Judgment:
Soumitra Pal, J.
1. The writ petition has been moved praying for a direction upon the respondents to award statutory marks to the petitioner in consonance with his academic qualification and, thereafter, if total marks secured by the petitioner is more than the marks obtained by the candidate last appointed, then the petitioner should be appointed immediately with retrospective effect.
2. A preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Subir Sanyal, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, that the allegations made in the writ petition are unfounded or baseless since it has not been affirmed in accordance with Rule 15 of the Rules of the High Court at Calcutta relating to applications under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (for short 'the rules'). Further, according to him, the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of laches since the writ petition has been moved in July, 2004 challenging a purported action by the respondents which took place during June, 2000. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Sanyal on the following judgments in support of his contentions :
1. Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Anr. v. Company Law Board and Ors., reported in AIR 1967 SC 295;
2. A.K.K. Nambiar v. Union of India and Anr., reported in AIR 1970 SC 652;
3. Roshan Lal and Ors. v. International Airport Authority of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1981 SC 597;
4. S.S. Moghe and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1981 SC 1495, and
5. Calcutta Corporation Teachers Association and Anr. v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation and Ors., reported in 1993 (2) CHN 444.
3. Mr. P.S. Deb Barman, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that substantive right which has accrued to the petitioner due to a wrong calculation of marks by the respondents and which is patent cannot be taken away by any infraction of the rules. However, it was admitted that the rules are mandatory in nature. Mr. Deb Barman relied on certain paragraphs of the following judgments in support of his contentions. They are as under :
1. In re: The Kerala Education Bill, 1957, reported in AIR 1958 SC 956 (paragraphs 29 and 31);
2. Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. and Ors. v. Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara, reported in AIR 1961 SC 964 (paragraphs 15 and 16);
3. Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan and Anr., reported in AIR 1959 SC 149 (paragraph 73);
4. Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in 1994(1) SCC 44 (paragraph 5);
5. Purushottam v. Chairman, M.S.E.B. and Anr., reported in 1999(6) SCC 49;
6. Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai and Ors., reported in 2002(6) SCC 16 (paragraph 4);
7. Daryao and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., reported in AIR 1961 SC 1457 (paragraphs 7, 9 and 10).
4. It is needless to mention that the High Court has framed rules relating to applications under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Rule 15, as referred to, is as under :-
'Every petition shall be verified by the solemn affirmation made by the petitioner or a person or persons duly authorized in this behalf and proof to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case in the manner as specified under Sub-rules (ii) and (iii) of Rule 15 Order 6 of the First Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure and who having cognizance of the facts stated and shall clearly by reference to the paragraphs of the petition whether the statements are based on knowledge, information and belief, or on records and where statements are based on information, the source of information should be disclosed and where the statements are based on records, sufficient particulars be given to identify the records.'
5. Prom a perusal of the above Rule, I find it contains two aspects -- (a) that every petition 'shall' be verified by a solemn affirmation made by the petitioner and (b) the petitioner having cognizance of the facts 'shall clearly' by reference to the paragraphs of the petition state whether the statements are based on knowledge, information and belief or on records. Thereafter, from the language of the Rule, I find it postulates in no uncertain terms that if a statement in a petition is made relying on an information, the source of information 'should be disclosed'. If it is on records, 'sufficient particulars be given' in the petition to identify the records. The use of the words 'be given' emphasizes that an express duty is cast on the petitioner to provide sufficient particulars in the petition so that the identity of the records can be established. Thus, the words 'shall',' shall clearly', 'should be disclosed' and 'sufficient particulars be given' in the context they have been used show that the intention of the framers is to make the rules mandatory. The language of the Rule is unambiguous and, in my view, demonstrates that the Rule is substantive. Unless the source of information is disclosed or unless sufficient particulars are given to identify the records, the petition shall not merit scrutiny. If a scant or no regard is given or if its applicability is given a go-by, the intention of framing the rules shall be set at naught since the purpose is to verify the correctness of the statements. In a petition, as in the instant case, where a prayer has been made for issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari, if the Court finds the records are to be called for, in view of the explicit language of the Rule, it is absolutely necessary to provide sufficient particulars to identify the records. Hence, compliance with the provisions of the rules in its letter and spirit is a must. It is in order to put the petitioner to strict proof of the statements in the petition.
