Rajiv Sharma, J.
1. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner on 27.2.1996. He was directed to file reply to the charge-sheet within a period of 15 days. He made a representation to the Deputy General Manager (Disciplinary Authority) on 21.3.1996 brining to his notice that the criminal case on the same facts was pending in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi in a case titled as State v. G.R. Bhatia and the present proceedings be deferred. The request made by the petitioner was turned down and he was granted 20 days further time to file the reply to the charge-sheet. He again brought to the notice of the disciplinary authority that till the pendency of the criminal case pending in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi the disciplinary proceedings be deferred vide communication dated 27.6.1996. The Disciplinary Authority appointed Sh. P.S. Saluja, Senior Manager as Inquiry Officer vide order dated 27.6.1996. The Presenting Officer sent a communication to the Inquiry Officer on 12.7.1996 giving therein the details of the documents the Department/Bank intended to rely upon. The petitioner did not plead guilty to the charges levelled against him. The Inquiry Officer asked the Presenting Officer on 30.10.1996 has he brought the documents as per M-1. The Presenting Officer informed the Inquiry Officer that he had brought the documents at serial Nos. 1 to 4, but he could not bring the documents as per serial Nos. 5 and 6 since these were not supplied by the Court. He sought 20 days time to produce the copies of the documents. The petitioner informed the Inquiry Officer to supply the attested copies of 29 documents mentioned in his representation dated 11.9.1997. He was allowed 2 days time to inspect the documents as per the proceedings dated 16.12.1997. A query was put to the Presenting Officer by the Inquiry Officer on 24.4.1998 whether he had collected the documents of the defendants or not. The Presenting Officer informed the Inquiry Officer that he had collected all the documents except the management's document dated 12.4.1998 since the Court denied to supply the same. He further informed that all the documents except Sr. Nos. 14 and 16 of D-3 have been procured by him and two copies of each after photostat will be supplied to him shortly. The proceedings were adjourned to 28.5.1998. The petitioner reiterated his request for the supply of the documents on 11.5.1998. lie again made a representation to the Inquiry Officer on 23.5.1998 bringing to his notice that the documents at serial Nos. 15, 24 and 25 were most vital for his defence which he had inadvertently agreed to drop. He sought the following documents vide representation dated 23.5.1998:
Sr. No. Details6. Cash Book (Form No. PNB 72 dated 12.4.1994).7. Cash Reserve Register (Form No. 31 dated 12.4.1994).8. Cash Balance Book (Form No. PNB 107 dated 12.4.1994.)20.2.1993 to 15.3.1994.14. Names and designations of officers who conducted daily checking of cash during the months of 12.10.1993 to 12.4.1994 and years 1992-93, 1993-94 and during the months under reference,
16. Managers' Monthly Certificate submitted to Regional Managers' Officer, Mandi by the Manger, Branch Officer, Mandi from February, 1993 to April, 1994.
23. Central Office Circular No. 6/94 dated 9.3.1994.
26. Order/Instruction, if any form the competent authority approving as to act as Incharge of the cash of the Branch as well as Evening Counter.
28. Duty-sheet of the officer who signed the cash Balance Book PNB: 107 as Accountant.
2. A query was reiterated by the Inquiry Officer to the Presenting Officer why the documents at serial Nos. 5 and *6* and M-l have not been produced in the proceedings dated 28.5.1998. The Presenting Officer informed the Inquiry Officer on 28.5.1998 that the documents at Sr. Nos. 5 and *6* could not be supplied and these documents be deleted, however, true copies of documents at Sr. No. 6 of M-l were tendered. He further informed the Inquiry Officer that the documents at serial Nos. 1, 3 and 4 were to be supplied by the charged officer and he has also supplied copies at Sr. Nos. 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 (copy of complaint supplied and copy of FIR) 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28 and 29 and the documents at Sr. Nos. 14, 16, 23 and 26 could not be supplied being not traceable and 26 there being no such order. The Presenting Officer informed the parties that all the documents i.e. management side and that of the charged officer have been supplied to the Inquiry Officer and was the petitioner ready to inspect the same. He informed the Inquiry Officer that he will inspect the documents mentioned in letter dated 23.5.1998. He was proceeded ex parte in the proceedings dated 28.5.1998. The ground mentioned for proceeding ex parte against the petitioner was that he was not co-operating. Thereafter the proceedings were held on 29.5.1998, 30.5.1998, 16.6.1998, 17.6.1998 and 18.6.1998. The Inquiry Officer completed the inquiry and submitted the report to the disciplinary authority. The petitioner was called upon vide letter dated 14.7.1998 to make his submissions on the inquiry report within 15 days. The petitioner made detailed submissions to the inquiry report on 30.7.1998. The Disciplinary Authority imposed a major penalty of reduction of salary by three stages in the time scale of pay in which he was placed for a period of one year with further direction that he will not earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction and the same shall have the effect of postponing future increments of his pay as specified under Regulation 4(f) of the Punjab National Bank Officer Employees (D&A;) Regulations, 1977. This penalty was imposed vide order dated 9.10.1998. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the imposition of penalty to the appellate authority on 21.11.1998. The same was rejected by the appellate authority on 1.4.1999.
