Sanjib Banerjee, J.
1. The added defendant petitions for the suit to be dismissed on the grounds that the plaint relating thereto discloses no cause of action and the suit is barred by law. In effect, the parties quibble over their rights as to large tracts of valuable land in commercial Howrah.
2. The narration of events has to begin with a reference to Suit No. 85 of 1984 wherein the plaintiffs' claim in such suit was discharged upon satisfaction in that regard being recorded by an order of November 27, 1991. The plaintiffs in the 1984 suit carried on business under the name and style of 'Himalayan) Trade Links' (hereinafter referred to as Himalayan. Himalayan had given a loan to Katihar Jute Mills Limited, the first defendant in the 1984 suit (hereinafter referred to as Katihar). Morgan Walker & Company Limited, the second defendant in the 1984 suit (hereinafter referred to as Morgan), had guaranteed repayment of the loan obtained by Katihar from Himalayan. Himalayan sued both the principal debtor and the guarantor in the 1984 suit.
3. Morgan gave the guarantee on Katihar's behalf against a counter-claim furnished by Pratap Properties Limited, the first defendant in this suit (hereinafter referred to as Pratap), and an equitable mortgage created by Pratap of some of its properties by deposit of title deeds relating thereto with Morgan. Shortly upon Himalayan seeking to press its claim against Katihar and Morgan, Morgan sought to enforce the mortgage created by Pratap by instituting Title Suit No. 12 of 1986 in the Court of the Second Civil Judge, Senior Division, at Howrah with the primary relief claimed being one for a decree for Rs. 70 lakh odd, about the amount of the claim made by Himalayan in the 1984 suit. It is the Howrah suit which has been transferred to this Court and in which the added defendant's application has now been made, inter alia, for dismissal of the action.
4. The substituted plaintiff in this suit, Salkia Estate Development Pvt. Limited (hereinafter referred to as Salkia or the substituted plaintiff), entered into an agreement with Morgan for discharging Morgan's debt to Himalayan. Salkia made an application in the other suit in November, 1991 for it to be recorded that the decretal debt of Himalayan had been fully and finally settled and satisfied on the terms and conditions mentioned at paragraph 7 of Salkia's application. Such terms are of some relevance but it is first the order that was made on Salkia's application in the 1984 suit that is to be seen. The order of November 27, 1991 records Salkia's assertion that it had entered into an agreement with Morgan by which Salkia had agreed to acquire Morgan's liability to Himalayan in consideration for assignment of Morgan's rights against Pratap on the counter guarantee. The order further records that Himalayan had agreed to accept Rs. 20 lakh in full and final settlement of its claim under the decree against the defendants in the suit and that Salkia had paid such sum of Rs. 20 lakh to Himalayan.
5. By the time that Salkia sought to step into Morgan's shoes and discharge Himalayan's debt on account of Morgan's guarantee furnished for the benefit of Katihar, Katihar had gone into liquidation and the 1984 suit proceeded, with leave under Section 446 of the Companies Act, against the official liquidator representing Katihar.
6. By the application made by Salkia in November, 1991, it required the Court to record the satisfaction of the decree of September 2, 1988 passed in the 1984 suit and for Salkia to be assigned whatever rights Morgan had to recover the amount from the official liquidator. In addition, Salkia sought to have certain other terms recorded, affecting Pratap. The order of November 27, 1991 noticed that Morgan had filed a suit against Pratap in Howrah, but declined to record the terms involving Pratap that Salkia desired should receive the imprimatur of Court, on the ground that no notice had been given to Pratap. It is best that the relevant portion of the order of November 27, 1991 be seen to appreciate the purport thereof:
In addition thereto there are some terms which are sought to be recorded which in my view may affect Pratap Properties Ltd. It may be mentioned that the defendant No. 2 had in the meantime filed a suit against Pratap Properties being Suit No. 12 of 1986 in the District Court of Howrah. As no notice of this application has been given to M/s. Pratap Properties Ltd. there will be an order in terms of prayer (a) of the petition except that the terms and conditions will not be binding on M/s. Pratap Properties Ltd., or affect its rights in any fashion whatsoever either in the Suit No. 12 of 1986 or otherwise. It is also recorded that this Court has not gone into the merits of the assignment of the defendant No. 2's right vis-a-vis M/s. Pratap Properties to the applicant in any manner whatsoever.