6. Now turning to the writ petition, the preliminary issue is whether the averments made in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the writ petition are in compliance with the rules. For brevity, let it be divided in two parts. Paragraphs 6, 7, 9, 12 and 13 have been verified as true to knowledge. Paragraphs 8, 10, 11 and 14 have been verified as matters of record. From the paragraphs which have been verified as true to knowledge, I find no material has been furnished about the source of the information. The petitioner claims to have been allotted a roll number for the interview, yet the call letter has not been annexed. Though the petitioner asserts that on several occasions he went to the office of the District Primary School Council to know his fate, no date regarding his visit has been mentioned. Neither the identity of the person who verbally told the petitioner about the marks obtained by him has been disclosed nor the particular office in the Council has been identified. In the absence of the source of these information, the statements made in the paragraphs are vague and cannot be relied on. So far as the second part -- the statements based on records, I find the identity of the records have not been established. Except for a mark-sheet, which is the only annexure, the petitioner has not annexed any supporting material to show his bona fides. The lacuna is vital. A verification on affidavits should not be done in a casual manner as has been done since the Apex Court in Barium Chemicals (supra), has held that 'It is true that in a case of this kind it would be difficult for a petitioner to have personal knowledge in regard to an averment of mala fides, but then where such knowledge is wanting he has to disclose his source of information so that the other side gets a fair chance to verify it and make an effective answer' (paragraph 57).
7. Similarly the Supreme Court in A.K.K. Nambiar (supra) held that where affidavits are not properly verified it cannot be admitted in evidence since 'The reasons for verification of affidavits are to enable the Court to find out which facts can be said to be proved on the affidavit evidence of rival parties. Allegations may be true to knowledge or allegations may be true to information received from persons or allegations may be based on records. The importance of verification is to test the genuineness and authenticity of allegations and also to make the deponent responsible for allegations. In essence verification is required to enable the Court to find out as to whether it will be safe to act on such affidavit evidence.' (paragraph 11)
8. Thus, it is an established principle of law that a petition cannot be verified in a casual manner and, if done, as has been done in the instant writ petition, it is liable to be rejected. Since on the preliminary issue the position of law is settled, the principles of law as decided in the judgments in Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. and Ors. v. Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara; Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi and Rajasthan and Anr.; Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai and Ors. and Daryao and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. are not applicable as those are on different aspects altogether.
9. Regarding laches, I am of the view, had the petitioner been vigilant about his rights he should have been diligent, since admittedly the interview was held in June, 2000 and the life of the panel was for a period of one year. The delay has not been explained. The ratio in the judgments of the Apex Court in Roshanlal (supra) and Moghe (supra), relied on by Mr. Sanyal, are applicable in the facts of this case. In Roshanlal the Apex Court dismissed the petition on the ground of laches since writ petition was filed in 1978 questioning the legality of the appointments which had taken place in 1975. In S.S. Moghe the Supreme Court declined the prayer of the petitioner since there was no satisfactory explanation in the petitions as to why no action at all was taken by the petitioners to challenge the validity of the promotions given to the respondents from 1968 onwards. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Purushottam (supra) relied on by Mr. Deb Barman in this context is distinguishable on facts. There the appellant was selected for the post in question and was illegally kept out of appointment on account of the so called decision of the scrutiny committee. The petitioner preferred an appeal. Being unsuccessful moved a writ petition. The High Court reversed the decision of the scrutiny committee. The petitioner, however, was denied appointment on the ground that somebody else had been appointed to the post and there was no vacancy and the panel had expired. The petitioner again moved the High Court. The High Court was persuaded to accept the contention of MSEB. Ultimately the Supreme Court held the right to be appointed could not be taken away on the ground of expiry of the panel and the post has been filled up by somebody else. From the facts it is evident there the appellant had all along contested but in the case at hand, the petitioner was not selected. During these years -- from 2000 till 2004 even no representation was filed before the authorities ventilating his grievances. An oblique attempt, however, has been made in the petition to cover up the laches that the petitioner was trying his best during these years -- but the explanation, if at all, is bereft of any substance as it lacks particulars.
10. Before I part, it is needless to mention that fundamental rights have been guaranteed under the Constitution. For enforcement of such rights a citizen is at liberty to move writ petitions before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But he has an obligation -- a duty. He should be diligent in moving a writ petition. Delay, if any, shall defeat the very purpose. Further petitions should not be verified perfunctorily. It should be in accordance with the rules. These are in order to establish the bona fides -- which, in my view, the petitioner has failed in the instant writ petition.
11. Thus, the writ petition is dismissed.
12. No order as to costs.
13. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment be given to the appearing parties, if applied for, on priority basis.