Judgment:
Tapan Kumar Dutt, J.
1. Heard the learned Counsels for the respective parties.
2. The petitioner's case in brief is as follows:
The respondent No. 1 is a registered Cooperative Society. The State Government which stands as a guarantor for repayment of National Dairy Development Board/Indian Dairy Corporation, loans have a control to a great extent over the activities of the District Milk Unions in the State directly and through a State level apex Milk Co-operative Society known Cooperative Milk Producers' Federation Ltd. The respondent No. 1 (The Kishan Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd., Nadia) is also affiliated to the State level West Bengal apex body known as the West Bengal Cooperative Milk Producers Federation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Milk Federation). The respondent No. 1 has its field of operation in the District of Nadia. The petitioner was appointed as the Managing Director of the respondent No. 1 under an order of the District Magistrate, Nadia and Chairman, the Kishan Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. on the basis of the recommendation of the said Milk Federation and the subsequent approval of the Board of the respondent No. 1. Such appointment was with effect from 01.02.2000 in a certain pay scale with DA and other allowances on a contractual basis for five years. It was stated in the appointment-order that such appointment shall be governed by the Rules and Regulations of the Kishan Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. On 20.08.2001 an attempt was made on the life of the petitioner when the petitioner was returning to his residence from his work-place and office at Krishnanagar by a local train in the evening. The petitioner has alleged that the petitioner as a Managing Director, as aforesaid, took certain steps in his work-place for which certain unscrupulous persons with vested interest got annoyed and the petitioner was shot inside the railway compartment near Birnagar Station and the petitioner sustained two gun shot injuries in his left hand. The petitioner has alleged that the said injury was of a very serious nature and he had to be admitted in the SSKM Hospital and the petitioner had to be operated upon on 23.08.2001. but, the bullet could not be removed. It appears from a perusal of the writ petition that the petitioner had to be successively admitted to different hospitals and ultimately a fresh operation was performed upon the petitioner on 06.06.2002 at Christian Medical College at Vellore. According to the petitioner the medical treatment did not end there and the petitioner was asked to visit the hospital for further check-up and/or operation. The petitioner has alleged that the petitioner has become physically disabled because of radial nerve damage and several joints of the left hand have become stiff.
3. It is the further case of the petitioner that the Board of the respondent No. 1 resolved on 04.12.2001 that the medical expenses of the petitioner and one Sri Sumit Saha, who was also injured during the incident on 20.08.2001, would be borne by the respondent No. 1 and special leave would be allowed to them till their recovery. The respondent No. 1 paid the salary to the petitioner for the period from 21.08.2001 upto August, 2002. According to the petitioner his medical expenses for the first four months were reimbursed but from January, 2002 onwards no such reimbursement was made. The petitioners' services were terminated and the petitioner received a memo dated 9th September, 2002 (annexure P11 of the writ petition) issued by the respondent No. 2 informing the petitioner that in pursuance of the recommendation made by the Milk Federation it has been decided by the management of the respondent No. 1 to terminate the services of the petitioner as Managing Director of the respondent No. 1 due to the petitioner's long absence and physical disability, impossibility of resumption to duties in near future and the consequential problems faced by the organization in day-to-day management of the business in absence of a regular Managing Director. It was indicated in the said memo that the said memo should be treated as a 30 days' notice of termination as per Clause No. 18(a)(ii) of the WBCS Rules, 1987 from the date of issuance of the said memo. In the said memo it was further indicated that an amount of Rs. 44,660.64 has been paid in excess to the petitioner and the said amount is recoverable from the petitioner but the respondent No. 1 is waiving the said amount which is recoverable from the petitioner as a humanitarian gesture which should be treated as the last and final payment of financial assistance to the petitioner. The petitioner has further stated that by another communication dated 09.09.2002 another cheque for Rs. 23,122/- was sent to the petitioner towards salary for the period from 01.09.2002 to 09.10.2002 in connection with the notice of termination.
