Susanta Chatterji, J.
1. The present rule was issued on February 9, 1982, t. the instance of the writ petitioner praying, inter alia, for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash three notices all dated January 21, 1982, under Section 154/155 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act'), one each in respect of the assessment years 1975-76 to 1977-78 issued by the Income-tax Officer, 'A' Ward, Nadia, arid for other consequential reliefs. It is stated that at all material times the petitioner owned two tea estates, one known as 'Radharani Tea and Estate in Dooars' and the other known as 'Krishna Kali Tea Estate in Assam'. The assessment years concerned in the writ application are 1975-76 to 1977-78. It is alleged that on November 17, 1981, the petitioner received three notices under Section 154/155 whereby respondent No. 1 proposed to rectify certain alleged mistakes in the assessment order for the said assessment years and was requested by respondent No. 1 to show cause by November 23, 1981. The nature of the mistakes proposed to be rectified will appear from the notices. Thereafter, by a letter dated December 7, 1981, the petitioner is alleged to have pointed out to respondent No. 1 that the three undated notices suffered from various infirmities. However, the petitioner moved a writ application challenging the said three notices and by order dated January 17, 1982, Dipak Kumar Sen J. (as His Lordship then was) was pleased to dispose of the same by directing the respondent not to give effect to the three notices. Again on January 25, 1982, the petitioner received three notices all dated January 21, 1982, issued by respondent No. 1, one each in respect of the assessment years 1975-76 to 1977-78. According to the petitioner, the Income-tax Officer can exercise his jurisdiction and/or authority to rectify anymistake which is apparent from the record and not otherwise. Further, under Section 154(3), an amendment which has the effect of enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee shall not be made under the said section unless the authority concerned has given notice to the assessee of its intention so to do and has allowed the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. It is also stated that the petitioner can be assessed under the Act only on the income assessable under the Act and not on an agricultural income. Under section 10(1) of the Act, in computing the total income of the previous year of any person, agricultural income shall not be included at all. Under Section 32(2) of the Act, where in the assessment of the assessee effect cannot be given to any allowance referred to therein in any previous year, owing to there being no profits or gains chargeable for that previous year, or owing to the profits and/or gains chargeable being less than the allowance, the allowance or part of the allowance to which effect has not been given shall be carried forward subject to the provisions of Section 72(2) and Section 73(3) of the Act. Elaborating in detail, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition again on the ground that inasmuch as the separate sheets enclosed with the three impugned notices do not bear any signature and/or seal of respondent No. 1 and the same are not authenticated and/or validated by respondent No. 1, the said three separate sheets are of no effect and as such cannot form part of the impugned notices, There is no mistake in the assessment order dated March 28, 1978, for the assessment year 1975-76, the assessment order dated September 10, 1979, for the assessment year 1976-77 and the assessment order dated September 19, 1982, for the assessment year 1977-78. The impugned notices are, according to the petitioner, vague and lack in material particulars and are wholly unintelligible and do not give the required information either to give any reply or to show any cause effectively and as such the said notices and all proceedings thereunder are in gross violation of the principles of natural justice.
2. Mr. Pronob Kumar Pal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has strongly submitted that Section 154 can be applied only where there is a mistake apparent from the record and the alleged mistake is an obvious, clear and patent one and does not require long and elaborate reasoning on points on which there may conceivably be two opinions. Regarding un-absorbed depreciation, development rebate and allowances, these cannot be treated as mistakes in the assessment orders for the assessment years 1975-76 to 1977-78. In support of his contention, the attention of this court has been drawn to ITO v. India Foils Ltd. : [1973]91ITR72(Cal) . The Division Bench presided by the Hon'ble Chief Justice P.B. Mukharji held that when the valuation was accepted not only by one Income-tax Officer but by three Income-tax Officers, it could not be said that it was a mistakeapparent from the face of the records. A mistake must be apparent on the face of the records. It must be an obvious, clear and patent mistake. One which is not so apparent and which requires a long and elaborate reasoning and arguments on points on which there may conceivably be two opinions will not be a mistake apparent from the records. The attention of this court has also been drawn to another case, Karimtharuvi Tea Estates Ltd. v. State of Kerala : [1963]48ITR83(SC) . It was found by the Supreme Court that the power of the State Legislature to make a law in respect of taxes on agricultural income arising from tea plantations is limited to legislating with respect to the agricultural income determined in accordance with Rule 24 of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, under which income derived from the sale of tea grown and manufactured by the seller is first to be computed under Section 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ('the 1922 Act') as if it were income derived from business. Any expenditure by the assessee, not being an allowance described in Clauses (i) to (xiv) of Section 10(2) and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee, laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of such business would be deductible. Of the income so computed, 40 per cent. being, under Rule 24, treated as income liable to income-tax, the other 60 per cent. alone will be 'agricultural income'. The State Legislature is free in the exercise of its plenary legislative power to allow further deductions from such computed agricultural income in the case of tea plantations as it considers fit, but it cannot add to the amount of agricultural income so computed by providing that certain items of expenditure deducted in the computation of the income from business under the provisions of the 1922 Act be not deducted and considered to be a part of the taxable agricultural income. The State Legislature cannot enact such a provision which would make agricultural income from tea plantations higher than what it would be if computed in accordance with Rule 24 read with Section 10. The provisions of the 1922 Act and the Rules made thereunder will control the provisions of the Agricultural Income-tax Act enacted by the State Legislature.
