P.K. Chattopadhyay, J.
1. The order of reference made by the Government of West Bengal referring the dispute to the tribunal under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act has been challenged in the instant writ petition by the petitioners herein.
2. Petitioners are engaged in the trade of manufacturing and sale of 'Biri' and have claimed that in their usual course of business, they do not engage any employee/home worker/Biri roller for manufacturing or rolling Biris at their Biri factory or industrial premises.
3. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that they get supply of rolled unbranded Biris from their Biri suppliers or independent contractors with whom the petitioners entered into agreements for getting supply of unbranded Biris. According to the petitioners, the said Biri suppliers or independent contractors have their own separate business and industrial premises wherein they manufacture Biris by employing their own labourers or workers. It has been specifically stated by the petitioners that the petitioners employ labourers in their Biri factories only for the purpose of toasting, labelling and packing the 'Biris' as supplied by the independent contractors apart from employing staff for administrative work, marketing purpose and accounting purpose,
4. Petitioners have stated that for the purpose of getting supply of Kancha Biri' or 'Unbranded Biri' on or about 2nd June 1986, the petitioners had entered into contract and/or agreement separately with each one of the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 and also with about 35 other Biri suppliers. It has also been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that in the year 1986 petitioners herein entered into contract with about 40 'Kancha Biri' suppliers or independent contractors including the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 for the purpose of getting supply of 'Unbranded' or 'Kancha Biri' at its Jhalda Biri Factory.
5. It has been stated by the petitioners that the said 'Kancha Biri' suppliers or independent contractors supplied regularly 'Kancha Biri' or 'Unbranded Biri' of the petitioners at their 'Biri' factory at Jhalda and after receiving supply of the said 'Kancha Biri', petitioners toasted, labelled/ branded the same with the help of the employees/workers engaged directly by the petitioners and also through labour contractors who were working at the industrial premises of the petitioner at Jhalda and thereafter made the said 'Biris' marketable to fit in the brand names of the petitioners.
6. Petitioners have also claimed that they had entered into separate agreement or contract with each one of the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 for getting supply of Kancha Biri' or 'Unbranded Biri' for a period of one year commencing from 2nd June 1986 to 31st May 1987. According to the petitioners, the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 with the help of some local people started putting pressure on the Manager and other managerial staff of the petitioners at Jhalda Biri Factory from the month of October 1.986 demanding more orders for the supply of 'Kancha Biri' over and above their existing quota. The said respondents with the help of other antisocial elements numbering about 100 attacked the factory premises of the petitioners at Jhalda, which prompted the said petitioners to cancel and/ or rescind the existing agreements between the petitioners and the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 for getting supply of 'Kancha Biri' pre-maturely on or about November 1986.
7. The Assistant Labour Commissioner, Purulia as the Conciliation Officer entertained a representation submitted by the respondent No. 5, herein, in connection with the alleged retrenchment of the 7 contractors, namely respondent Nos. 6 to 12, herein, but the petitioners all along took a firm stand that no industrial dispute could arise out of the cancellation of the agreements between the petitioners and the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 herein who according to the said petitioners were solely contractors and not workmen.
8. According to the petitioners, the alleged retrenchment of the contractors cannot be brought within the mischief of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and it was also contended by the petitioners that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 cannot be made applicable in the facts of the present case. It was also contended on behalf of the petitioners that The Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 and The West Bengal Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1968 are special statutes and have been enacted by the legislature for the welfare and benefit of the workers/ employees employed in the 'Biri' industry.
9. It has been stated by the petitioners that their representative appeared at the Joint Conference held before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Purulia on 16th May 1990 and specifically submitted before the said Assistant Labour Commissioner that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 cannot be made applicable in the present case as specificremedy has been provided in this regard under the provisions of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 and The West Bengal Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1968.
1O. The Conciliation Officer ultimately submitted a report before the appropriate authority of the Government of West Bengal on 23rd October 1990 rejecting the objections raised by the petitioners both on the points of law and fact and pursuant to the said report of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, the disputes between the parties were referred to the Ninth Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. By the order of the Governor, Assistant Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Labour Department, issued the order on 1st July 1991 referring the dispute to the said Ninth Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of the following issues:
'1. Whether termination of services of (1) Sri Nehal Kumar, (2) Sri Juran Kumar, (3) Sri Radhanath Kumar, (4) Sri Lilu Kumar, (5) Sri Umesh Kumar, (6) Sri Mantu Kumar, (7) Sri Ananta Kumar of M/s. Ashok Beedi Factory with effect from 24.11.86 is justified?
