ORDER
It is reported that you have been indulging in several acts of indiscipline affecting the smooth operation of Haldla Refinery Hospital.
On 28/6/93 you refused to serve Breakfast to the in-patients of Hospital, when Shri P.C. Das. Cook-cum-Bearer, Emp, No. 71243 was called to prepare Breakfast you obstructed him and did not allow him to enter the kitchen. Due to non-supply of food 3 indoor patients out of 4 had to be discharged from Hospital. After lot of discussions you agreed to supply food but in the process serving of meal was delayed. Again you delayed serving of Breakfast/Lunch to the in-patients of Hospital on 13th July, 14th July, & 15th July, 1993.
You have started tampering with the official records related to overtime of employees from 17/3/93. You have falsified your record of overtime as per the details given in the attached statement. Though you have been advised number of times not to do so verbally as well as vide out letter No. PH/F-2/71076 dated 20th October, 1993 yet you continue to put wrong entries in the OT Register.
You have stopped drawing the cleaning material from stores and are leaving utensils uncleaned which is unhygienic and a source of infection/desease for patients.
Though you have been instructed a number of times to keep the utensils and the cooking platform clean by using proper cleaning materials, youare not following the instructions and thereby deliberately creating unhygienic conditions in the Hospital.
Your above acts constitute misconduct under sub clause 1.9.16,26,37, & 44 of Clause 19 of Certified Standing Orders of Haldla Refinery since your presence on duty is not considered desirable you are hereby placed under suspension with Immediate effect.'
4. It is also necessary to note the relevant standing orders and these are as follows :
'1. Wilful insubordination or disobedience whether alone or in combination with another or others, of any reasonable and lawful order of a superior including order to work overtime and accept chargesheets and any other communications from the Management.
9. Drukness, riotous or disorderly behaviour within the Refinery area or any act subversive of discipline.
16. Disregarding reasonable instructions for the maintenance of cleanliness of the premises or committing nuisance on the premises, or any act prejudicial to general health and cleanliness.
26. Negligence in the discharge of duties.
37. Falsification, defacement or destruction of personal records or any record of the Company.
44. Doing anything prejudicial to the interest of the Company.' in the above context, the Enquiry Officer has found as follows:
'1. That the alleged delays in serving the breakfast has been proved but the parts of the charge that the delinquent has obstructed another cook has not been proved as the other cook had himself did not enter the kitchen due to the morning shift duty of the delinquent.
2. The unauthorised entry of the overtime in the overtime register provedbut tampering or falsifying this register have not been proved. The chargenumber 3 has not been proved.'
5. The enquiry report was considered by the disciplinary authority vide order dated 22/8/94 at page 67 of the paper book and it was noted in the following words :
'I have also carefully gone through the records of the enquiry connection papers and documents and findings of the Enquiry Officer and concur with his flourlngs, that on the evidence recorded at the enquiry and the charges levelled against him under sub-clause 1, 9. 16. 26, 37 & 44 of Clause 19 of the Certified Standing Orders of Haldla Refinery sufficiently proved. The charges levelled against you and proved at the Enquiry being grave and serious, the punishment warranted is that of dismissal.'
It is thus clear that even according to the disciplinary authority the punishment of dismissal could be possible only in the context of grave and serious charges and not in the context of minor charges of mere delay of serving the food. It is not clear as to how the disciplinary authority has found the charges as serious and grave when the alleged abstraction by the delinquent on the date of the main incident or alleged tampering of recordsor falsification of the records had not been proved by the Enquiry Officer. It is also not clear as to how the Disciplinary Authority in the aforesaid order dated 22/8/94 had concluded that the charges in sub-clause 1, 9, 16, 26, 37, & 44 of clause 19 of Certified Standing Orders have been proved when there is no separate finding whatsoever in regard to these various clauses of standing orders in the enquiry report by the Enquiry Officer.
