ORDER
1. The instant writ petition was moved, inter alia, for issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing New India Assurance Company the respondent No. 1 to pay the claim of the writ petitioner arising outof the transaction in respect of Policy No. 2312100641 2312100641 (2) dated Septembers, 1981. The writ petition was admitted by Susanta Chatterjee. J. on July 14, 1988 when the petitioner was directed to serve copy of the writ petition upon the respondents within four weeks. Thereafter, hearing of the writ petition was fixed by my order dated December 20, 1988 and the writ petition was heard in presence of the respondents after completion of affidavits.
2. The facts of the writ petition are as follows :--
Diiip Kumar Ghosh the petitioner herein carries on business under the name and styie of 'Jayer Exports' as sole proprietor thereon having its office and place of business at Village -- Santoshpur, Police Station --Maheshiala District 24-Parganas. The main business of the petitioner is the manufacturer of surgical dressings, medical bandages, absorbent cotton wool and various other types of cotton products required in medical profession for sugical purpose. The petitioner firm exports these products to various overseas customers in foreign countries.
3. The petitioners received an order dated June 9, 1981 from Messrs. Patel Wholesale House, a foreign buyer, having its piace of business at Post Box No. 5130 in Limba, Malawi whereby the petitioner was directed to supply surgical dressings and other medical items. The vale of the said order is 21,207.50 (C.I.F.).
4. The petitioner accepted the said order and made arrangement for supply of the said goods to the said buyer. In order to supply the said goods the petitioner contracted with M/s. Himalaya Shipping Co. Ltd. at Cal-cutta. The said goods were shipped by the vessel M. V. Sri Kailash, a ship of M/s. Himalaya Shipping Co. Ltd.
5. The petitioner performed all obligations and requirements for supply of the said goods to a foreign country. The petitioner also insured the goods with the respondent No. I, who agreed to insure the said goods and contracted for the insurance by its PolicyNo. 2312100641 2312100641 (2). The said Policy was issued at Calcutta on September 8, 1981. The amount of insurance has been fixed by the parties at 23,328. The said goods were despatched by Invoice No. JC/179/81 dated September 1, 1981 under Bill of Lading No. BRA 11 dated September 7, 1981.
6. Although the said goods were shipped to reach their destination at Port Beira, Lambe, Malawi but the said vessel could not reach its destination at Port Beira due to the internal trouble or disputes of the said M/s. Himalaya Shipping Co. Ltd. the owner of the ship.
7. Since the petitioner did not get the amount of payment for the said supply within the stipulated period, he made several enquiries to several agencies and came to know that the said vessel could not reach its destination. The said fact was also confirmed by M/s. Himalaya Shipping Co. Ltd. by their letter dated June 6, 1982 written to the petitioner. It has been stated in the said letter that the State Bank of India, who had earlier agreed to tranship the cargo to Beira resorted to legal action against the company and a Receiver has since been appointed by the Calcutta High Court. As such, the said vessel could not reach its destination.
8. On further enquiry the petitioner came to know that the said vessel returned to Port Bombay and was abandoned at the mid-sea by its crew members. The petitioner made several attempts and took up the matter even with the Bombay Port Trust in order to clear the consignment from its stranded position to reship the same to fulfil their contract for the said supply. In spite of several efforts, the petitioner failed to reship the same to its destination at Port Beira.
9. On February 24, 1983 since the said consignment was not delivered at its destination, the banker of the petitioner, i.e. Bank of Baroda returned all shipment documents to the petitioner as per instructions of the Reserve Bank of India the same being unpaid by the buyer at Malawi. In course of delay and failure of their agencies to clear the saidcargo from the ship and to deliver the same either to the petitioner or to re-ship the same to the destination at Port Beira the said goods became unusable since fungus and tetanus grew up over the said goods. According to the petitioner, he offered to sell the same to the said foreign buyer, but the buyer refused to accept the same as the said cargo was not usable for medical purpose at that time and was further contaminated. Since the materials were manufactured by the petitioner according to foreign Government's specification, the same should not be sold out in India as per Drug Rules. However, with several efforts the petitioner was able to off-load the said cargo and also paid to the Bombay Port Trust its duty amounting to Rs. 20,000/- and released the said cargo from the Bombay Port Trust. The petitioner directed his agent situate at Meerut to sell out the said goods in open market at suitable price. The said agent advertised in 'DAINIK PROBHAT' dated November 24, 1983 that the said goods would be sold at 'as is where is condition'. The said goods could not be sold as surgical dressing since Sepior Inspector of Drug at Meerut by his letter dated November 11, 1983 informed the agent of the petitioner at Meerut that the said items were not fit for use as drug. The petitioner had to spend Rs. 72,000/- towards several agencies for getting the goods back to his custody.
10. At the time of transhipment of goods for Beira, the petitioner insured the same against all risks with the respondent --Insurance Company.