2. What relief, if any, are they entitled to?'
11. Challenging the validity and/or legality of the aforesaid order dated 1st July 1991 issued by the Assistant Secretary to the Government of West Bengal referring the disputes under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Ninth Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of the issues mentioned therein, the petitioners herein filed the present writ petition.
12. The petitioners raised the question of validity and/or legality of the order of reference on the ground that the alleged disputes between the parties cannot come within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and according to the petitioners all the affairs relating to employment including wrongful discharge, dismissal or retrenchment of service of the workers employed in the 'Biri' Industry are governed by the provisions of The Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 and the rules framed thereunder. Some of the relevant provisions which are necessary for the purpose of adjudication of the points involved in this petition are set out hereunder:
'Section 2(d). 'Contractor' means a person who, in relation to a manufacturing process, undertakes to produce a given result by executing the work through contract labour or who engages labour for any manufacturing process in a private dwelling house and includes a sub-contractor, agent, munshi, thekedar, or sattedar.
Section 2(i). 'Industrial Premises' means any place or premises (not being a private dwelling house), including the precincts thereof, in which or in any part of which any industry or manufacturing process connected with the making of beedi and cigar or both is being, or is ordinarily, carried on with or without the aid of power [and includes a godown attached thereto];
Section 31. Notice of dismissal.--(1) No employer shall dispense with the services of an employee who has been employed for a period of sixmonths or more except for a reasonable cause and without giving such employee at least one month's notice or wages in lieu of such notice:
Provided that such notice shall not be necessary if the services of such employee are dispensed with on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an inquiry held by the employer for the purpose.
(2)(a) The employee discharged, dismissal or retrenched may appeal to such authority and within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services or on the ground that he had not been guilty of misconduct as held by the employer or on the ground that such punishment of discharge or dismissal was severe.
[(2-A) The appellate authority shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), when trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:-
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; and
(b) compelling the production of documents and material objects.]
(b) The appellate authority may, after giving notice in the prescribed manner to the employer and the employee, dismiss the appeal or direct the reinstatement of the employee-with or without wages for the period during which he was kept out of employment or direct payment of compensation without reinstatement or grant such other relief as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case.
(3) The decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the parties and be given effect to within such time as may be specified in the order of the appellate authority.'
13. Rule 26 of The West Bengal Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1968 is also set out hereunder:
'26. Appeals under Section 31.--(1) The appellate authority for the purposes of Sub-section (2) of Section 31 shall be the Deputy Labour Commissioner of the area concerned.
(2) An employee who is discharged, dismissed or retrenched may prefer an appeal under Sub-section (2) of Section 31, to the appellate authority specified under Sub-rule (1) within a period of thirty days from the date of communication of the order of such discharge, dismissal or retrenchment:
Provided that an appeal may be admitted after the said period of thirty days if the appellant satisfies the appellate authority that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the said period.
3) The notice to be given by the appellate authority under Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 31 shall-
(a) in the case of a notice to an employer, be in Form No. VIII; and
(b) in the case of a notice to an employee, be in Form No. IX;
and every such notice shall be sent to the party concerned by registered post with acknowledgment due.'
14. The learned advocate of the petitioners raised an objection as to the maintainability of the order of reference made by the State Government under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on the ground that the disputes between the parties herein cannot be regarded as 'Industrial Disputes' and as such the same cannot be referred by the State Government under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Industrial Tribunal for necessary adjudication.
15. According to the learned counsel of the petitioners, respondent Nos. 6 to 12 herein were appointed as contractors by the petitioners and the definition of 'Industrial Dispute' does not include any dispute' with the contractor. Referring to the definition of Industrial Dispute as mentioned in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, learned counsel of the petitioners submitted that in order to be an 'Industrial Dispute' it has to be a dispute or difference between the employers and employees or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person.
16. The learned counsel of the respondents, however, submitted that the aforesaid objection regarding maintainability of the order of reference as raised on behalf of the petitioners herein should be raised before the tribunal and should be decided by the tribunal only after hearing the parties and also after taking into considerations of the evidence and materials on record.
17. Referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court, Mr. Pradip Kumar Ghosh, learned senior counsel of the petitioners submitted that in absence of any 'Industrial Dispute' appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference and as such in the present case, High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition when specific allegation has been raised that no 'Industrial Dispute' either exists or can be apprehended in the facts of the present case.
18. The learned counsel of the petitioners referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan reported in : (2000)ILLJ247SC . The relevant portion from Paragraph 25 of the said decision is quoted hereunder:
'25....... ................................................ HighCourt has jurisdictionto entertain a writ petition when there is allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be subject matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial Tribunal, which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended appropriate government lacks power to make any reference.......'
19. Mr. Ghosh also relied upon paragraph 24 of the said decision wherein the earlier decision of the Apex Court in the case of Workmen Employed by Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. has been quoted. The said paragraph 24 of the aforesaid decision is also set out hereunder:
'24. In Workmen Employed by Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. : (1984)IILLJ391SC , : [1982]1SCR183 this Court said as under (para 4):
Section 10(1) confers power on the appropriate Government to refer an existing or apprehended industrial dispute, amongst others, to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The dispute therefore, which can be referred for adjudication of necessity, has to be an industrial dispute which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference, and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it.'
20. Learned counsel of the petitioners further submitted that the question of maintainability of the order of reference on the ground of non-existence of an 'Industrial Dispute' cannot be decided by the Industrial Tribunal as the said Tribunal itself is a creature of the statute and derives its jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue only on the basis of valid order of reference. The learned counsel of the petitioners also referred to paragraphs 28 and 29 of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in the case of National Engineering Industries Ltd. (supra). The relevant portions from the said paragraphs 28 and 29 are quoted hereunder:
'28. Industrial Tribunal is the creation statute and it gets jurisdiction on the basis of reference. It cannot go into the question on validity of reference. Question before the High Court was one of jurisdiction, which it failed to consider.....
29.....It (StateGovernment) could not direct the appellant to raise its objection to reference before the Industrial Tribunal for which Industrial Tribunal certainly lacked Jurisdiction. State Government before making the reference did not consider all the relevant considerations which would clothe it with the power to make the reference under Section 10 of the Act.....This also shows non-application of mind by the State Government in making the reference.'
21. Referring to various annexures to the writ petition, learned counsel of the petitioners submitted that the State Government could not have made an order of reference invoking the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as according to the petitioners subject matter of dispute was termination of contract of 7 contractors who by no means could be regarded as workmen for the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
22. Mr. Ghosh, learned senior counsel of the petitioners referred to various representations made by and/or on behalf of the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 herein and contended that the said respondent Nos. 6 to 12 were all along described as the contractors and not as workmen and as such the Government had no authority to treat the contractors as workmen and to refer the dispute before the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. According to the learned counsel of the petitioners, dispute with a contractor cannot be regarded as the 'Industrial Dispute' under the definition of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and accordingly, such dispute cannot be referred to a tribunal for adjudication.
23. Learned counsel of the State respondents, however, submitted that the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 are the workmen of the Ashok Biri Factory, the petitioner No. 1, herein had been manufacturing 'Biris' for the said petitioner company for last 20 years along with other persons. According to the learned counsel of the respondent authorities of the Government of West Bengal, the said respondent Nos. 6 to 12 though engaged others to work along with them for the purpose of manufacturing the 'Biri' of the petitioner company but the same cannot mean that they became contractors instead of workmen of the petitioner company. According to the learned counsel of the State respondents, the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 never ceased to be workmen on the ground that they allowed others to work along with them for the purpose of manufacturing the 'Biris' of the petitioner company.
24. Mr. Rabi Lal Moitra, learned Government pleader, representing the State respondents further submitted that the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 herein all along worked for manufacturing the 'Biris' of the petitioner company as workmen and merely because the said respondent Nos. 6 to 12 allowed other persons to work along with them and also took the responsibility for making payment of their remuneration, the same cannot take away the status of workmen of the said respondent Nos. 6 to 12 herein.