4. The petitioner has annexed a copy of a letter dated 19.07.2000 issued by one Sri Vivek Bharadwaj who happened to be the District Magistrate. Nadia and Chairman of the respondent No. 1. as stated by the petitioner in the writ petition, for the purpose of showing that the petitioner was under serious threat from a group of employees of the respondent No. 1 when, the petitioner had started taking positive actions in respect of the affairs of the respondent No. 1. The petitioner has challenged the aforesaid notice of termination dated 09.09.2002 in the writ petition and has also prayed for directions upon the respondent authorities for making payment of salaries, allowance and other service benefits to the petitioner reimbursement of all medical expenses which have been incurred by the petitioner. The petitioner's case is that the said notice of termination is completely at variance with the minutes of Board Meeting dated 04.12.2001 and that the said notice of termination is illegal and suffers from a total non-application of mind. The petitioner has also stated in the writ petition that even when the petitioner was undergoing medical treatment after his visit to the Christian Medical College and Hospital, the petitioner had a telephonic discussion with one Sri T. K. Sinha, Managing Director of the said Milk Federation and in course of such discussion it was suggested to the petitioner that the petitioner could accept another assignment, and pursuant to such discussion the petitioner had written a letter dated 01.07.2002 to the said Mr. Sinha proposing terms and conditions under which the petitioner was agreeable to accept another assignment under the jurisdiction of the said Milk Federation. It appears from a copy of the said letter dated 01.07.2002 that the petitioner had proposed that the new assignment should not be less than the remaining period of his contractual service which according to the petitioner, at that point of time, was two years.
5. The respondent authorities have contested the writ petition by filing affidavit-in-opposition. The respondent authorities have taken an objection to the writ petition on the ground that the writ petition is not maintainable against the respondent No. 1 which is a cooperative society and that it is not an agent or instrumentality of the State Government or Central Government. The respondent authorities have also taken a point that the said Milk Federation has not been made a party in the writ proceeding and as such the writ petition is not maintainable. The specific case of the respondent authorities is that nothing is due and payable to the petitioner and that the respondent No. 1 has paid an excess amount of Rs. 44,660/- to the petitioner but the petitioner has been exempted from repaying the said amount to the respondent No. 1 on humanitarian ground. The respondent authorities have further alleged that the writ petitioner had accepted and treated the said Milk Federation as his real employer and that the petitioner has approached the said Milk Federation with a prayer that he should be given a new posting of equivalent rank and status under the jurisdiction of the said Milk Federation which may be a case of transfer from the respondent No. 1 or a fresh appointment under the common cadre system of the said Milk Federation. The respondents have also stated in their affidavit-in-opposition that the writ petitioner retired from the services under National Dairy Development Board under Voluntary Retirement Scheme and was subsequently appointed by the recommendation of the Milk Federation on a contractual and temporary basis.
6. It may be mentioned here that the petitioner has also alleged that in view of the fact the petitioner has suffered a medical disability in the course of his employment, he is entitled to the protection given under the provisions of The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation), Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act of 1995). The respondent authorities have alleged that the petitioner has not pleaded the necessary facts for invoking the provisions of the said Act of 1995 and that the petitioner has prayed for salary for the unexpired contractual period but he has not prayed for reinstatement. It may be recorded here that the Learned Counsel for the petitioner ultimately did not press the petitioner's case under the said Act of 1995. The respondent authorities have stated in their affidavit-in-opposition, with regard to the Constitution of the Board of the respondent No. 1, that twelve members are elected from amongst the Chairmen of the affiliated societies, two nominees of the National Dairy Development Board so long as loan and/or interest is outstanding to the said National Dairy Development Board, one nominee of the Cooperative Milk Producers Federation and three nominees of the State Government, i.e. one from the District Administration, one from the ARD Development and one from the Registrar Co-operative Societies and that the State Government appoints the Chairman of the said Board till the NDDB loans are fully repaid.
7. The Learned Advocates for the respective parties have cited some reported and/or unreported decisions of Hon'ble Courts in support of their respective submissions.
8. The respondents' learned Counsel has raised a preliminary point with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the respondent No. 1 is a Co-operative Society, not being an instrumentality of a State and not coming within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and also on the ground that the service of the petitioner was in the nature of a private contract for a fixed period of time and purely on a temporary basis. According to the said Learned Counsel the petitioner's grievance, if any, cannot be decided by a Writ Court.