6. The above reproduction of the relevant portion of the charges and the findings and conclusions of the Disciplinary Authority have been made to show as to what in fact have been established against the delinquent. As noted earlier, there was delay in serving breakfast but this delay was not without explanation. The appellant wanted to show that the respondent was determined to see that the breakfast was not served and had obstructed another Cook from entering the kitchen so as to disrupt the normal function of the hospital. However, such obstruction has not been found to have been proved as another Cook had never attempted to enter the kitchen as the respondent was already on duty. It appears that another Cook had merely brought the cooking material from the market and thereafter the breakfast could be prepared and served by the respondent. Again the appellant wanted to show that overtime register was tampered and falsified by the respondent but the Enquiry Officer had found that there was no tampering of the register or any alleged falsification but the respondent had merely defiantly entered the overtime which was never sanctioned by the hospital authorities. The tampering of the register was a serious matter but merely recording the overtime as a protest in the context of the dispute whether marketing is part of the duty or not is a different matter. The appellant has attempted to show that the respondent did not keep the kitchen clean and in hygienic conditions and did not collect the material for such cleaning but this charge was not found proved. As noted earlier the long pending grievance of the Cooks in regard to the marketing was never reasonably resolved. (The evidence had came during enquiry even from the witness of the department that there was some problem regarding providing of raw goods and such problem was continuing for long time. The defence evidence was also to the effect that the issue of marketing of raw goods was a long pending dispute and relevant evidence could be seen on page 52 & 55 of the paper book).
7. Can it be said in the aforesaid circumstances that mere delay in serving food or mere discharge of one or two patients in the context of delay would be a serious and grave charges so as to warrant dismissal? it is true that the writ court could not sit as a Court of Appeal but if conclusions are not based on facts or perverse or arbitrary then the writ court can certainly interfere. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India : AIR1996SC11 , it has been held :--
'The grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by Judicial review can be classified as under :
(i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it.
(ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness: it applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of acceptedmoral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at. The decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it.
(iii) Procedural impropriety.
The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. Another development is that referred to by Lord Diplock in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Deptt., ex Brined, viz. the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. Two other facets of Irrationality may be mentioned : (1) it is open to the court to review the decision-maker' evaluation of the facts. (2) The will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision-maker. if the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the other way, cannot be upheld.'
8. In Union of India and another v. Ganayutham (Dead) by LRs., : (2000)IILLJ648SC , it has been observed in para 24 is follows :--
'We are of of the view that even in our country, in cases not involving fundamental freedoms, the role of our Courts/Tribunals in administrative law is purely secondary and while applying Wednesbury and CCSU principles to test the validity of executive action or of administrative, action taken in exercise of statutory powers, the Courts and Tribunals in our country can only go into the matter, as a secondary reviewing court to find out if the executive or the administrator in their primary roles have arrived at a reasonable decision on the material before them in the light of Wednesbury and CCSU tests. The choice of the options available is for the authority the Court/Tribunal cannot substitute its view as to what is reasonable.'
9. Their Lordship of the Supreme Court in para 28(4) (a) further observed as follows : (Their Lordship were making observation when summarised the current position of productionality in administrative law in England and India).
'The position in our country, in administrative law. where no fundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that the Courts/Tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary Judgment of the court is to be based oo Wednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Dtplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority.'
10. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Others in : 1988CriLJ158 , Their Lordship of the Supreme Court had interfered with the punishment only after coming to the conclusion that the punishment was an outrageous defiance of logic and was shocking. The punishment was disproportionate, perverse and irrationals as their Lordship felt that on facts, Wednesbury and CCSU Test were not satisfied. Still in another case, B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, : (1996)ILLJ1231SC , it was held that the High Court/Tribunalwhile exercising the power of judicial review could not normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and Imposed some other penalty. It the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either by directing the Disciplinary Authority or Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or shorten the litigation, it may itself in rare case Impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. Similar view was taken in india OH Corporation Ltd. v. Ashoke Kr. Arora, : AIR1997SC1030 that the court will not intervene unless the punishment is wholly disproportionate.
