Sailendra Prasad Talukdar, J.
1. The controversy raised in the writ application relates to the date of birth of the petitioner. The petitioner was employed as Khalashi in ME (S) Department of the Indian Iron & Steel Company Ltd., Burnpur Works (now IISCO Steel Plant).
The Senior Manager (F & A) of the said organization issued permanent engagement form on 2nd December, 2005. On 28th March, 2006, the petitioner submitted a representation before the Chief Personnel Manager (Works) seeking correction of his age as it was wrongly recorded in the permanent engagement form. This was followed up by submitting another representation on 27th July, 2006. Such correction was sought for referring to the date of birth, as mentioned in the Admit Card, copy of which been annexed and marked as annexure PI at page 17 to the writ application.
2. Mr. Bose with Mr. De appearing as learned Counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that the authority concerned has been callously indifferent to the genuine grievances ventilated in such representation and the same have not received attention those deserve. He further submitted that due to no fault on the part of the petitioner and as a result of consistent laches on the part of the authority, the writ petitioner would have to retire three years, before the date of his actual retirement.
3. It was submitted that the authority concerned referred to different dates of birth in various official records as the date of birth of the writ petitioner and in such context, nothing much could be read in the fact that the writ petitioner accepted such permanent form by putting his signature. Copies of certain documents like Provident Fund nomination form, medical treatment book, Permanent Account Number Card etc. have been annexed; supplementary affidavit filed by the writ petitioner. Those give different dates of birth, i.e. 1st November, 1953 and 1st January, 1953. Reference had been made to the re-induction of one Ramananda Tiwary in view of the Division Bench judgment of the Jharkhand High Court in L.P.A. No. 493 of 2006. In another certificate relating to Preliminary Training in Trade Courses, the date of birth of the writ petitioner has been recorded as 15th March, 1951. The petitioner in such circumstances sought for court's interference.
4. Mr. Gupta appearing as learned Counsel for the respondent authority invited attention of the court to the service record of the writ petitioner. The relevant entries in such various records indicate that the writ petitioner completed his age of superannuation on 25th February, 2008. The authority concerned appears to have proceeded on the basis of the date of birth as indicated in the certificate recorded and issued by the I & S Co. Ltd.
5. Standing Order 34 of Burnpur Works and Kulti Works, which has the force of law, deals with verification and recording of the various documents referred to therein. There is mention of Admit Card issued by, any recognized University/Board issued before the employee joined the company services.
6. It appears that there is a provision of determination of age by a medical Board to be constituted by the authority where, there is no appropriate documents produced by the employee or where the employee is not satisfied with the decision of the management in that regard.
7. It is quite strange indeed. It cannot be disputed that no such exact determination of age is possible and what is at best possibly by ossification test is approximate with permissible elasticity on both sides. The petitioner joined services in 1972. Mr. Gupta submitted that if he really appeared in the School Final examination in 1968, what could prevent him from disclosing the same and why the relevant document in support of his age/date of birth could not be produced before the authority? He submitted that even the duplicate Admit Card which had been relied upon was issued on 29.9.2004. According to him, there is no explanation as to why the petitioner did not approach the authority with the same immediately thereafter seeking correction of age. Such duplicate copy of the Admit Card records the date of birth as 15th March, 1951. Mr. Gupta contended that the writ petitioner cannot be permitted to raise such dispute at the fag end of his career when his retirement is practically knocking at the door.
8. Mr. Basu appearing for the writ petitioner submitted that in an identical fact situation, learned single Bench of this Court took favourable view which was upheld by the learned Division Bench of this Court. Attention of this Court had been drawn to an unreported decision of the learned Division Bench of this Court in connection with the same.
9. Relying upon the decision in the case of Union of India v. C. Rama Swamy and Ors. reported in : [1997]3SCR760 , it was submitted by Mr. Gupta that it cannot be said that the petitioner in view of the date of birth as officially recorded did not derive any benefit in the service. If so, it is difficult to accept the broad proposition that principle of estoppel would not apply in such a case.
