Surinder Singh Nijjar, C.J.
1. This appeal has been filed by the Kolkata Port Trust challenging the judgment of the learned single Judge dated 6th February, 2007 in writ petition No. 2053 of 2003. By the aforesaid judgment, the writ petition has been allowed. Writ in the nature of mandamus has been issued directing the respondent to do the needful in terms of the order prayed for in the writ petition by allowing him to exercise his option and to switch over to the Pension Scheme. The respondents were directed to act accordingly within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. Instead of implementing the aforesaid judgment, the present appeal has been filed.
2. The petitioner joined the Calcutta (now Kolkata) Port Trust (herein after referred to as the Port Trust) under its Marine Department as a Hooghly Pilot with effect from January, 1952. He was confirmed as Class-I Officer. At the time of his appointment, there was no Pension Scheme for the employees of the Port Trust. They were given benefits of Contributory Provident Fund Scheme. While the petitioner was in service, the Port Trust introduced a pension Scheme for its employees. The aforesaid Scheme was not properly circulated and most of the employees remained ignorant of the Scheme as well as the benefits arising therefrom. These circulars had been issued in 1980 and 1981. These circulars had provided that the employees who were desirous of switching over from Contributory Provident Fund Scheme to the Pension Scheme could opt for the same within a stipulated period. However, since many people did not come to know about the Scheme, the circulars did not attract a good response. Subsequently, the Financial Advisor and the Chief Accounts Officer issued a Circular to all Heads of Departments giving opportunity to Class-I and Class-II Officers who were in service as on 01.08.1982 to exercise the option up to 31st May, 1985. Again, the Scheme was not properly circulated and only very few employees of the Port Trust opted for the same. The Port Trust, therefore, issued another circular on 19th of February, 1986 and extended the time for exercising option till 30th June, 1986. Again, the circular met with very poor response. In the meantime, the petitioner after rendering 39 years of satisfactory service, retired from service with effect from 01.12.1990. It is not disputed that the petitioner received the entire benefits under the Contributory Provident Fund Scheme. After retirement, the petitioner and his family members settled at his Mohali residence in Punjab, House No. 730 Phase-III, B1, Mohali, Punjab. In December, 2000, the petitioner had come to visit his friends and relatives in New Delhi. During his visit he came to learn from his friends Trilok Singh, who had also retired from Kolkata Port Trust as Chief Hydrographer, about the introduction of the Pension Scheme and its benefits for the retired employees. The petitioner, thereafter, got in touch with one of his friends, viz., one Mr. N.K. Kapur and sought for details of the Scheme. He was informed that the Pension Scheme dated 9th January, 1997 had been framed for grant of Pension in lieu of Provident Fund for those employees who retired from service on or after 1.1.1986 with Contributory Provident Fund benefits. The Scheme had been circulated to Chairmen of all the major Port Trusts as well as to the Deputy Chairmen of all Dock Labour Boards. He was, therefore, able to collect a copy of the same and it is annexed as 'P-1' to the writ petition. It is a case of the petitioner that the aforesaid Scheme ought to have been brought to the notice of the petitioner by suitable notice or publicity. In fact, he claimed that it was the duty of the Port Trust to communicate the Scheme to the retired employees personally. The petitioner complained that the Scheme itself had been issued for the benefit of all retirees who had retired after 1.1.1986. Therefore, the petitioner was not aware about the Scheme, otherwise he would have exercised the option to come over to Pension Scheme. On coming to know about the Scheme, the Petitioner submitted a representation to the Kolkata Port Trust on 2.2.2001, requesting that he be allowed to switch over from CPF to Pension Scheme. But the petitioner came to know that the Pension Scheme had been published in 'The Statesman'. Since the petitioner was living in Mohali, he never came across the publication in 'The Statesman' as it is not in wide circulation in Punjab. The petitioner also claimed that the Port Trust has extended the benefits of the Pension Scheme to many other employees by condoning the delay. This delay was condoned by the Port Trust either on their own or in accordance with the orders passed by different Courts in proceedings initiated by the aggrieved employees. Therefore, by letter dated 24th of September, 2001, the petitioner again requested that he be allowed to switch over to the Pension Scheme. In his representation, the petitioner relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Indra Bhusan Dutta