11. The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that the punishment in disciplinary proceedings is not justiciable and has placed reliance on the authority [State of Orissa and others v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, : (1963)ILLJ239SC but even that case some of the charges which have been established were found to be substantial and grave. The High Court had interfered and asked for review of the punishment on the ground that some of the charges were not found proved and consequently the direction was made for review. Their Lordship of the Supreme Court observed that when some of the substantial charges had already been proved the High Court has no jurisdiction to review in such circumstances. Their Lordship in para 9 has observed as follows :
'But the court in a case in which an order of dismissal of a public servant is Impugned, is not concerned to decide whether the sentences Imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanour established. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an enquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable; nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. if the High Court is satisfied that if some but not all of the findings of the Tribunal were 'unassailable', the order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determining the appropriate punishment are placed, was final, and the High Court had no Jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty for as we have already observed the order of dismissal passed by a competent authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been compiled with, is not Justiciable. Therefor, if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be Imposed, it is not for the court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant The court has nojurlsdlctlon of the findings of the enquiry officer or the Tribunal prtma Jacte make out a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all if appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice. The High Court was in our judgment. In error in directing the Governor of Ortssa to reconsider the question.'
12. Their Lordship of Court in the above quotation itself had observed that the gravity of the misdemeanour was not in dispute and some of the charges were found to be substantial. The observations were made in the context of the substantial charges which were established against thedelinquent. As noted above. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India, : AIR1996SC11 , Their Lordship of the Supreme Court mentioned the grounds on which an administrative action is subject to control of the judicial review and has further added that it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. Another development is that referred to Lord Deplock in R. v. Secretory of State for the Home Deptt.. ex Brind, viz. the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. It appears that in the above case of : (1963)ILLJ239SC , the High Court has entered the area of the principle of proportionality and consequently Their Lordship had set aside the order by making the aforesaid quoted observations. In the instant case, the facts are entirely different and as mentioned in the above portions of this Judgment, there is mere delay in serving the breakfast on few dates and the core or the gravity of the charges could not be proved during the enquiry proceedings. It was not in dispute even as per observations of the Disciplinary Authority, that the punishment of the dismissal could be imposed only when the proved charges are grave and serious. if the charges are not grave and serious then by Implication even the Disciplinary Authority could not Impose the punishment of dismissal. In this context, the appellant could not get any help from the aforesaid authority to support the plea that punishment is not justiciable under any circumstances.
13. In Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab and Another, : AIR1963SC395 , it was held that in departmental enquiry both the stages are equally Judicial and they are one continuous proceedings though there are two stages in it. The first is coming to the conclusion on the evidence as to whether the charge is alleged or established or not and the second is reached only if it is that they are so established. That stage deals with the actions to be taken, thus, if the punishment Imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is arbitrary shocking or wholly disproportionate to the charges established then the High Court can certainly interfere on the question of punishment, as the punishment stage is not purely an administrative action. The delinquent before the amendment of the Constitution had even the second opportunity to show that the action proposed to be taken against him is either unduly severe or not called for as laid down in State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, : (1963)ILLJ295SC but the appellant in the instant case has not framed the rules for this second opportunity. Thus, if the punishment is unduly severe or wholly disproportionate then the High Court can always interfere as the delinquent does not get the second opportunity in regard to punishment after the Constitutional amendment. It has been noticed also in authority. Union of India and Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, : (1991)ILLJ29SC (see also Union of India v. Giriraj Sharma, : (1994)ILLJ604SC in regard to the harsh punishment).