7. Prayer (a) of Salkia's application sought the recording of the terms and conditions mentioned at paragraph 7 of the application. Such terms were recorded, but only insofar as they related to the parties to the 1984 suit. Salkia's assumption of Morgan's rights qua Pratap were specifically kept outside the purview of the order. One of the terms that Salkia wanted to be recorded was as follows:
vi) It is recorded that in consideration of the defendant/judgment-debtor No. 2 (Morgan) transferring and assigning its right, title and interest under the counter-guarantee furnished by Messrs Pratap Properties Limited and assigning its mortgage security furnished by Pratap Properties Limited in favour of your petitioner Messrs Salkia Estate Development Private Ltd. as aforesaid, the defendant/judgment debtor No. 2 is hereby discharged as guarantor and in this regard, the consent of the plaintiffs/decree-holder Nos. 1 and 2 to the discharge of the defendant/judgment -debtor No. 2 as guarantor is also hereby recorded;
8. The recording sought by Salkia that Morgan's interest in the counter guarantee furnished by Pratap stood transferred and assigned in its favour, is deemed to have been refused by the order as the same would have affected Pratap's rights whether in the Howrah suit (now this suit) or otherwise. Similarly the recording that Salkia sought of the assignment in its favour of the mortgage by Pratap to Morgan, was also not recognised by the order of November 27, 1991. The other matter referred to in the sixth clause of paragraph 7 of Salkia's application, that Morgan stood discharged as guarantor to Himalayan, was recorded and accepted by Court as this was not a matter affecting Pratap.
9. Salkia applied to be substituted in place of Morgan in this suit. The Howrah Court allowed Salkia's application under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on July 14, 1992. Long afterwards, the applicant herein applied to be impleaded in the suit, claiming to be a lessee of the immovable property, or a part thereof, mortgaged by Pratap in favour of Morgan. The Trial Court rejected the plea. The Additional District Judge, Howrah, revised the order and required the applicant herein to be impleaded. Salkia carried the revisional order by way of a further revision before this Court, which failed. The Supreme Court declined to grant leave for special leave to appeal from the order of this Court, but clarified that the observations made by this Court should be deemed to be restricted to the issue of adding the applicant as a party. Thus, the applicant herein came to be added as the second defendant in the suit which now Salkia prosecutes, claiming to be the assignee of Morgan's rights; both under the counter guarantee and in respect of the equitable mortgage created by Pratap in favour of Morgan.
10. The applicant says that there is near complete identity between Salkia and Pratap such that Salkia would get a walkover in the suit if the applicant were not there. The applicant argues that on Salkia's showing, it cannot proceed with the suit as Salkia neither has any right to be assignee of the debt simpliciter nor can it assert a sub-mortgage. The applicant urges that in either case, whether as assignee of debt simpliciter or as assignee of the mortgage, Salkia would need to show at least an agreement in writing, which has not surfaced despite the clear challenge thrown in the present application. The applicant says that though Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 recognises a mortgage by deposit of title deeds being effective without registration, that is the sole exception to the creation of any mortgage without the transfer being supported by a written instrument that requires registration. The applicant says that an assignment of the mortgagee's rights, even in case of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds, would compulsorily require a written instrument and registration thereof. It is submitted that Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, as substantially incorporating the provisions of Section 17 of its predecessor statute of 1877, does not allow any leeway and gives no option to Court to accord any recognition to such transaction or subsequent transfer without the preconditions relating thereto being complied with.
