprised in Khata and Ghasni (grassi land) Khasra No. 66 to the extent of 1/2 share has been mortgaged for a sum of Rs. 450/-but the cultivation possession of the land is with parties separately, hence it is ordered that mutation of mortgage regarding land comprised in Nos. 103, 112, 172, 177, 365, 367, 406, 474 is sanctioned. Mortgage amount will be decided at the time of redemption by the Court.
Sd/- Janki Ram
Dated : 26th February, 1910.
Sd/- Attesting Authority.'
8. The question arises whether the statement of Janki Ram son of Surat Ram made at the time of attestation of mutation on 26-2-1910 amounts to acknowledgment of the then existing mortgage and Liability of redemption of mortgage by the mortgagors which had extended the time of redemption of mortgage in terms of Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
9. Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is as under :--
'18. Effect of acknowledgment in writing--
(1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.
(2) Where the' writing containing the acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed, but subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be received.
Explanation -- For the purposes of this section --
(a) an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right or avers that the time for payment delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to set off, or is addressed to a person other than a person entitled to the property or right,
(b) the word 'signed' means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf, and
(c) an application for execution of a decree or order shall not be deemed to be an application in respect of any property or right.'
10, Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is pari materia to Section 19 of the old Limitation Act of 1908. In Shapoor Fredoom Mazda v. Durga Prosad Chamaria, AIR 1961 SC 1236, the Supreme Court has laid down that:
'...............some of the relevant essential requirements of a valid acknowledgment are that it must be made before the relevant period of limitation has expired, it must be in regard to the liability in respect of the right in question and it must be made in writing and must be signed by the party against whom such right is claimed..........'
It was further observed that (at page 1238):--
'It is thus clear that acknowledgment as prescribed by Section 19 merely renews debt; it does not create a new right of action. It is a mere acknowledgment of the liability in respect of the right in question; it need not be accompanied by a promise to pay either expressly or even by implication. The statement on which a plea of acknowledgment is based must relate to a present subsisting liability though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability may not be indicated in words. Words used in the acknowledgment must, however, indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor, and it must appear that the statement is made with the intention to admit such jural relationship. Such intention can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission, and need not be expressed in words. If the statement is fairly clear then the intention to admit jural relationship may be implied from it. The admission in question need not be express but must be made in circumstances and in words from which the court can reasonably infer that the person making the admission intended to refer to a subsisting liability as at the date of the statement. In construing words used in the statements made in writing on which a plea of acknowledgment rests oral evidence has been expressly excluded but surrounding circumstances can always be considered. Stated generally courts lean in favour of a liberal construction of such statements though it does not mean that where no admission is made one should be inferred, or where a statement was made clearly without intending to admit the existence of jural relationship such intention could be fastened on the maker of the statement by an involved or far fetched process of reasoning.'
11. Further, in Tilak Ram v. Nathu, AIR 1967 SC 935, the Supreme Court considered which type of statement amounts to acknowledgment in a case of redemption of mortgage and following Shapoor Fredoom Mazda's case (supra) held (at page 939) :
'The right of redemption no doubt is of the essence of and inherent in a transaction of mortgage. But the statement in question must relate to the subsisting liability or the right claimed. Where the statement is relied on as expressing jural relationship it must show that it was made with the intention of admitting such jural relationship subsisting at the time when it was made. It follows that where a statement setting out jural relationship is made clearly without intending to admit its existence an intention to admit cannot be imposed on its maker by an involved or a far fetched process of reasoning.'
In its latest judgment Reet Mohinder Singh Sekhon v. Mohinder Parkash, AIR 1989 SC 1775, even the recital in a sale deed executed by the mortgagee in respect of the transfer to the purchaser the rights of recovering the principal amount and interest according to the mortgage deed was considered as an acknowledgment that mortgage money still remained unpaid and also that mortgagor had subsisting right of redemption which he could exercise against the mortgagee.