9. The learned Advocate for the petitioner cited an unreported decision dated 27.07.1998 of an Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in MAT No. 1414, 1415, 1416 and 1417 of 1995. It appears that the present respondent No. 1 was a party to the said proceedings. The petitioner/first respondent in each of such cases were the employees of the said Kishan Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. and their services were terminated by a certain order on the alleged ground of misconduct by the writ petitioners in the said cases including refusal to join at the transferred post. In the aforesaid cases it was argued on behalf of the appellant in the said cases that the writ petition was not maintainable against a Cooperative Society. On behalf of the writ petitioners in the aforesaid cases it was argued that a writ petition is maintainable against a Cooperative Society if a mandatory, statutory provision has been violated by such Cooperative Society. The Hon'ble Division Bench was pleased to hold that it is beyond any doubt that where a mandatory, statutory provision is violated by the society, a writ petition would be maintainable against it and that it cannot be disputed that the services of the employees of a cooperative society are protected by a statutory provision. In the said cases the Hon'ble Division Bench found that there has been a flagrant violation of the principle of natural justice and the orders passed by the said Cooperative Society which was the appellant in the aforesaid appeals were wholly without jurisdiction. In the said unreported case, it also appears, that the District Magistrate, Nadia and Special Officer, the Kishan Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. passed the order of removal of the writ petitioners in the aforesaid cases from the service of the said Kishan Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. But it has to be noted that the Hon'ble Division Bench was pleased to find prima facie that the writ petition, in that case, would be maintainable against the appellant No. 1 in that case. It further appears that the aforesaid appeal before the Division Bench arose out of an interim order passed by the Hon'ble Court of first instance. In view of the fact that the Hon'ble Division Bench was pleased to observe that it was only a prima facie finding of the said Hon'ble Bench it can hardly be said that the finding of the Hon'ble Division Bench was finally made on the question of maintainability of the writ petition concerned. That apart, it further appears that the said unreported case dealt with the case of the regular employees and not like that of the petitioner who was appointed for a fixed term of 5 years after the petitioner had retired from the services of the National Dairy Development Board by availing of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme.
10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner cited : (2005)ILLJ544SC (Virendra Kumar Srivastava v. U.P. Rajya Karmachari Kalyan Nigam and Anr.) in respect of his submission that the respondent No. 1 comes within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. But the object for which the Corporation was formed in the said reported case has been stated in paragraph 7 of the said reported case wherefrom it appears that the Government had decided to set up a Corporation wholly financed by the Government for establishing a chain of stores throughout the State for supply of essential commodities to the State Government employees at normal rates. The composition of the Board has also been stated in paragraph 7 of the said reported case. It appears that the said reported case differs from the present case factually to a great extent and it is difficult to appreciate as to how the said reported case can be of any assistance to the petitioner. In the said reported case the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to come to a finding that the control of the State was not only regulatory but it was deep and pervasive in the sense that it was formed with the object of catering to the needs of the Government employees as a supplement to their salaries and other perks.
11. The said learned Counsel cited a Judgment reported at : (2004)ILLJ161SC (Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas and Ors.) in support of his proposition that even in case of a private body if such private body acts in violation of certain statutes, a writ will lie against such private body. It will appear from the said reported case that in the said case the respondent No. 1 was working as a Branch Manager in the appellant-Bank. Upon an enquiry into the charges against the respondent No. 1 it was found that the said respondent No. 1 was guilty of the charges and ultimately the respondent No. 1 was dismissed from service. In paragraph 33 of the said reports the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold that a private company carrying on banking business as a scheduled bank, cannot be termed as an institution or a company carrying on any statutory or public duty. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was further pleased to hold that a private body or a person may be amenable to writ jurisdiction only where it may become necessary to compel such body or association to enforce any statutory obligations or such obligations of public nature casting positive obligation upon it. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was further pleased to hold that merely regulatory provisions to ensure the commercial activity carried on by private bodies work within a discipline, do not confer any such status upon the company nor put any such obligation upon it which may be enforced through the issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to take into consideration that the case before the said Hon'ble Court was a case of a disciplinary action being taken against its employees by the Bank concerned and the employees' service with the Bank stood terminated. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that the employee was not trying to enforce any statutory duty on the part of the Bank and that the writ petition filed by the employee was not maintainable. Thus, the said reported case cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner.
12. The learned Counsel for the petitioner cited a decision reported at : (2004)IIILLJ780SC (A. Umarani v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies and Ors.) and referred to paragraph 60 of the said reports. In paragraph 60 of the said reports the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe 'Although, we do not intend to express any opinion as to whether the cooperative society is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India but it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the writ petition will be maintainable when the action of the cooperative society is violative of mandatory statutory provisions. In this case except the nodal centre functions and supervision of the co-operative society, the State has no administrative control over its day-to-day affairs. The State has not created any post nor could it do so on its own. The State has not borne any part of the financial burden. It was. therefore, impermissible for the State to direct regularisation of the services of the employees of the cooperative societies. Such an order cannot be upheld also on the ground that the employees allegedly served the cooperative societies for a long time.'
13. The learned Counsel for the petitioner next cited a decision reported at : AIR2004SC2271 [Gayatri De v. Mousumi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. and Ors.) and referred to paragraph 55 of the said reports. In the said paragraph the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that 'the special Officer was appointed by the High Court to discharge the functions of the Society, therefore, he should be regarded as a public authority and hence, the writ petition is maintainable.' In the present proceeding none of the parties has come forward with the case that any Special Officer was appointed by the Hon'ble High Court in respect of the respondent No. 1. Thus, the said reported case cannot be of any assistance to the writ petitioner.