11. According to the applicant, even if it were apparent that there was no registered instrument relating to the assignment of the mortgage by Morgan in favour of Salkia, Salkia may still assert its right under the counter guarantee. But again, the applicant argues, for assignment of such counter guarantee or the debt due thereunder the law requires a writing to be executed. The applicant first refers to the definition of 'actionable claim' found in the interpretation clause of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act:
3. Interpretation clause.-In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context,:'actionable claim' means a claim to any debt, other than a debt secured by mortgage of immovable property or by hypothecation or pledge of movable property, or to any beneficial interest in movable property not in the possession, either actual or constructive, of the claimant, which the Civil Courts recognise as affording grounds for relief, whether such debt or beneficial interest be existent, accruing, conditional or contingent;
12. The definition of 'actionable claim', urges the applicant, would require the assignment of the debt that Salkia claims to have been made by Morgan, to fall within its fold. Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act is cited to emphasise on the legal requirement necessary before a case of assignment of debt is accepted:
130. Transfer of actionable claim. - (1) The transfer of an actionable claim whether with or without consideration shall be effected only by the execution of an instrument in writing signed by the transferor or his duly authorised agent, shall be complete and effectual upon the execution of such instrument, and thereupon all the rights and remedies of the transferor, whether by way of damages or otherwise, shall vest in the transferee, whether such notice of the transfer as hereinafter provided be given or not:
Provided that every dealing with the debt or other actionable claim by the debtor or other person from or against whom the transferor would, but for such instrument of transfer as aforesaid, have been entitled to recover or enforce such debt or other actionable claim, shall (save where the debtor or other person is party to the transfer or has received express notice thereof as hereinafter provided) be valid as against such transfer.
(2) The transferee of an actionable claim may, upon the execution of such instrument of transfer as aforesaid, sue or institute proceedings for the same in his own name without obtaining transferor's consent to such suit or proceedings and without making him a party thereto.
Exception. - Nothing in this section applies to the transfer of a marine or fire policy of insurance or affects the provisions of Section 38 of the Insurance Act, 1938 (IV of 1938).
13. The short case run in this application is that neither the debt, without the security, nor the security covered by the equitable mortgage, can be enforced against Pratap and even the fact of Pratap being more than willing to suffer a decree will not permit the Court to make a decree in the absence of the statutory preconditions being met.
14. The applicant refers to a judgment reported at 27 Cal LJ 453 (Sakhiuddin Saha and Ors. v. Sonaulla Sarkar and Ors.) for the proposition that mortgage debt is immovable property. A passage at page 457 of the report is placed for the principle that if a mortgage debt is within the definition of 'immovable property' in the General Clauses Act, it is also within the definition of such property in Section 2(6) of the Registration Act, 1908; and it would follow that a mortgage debt is immovable property for the purpose of Section 17(b) of the Registration Act:
If that be the true view it would be sufficient in the case before us to say that where a mortgage debt is transferred by an instrument in writing and the value of the right, title or interest transferred is one hundred rupees or more, the writing requires registration under the Registration Act.
The Division Bench went on to hold that if a mortgage, even a simple mortgage, creates an interest in land, its transfer must be the transfer of an interest in land, compulsorily requiring registration before the Court can accept the transfer.
15. AIR 1922 Mad 344 (Elumalai Chetti and Anr. v. P. Balakrishna Mudaliar) is placed by the applicant for the proposition that a debt may be transferred if there is no registration of the writing recording the same, but the interest in the security does not pass without registration. The following passage at page 346 of the report has been placed:
In my view, in either case, if the debt is transferred by enforcement or otherwise, without the transferor taking care to transfer the mortgage right by a registered instrument, the debt and the security will get disassociated and the security may possibly cease.
In case, we are to hold that the security passes by the indorsement of the promissory-notes in cases of mortgages by deposit of title-deeds where notes have been taken for the mortgage amounts we must hold the same view with reference to any kind of mortgage where the mortgagee happens to have taken a promissory note for the mortgage amount; for the argument will be just the same.
We will also have to hold that not only the first indorsee but every subsequent indorsee, including even blank indorsees, will obtain the mortgage rights by indorsement unless of course, a different intention is manifest.
This view I think, will introduce a grave uncertainty into the registration of mortgages and render the records of registration offices unreliable in ascertaining in whom the mortgage right subsists, for the time being.
