ORDER
M.C. Ghose, J.
1. Upon hearing the advocate for the accused it appears that the petitioner's son was charged with an offence under Section 17(2), Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act in April 1932 and the said son absconded and could not be found. The petitioner was appointed a special Police Officer and was directed to produce his son at the police station. On 24th November 1933, about 18 months afterwards a Police Officer went to the petitioner's house and demanded him to produce his son whereupon the petitioner sent for his son who was said to have gone out for a walk, and when the son came back the petitioner produced him to the Police Officer without delay. Upon these facts the petitioner has been convicted under Section 212, I.P.C. The two facts upon which the learned Sessions Judge has based the conviction are (1) that the petitioner knew the whereabouts of his son and (2) that he did not himself produce the son nor gave information to the Police Officer as to the whereabouts of the son.
2. It is urged by the advocate that these facts are not sufficient to amount to a harbouring within the definition of Section 216-B, I.P.C. There it is stated that 'harbour' includes the supplying a person with shelter, food, drink, money, cloths, arms, ammunition or means of conveyance or the assisting a person in any way to evade apprehension. Mere knowledge of the whereabouts of an offender does not amount to harbouring him: See in this connexion the case of Emperor v. Husain Bakhsh (1903) 25 All 261 where the accused men actually tried to mislead the police by telling lies as to the whereabouts of the offender and yet they were found not to have harboured him. The present case is stronger inasmuch as the petitioner produced the offender to the police as soon as the police demanded him. In the circumstances, the conviction is set aside and the fine, if paid, will be refunded.