14. In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, : [1997]228ITR725(SC) , the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution has been held to be an integral and essential and basic feature of the Constitution. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mo/door Congress. : (1991)ILLJ395SC , it was observed that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which whole constitutional system is based. The rule of law means that the decision should be made by the application of the known principles and rules and in general such decision should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. In the instant case, the punishingauthority was aware that the extreme penalty of the punishment could be awarded only when the charges proved are grave and serious and not when the charges proved are minor or technical in nature. However, the punishing authority without proper appreciation of the report of the Enquiry Officer has arbitrarily concluded that the charges proved are grave or serious. The reference has already been made that the appellant could only prove in the instant case mere delay in serving breakfast on few dates and that too in the context of the plea of the delinquent that the marketing of the food material is not part of the duty. State Bank of india v. Samarendra Ktshore Endow, : (1994)ILLJ872SC , the learned counsel for appellant placed reliance on the authority to argue that the power under Article 226 is one of Judicial review and that it is not an appeal from a decision itself but a review of the manner in which the decision was taken but this principle was Kept in view in the aforesaid discussion and even this authority has dealt with the aspect as to what should be course of action when the punishment imposed was hursh. This authority does not help the appellant to substantiate the argument that there ts no jurisdiction in the court to interfere on the question of punishment in the facts of the instant case. In State of Punjab v. Bakhshish Slngh, : AIR1997SC2696 , the misconduct proved was of the grave nature and in that context, it was observed that the appellate court ought not to have interfered with the decree of the trial court. The observation was made in the context of the facts of that case. As noted earlier the Disciplinary Authority in the instant case could not prove any grave charge against the delinquent and consequently this authority is of little help to the appellant to argue that no interference is warranted on the question of punishment. In N. Rajarathtnam v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., : (1997)ILLJ224SC , the illegal gratification was proved against the delinquent and in that context the imposition of punishment of dismissal was found to be Justified. The facts of the instant case are wholly different as mentioned earlier and consequently this authority is of little help to the appellant.
15. In the light of the above discussion, the punishment of dismissal as Imposed by the appellant against the delinquent could not be upheld. The admitted position is that the punishing authority Dr. T.K. Bhattacharjee (C.M.O.) had been examined during the enquiry proceedings as a special witness on the request of the delinquent. It is not clear as to how the evidence of the punishing authority could have helped in proving or rebutting charges against the delinquent as apparently the punishing authority was not present at the spot at the time of alleged incident. It may be that the disciplinary authority was not biased when it concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer as the findings of the Enquiry Officer were virtually based either on the documents or on evidence of the delinquent or on the statement of the delinquent during enquiry. However, the fact remains that the Disciplinary Authority Dr. T.K. Bhattacharjee (C.M.O.) had almost Jumped to the conclusion of the charges having been established in terms of sub-clause 19 of the Standing Orders even though there was no report of such findings by the Enquiry Officer. It further appears that Disciplinary Authority had almost arrived at arbitrary conclusion that the charges proved against the delinquent are grave and serious even though the Enquiry Officer had merely observed that the chargesproved were only of the delay in serving breakfast and defiant entry of the overtime in the relevant register. The arbitrary conclusion in regard to nature of the charges proved and in regard to Imposition of punishment would show that there was no independent application of mind to the facts of the case and the punishing Authority was almost biased at the second stage i.e. after the submission of the Enquiry Report. The punishment Imposed could also not be upheld for this reason. The appellant will entrust the task of Imposition of minor punishment to another superior authority in order to comply with the direction of this court in regard to the imposition of the punishment. In this context the detailed submissions in regard to vitiating of the enquiry proceeding by mere examination of the Disciplinary Authority need not be considered as there is merit in the submission of the appellant that the question of the delays have been proved on evidence which had come from other witness and not from the punishing authority. The enquiry proceeding on the ground of bias in the facts of this case could not be set aside, particularly, when the request for the examination of disciplinary authority was made by the delinquent himself. Thus, the findings of the learned single Judge on the point of bias could not be upheld. There is not infirmity in the enquiry proceedings and such proceedings were in accordance with the rules of natural Justice.
16. The 'standing orders' had permitted the disciplinary authority to consider the previous record of the service of the delinquent at the time of awarding the punishment. The relevant portion of the 'standing orders' clause 20(V) (g) is in the following words :
'In awarding punishment of dismissal under these Standing Orders, the disciplinary/appellate authority shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record of service, if any, of the workman concerned and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances that may exist'.
17. The disciplinary authority could always take into consideration the past record of the delinquent without giving hearing in the facts of this case and particularly in the context of the 'standing orders'. The finding of the learned single Judge that the punishment Imposed should be set aside on this ground could not be accepted. It may be added that the basic conclusion of the disciplinary authority as to the grave and serious nature of the proved charges have not been accepted in the above portions of the judgment and there was thus no question of the past record playing any major factor in the facts of this case.