16. In the judgment reported at AIR 1947 All 117 (Benares Bank Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar Ltd. and Ors.), that the applicant cites next, it was held that a document that evidenced the assignment of a mortgage could still be treated as an assignment of debt with the security not passing if it was unregistered. In this case, the Benares Bank took a mortgage by deposit of title deeds from a constituent to secure a loan. The title deeds were deposited by the constituent with an undertaking to execute a mortgage over the properties in the English form, but the document was not executed. Benares Bank, in turn, obtained funds from the Bank of Bihar and made over the relevant title deeds, along with a host of others, to the Bank of Bihar. The Bank of Bihar launched a suit on the several mortgages created in its favour by Benares Bank where the original mortgagors were also impleaded, Benares Bank went into liquidation during the pendency of the suit. The suit was continued with leave under Section 171 of the Companies Act, 1913 and the official liquidator claimed that the charge of the immovable properties in favour of the Bank of Bihar was void for want of registration with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (much like Section 125 of the Companies Act, 1956). But the official liquidator's concern appears to have been misplaced since there was no registration of the instrument under the Registration Act, 1908. The parties proceeded at the trial on the basis that the instrument could only be seen as an assignment of the debt simpliciter without the security passing to the assignee. It was in such context and on the basis of a Privy Council judgment that the Allahabad High Court held in the first appeal that it would be too technical to suggest that upon the document failing as to the passing of the security thereunder in view of nonregistration, it could also not be treated as a writing for assignment of the debt contemplated by Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act.
17. The Privy Council decision referred to in the Allahabad case is also referred to here by the applicant. In the judgment reported at [Imperial Bank of India v. Bengal National Bank Limited (in liquidation)], it was held by the appellate order of this Court that fell for consideration before the Privy Council, that as a secured debt was not within the definition of 'accountable claim', the debt without security could not be made the subject of the transfer at all. The Privy Council held that it appeared to have escaped the notice of the Appellate Court that the definition of 'accountable claim' also excluded debt secured by hypothecation or pledge of moveable property; and it would be remarkable if merchants were unable to secure credit by disposing of their available book debts unless at the same time they could re-hypothecate or re-pledge the merchandise which they happened to hold. On facts, the Privy Council found that the assignee of the debt could only enforce the debt in the absence of registration of the document which spoke of the security passing.
18. The applicant has also relied on Sections 91 and 92 of the Transfer of Property Act but since Section 91 speaks of persons who may be entitled to redeem a mortgage and Section 92 refers to subrogation, such provisions do not appear to be apposite in the context.
19. The substituted plaintiff says that the second defendant-applicant came in on its own accord and cannot now seek dismissal of the suit. Salkia reminds that for the plaint to be rejected, it has to be read as a whole as to whether it discloses any cause of action or appears to be ex facie barred by any law. It says that since neither the original plaintiff nor Salkia recognised the rights of the applicant, neither sought to implead the applicant. Salkia would not mind the name of the second defendant being deleted since Salkia had, all along, objected to the second defendant coming on board and queering Salkia's pitch. Salkia urges that on an application for dismissal of the suit by one of the defendants, the Court may dismiss it against the applying defendant but would not proceed to reject the plaint altogether. A Full Bench decision reported at (Balwant Singh v. State Bank of India and Ors.) is cited and paragraph 11 thereof placed:
11. As a result of the above discussion, I hold that the plea raised by the petitioner is untenable and the contrary view is neither sound nor just and is not warranted by the language of the statute. Consequently, my answer to the question posed is that the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, would be attracted only in a case where by reason of the plea that a plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the plaintiff is to be wholly non-suited, but this rule would have no applicability to cases where a plaint discloses a cause of action in respect of the part of the claim against some of the defendants, as in that event the names of the defendants against whom there is no cause of action or the suit is barred by law, have to be struck off and the suit has to proceed against the remaining defendants. The case would now go back to the learned Single Judge for disposal on merits.
20. Salkia points out that despite the applicant being impleaded, Salkia has sought no relief against the applicant and it would not object to having the applicant's name being struck off and the suit proceeded with against the solitary, original defendant. Salkia also refers to the judgment reported at : [1999]1SCR983 (D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman and Ors.) and places paragraph 10 thereof for the proposition that Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure enjoins the Court to reject the plaint where it does not disclose a cause of action, but there is no question of striking out any part of the pleading under such rule. The Supreme Court judgment was rendered in the context of an election petition and a distinction was made between the requirements of the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 on the one hand and Order 6 Rule 16 and Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code on the other. The Supreme Court found impropriety in the order impugned as it had chosen to test the veracity and sufficiency in the allegations of the election petition by taking note of the facts pleaded by the returned candidate in his counter-affidavit. The Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the provisions of the Representation of the People Act the Court could not embark on a enquiry into the sufficiency of the pleadings in an election petition on an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code.