11. The relevant conditions of the said insurance are, inter alia, as follows :--
(a) No claim for Constructive Total Loss shall be recoverable hereunder unless the goods are reasonably abandoned either on account of their total actual loss appearing to be unavoidable or because the cost of recovering, reconditioning and forwarding the goods to the destination to which they were insured would exceed their value on arrival.
(b) The seaworthiness of the vessel as between the Assured and the Underwriters ishereby admitted. In the event of loss, theAssured's right of recovery hereunder shallnot be prejudiced by the fact that the same hasbeen attributable to the wrongful act ormisconduct of the ship-owners of their servants committed without the privity of theAssured.
(c) It is the duty of the Assured and their Agents in all cases to take such measures as may be reasonable for the purpose of averting or minimising a loss and to ensure that all rights against carriers, bailees or other third parties are property preserved and exercised .
12. Although the petitioner lodged claim with the respondent No. 1 for payment of the insurance claim, the respondent No. 1 failed and neglected to pay the insurance claim of the petitioner by raising several pretexts and pleas. The respondent No. 2 by his letter dated December 2, 1987 refused to grant the claim on, inter alia, the following grounds:
'(a) the proximate cause of the loss was 'delay', but also unwarranted fee from all claims arising from delay, even though the delay could have any cause by an insured against.
(b) damage to consignment in question was caused due to 'inherent vice of consignment'. It is evident that the loss due to fungus/ tetanus was caused due to inevitable damage/ deterioration/decay and inherent vice of the consignment. Sufficient loss was also caused due to bad packaging. Hence the respondent No. 1 refused to grant the claim of the petitioner.'
13. In the above circumstances, the writ petition has been moved before this Court.
14 Mr. Dipankar Prasad Gupta, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner at the final hearing of the writ petition, submitted that the writ petitioner was entitled to recover the claim from the respondent company, inasmuch as, the respondent company admitted the seaworthiness of the vessel at the initial stage, but subsequently it was found that the vessel was not seaworthy as the same was prevented from reaching its destination at Port Beira due to several litigations, which thepetitioner was not made known by the owner of the vessel.
15. Mr. Gupta has further submitted that the said goods were reasonably abandoned since the said loss was found totally unavoidable and the cost of recovering, reconditioning and forwarding the said goods, to the destination was found not profitable.
16. According to Mr. Gupta, althoughthe said goods were insured by the petitionerand the petitioner had no fault at any point oftime, it was due to the failure of the HimalayaShipping Co. Ltd. that the said vessel couldnot reach the destination to deliver the saidgoods to the said foreign buyer.
17. Mr. Gupta further submits, that thepetitioner took out a policy of insurance from the respondent company dated September 8, 1981 covering the shipment of the said goods. The relevant clauses of the insurance policy involved in the, present case are as follows :--
'5. This insurance is against all risks of loss of damage to the subject-matter insured but shall in no case be deemed to extend to cover loss, damage or expenses proximately caused by delay or inherent vice or the nature of the subject-matter insured .....
9. It is the duty of the assured arid their agents, in all cases, to take such measures as may be reasonable for the purpose of averting or minimising a loss and to ensure that all rights against the carriers, bailees or other 3rd parties are properly preserved and exercised.'
18. According to Mr Gupta, it is an admilted case that the voyage was abandoned by the crew members and the ship was stranded at mid-sea. All the shipping documents were returned to the petitioner as per instruction of the Reserve Bank of India. Due to prolonged neglect, the goods became affected by fungus and tetanus and hence unfit for use. After, several efforts, the petitioner was able to off-load the cargo, which was then sold at the end of November, 1983 not as surgical dressings, but like scrap. Mr. Gupta further submits that the petitioner duly made a claim to the respondent companyfor the above loss and ultimately by a letterdated December 2, 1987 respondent companyrepudiated the claim and disclosed the allegedgrounds that :
(a) The proximate cause of loss was delay.
(b) The damage was caused due to inherent vice and damage was inevitable.
(c) The loss was also due to bad packing.
19. Mr. Gupta submits that the respondents have raised a preliminary objection that as the instant writ petition involves adjudication of contractual obligation and disputed questions of facts, the same is not maintainable in the instant writ jurisdiction.
20. in this connection, Mr. Gupta has referred to the judgment in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Smt. Kiran Sinha, reported in AIR 1985 SC 1265, wherein the Supreme Court, it appears, without laying down any proposition held that the High Court should not have in the circumstances of the said case directed payment of money claimed, under the Insurance Policy, in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
21. Mr. Gupta submits that the contentions are riot tenable for a number of reasons. The basic facts are not in dispute at all No investigation into disputed questions of facts is necessary in the present case, as the petitioner has been able to prove that there was no delay and there was no inherent vice, the writ petition is entitled to be allowed.