25. According to Mr. Moitra, the said respondent Nos. 6 to 12 also had been manufacturing the 'Biris' for the petitioner company and therefore, they should be regarded as workmen even though they allowed others to work along with them and paid their remuneration regularly. Mr. Moitra referred to and relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra and Ors., reported in : (1957)ILLJ477SC .
26. The learned advocate of the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 virtually adopted the submissions made by the learned counsel of the State respondents.
27. Admittedly, in most of the representations made before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 were treated as contractors but at least in one representation annexed at page 44 of the writ petition, the said respondent Nos. 6 to 12 claimed themselves as workmen and they have specifically stated in the said representation that they had been manufacturing 'Kancha Biri' for the factory of the petitioners. In view of the aforesaid representation, it cannot be said that the respondents, particularly the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 also accepted all along that they had been working as contractors and accordingly, it cannot be said that the said respondent Nos. 6 to 12 were admittedly contractors of the petitioner company.
28. From the report of the Conciliation Officer (which was submitted in course of hearing by the learned counsel of the State respondents), it appears that the Assistant Labour Commissioner although treated the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 as contractors but also held that there was master and servant relationship between the company and the said contractors and they were given wages by way of remuneration. The relevant extract from the said report of the Assistant Labour Commissioner is quoted hereunder:
'The fact of this case clearly indicates that these seven contractors were employed by the Manufacturer/Trade Mark Holder (M/s. Ashok Beedi Factory, Jhalda). They had to receive raw materials from the said manufacturer and delivered the manufactured beedis (Unbranded Beedis) to the Manufacturer/Trade Mark Holder. And for the purpose of Beedi Rolling they used to employ Beedi Roller for and on behalf of the Manufacturer/Trade Mark Holder. The final power of rejection was vested with the Manufacturer/Trade Mark Holder and through this power of rejection as well as through the distribution of raw materials and remuneration the employer exercised sufficient control and supervision over these contractors. There was master and servant relationship between the company and these contractors. They were given wages by way of remunerations.'
29. In view of the aforesaid observations and/or findings of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, it cannot be said that the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 were admittedly engaged as contractors only and cannot be regarded as workmen under any circumstances.
30. Whether the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 were engaged as contractors only or they had been working as workmen and also as contractors of the petitioner No. 1 cannot be decided by this Court in its constitutional writ jurisdiction and the same should be decided by an appropriate legal forum after allowing the parties to adduce evidence and after considering the materials and evidence on record.
31. Accordingly, I am not inclined to accept the submissions of the learned counsel of the petitioners that the disputes in the present case should be regarded as disputes between a manufacturer and contractors instead of disputes between employer and workmen. It has not yet been established by an appropriate legal forum that the said respondent Nos. 6 to 12 were engaged as contractors only by the petitioner company and they were never allowed to work in addition to their functioning as contractors. So, the aforesaid issue whether the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 were engaged as workmen or not should be decided by an appropriate legal forum on evidence.
32. What functions were actually being performed by the said respondent Nos. 6 to 12 are the question of facts and the appropriate Labour Court orTribunal on a consideration of the evidences should come to a proper conclusion as regards the functions of the said respondent Nos. 6 to 12.
33. Whether an employee is a workman or not should be determined on the basis of the primary, basic and pre-dominant duty performed by the said employee and not by the incidental duties performed by him.
34. For the aforementioned reasons whether the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 were employees of the petitioner company or not should be decided by the appropriate Labour Court or tribunal in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
35. The next question now arises whether the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 should be made at all applicable in the facts of the present case.
36. Mr. Ghosh specifically contended that the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 should seek their remedy under the provisions of The Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 as the said Act is a special statute dealing with the matters relating to employment in the 'Biri' Industry. Mr. Ghosh further submitted that the said special Act has been given overriding effect over any other law or agreement. Mr. Ghosh referred to Section 40(1) of the said Act of 1966 in this regard which is quoted hereunder:
'Section 40. Effect of laws and agreements inconsistent with this Act.--(1) The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in the terms of any award, agreement, or contract of service whether made before or after the commencement of this Act:
Provided that where under any such award, agreement, contract of service or otherwise an employee is entitled to benefits in respect of any matters which are more favourable to him than those to which he will be entitled to under this Act, the employee shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that matter notwithstanding that he receives benefits in respect of other matters under this Act.'