18. The learned counsel for the appellant has taken various pleas in regard to the maintainability of the writ petition. The first submission is that the appeal has been provided in the relevant 'standing orders' and consequently the writ is not maintainable. It was further argued that the delinquent was admittedly a 'workman' and the dismissal from service could be raised as an industrial dispute. Writ Court should not have entertained the writ petition as the appropriate Forum was the industrial Tribunal. It was then contended that even assuming that the appellant is 'State' within the meaning of the Article 12 of the Constitution, the dispute does not have any element of public law character and consequently the writ ought not have been entertained as writ of mandamus cannot be issued to enforceprivate duties and obligations or for enforcing private law rights. The learned counsel had placed reliance on several authorities in support of these contentions. It la true that there is a provision of appeal in 'standing orders' but in the facts of the case, particularly in the case of the clarification that the marketing of the food material is the part of the duty, the remedy of appeal may not have been efficacious remedy. The facts in enquiry as found proved were virtually admitted and there was hardly any occasion for factual evaluation by the appellate court. The punishment as noted above, is purely a question of law. In the facts of this case and the Writ Court was fully Justified in entertaining this matter. In any case, it is too late to take such pleas in the appeal. It may have been an industrial dispute but the reference under section 10 of the relevant Act would be in the discretion of the concerned Government and no one can claim the reference as a matter of right. Thus the mere fact that industrial dispute could have been raised, would not justify the refusal by Writ Court to entertain the writ application in the facts of this case.
19. The writ petitioner very clearly and specifically in para 2 of the writ petition has alleged that indian Oil Corporation Ltd. is an undertaking of the Central Government. The composition of the said corporation ts dominated by the representative appointed by the Central Govt. and the money required for running the said corporation are provided entirely by the Central Govt. The said corporation is an instrument and an agency and is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of india and is amenable to writ jurisdiction. The affidavit-in-opposition has not specifically denied in regard to dominant rule of the Government as also in regard to the total financial aid by the Central Govt. Thus the case of the writ petitioner that the said corporation is an instrument or an agency or is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of india have not been effectively rebutted in the affidavit-in-opposition and there is thus, no hesitation in holding that the appellant 13 amenable to writ jurisdiction. It may be noted that learned counsel for the appellant has also not argued the factual position in detail. The basic submission was that there is no public law element or public law character and consequently there will be no occasion for interference in the writ Jurisdiction. In support of this contention, the reliance was placed on the authority Shrt Anupam Ghosh v. Union of India & Ore,, 1991 (2) CHN 451. In that case, the appellant was the Finance Director of Andrew Yule Company Limited which fs a Government company within the meaning of the Company's Act. In his letter of appointment it was inter alia provided that his services was liable to be terminated by either side on three months notice. The service was terminated with Immediate effect by notice dated 22/9/9G. This letter of termination of service was challenged in writ petition and the same was opposed inter alia on the ground that the Impugned order of termination of personal contract of service relating to private laws and having no relation to public law or public duty, no writ application was maintainable. This contention was upheld in Shrt Anupam Ghosh case (supra) on the ground that it was difficult to hold in the facts of that case that the Impugned action of termination of service was made in contravention of any statutory provision or the impugned order deals in the matter of public law character. It was, further held in that case that the service of the writ petitioner andthe conditions thereof form private contract between the parties and in view of the position of the law discussed, the Impugned action of termination of service was held to be not amenable to writ Jurisdiction. The facts of the instant case are very different. There is already a reference in the above portion of this judgment as to Clause 20[V)(g} in relation to awarding punishment of dismissal. That Disciplinary Authority is under obligation to take into account the gravity of the misconduct as also extenuatlngly or aggravating circumstances. It is not a matter of private contract but the dismissal has to be in accordance with the 'standing orders'. As noted earlier in the relevant portions of the Judgment, the Disciplinary Authority has not taken into account the real nature of the charge proved and had arbitrarily concluded that the charges proved in terms of the 'standing orders' and are grave in nature. The punishing authority has also not taken into consideration the extenuating circumstances in regard to the delays in serving breakfast or meals or defiant entry in the overtime register. The delinquent alongwith other Cooks have long standing grievance that they were exploited by the