14. The learned Counsel for the petitioner next cited a decision reported at : (2001)ILLJ1341SC [Andhra Pradesh State Federation of Coop. Spinning Mills Ltd. and Anr. v. P.V. Swaminathan). It appears from the facts of the case in the said reports that the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court came to the conclusion that a writ would lie against Andhra Pradesh State Federation of Co-operative Spinning Mill Ltd. as it would be a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. It also appears from the facts of the said reported case that the question of non-maintainability of the writ petition was not seriously pressed on behalf of the said Andhra Pradesh State Federation of Co-operative Spinning Mill Ltd. Thus it would appear that the question of non-maintainability of a writ petition was not much in issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and, thus, the said reported case cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner. Of course, the learned Counsel for the petitioner cited the said reported case in support of his contention that the petitioner would be entitled to the benefits flowing from the terms of appointment for the period during which he could not render service to the respondent No. 1, within the contractual period of 5 years, as already indicated above. Such question can be gone into only if it is found that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is maintainable.
15. The learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to paragraph 9 of the decision reported at : (1997)IILLJ647SC [Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees' Association, Prabhadevi Telephone Exchange v. Union of India and Anr.). In the said paragraph the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe inter alia. 'Necessarily, if the service conditions stand attracted, all the conditions laid therein would become applicable to the employees with a fixity of tenure and guarantee of service, subject to disciplinary action. His removal should be in accordance with the just and fair procedure envisaged under the Rules or application of the principles of natural justice, as the case may be, in which event the security of the tenure of the employee is assured and the whim and fancy and vagary of the employer would be deterred and if unfair and unjust action is found established it would be declared as an arbitrary, unjust or unfair procedure.' In the present case the question that has to be first resolved is whether the respondent No. 1 answers the description of an instrumentality of a State or any other authority as contemplated under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Only if the respondent No. 1 can be said to be an instrumentality of a State or any of the 'other authorities' as contemplated under Article 12 of the Constitution, then in that event the question of going into the merits of the case arises, that is to say, whether or not the action of the respondent authorities is unfair or unjust or illegal.
16. The learned Counsel for the petitioner cited another decision reported at : (2004)3SCC553 [ABL International Ltd. and Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors.). It appears that the facts of the said reported case have no similarity at all with the facts of the present case. In paragraph 23 of the said reported case the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold that once the State or instrumentality of the State is a party to the contract, it has an obligation in law to act fairly, justly and reasonably which is the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to further observe that if such instrumentality of the State acts in contravention of the requirement of Article 14, then the Writ Court can issue suitable directions to set right the arbitrary actions of such instrumentality of the State. There cannot be any dispute with regard to such proposition of law. In paragraph 24 of the said reports the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that in the facts and circumstances of the said reported case the company in question was wholly a Government- owned company and that it discharged the functions of the Government and acted as an agent of the Government and it had a responsibility to discharge function in the national interest. Thus, it can be seen that the facts of the said reported case were quite different from the facts of the instant case and the said reported case cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner.
17. The learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 very emphatically submitted that the respondent No. 1 cannot be considered to be a State and/or an instrumentality of a State and/or other authority as contemplated under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and the writ petition is not maintainable. The said learned Counsel further submitted that the petitioner was appointed purely on a temporary contractual basis and such contract was private in nature. The said learned Counsel referred to the decision reported at : [2002]3SCR100 [Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Ors.). In paragraph 27 of the said reports the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe as follows:
27. Ramanall was noted and quoted with approval in extenso and the tests propounded for determining as to when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government therein were culled out and summarised as follows: (SCC p. 737, para 9)
(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it, would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p. 507, para 14)
(2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character. (SCC p. 508, para 15)
(3) It may also be a relevant factor...whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State-conferred or State-protected. (SCC p. 508, para 15)
(4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (SCC p. 508, para 15)
(5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p. 509, para 16)
(6) 'Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference' of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p. 510, para 18)
18. In paragraph 40 of the said reports the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe 'The question in each case would be-whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.' The learned Counsel for the said respondents submitted that in order to be an instrumentality of the State there must be a deep and pervasive control of the Government. According to him, the Government does not have such deep and pervasive control over the respondent No. 1.
19. The said learned Counsel relied upon another judgment reported at 2006 (4) Supreme 588 (S.S. Rana v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies and Anr.). In paragraph 9 and 10 of the said reports the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe as follows:
9. It is not dispute that the Society has not been constituted under an Act. Its functions like any other Co-operative Society are mainly regulated in terms of the provisions of the Act, except as provided in the bye-laws of the Society. The State has no say in the functions of the Society. Membership, acquisition of shares and all other matters are governed by the bye-laws framed under the Act. The terms and conditions of an officer of the Co-operative Society, indisputably, are governed by the Rules. Rule 56, to which reference has been made by Mr. Vijay Kumar, does not contain any provision in terms whereof any legal right as such is conferred upon an officer of the Society.