12. Applying the ratio of these decisions of the Supreme Court, I have no hesitation to hold that in the present case, statement of Janki Ram son of Surat Ram made on 26-2-1910, at the time of attestation of mutation of mortgage, amounts to acknowledgment of existing mortgage and also liability of redemption of mortgage by the mortgagors whereby the period of limitation for redemption of mortgage stood extended as provided under Section 18 of the Limitation Act. (Please also see: Suraj Bakhsh v. Ganga Bakhsh, AIR 1927 Oudh 457; Sheo prasad v. Rama Kant, AIR 1948 Oudh 257, Arjan Singh v. S. Qurdial Singh, AIR 1951 Pepsu 52; Mst. Chandelinju v. Raghunathsingh, AIR 1952 Madhya Bharat, 1977 Jnardhanan Embranthiri v. Mariam, AIR 1957 Trav Co. 186; Abdul Rahim v. Ahmad AH, AIR 1964 All 252 : (1963 All LJ 729), Radha Krishna v. Anoop Chand, AIR 1973 Madhya Pradesh 248 and Nallathambi Nadar Chellakannu Nadar v. Ammal Nadachi Chellathankom, AIR 1964 Madras 169).
13. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shiv Lal v. Chetram, AIR 1971 SC 2342 is an authority on the point that certified copy of a statement made in mutation proceedings cannot serve as an acknowledgment of the mortgage where neither its original was produced nor any witness was examined to prove the fact that the persons who were shown to have signed the original had, in fact, signed the same or those persons were mortgagors or their representatives. In the present case, neither the document, Ex. PA, pertaining to mutation nor its contents are in dispute.
14. The statement of Janki Ram made on 26-2-1910, at the time of attestion of mutation of mortgage is very clear and leaves no doubt that on that day he had admitted existence of mortgage as well as liability of its redemption to be discharged by the mortgagors. Therefore, the limitation for redemption of mortgage stood extended and started on 26-2-1910 itself and was to and on 25-2-1970. The present suit was field on 1-1-1969 which is within limitation. There is no dispute that according to the law of limitation applicable in the present case, the period of limitation was 60 years.
15. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the acknowledgement made by Janki Ram son of Surat Ram was on behalf of surat Ram is his duly authorised agent in terms of explanation (b) to Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is well settled that Mukhtar Nama or written authority need not be there to constitute a duly authorised agency in favour of a person as contemplated under Section 18 of the Limitation Act 1963. From the conduct of the parties and from the other surrounding circumstances, it can and must necessarily be inferred as to whether there was any authority to make an acknowledgment of a liability in respect of a property or a right on behalf of a person. In the present case, looking to the relationship between Janki Ram, who made the acknowledgment, and Surat Ram mortgagee, there is presumption of their being joint and it can be safely inferred that Janki Ram was representing his father Surat Ram at the time of attestion of mutation. This conclusion is supported by another circumstance that on an earlier occasion when report of mortgage was made by the partwari on 13-6-1908, other son of Surat Ram, Mastia, was with him. Above all, the attesting authority or predecessor in interest of appellants or the appellants-defendants themselves had never questioned, during all these years, that Janki Ram had no authority to acknowledge the mortgage on behalf of his father. Therefore, I find no force in the contention raised on behalf of the appellants-defendants that acknowledgment made by Janki Ram was of no effect. For coming to this conclusion I find support from the decisions in Sukumari Gupta v. Dhirender Nath Roy Chowdhury, AIR 1941 Calcutta 643; Sukhdeo v. Sahdeo Singh, AIR 1947 Oudh 173; Mohammad Khan v. Mohammad Salim Khan, AIR 1951 All 392; (1951 All LJ 174) and Arakchand Kankaria v. Amarchand Kankaria, AIR 1962 Mad 252.
16. No other point has been raised on behalf of the appellant-defendants before me.
17. In the result, the appeal is dismissed and the decree and judgment dated 28-9-1976 of the District Judge is confirmed. There is no order as to costs.