Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred being dissatisfied with an award dated 20th March, 2007 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Third Court, Midnapore in L.A. Misc. Case No. 32 of 2000 by which the award passed by the Collector was enhanced by five times.
2. The Stamp Reporter has given report that this appeal has been preferred 243 days beyond the period of limitation fixed by law.
3. Mr. Roychowdhury, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, however, has by relying upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in case of Dipankar Roy v. Pranab Kumar Mani reported in 2007 (4) CHN at page 379 contended before us that his client being not a party to the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Tribunal out of which this appeal arises, the period of limitation for filing this appeal will start running after the leave is granted by this Court to his client to prefer this appeal and not from the date of award and consequently, the appeal is not barred by limitation.
4. After going through the decision referred to by Mr. Roychowdhury in case of Dipankar Roy (supra), we find that in that case, against an order of a learned single Judge disposing of a writ application, a third party to the proceedings preferred a mandamus appeal before the Division Bench of this Court beyond the period of limitation fixed by the Article 117 of the Limitation Act.
5. The Division Bench was of the view that the appellant therein, being not a party to the proceedings before the learned single Judge, could not prefer an appeal so long leave was not granted by the Division Bench and thus, according to the said Division Bench, the right to prefer appeal arose only on such leave being granted and accordingly, the period of limitation should start running from the date of grant of such leave and not from the date of the order passed by the learned single Judge as provided in the third column of the Article 117 of the Limitation Act.
6. With great respect to the learned Judges of the said Division Bench, we are unable to subscribe to the opinion expressed by Their Lordships inasmuch as, such view is opposed to the well-settled principle of law laid down by large number of decisions of not only this Court but also of the Privy Council that so far as the third column of the Schedule of the Limitation Act is concerned, a Court cannot add any word into it and should be strictly guided by the language 'employed' therein.
7. In this connection, reference may be made to the following observations of P.B. Mukherjee, J. (as His Lordship then was) sitting in a Division Bench of this Court in the case of G.D. & Co. v. W.I. Theatres reported in (1961) 65 CWN at page 504, which are quoted below:
I can do no better here than draw the attention to the observations of Sir Manmatha Nath Mukherji, J. in Smt. Sarat Kumari Dassi v. Nagendra Nath Pal 29 CWN 973 : AIR 1926 Cal 65 where the learned Judge points out after a careful study of the Third Column of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, how it reveals the outstanding fact which cannot be ignored, namely, that the starting point of limitation does not always synchronize with the accrual of the cause of action and that while in many cases it does, but in many others it dates from specified events which again are either anterior or posterior to the cause of action.
Repeated warnings have been given on this point by the Privy Council. I think the point is concluded today and is no longer open to argument. In Luchmee Buksh Roy v. Runjit Ram Pandey (1873) 13 BLR 177 (PC) the Judicial Committee observed:
It has been said that this case ought to be decided upon on equitable construction, and not upon the strict words of the Statute; but Their Lordships think that Statutes of Limitation, like all others, ought to receive such a construction as the language in its plain meaning imports. Statutes of Limitation are in their nature strict and inflexible enactments.Subsequently, the Privy Council, repeated this principle of 'strict grammatical' construction so far as the Indian Limitation Act is concerned in the case of Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (21) of that Report Sir Dinshaw Mulla observed:There is, in Their Lordships' opinion, no warrant for reading into the words quoted 'any qualification either as to the character of the appeal or as to the parties to it;' the words mean just what they say. The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, Their Lordships think, the only safe guide.
8. In view of the aforesaid decisions referred to in the case of G.D. and Co. cited above, we find that the decision relied upon by Mr. Roychowdhury cannot be treated as a valid piece of precedent.
9. Even in the recent past, a Full Bench of this Court in case of Nurnahar Bewa v. Rabindra Nath Dev reported in 0065/1988 : (1988)2CALLT32(HC) made the following observations in matter of interpretation of the Limitation Act:
The Limitation Act is a Statute of repose and in constructing the law of limitation, the Court should confine strictly within the provisions of the Limitation Act and should not enlarge the scope of the Act by introducing any notional meaning by implication.
10. The attention of Their Lordships was not drawn to either of the decisions mentioned above, nor did Their Lordships take note of those well-settled principles and thus, in ignorance of those binding precedents. Their Lordships took a view, which is contrary to the one taken in those decisions.
11. The foundation of the view adopted by Their Lordships in the case of (sic) Roy (supra) that the period of limitation started running not from the date of the order of the learned single Judge as provided in Article 117 but from the date of accrual of the right of appeal at the instance of the third party to the proceedings, i.e. the date of grant of leave to appeal is patently contrary to the one laid down in the Division Bench decision in case of G.D. & Company (supra) and the other decisions mentioned therein. Their Lordships, in the case of Dipankar Roy (supra), substituted a new starting point of limitation in place of the one mandated in Article 117 in violation of the well-settled law of interpretation of the Statute of Limitation.
12. We, therefore, are unable to follow the view taken in the case of Dipankar Roy (supra) and propose to espouse the consistent view adopted by this Court in the past by following the decisions of the Privy Council mentioned above and hold that even if a third party to the proceedings being dissatisfied with the decision of a Court intends to prefer any appeal before the higher forum on the ground that such decision will prejudicially affect his interest, the period of limitation for preferring such appeal will be the same as provided in the Limitation Act as if he was a party to the proceedings.
13. It is needless to mention that the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is available to such third a party.
14. We, therefore, hold that this appeal is barred by limitation.
15. Mr. Roychowdhury, the learned advocate for the appellant submits that for abundant precaution, his client has also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing this appeal. Let the said application be placed for hearing.