3. Mr. Ajay Mohan Goel, Advocate has strenuously argued that the inquiry has not been held against his client as per the provisions of the Punjab National Bank Officer Employees (D&A;) Regulations, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Regulations' for brevity sake). He contended that the detailed procedure stipulated in these Regulations has not been complied with. According to him, the procedure prescribed is mandatory. He further contended that there is violation of the principles of natural justice since his client has not been supplied with the documents relied upon by the management during the course of the inquiry proceedings. He further contended that the documents in fact were required to be supplied by the Disciplinary Authority to the Inquiry Officer and thereafter the same were to be supplied to his client by the Inquiry Officer. In other words, his submission is that the documents instead of being supplied to his client by the Inquiry Officer were produced before the Inquiry Officer by the Presenting Officer. He further contended that the documents sought for by the petitioner were to be supplied at the initial stage to prepare his defence and few of the documents which had been supplied to his client in piecemeal did not comply with the mandatory requirement of supplying the documents to be relied upon by the management at the threshold. He further contended that the list of witnesses was also required to be supplied by the Inquiry Officer at the initial stage. He also contended that his client could not be proceeded ex parte without there being any cogent or tangible reason assigned by the Inquiry Officer. According to him, his client had been impressing upon the Inquiry Officer to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Regulations and to supply him the necessary documents and permit him to be defended by a competent person. He lastly contended that the appellate order is a just summary of the order whereby the penalty has been imposed upon his client. He elaborated his submission by submitting that the Appellate Authority was required to consider all the grounds raised in the memorandum of appeal, other material and the Appellate Authority could not just summarize the order of penalty while deciding the appeal, Mr. Ajay Mohan Goel has also placed strong reliance on Annexure P-41, more particularly, paras 5, 6, 7 and 12 therein.
4. Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocate submitted that the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner in accordance with law and the Regulations framed by the Bank have been followed during the course of the inquiry being held against the petitioner. He further submitted that the documents sought for by the petitioner were supplied to him or he was permitted to inspect the same. He lastly contended that the appellate order shows due application of mind by the Appellate Authority and the same can not be faulted with.
5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully. What is culled out from the pleadings of the parties is that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner. He was permitted to file his reply within 15 days. He had shown his reservation to file the reply due to pendency of the criminal case in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi. However, he was granted 20 days further time to file the reply. He had been impressing upon the Inquiry Officer to supply the documents necessary to prepare his defence. The Inquiry Officer, as noticed above, had been calling upon the Presenting Officer to produce the documents before him. The petitioner in his every communication had given the details of the documents asked for by him. He wanted the copies thereof to prepare his defence. He was proceeded against ex parte in the proceedings held on 28.5.1998.
6. It will be apt at this stage to take note of few salient Regulations. Regulation 6 lays down the procedure for imposition of major penalty. It is provided in sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 6 that where it is proposed to hold an inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite and distinct charges on the basis of the allegations against the officer employee and the articles of charge together with a statement of the allegations, on which they are based, shall be communicated in writing to the officer employee, who shall be required to submit within such time as may be specified by the Disciplinary Authority, a written statement of his defence. The Disciplinary Authority where it is not the Inquiring Authority is required to forward to the Inquiring Authority the following documents: (i) a copy of the articles of charge and statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour; (ii) a copy of the written statement of defence if any, submitted by the officer employee; (iii) a list of documents by which and list of witnesses by whom the articles of charges are proposed to be substantiated; (iv) a copy of statements of the witnesses, if any; (v) evidence proving the delivery of the articles of charge under Sub-regulation (3) and (vi) a copy of the order appointing the presenting officer in terms of Sub-regulation (6). Regulation 10 provides that the Inquiring Authority, where the officer employee does not admit all or any of the articles of charge, furnished to such officer employee a list of documents by which and a list of witnesses by whom the articles of charge are proposed to be proved. Sub-regulation (a) of Regulation 10 reads thus:
(a) The inquiring authority, where the officer employee does not admit all or any of the articles of charge, furnished to such officer employee a list of documents by which and a list of witnesses by whom the articles of charge are proposed to be provided.