10. In the case of Smt. Pusp Chakraborty and Ors. v. Allahabad Bank and Ors. reported in 2000 (1) CLJ 259, learned Division Bench of this Court observed that the right to get the date of birth corrected either on the basis of matriculation certificate or otherwise is not a legal right far less a Constitutional right. While, affirming the judgment of the learned single Bench dismissing the application, learned Presiding Judge, Justice Mathur, (As His Lordship then was) held that an employee cannot be permitted to turn back at the fag end of his career to challenge the entry in his service record of the date of birth. Referring to the decision in the case of Birad Mai Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1976, it was submitted by the Mr. Gupta that documents like the extract of School Register, mark sheet or certificate of Education Board etc. even if proved would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth.
11. In the case of Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. Dinabandhu Majumdar and Anr. reported in : [1995]3SCR712 , the apex court observed that 'the fact that an employee of Government or its instrumentality who remained in service for over decades, with no objection whatsoever raised as to his date of birth accepted by the employer as correct, when all of a sudden comes forward towards the fag end of his service career with a writ application before the High Court seeking correction of his date of birth in his Service Record, the very conduct of non-raising of an objection in the matter by the employee should be a sufficient reason for the High Court, not to entertain such applications on grounds of acquiescence, undue delay and laches'.
12. As indicated earlier, it was categorically contended by Mr. Bose appearing as learned Counsel for the writ petitioner that the learned Division Bench of this Court in an identical situation granted relief to the employee while affirming the decision of the learned, single Bench. It is necessary to mention that such unreported judgment was in the case of Indian Iron & Steel Company Ltd. v. Nageswar Prasad (F.M.A.T. 3123 of 1987).There could be no occasion for the learned Bench to consider the matter in the perspective of the principles as referred to earlier. By no stretch of imagination, it cannot be held to be a binding precedent. The ratio decidendi of the case under consideration before the Division Bench cannot even be said to be a persuasive authority.
13. Lord Halsbury said in Quinn v. Locathem (1901) AC 495 at 506, 'Every Judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but govern and are qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found'. It was observed 'A case is only authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to flow logically from it.'
14. Talking about precedent, Lord Denning said, 'If lawyers hold to their precedents too closely, forgetful of the fundamental principles of truth and justice which they should serve, they may find the whole edifice comes tumbling down about them. They will be lost in 'The Codeless myriad of precedent. That wilderness of single instances'. The common law will cease to grow. Like coral reef it will become a structure of fossils'.
15. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the writ petitioner was appointed as far back as in 1972. It was submitted by Mr. Bose that he was not educated enough so as to assess the consequences of putting his signature in the service record and more over, as a young boy looking for employment, it could not be possible for him to raise his voice of protest as against, any act on the part of the authority. But the question remains that there is no suitable satisfactory explanation as to why even after such appointment, he did not refer to his 'appearance in the school final examination'. There is no convincing explanation as to why the writ petitioner did not approach the authority with a claim for correction of age even after such appointment relying upon documents in his support.
16. The writ petitioner is supported by certain documents which have been relied upon in order to indicate that the original certificates etc. have been lost and for this, a General Diary was lodged. But all these are documents of the recent past. Those are rather harmoniously combined so as to suggest that the writ petitioner in a very designed and calculated manner proceeded in order to challenge his date of birth as officially recorded when he was approaching the age of retirement. It is difficult 'to appreciate this and in view of the discussions as made above, this Court does not feel inclined so as to accept the grievances of the writ petitioner.
17. Considering all such facts and circumstances, I do not think that the writ petitioner deserves to get relief in the manner as sought for. It is possibly needless to add that this does not take away his right to assert his claim before the competent Court and thereafter, if so deemed fit and proper, he may approach the authority concerned for necessary redress.
In such circumstances, the writ petition being W.P. 17034 (W) of 2007 be dismissed with the aforesaid observations.
Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties expeditiously.