37. The Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 is a complete code and the definitions of contractor, employee, contract labour and employer have also been provided in the said Act.
38. Under provisions of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 status of a contractor is of an employer and he has not been given the status of 'workmen'. Under the provisions of The West Bengal Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1968, a Contractor has to take out a licence for his industrial premises. He has also to file monthly return in Form No. XI, Annual Return in Form No. XII as employer of the workers who are working under him.
39. From the report of the Conciliation Officer it appears that the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 were holding valid licences--under the category-L-2 and L-4 issued in their names under Central Excise Act, which are issued under the said Act to the manufacturers of Tobacco-products/Beedi. The Conciliation Officer has also observed in his report to the followingeffect:--
'whenever a manufacturer employs a contractor the first and foremost condition is that the Contractor should possess L-2 and L-4 licences.'
40. Mr. Ghosh referred to and relied upon a Full Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. Union of India and Ors., reported in : (1974)ILLJ367SC . In paragraph 17of the said judgment, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder:
'17. The Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 is an Act to provide for the welfare of the workers in beedi and cigar establishments and to regulate the conditions of their work and for matters connected therewith. The special feature of the industry was the manufacture of beedis through contractors and by distributing work in the private dwelling house, where the workers took raw materials given by the employers of contractors.............'
41. Mr. Ghosh, learned senior counsel of the petitioners referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vegotis Pvt. Ltd. v. The Workmen reported in : (1971)IILLJ567SC and subsequent decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Management, Burma Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company of India Ltd., Madras v. The Industrial Tribunal Andhra Pradesh and Ors. reported in (1975) Lab IC 165 and submitted that when a specific Act has been provided to regulate matters relating to Beedi and Cigar industries and particularly the problems relating to the workers and contractors in Beedi and Cigar Establishments then provisions of the said Act should be applied in order to resolve the disputes raised by the workers and/or contractors in respect of the said Beedi and Cigar Establishments.
42. In the present case, a dispute has been raised whether the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 should be regarded as workmen or contractors. According to the learned counsel of the State respondents, the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 cannot cease to be workmen by reason of the fact that they used to work along with others and those persons working along with the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 were controlled and paid by the said respondents.
43. In any event, whether the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 should be regarded as workmen or contractors should be decided after considering the various special factors and features of the 'Biri' Industry and accordingly, the parties herein must find out the remedy under the special statute prescribed in this regard, namely. The Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966.
44. The respondents herein all along sought to resolve the disputes under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ignoring the provisions of the aforesaid special statute, namely, The Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 and rules framed thereunder.
45. When a special statute has been subsequently enacted by the legislature then the parties must seek remedy under the said statute alone without referring to any other law and/or statute operating in the general field before enactment of such statute. Furthermore, in the said Act of1966 it has been specifically provided in Section 40(1) that the provisions of the said Act of 1966 shall have an overriding effect over any other law for the time being in force.
46. Accordingly, in the present case, the respondent authorities particularly, the respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 3 acted wrongfully and illegally by issuing the order dated 1st July 1991 and referring the disputes under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Ninth Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of the issues mentioned in the said order without asking the parties to seek their remedies under the provisions of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 and Rules framed thereunder.
47. The claims of the respondent Nos. 6 to 12 herein should be adjudicated by the Appellate authority as provided under Rule 26 of The West Bengal Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1968.
48. In the present case, admittedly, the tribunal has not yet adjudicated the issue referred before it by the impugned order of reference dated 1st July 1991.
49. For the reasons stated hereinabove, I am of he view that the State respondents have wrongfully referred the disputes before the tribunal for adjudication as the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 have no manner of application in the present case in view of the enactment of The Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 and The West Bengal Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1968.
50. In the aforesaid premises, the impugned order of reference dated 1st July, 1991 issued by the Assistant Secretary to the Government of West Bengal referring the disputes to the Ninth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal for adjudication of the issues mentioned in the said order being annexure 'H' to the writ petition cannot be sustained in the eye of law and the same is accordingly quashed. The respondent Nos. 6 to 12, however, would be at liberty to seek their remedy under the provisions of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 and The West Bengal Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1968 in future, if they are so advised.
The writ petition thus succeeds to the extent indicated above. There will be, however, no order as to costs.
Let xerox certified copy of this judgment be made available to the respective parties, if applied for, on urgent basis.