v. Calcutta Port Trust W.P. No. 591 of 1996, delivered on 28th July, 1998 by S.B. Sinha, J., and a judgment in the case of Amiya Ghosh v. Calcutta Port W.P. No. 42 of 2000 delivered by Aloke Chakrabarti, J. It was pointed out that no appeal has been filed against the aforesaid two judgments and they had been implemented. The petitioner, therefore, claimed the same relief on the principle of parity. However, the claim was rejected on 03.12.01. The reasons given for the rejection was that the relevant circulars were duly communicated to the existing employees through display, on the Notice Boards of the Sections/departments by the concerned H.O.Ds and the option had been exercised by thousand of employees. It was also the case of the respondents that the 1997 circular was widely circulated in leading newspapers in English, Hindi and Bangali and thousand of retirees who retired after 1.1.1986 or their widows had exercised the options. Therefore, the petitioner can not claim ignorance of the Pension Scheme. But the petitioner further claimed that the circular dated 9.1.1997 was further clarified by a subsequent letter dated 15th April, 1997 by which the last date for exercising the option was extended from 31.03.1997 to 30.09.1997. Even, this time was further extended up to 31st of December, 1997. The learned single Judge also noticed the averments made in the affidavit-in-reply in which it has been stated that various Schemes for Pension were first introduced by the erstwhile Commissioners of the Port Trust from as early as on 29th of May, 1962. Thereafter, numerous circulars had been issued. All these circulars had been circulated whilst the petitioner was in service but he never opted for Pension Scheme. Therefore, the petitioner must be deemed to have waived and/ or abandoned his right to opt. These circulars had been attached as annexure 'R-I'.
3. After considering the entire fact situation and hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, learned single Judge has held that the petitioner would be entitled to exercise the option even now. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, the learned single Judge has distinguished the judgment or the Supreme Court in the case of V.K. Ramamurthy v. Union of India and Anr. : AIR1996SC2658 . The learned single Judge has observed that 'We are faced with the situation where thousands of employees similarly placed as the petitioner, have been conferred with the benefits of the Pension Scheme, but the claim of the petitioner has been denied on the ground that there was a conscious abandonment of rights by the petitioner.' The learned single Judge has rejected the objection raised by the respondents with the observation that no satisfactory answer has been given to the plea of the petitioner in relation to proper circulation through a newspaper. It is also observed by the learned single Judge that the intention of the Pension Scheme is benevolent. It was to give the benefit of the Pension to those persons who had retired 11 years prior to the date of the circulation. In these 11 years much had happened. The petitioner had relocated his family 1500 Kms. away from Kolkata in Mohali in the State of Punjab. In our opinion, the learned single Judge has correctly come to the conclusion that it would, therefore, be most unreasonable to expect that such a person who had retired 7 years prior to the date of the issuance of the circular would be well-conversant with the day to day affairs happening and taking place, more than 1500 Kms. away from his home, in Kolkata. In our opinion, the learned single Judge has also come to a correct conclusion that as far as circulation of the Scheme in 'The Statesman' 'The Telegraph', (Sanmarg' (Hindi) and 'The Ananda Bazar Patrika' (Bengali) are concerned, it is of no consequence as the Newspapers did not have wide circulation in Punjab. Therefore, it would be wholly unfair to deny the petitioner benefits of the Pension Scheme. The Judgment in V.K. Ramamurthy's case (supra) has also been correctly distinguished as in that case prior to superannuation, as many as six opportunities had been given to the petitioner and he chose not to exercise the option for the Pension Scheme. In fact, the petitioner therein deliberately chose to continue with the Provident Fund Scheme. The observations of the Supreme Court in V.K. Ramamurthy's case (supra) are as under:
That the Pension Scheme was introduced by the Railway Board since 16.11.1957 while the petitioner was still in service is not disputed. Further, the assertion of the railway administration that prior to the superannuation of the petitioner on 14.7.1972 as many as six options had been given to the petitioner to come over to the Pension Scheme and yet he did not choose to come over to the Pension Scheme and on the other hand deliberately chose to continue in the Provident Fund Scheme is also not disputed. The question that arises for consideration, therefore, is whether still the petitioner can option to go back to the Pension Scheme?