10. It has not been shown before us that the State exercises any direct or indirect control over the affairs of the Society for deep and pervasive control. The State furthermore is not the majority shareholder. The State has the power only to nominate one director. It cannot, thus, be said that the State exercise, any functional control over the affairs of the Society in the sense that the majority directors are nominated by the State. For arriving at the conclusion that the State has a deep and pervasive control over the Society, several other relevant questions are required to be considered, namely (1) How the Society was created?; (2) Whether it enjoys any monopoly character? (3) Do the functions of the Society partake to statutory functions or public functions? and (4) Can it be characterized as public Authority?
20. The said learned Counsel relied upon another judgment reported at 1996 (1) CLJ 502 [Bholanath Roy and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.). In the said reported case the petitioners were the employees of Gour Co-operative Milk Producer's Union Limited and the said petitioners filed the said writ application, inter alia, for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents therein to pay the writ petitioners the scales of pay as payable to the employees of the State Government and yearly increments which allegedly had been given in case of other Milk Unions. It further appears that pursuant to a scheme commonly known as Operation Flood II, Cooperative Milk Unions had to be formed. In the instant case it has been also stated in paragraph 2 of the writ petition that the respondent No. 1 was set up under a National Dairy Project known as 'Operation Flood'. In paragraph 18 of the said reports the Hon'ble Court was pleased to observe that Article 12 of the Constitution cannot be stretched too far so as to bring within its purview all autonomous bodies which have some nexus or dealing with the Government and/or other public bodies. The Hon'ble Court was pleased to hold in the said reports that the said Milk Union which was respondent No. 5 in such writ petition was not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and no relief could be granted to the petitioner in such writ application.
21. From a perusal of a copy of the bye-laws of the respondent No. 1 it appears that it has been stated as to how the funds may be raised by the respondent No. 1. It indicates that such funds can be raised by way of entrance fees, shares, debentures, deposits, loans, grants, aids and subsidies, donations etc. With regard to the membership it has been stipulated that any registered Primary Milk Producers Co-operative Society under the jurisdiction of the respondent No. 1 supplying milk to the respondent No. 1 shall be entitled to hold membership and that every member shall hold at least one share of a certain denomination. There are other stipulations also with regard to 'membership'. In so far as the constitution of the Board of Directors is concerned, it has been stipulated that 12 members shall be elected from amongst the Chairman of the affiliated societies, two nominees of the National Dairy Development Board so long as any loan and interest is outstanding to the said NDDB, one nominee of the Co-operative Milk Producers Federation to which the respondent No. 1 is affiliated and three nominees of the State Government. It has also been stipulated that the State Government shall appoint the Chairman of the Board till the NDDB loans are fully repaid. From a perusal of the bye-laws it cannot be said that the State Government has any deep and pervasive control over the respondent No. 1 in any way or manner. It also does not appear that the respondent No. 1 was at an earlier point of time a department of the State. From the Constitution of the Board of Directors it will appear that two nominees of the NDDB will be on the Board so long as any loan or interest is outstanding to the NDDB but not thereafter. It will further appear that the State Government can appoint the Chairman of the Board only till the NDDB loans are fully repaid but not otherwise. On the other hand, 12 members are elected from amongst the Chairman of the affiliated societies. The stipulation with regard to the funds of the respondent No. 1 has already been indicated above. Thus, it will appear from the facts and circumstances of the instant case that the respondent No. 1 is not dominated by or under the control of the Government financially, functionally and administratively. The petitioner was appointed on a contractual basis for 5 years by the respondent No. 1 and it cannot be said that impugned action of the respondent authorities concerned has any public law character.
22. In view of the discussions made above, this Court finds that the respondent No. 1 is not a State nor an instrumentality of the State nor an 'other authority' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in the present writ application. In view of such finding, the preliminary point raised on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 with regard to the non-maintainability of the writ petition has to be upheld. In view of the above finding, this Court is of the view that it is not necessary for this Court to go into the merits of the petitioner's case and It is also not necessary for this Court to enter into the question as to whether the bye-laws of the respondent No. 1 have any statutory force, as raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3. In view of the discussions made above, the writ petition is dismiss on the ground that it is not maintainable. This order will not prevent the writ petitioner from pursuing any alternative remedy for redressal of his alleged grievances.
23. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
24. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on compliance of usual formalities.