21. It is the case that the substituted plaintiff next brings that is the most apposite in the context of the challenge thrown by the applicant. In the judgment reported at 4 Cal LJ 102 (Gokul Das and Anr. v. Eastern Mortgage and Agency Company Limited and Ors.), a Division Bench of this Court found a good equitable sub-mortgage, despite the document relating thereto not being registered. The defendants in the suit had urged that the plaintiff had no right as sub-mortgagee upon the relevant document being unregistered. The Division Bench answered the question as follows:
We think it is quite clear, from the evidence of Bhupendra Nath Bose, who was Dhanpat Singh's own solicitor, and of Srish Chandra Roy Chowdhury, a pleader, that these three mortgage deeds were in fact deposited with Bhupendra as the agent of the plaintiffs to secure the debt then due from Dhanpat Singh to them. There can be very little doubt but the mortgage was concluded on that day. It was a valid mortgage under Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act and did not require registration. A valid mortgage had been created before the letter of the 19th June, 1893. The letter of the 19th June speaks of the sub-mortgage as having been already made and was written by Dhanpat Singh at the suggestion of the pleader Srish Chandra Chowdhury as an admission by him that this sub-mortgage had been created. Reliance has been placed upon a passage in the letter that the deeds were not to be parted with without the mutual consent of himself and the plaintiffs or under an order of the Court. It is said that this shows that Dhanpat Singh still retained control over the deeds, but it is clear that this is not what was intended. It was probably only meant that the plaintiffs were not to part with the deeds without giving Dhanpat Singh an opportunity of paying off their debt, and getting them back, as the debt of the Roys to him was so much greater than his debt to the plaintiffs. We entirely agree, therefore, with the Subordinate Judge in holding that a good equitable sub-mortgage was created in favour of the plaintiffs on the 3rd June 1893, that the object of the letter of the 19th June, 1893 was not to constitute the contract between the parties, but was written with the object and for the purpose we have stated, and that, consequently, it did not require registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act.
22. Though there is considerable force in what the applicant urges, particularly upon no document emerging from the substituted plaintiff as to the creation of the sub-mortgage, and the consequence thereof being the relief for enforcement of the mortgage being apparently barred, what needs to be assessed is as to whether the substituted plaintiff has no case to carry to the trial. The Gokul Das case that the substituted plaintiff cites shows a clear discussion on Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act which permits the creation of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds without any further act. The Gokul Das case also finds that a transferee of an equitable mortgage would need no registration to rely on such transfer or to-enforce the mortgage. A later Division Bench judgment of this Court relied upon by the applicant appears to hold a contrary view, as do the judgments of Allahabad and Madras referred to earlier. The Gokul Das view seems also to have been overruled by the Privy Council in the Imperial Bank case where the Privy Council held that even if the title deeds were not available as security, the writing evidencing the creation of the sub-mortgage, albeit unregistered, may be relied upon only for the enforcement of the debt. The Privy Council proceeded on the basis, as the appellate order of the High Court before it also proceeded, that the transfer of the rights of a mortgagee required registration in every case. The specific issue noticed in the Gokul Das case, that of no registration being required under Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act for mortgage by deposit of title deeds and of transferees of such mortgage being entitled to the same exemption, does not appear to have been directly addressed in the Imperial Bank case that reached the Privy Council. However attractive it may appear that in the manner that the Privy Council accepted the requirement of registration of a sub-mortgage there can be no further argument on the legal question, it is possible that the matter is not so completely shut for the substituted plaintiff to rely on the Gokul Das dictum.
23. What the parties show are two apparently conflicting views taken by the Division Bench of this Court within a decade with an apparent pronouncement thereon by the Privy Council. But the question directly addressed in the Gokul Das case did not fall for consideration in the Privy Council judgment in the Imperial Bank case. An enquiry to assess the legal issue may not be necessary. Even if the question is answered in favour of the applicant, that would only imply that the substituted plaintiff would not be entitled to enforce the mortgage against Pratap; it would not, by itself, render the entire suit bad, particularly in the light of the tentative view taken on the substituted plaintiffs claim on the debt simpliciter.