To be fair, Mr. Dutta had also cited the judgment in the case of Krishena Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. : (1991)ILLJ191SC . The aforesaid judgment has, also been correctly distinguished by the learned single Judge in para 13 of the judgment which is as under:
35. It would also appear that most of the petitioners before their filing these petitions had more than one opportunity to switch over to the Pension Scheme which they did not exercise. Some again opted for PF Scheme from the Pension Scheme.
4. These reasons, in our opinion, would not be available to the Port Trust in this case. The Scheme which was circulated on 9th January, 1997 has been framed specifically for providing an option to CPF retirees, who retired after 1.1.1986, to come over to the Pension Scheme. The Scheme categorically states that a number of requests relating to Pension had been received from time to time. This related to giving of option to CPF retirees who retired after 1.1.1986. The scheme had been introduced on the basis of the judgments rendered by the Bombay High Court in a number of writ petitions which are mentioned in the Scheme. The Scheme is exclusively for those persons who retired from service after 1.1.1986 and were governed by the CPF, and in whose case retirement benefits have also been paid under the CPF Scheme. They now had the option to have their retirement benefits calculated under the Pension Scheme provided they refund to the Port Trust the employers' contribution to the Contributory Provident fund and interest thereon. Under this Scheme, the employees were to exercise the option up to 31 of January, 1997. The date for exercising option was extended from time to time, by subsequent letters dated 15th of April, 1997 and 24th of November, 1997. The last date for exercising option was till 31st of December, 1997. Although benefits of the Scheme were for the employees who had retired 11 years prior to the Scheme, yet proper publicity throughout India was not given to the same.
5. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion, that the learned single Judge has rightly held that the petitioner has been unjustly denied the benefit of the right to exercise his option in our opinion, the learned single Judge also correctly distinguished the judgment cited by the respondents in the case of State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Madan Mohan Ghosh (2005)3 CHN 510. It was correctly held in the present case that there were no deliberate laches on the part of the petitioner in not opting within the cut off date. In our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot possibly be held that the petitioner was guilty of laches as there had hardly been any publication of the Scheme throughout India. In order to bind the petitioner it was necessary for the respondents to establish that the Scheme was duly circulated throughout India, and not only in the Newspapers circulated in the State of West Bengal. In his representation, the petitioner had clearly mentioned that a number of persons were similarly situated had been granted the benefits after condoning the delay. The claim of the petitioner, in our opinion, has been arbitrarily rejected. Similarly situated persons have been granted the necessary relief. This action of the respondents is clearly arbitrary and, therefore, violative of Article 14 or the Constitution or India. We also observe here that the introduction of the Scheme is for the benefit of the employees. Therefore, the Scheme is required to be liberally construed.
6. It is also settled that when construing a provision in a beneficial piece of legislation the Court would interpret the provision in such a way as to advance the purpose for which the legislation was enacted. The Court cannot adopt a narrow and doctrinaire approach. This legal proposition of law was laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Alembic Chemical, Works Co. Ltd., v. The Workmen reported in : (1961)ILLJ328SC . In this case it has been held as follows:
The answer to this question must be in the negative for two reasons; first, having regard to the obvious policy and object of the Act, if Section 79(1) is capable of two constructions that construction should be preferred which furthers the policy of the Act and is more beneficial to the employees in whose interest the Act has been passed. It is well settled that in construing the provisions of a welfare legislation courts should adopt what is sometimes described as a beneficent rule of construction.