7. In the present case there is violation of Regulations 6 and 10(a). The Disciplinary Authority had not supplied to the Inquiry Officer the documents mentioned in Regulation 6. It was incumbent for the Disciplinary Authority to supply the list of documents by which and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be substantiated to the Inquiry Officer. It is only after the documents and the list of witnesses are supplied by the Disciplinary Authority that the Inquiring Authority is required to furnish to the charged officer a list of documents by which and a list of witnesses by whom the articles of charge are proposed to be proved.
8. In the case in hand, a strange procedure has been followed by the Bank. The documents which were required to be supplied initially by the Disciplinary Authority to the Inquiry Officer and thereafter to the charged officer were produced by the Presenting Officer before the Inquiring Authority in piecemeal. As noticed above, the Inquiring Authority had been calling upon the Presenting Officer to produce the documents from time to time. If the documents were being produced before the Inquiring Authority and few of them had been supplied to the petitioner, how the petitioner could defend his case. The documents and the list of the witnesses were required to be furnished at the threshold to enable the delinquent to prepare his defence. The documents are not supposed to be supplied during the course of inquiry as per the convenience of the Presenting Officer. The Presenting Officer is always an interested party. It is evident from the record that the documents as prayed for by the petitioner in Annexures P-7 and P-15 during the course of the proceedings dated 16.12.1997, 24.4.1998, P-23 dated 28.5.1998 were not supplied by the Inquiry Officer at the initial stage. These documents ought to have been supplied by the Inquiry Officer at the initial stage of the inquiry. The Presenting Officer has also shown his inability to produce few documents since they were in the custody of the Court. The procedure adopted by the management during the course of the inquiry was illegal. It has seriously prejudiced the petitioner. He had been craving for the supply of the documents which according to him had the bearing in the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings. He had been permitted to inspect few documents only. This was permitted by the Inquiry Officer as per Sub-regulation (b) of Regulation 10.
9. The Inquiry Officer without there being any plausible justification had ordered ex parte proceedings against the petitioner. If the petitioner had been insisting for the supply of the documents in accordance with law and bringing to the notice of the authorities that the proceedings may not be continued since the criminal case is already pending in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, it was not proper for him to order ex parte proceedings against the petitioner. This decision could only be taken if the petitioner had been reckless or negligent while defending his case. He had been insisting the Inquiry Officer either to supply the documents or to proceed in accordance with law.
10. Consequently, it is held that the mandatory procedure prescribed under the Regulations has not been followed by the Inquiry Officer causing serious prejudice to the petitioner. It is reiterated that the petitioner was required to be supplied with the copies of the documents and the list of witnesses by whom the articles of charge were proposed to be substantiated at the threshold. The act of the Inquiry Officer to permit the Presenting Officer to produce the documents and thereafter either to supply few of them to the petitioner or to permit him to inspect the same was contrary to the procedure laid down. The documents were to be supplied at the initial stage to the petitioner to prepare his defence. Since the documents had not been furnished to the petitioner by the Inquiry Officer as per Regulation 10(a) it has led to the violation of principles of natural justice. The disciplinary proceedings must be conducted in accordance with law and fairness must be observed. The action of the Inquiry Officer must not prejudice the charged officer during the course of the disciplinary proceedings.
11. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Bank of Patiala and Ors. v. S.K. Sharma : (1996)IILLJ296SC , have laid down the following, principles to be followed in context of disciplinary enquiries and order of punishment imposed by employer upon employee:
We may summarize the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee):
(1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character.
(2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case.
(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under 'no notice', 'no opportunity' and 'no hearing' categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/Government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/ employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle.
(4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee.
(b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived if, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar 1994 AIR SCW 1050. The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called.
(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice - or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action - the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between 'no opportunity' and not adequate opportunity, i.e., between 'no notice'/'no hearing' and 'no fair hearing.' (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it 'void' or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem), (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. (It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.)
(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them.
(7) There may be situations where the interests of state or public interest may call for a curtailing or the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision.
12. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Uttaranchal and Ors. v. Kharak Singh : (2009)ILLJ235SC , have observed that if the documents are not furnished to the delinquent it causes prejudices. Their Lordships have held as under (pp. 245 para 20):
20. A reading of the enquiry report also shows that the respondent herein was not furnished with the required documents. The document's witnesses were not examined in his presence. Though the respondent who was the writ petitioner specifically stated so in the affidavit before the High Court in the writ proceedings, those averments were specifically controverted in the reply-affidavit filed by the Department. Mere denial for the sake of denial is not an answer to the specific allegations made in the affidavit. Likewise, there is no evidence to show that after submission of the report by the enquiry officer to the disciplinary authority, the respondent herein was furnished with the copy of the said report along with the relied upon documents. When all these infirmities were specifically pleaded and brought to the notice of the appellate authority (i.e. Forest Conservator), he rejected the same but has not pointed out the relevant materials from the records of the enquiry officer and disciplinary authority to support his decision. Hence, the appellate authority has also committed an error in dismissing the appeal of the respondent.
13. In the present case the expression used in Regulation 10(a) is that the incumbent 'shall' be supplied with the documents and the list of witnesses. The word 'shall' denotes that the compliance is mandatory and imperative. The petitioner has been deprived of his right to prepare the defence at the initial stage and it has definitely prejudiced him during the course of the disciplinary proceedings. There is violation of the principles of natural justice. It is reiterated that the procedure prescribed in Regulations 6(5) and 10(a) are mandatory and their infraction will render the disciplinary proceedings null and void.
14. The petitioner had preferred an appeal on 21.11.1998. The same was decided by the Appellate Authority on 1.4.1999. I have gone through the contents of order dated 1.4.1999. The appellate order is not a speaking order. What the Appellate Authority strangely has done is that it has summarized the penalty order dated 9.10.1998, rather few of the sentences have been picked up verbatim from the order whereby the penalty has been imposed. The purpose of the appeal whenever provided under law is that the appellate authority shall apply its mind independently after taking into consideration all the pleas and the material brought before it. It is not expected from the appellate authority not to apply its independent mind and to dispose of the appeal in a very cursory manner. The forum of appeal gives an opportunity to the delinquent to pin point the deficiencies/shortcomings and infraction of mandatory rules during the course of disciplinary proceedings and he may also point out to the appellate authority the illegality if any in the order whereby the penalty has been imposed. He can also bring to the notice of the appellate authority that the penalty imposed is disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. There is a wholesome principle for providing statutory appeal.
15. Consequently, it is held that the order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 1.4.1999 is not in accordance with law. This order is not a speaking order. It shows total lack of application of mind by the Appellate Authority. The reasons must be assigned in an appellate order more particularly when the same is liable to be tested in higher fora, including Courts.
16. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. : (2006)IILLJ806SC , have held that the order passed by the Appellate Authority should be reasoned order. Their Lordships have opined as under:
The Appellate Authority, therefore, while disposing of the appeal is required to apply his mind with regard to the factors enumerated in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 37 of the Rules. The judgment of the civil Court being inter partes was relevant. The conduct of the appellant as noticed by the civil Court was also relevant. The fact that the respondent has accepted the said judgment and acted upon it would be a relevant fact. The authority considering the memoria 1 conduct have justifiably come to a different conclusion having regard to the findings of the civil Court. But, it did not apply its mind. It could have for one reason or the other refused to take the subsequent event into consideration, but as he had a discretion in the matter, he was bound to consider the said question. He was required to show that he applied his mind to the relevant facts. He could not have without expressing his mind simply ignored the same.
An appellate order if it is in agreement with that of the disciplinary authority may not be a speaking order but the authority passing the same must show that there had been proper application of mind on his part as regards the compliance with the requirements of law while exercising his jurisdiction under Rule 37 of the Rules.
In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra which has heavily been relied upon by Mr. Gupta, this Court stated: (SCC p. 770, para 16)
16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Appellate Authority, therefore, could not ignore to exercise the said power.
The order of the Appellate Authority demonstrates total non-application of mind. The Appellate Authority, when the Rules require application of mind on several factors and serious contentions have been raised, was bound to assign reasons so as enable the writ Court to ascertain as to whether he had applied his mind to the relevant factors which the statute requires him to do. The expression 'consider' is of some significance. In the context of the Rules, the Appellate Authority was required to see as to whether (i) the procedure laid down in the Rules was complied with; (ii) the enquiry officer was justified in arriving at the finding that the delinquent officer was guilty of the misconduct alleged against him; and (iii) whether penalty impost?d by the disciplinary authority was excessive.