authorities by forcing them to do the marketing of the food material under the threat of disciplinary action even though such marketing has neither been mentioned in the letter of appointment nor the issue was reasonably resolved. There is some explanation even for the delays in the month of July. 1993 when the delinquent had asserted that the delay could not be avoided due to of bad wheather and in the absence of any assistance. Apparently the punishing authority had passed the order in flagrant violation of the 'standing orders' 25(g) for the reasons already stated. Thus it is not a mere case of an enforcing contractual rights as was the case in the authority of Anupam Ghosh (supra). In Executive Committee, Valsh Degree College v. Lakshmi Narayan Singh, AIR 1976 SC 886 it has been indicated by the Supreme Court that for enforcing personal contract of employment writ cannot be enforced as a general rule but such writ may be issued if conditions of service are controlled by statutory rules and regulations. In the instant case the condition of service is admittedly controlled by the 'standing orders' under which the disciplinary proceedings had been initiated and the termination of the service could only be in the terms of 'standing orders'. In Delhi Transport Coprn. v. D.T.C. Majdoor Congress, : (1991)ILLJ395SC , it has been observed that the employment under public undertaking is a public employment and a public property. It is not only the undertakings but also the society which has a stake in their proper and efficient workings. Both discipline and devotion are necessary for efficiency. To ensure both, the service conditions of those who work for them must be encouraging certain and secured, and not vague and whimsical. It was further observed that the right to livelihood, therefore, cannot left on the fancies of individuals in authority. The employment is not a bounty from them nor can it survival be at their mercy. Therefore, when the Constitution assures dignity of the individual and the right to livelihood the exercise of the power by the executive should be cushioned with adequate safeguards for the rights of the employees against any arbitrary and capricious use of powers. The competing claims of the 'public interest' as against 'individual interest' of the employees are to be harmoniously blended so as to serve the social need consistent with the constitutional scheme. Thus the submissions of the learned counsel for theappellant in regard to the amenability of the writ petition could not be accepted in the facts of the case. The relevant authority had already been noted and there is no need to give detailed reference to the authorities cited at the bar in the context of alternative remedy to argue in relation to amenability of the writ. The learned single Judge has rightly held that the availability of the alternative remedy in the context of the authority Htrday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, : [1970]78ITR26(SC) would be no bar to grant the relief in the writ Jurisdiction, particularly when the matter is at final hearing stage.
20. The principle in regard to Judicial review and the scope of such judicial review have already been noted while discussing the question of punishment. In Judicial review only decision making process is reviewed and not the merit of the decision itself. It is true that in Judicial review there is no scope for reappllcatlon of the evidence or to consider the sufficiency of the evidence. Thus the reference to the authorities on these points need not be given in the facts of the instant case. The disciplinary authority could reach to a conclusion only on the basis of the evidence and if the findings are not supported by the evidence or perverse or the conclusion arbitrary then the Writ Court can always interfere in a given case.
21. It was vaguely submitted on behalf of the respondents that no misconduct has been proved in terms of the 'standing orders' but the 'standing orders' as quoted above in the relevant portions of the Judgment would cover the facts and charges as proved. The serving of the delayed breakfast for whatever reasons is certainly subversive of the discipline as also the defiant entry in the over time register, would amount disobedience of the order of the authorities. The substance has to be seen. The appellant was given full opportunity to defend himself in the disciplinary proceedings and the proceedings were conducted in accordance with the principle of natural justice and consequently the enquiry proceedings are not vitiated. The learned single Judge was not right in finding that the enquiry has been vitiated on account of bias or some similar factors like consideration of past record. However, the learned single Judge was fully right in holding that the punishment Imposed was wholly disproportionate.
22. In the light of above discussion the appeal is dismissed as far as it relates to the setting aside of the order of punishment of dismissal. As the enquiry proceedings were proper and the charges against the respondents have been partly proved and as the charges proved appear to be minor in nature and not grave, the disciplinary authority i.e. appellant can impose appropriate minor punishment as deems proper in the light of the observations made in the judgment. The respondent shall be reinstated within fortnight from the date of this order but will not be entitled to claim back wages in the facts and circumstances of the case. With such modification as Just indicated, the appeal stands dismissed. The party shall bear their own costs.
N.K. Mitra, J.
23. I agree,
24. Appeal dismissed with modification