7. This legal position has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Venkatiah and Anr. reported in : (1963)IILLJ638SC . Mr. P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Bench laid down the principle in the following words:
Mr. Doila contends that since this Act has been passed for conferring certain benefits on employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury, it is necessary that the operative provisions of the Act should receive a liberal and beneficent construction from the courts. It is a piece of social legislation intended to confer specified benefits on workmen to whom it applies, and so, it would be inappropriate to attempt to construe the relevant provisions in a technical or a narrow sense. This position cannot be disputed. But in dealing with the plea raised by Mr. Dolia that the Section should be liberally construed, we cannot overlook the fact that the liberal construction must ultimately flow from the words used in the Section. If the words used in the section are capable of two constructions one of which is shown patently to assist the achievement of the object of the Act, courts would be justified in preferring that construction to the other which may not be able to further the object of the Act. But, on the other hand, if the words used in the section are reasonably capable of only one construction and are clearly contractable (sic) in regard to the construction for which Mr. Dolia contends, the doctrine of liberal construction can be of no assistance.
8. This Legal position has also been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Deepla Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in : AIR2004SC2107 , In this case it has been held as follows:
53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby, See: Regional Director, ESI Corporation v. Ramanuja Match Industries.
54. The decision of this Court in Kunal Singh v. Union of India relied upon by Mr. Banerji cannot be said to have any application whatsoever in the instant case as therein this Court while considering the provisions of Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities) Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 held that the language thereof is plain and certain statutory obligation on the employer was case to protect an employee acquiling disability during service and only in that situation, it was observed; (SCC p.530, para 9)
9. ...In construing a provision of a social beneficial enactment that too dealing with disabled persons intended to give them equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation, the view that advances the object of the Act and serves its purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the Act.56. It is now well settled that for the purpose of interpretation of statute, same is to be read in its entirety. The purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect. The object underlying the statute is required to be given effect to by applying the principles of purposive construction.
9. This view was further reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Gamini Krishnayya and Ors. v. Guraza Seshachalam and Ors. reported in : [1965]1SCR195 . In this case it has been held that:
13. The answer to the view of the High Court be that in the first place every provision in the statute must be given effect to unless by doing so any conflict with any other provision of the Act would arise. In the second place we cannot ignore the object of the legislature in enacting this law which was to grant relief to the agriculturists and that any beneficial measure of this kind should, as far as permissible, be interpreted in such a way as to carry out the main object which the Legislature had in view....
10. In view of the aforesaid observations we are of the considered opinion that the claim of the petitioner has been illegally and arbitrarily denied.
11. The Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Captain Anadi Kumar Das v. The Calcutta Port Trust and Ors. A.P.O. No. 400 of 2002 arising out of W.P. No. 1830 of 2001, dated 4th of August, 2006 has observed as follows:
The writ petitioner-appellant categorically stated that the concerned circulars were never circulated amongst the retired employees and the said circular was not brought to the knowledge of the petitioner by the Calcutta Port Trust and thus the petitioner was deprived of the opportunity of exercising option and the same offended the principles of natural justice. It is needless to say that the circulation of the said orders extending benefit to the retired employees amongst all the concerned retired employees including the writ petitioner was a must and it was incumbent upon the Port Trust Authority to show that the said circular was brought to the knowledge of each and every concerned retired employee by the authority. In order to discharge the heavy onus upon the Calcutta Port Trust not a single scrap of paper was produced by the respondent to show that the said matter was circulated and reached the writ petitioner.
When the concerned Port Trust Authority did not perform its positive duty of communicating the said circular to the writ petitioner, the authority could not reap the benefit of delay in exercising the option. Such question of delay in exercising the option would have been relevant if the Port Trust Authority discharged its own obligation in communicating the order to the writ petitioner. In the teeth of failure of the Port Trust Authority to communicate the said circular to the employees rejection of his fresh option to come under the pension scheme in conformity with the circular is arbitrary, wrong, illegal and the same offends the principles of natural justice and the same cannot stand in law.
We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observasions of the Division Bench.
12. We are of the considered opinion that the judgment of the learned single Judge is well reasoned. We are entirely in agreement with the learned single Judge on the conclusions reached on facts as well as on law. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is, thus, dismissed.
Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.
13. I agree.
Later on:
Prayer for stay made by Mr. Kishore Dutta on behalf of the appellants is considered and rejected.