In R.P. Bhatt v. Union of India this Court opined: (SCC p. 654, paras 4-5)
4. The word 'consider' in Rule 27(2) implies 'due application of mind'. It is clear upon the terms of Rule 27(2) that the Appellate Authority is required to consider (1) whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice; (2) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and (3) whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and thereafter pass orders confirming, enhancing etc. the penalty, or may remit back the case to the authority which imposed the same. Rule 27(2) casts a duty on the Appellate Authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof.
5. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. We regret to find that the Director General has also not given any finding on the crucial question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of Clause (c) of Rule 27(2) viz. whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director General is liable to be set aside.
17. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in latest pronouncement in Divisional Forest Officer, Kothagudem and Ors. v. Madhusudhan Rao : (2008)IILLJ671SC , have held that though it is true that no detailed reasons are required to be given by the appellate authority, but some brief reasons should be indicated even in an order confirming the view of the lower forum. Their Lordships have held as under:
It is no doubt also true that an appellate or revisional authority is not required to give detailed reasons for agreeing and confirming an order passed by the lower forum but, in our view, in the interest of justice, the delinquent officer is entitled to know at least the mind of the appellate or revisional authority in dismissing his appeal and/or revision. It is true that no detailed reasons are required to be given by the appellate authority, but some brief reasons should be indicated even in an order confirming the view of the lower forum.
18. In a recent judgment State of Uttaranchal and Ors. v. Kharak Singh : (2009)ILLJ235SC , the Apex Court has held that the appellate authority must take into consideration the entire material placed before him at the time of deciding the appeal.
19. Mr. Ajay Kumar has vehemently argued that assuming not conceding that there is infraction in following the mandatory provisions during the course of the disciplinary proceedings, the same stood cured after the petitioner had availed an opportunity of appeal. This Court cannot subscribe to this view. It is settled law that there is a tendency in the organizations to support the order which has been initially passed and post hearing will not cure the initial illegality in the order.
20. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna and Ors. : [1987]164ITR1(SC) , have held that if the order is bad at the initial stage it cannot be cured at the appellate stage. Their Lordships have held as under:
But perhaps another way of looking at the matter lies in examining the consequences of the initial order as soon as it is passed. There are cases where an order may cause serious injury as soon as it is made, an injury not capable of being entirely erased when the error is corrected on subsequent appeal. For instance, as in the present case, where a member of a highly respected and publicly trusted profession is found guilty of misconduct and suffers penalty, the damage to his professional reputation can be immediate and far-reaching. 'Not all the King's horses and all the King's men' can ever salvage the situation completely, notwithstanding the widest scope provided to an appeal. To many a man, his professional reputation is his most valuable possession. It affects his standing, and dignity among his fellow members in the profession, and guarantees the esteem of his clientele. It is often the carefully garnered fruit of a long period of scrupulous, conscientious and diligent industry. It is the portrait of his professional honour. In a world said to be notorious for its blase attitude towards the noble values of an earlier generation, a man's professional reputation is still his most sensitive pride. In such a case, after the blow suffered by the initial decision' it is difficult to contemplate complete restitution through an appellate decision. Such a case is unlike an action for money or recovery of property, where the execution of the trial decree may be stayed pending appeal, or a successful appeal may result in refund of the money or restitution of the property, with appropriate compensation by way of interest or mesne profits for the period of deprivation. And, therefore, it seems to us, there is manifest need to ensure that there is no breach of fundamental procedure in the original proceeding, and to avoid treating an appeal as an overall substitute for the original proceeding.
21. In view of the above analysis and the observations made it is held that the inquiry has been held against the petitioner in violation of Regulations. The Regulations are mandatory and their breach has definitely caused prejudice to the petitioner in preparing his defence. The Regulations 6(5) and 10(a) are couched in imperative/mandatory language. The petitioner ought to have been supplied the documents at the initial stage by the Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer could not dependent upon the supply of the documents by the Presenting Officer. The Inquiry Officer has to balance the interests of delinquent and the management. The appellate order, as noticed above, is not a speaking order. The Appellate Authority has not applied its independent mind.
22. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed. The Annexure P-48 dated 9.10.1998 and Annexure P-51 dated 1.4.1999 are quashed and set aside. The petitioner is held entitled to all the consequential benefits. The petitioner is held entitled to costs, which are quantified at Rs. 5,000.