24. There is no doubt that even if a document is not received, for want of registration, to evidence the transfer of a mortgage, the writing may still be looked into to ascertain whether the debt simpliciter was assigned thereby. Salkia has not produced any document to show that an agreement was contemporaneously entered into with Morgan, far less that such agreement was subsequently registered. Yet, there is the order of November 27, 1991 that accepts and records all matters between the parties to the 1984 suit but excludes only the matters that the applicant therein required to be recorded as against Pratap. Thus far, Salkia has produced no writing of the nature that would answer the description recognised by Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act or would pass the test for Salkia to proceed against the security furnished by Pratap to Morgan. But there is Salkia's written application including the terms set out at paragraph 7 thereof, of which Morgan had notice and the Court was satisfied before it made an order in terms of prayer (a) of the application, leaving out merely such matters as did not relate to the parties in the suit. The application, and the Court's recognition thereof in making the order may or may not pass the test set down in Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act, but it would leave the substituted plaintiff with a thin but arguable case.
25. For an application of such nature to succeed and for the progress of the suit to be permanently arrested, the Court has to conclusively find that the suit is bound to fail. The benefit of the doubt, if there be one, goes to the plaintiff in an application of the present kind. The substituted plaintiff has brought itself in place of the original plaintiff and has carried out minor amendments to the plaint. As it stands today, the plaint speaks of this plaintiffs right to seek a decree on the debt and also a right to enforce the mortgage. What the added defendant-applicant asserts is that the plaint does not say that there is any assignment in writing of the debt or even if there is any assignment in writing, whether there is any registration thereof to entitle the substituted plaintiff to proceed against the security. Despite the substituted plaintiffs assertion in its affidavit in the present application that no agreement in writing was necessary to be executed, and the near inescapable implication of such statement that there is no such document, it is a matter of evidence and construction. There is a doubt and the plaintiff cannot be non-suited ahead of the trial when there is a doubt.
26. The other aspect is in the plaintiff's application for substitution being allowed and remaining unchallenged. In receiving such application and recognising Salkia's right to replace Morgan under the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code, there is a prima facie view as to Salkia's rights that the Court has taken which, in the circumstances, it may be impermissible to dislodge, at least at the pre-trial stage before a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, on the strength of the argument that the added defendant-applicant makes. In the order made by the Howrah Court in July of 1992 it accepted, for the purpose of allowing the substituted plaintiff to replace the original, that a case of assignment, creation or devolution of interest during the pendency of the suit had taken place. On such basis the Court had allowed the substituted plaintiff to continue the suit as the person upon whom the interest had come or devolved. The applicant succeeded in getting a firm toehold in the suit only upon the Supreme Court order of May 7, 2002 refusing to grant leave to appeal from the order passed by this Court rejecting the revisional application against the Additional District Judge's order allowing the applicant to be impleaded. The applicant was aware all along as to the nature of the claim being pursued by the substituted plaintiff; and, of the substituted plaintiff having replaced the original in 1992. Yet the present application was made only in June of 2007. Mere delay in seeking dismissal of a suit may not be an absolute bar, but would be a relevant consideration.
27. The result is that the suit survives, but only just, in the face of the robust challenge brought by the added defendant-applicant. That is not to suggest that the plaintiff has succeeded in overcoming the challenge but merely that the plaintiff succeeds in postponing a more comprehensive adjudication on the challenge till the trial.
28. As a corollary to the grounds urged for rejection of the plaint, the applicant suggests that the subsisting orders in favour of the plaintiff should be vacated as the legal grounds on which the suit stands are suspect and uninspiring. Since the plaintiffs application for injunction is pending, the applicant is left to take all points to seek vacating of the subsisting order without prejudice to the fate that this application meets.
The applicant will be entitled to costs assessed at 5000 GMs in the event that grounds urged in this application ultimately succeed at the trial. GA No. 1876 of 2007 is disposed of on the above basis.
29. Urgent certified photostat copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.