3. Mr. A.C. Moitra, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents, has, however, submitted that the impugned notices have been issued in accordance with law and the steps taken by the respondents are consistent with the provisions of the law and there is nothing for this writ court to interfere in the matter. He has also argued that the Act is a complete code and the Act provides for complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment. Such assessment orders cannot be challenged by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution. He draws inspiration from a judgment of the Supreme Court in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa : [1983]142ITR663(SC) . He has also drawn the attention of the court to another decision in Tata Tea Ltd. v. State of WestBengal : [1988]173ITR18(SC) , wherein the meaning of 'agricultural income' has been interpreted. It has been found that even after the deletion of Sub-sections (2) and (2A) of Section 8 of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, an Agricultural Income-tax Officer acting under the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, had no power to levy agricultural income-tax except in respect of 60 per cent. of the income derived by an assessee from the sale of tea grown and manufactured by it and computed in the manner laid down under the 1922 Act and the Rules framed thereunder :
Having heard the lengthy argument advanced by learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, this court finds that by looking td Section 154 :
'Rectification of mistake.--(1) With a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record-
(a) the Income-tax Officer may amend any order of assessment or of refund or any other order passed by him ;
(b) the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may amend any order passed by him under Section 250 or Section 271 ;
(c) the Commissioner may amend any order passed by him in revision under Section 263 or Section 264.
(1A) Where any matter has been considered and decided in any proceeding by way of appeal or revision relating to an order referred to in Sub-section (1), the authority passing such order may, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, amend the order under that sub-section in relation to any matter other than the matter which has been so considered and decided.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this section, the authority concerned-
(a) may make an amendment under Sub-section (1) of its own motion, and
(b) shall make such amendment for rectifying any such mistake which has been brought to its notice by the assessee, and where the authority concerned is the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by the Income-tax Officer also.
(3) An amendment, which has the effect of enhancing an assessment or reducing a refund or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee, shall not be made under this section unless the authority concerned has given notice to the assessee of its intention so to do and has allowed the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
(4) Where an amendment is made under this section, an order shall be passed in writing by the income-tax authority concerned.
(5) Subject to the provisions of Section 241, where any such amendment has the effect of reducing the assessment, the Income-tax Officer shall make any refund which may be due to such assessee.
(6) Where any such amendment has the effect of enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund already made, the Income-tax Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice of demand in the prescribed form specifying the sum payable, and such notice of demand shall be deemed to be issued under Section 156 and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly.
(7) Save as otherwise provided in Section 155 or Sub-section (4) of Section 186, no amendment under this section shall be made after the expiry of four years from the date of the order sought to be amended.'
4. By looking to the impugned notices, this court does not find any irregularity and/or illegality. There are no legal infirmities also. The petitioner may show cause in response to such notices in accordance with law. There is no lack of jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings. The petitioner cannot be permitted to move the writ jurisdiction to stall the proceedings in a circuitous process. This court is of the view that the writ petition is absolutely premature and that it is misconceived. There is neither any ambiguity and the petitioner cannot agitate that there is lack of initial jurisdiction to issue the impugned notices. The case laws cited at the Bar do not support the contention of the writ petitioner. This court will not consider the merits of the case of the petitioner and quash the notices without allowing the statutory authorities to proceed according to law. Within the scope of Section 154, the acts done and/or caused to have been done by the respondents are found to be well-justified and there is nothing for the writ court to interfere in this matter. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. The rule is discharged and interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no further costs.
5. As prayed for, there will be stay of operation of this order for a period of two weeks from date.