22. According to Mr. Gupta, since the writ petition has been admitted by this Court, although there was alternative remedy, the same should not be thrown out at the final stage on the ground that the petitioner had alternative remedy.
23. in this connection, Mr. Gupta has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of L. Hirday Narain v. Income-tax Officer, Bareilly, reported in : [1970]78ITR26(SC) , wherein the Supreme Court observed that when the petitioner had been admitted it would not be fit and proper for the learned Judge at thefinal hearing to dismiss the writ petition, on that ground only. In that case, the Supreme Court has further held that the petitioner filing a writ petition instead of availing of statutory remedy and the High Court entertaining the writ petition and giving a hearingon merits, the petition cannot thereafter be rejected on the ground, that statutory remedy was not availed of.
24. M.r. Gupta has placed reliance on three grounds from the main letter dated December 2,1987 the first of which relates to delay.
25. According to Mr. Gupta, there has been no delay on the part of the writpetitioner. The writ petitioner has done all that he could do in relation to shipment of the goods as well as taking out the policy ofinsurance. The damage to cargo was causednot because there was delay on the part of thepetitioner but because the ship was aban-doned by the crew and the cargo was left toDeteriorate, in adverse conditions for anextremely long period (over 22 months). Thedelay was not caused in any manner by thepetitioner nor had the petitioner any hand inthe delay, as stated by the letter of repudia-tion. Thereafter, the allegation of delay by theInsurance Company is not at all germane tothe facts and circumstances of the case.Furthermore, the petitioner directly ori in-directly had no control over this delay. This isnot 'delay' which would entitle the insurancecompany to avoid its liability under thepolicy.
26. Regarding inherent vice, the word'inherent' has been defined in the CollinsCOBULLED Dictionary in the followingterms:
'Qualities or characteristics that are in-herent in something or some one exists as anecessary and natural part of that person orthing.'
27. The cargo in question never had any inherent vice which from its very nature was such that damage to it was inevitable andnatural. Deterioration to the cargo was notdue to any defect or vice, which was inherent to the same. Deterioration took place because of superimposed circumstances and outside influence of an adverse character. It was not the natural behaviour of the cargo at all.
28. Mr. Biswajit Chowdhury, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents Insurance Company submits that twoquestions are to be decided by this Court :--
1. Whether a writ in the nature, of Mandamus can at all be issued directing payment of claim, arising out of Policy of Insurance?
2. Whether a writ in the nature of certiorari can be issued for quashing the letter dated December 2, 1987 (being the letter of repudiation of claim) being Annexure 'B' to thepetition?
29. Mr. Chowdhury submits that as the petitioner has no legal/statutory right to have his goods insured, there is no legal/ statutory duty, on the part of the respondent --insurance Company to insure the goods. Accordingly, the writ petition is not main-tainable, as no legal right of the petitioner hasbeen infringed by the decision of the respondent No. 2 repudiating the insurance claim,on December 2, 1937.
30. According to Mr. Chowdhury, thepetitioner has mainly taken two grounds inthe Writ petition :
I. Seaworthiness of the. ship having beenadmitted by the respondent No. 1 which was'found unseaworthy as the ship could notreach the destination due to several litigationsabout which the. petitioner was not madeknown by the owner of the ship.
II. Goods were reasonably abandoned as theloss was totally unavoidable and the cost of'forwarding the goods after reconditioningwas not profitable. Petitioner insured thegoods and he was not at fault. The ship couldnot reach the destination to deliver the goodsto the foreign buyer due to failure of the shipowner.
31. Mr. Chowdhury submits that as regards Ground-I above, about unseaworthi-ness of the ship, Article III, para. 1 of the Schedule to (The Indian) Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1975 may be referred to which deals with responsibilities and liabilities of the carrier, inter alia, as follows :--
'1. The Carrier shall be found, before and at the beginning of the voyage, to exercise due diligence to-
(a) make the ship seaworthy.'
32. According to Mr. Chowdhury, in the instant case, the unseaworthiness of the ship, if any, arose after the ship left the Port of Calcutta with the goods of the petitioner, when the ship was held up Dar-es-Salaem, before she reached the port of destination. The responsibility of the carrier about seaworthiness of the ship was limited 'before and at the beginning of the voyage' in terms of clause (a) of Para. 1 of Article III, quoted above, when the ship was to sail from and at the time when she left the Port of Calcutta and not afterwards. The admission of seaworthiness of the ship 'Sri Kailash' by the respondent No. 1 in the Policy of Insurance was limited to Ss. Sri Kailash at Calcutta and such seaworthiness was warranted after the ship left the Port of Calcutta. There is no allegation and/or ascertain in the writ petition that the ship was not reasonably fit to carry the goods of the petitioner. In this connection, he referred to the provisions of Section 42 of the Marine Insurance Act, 1963.
33. Mr. Chowdhury further submits that Ground II, as aforesaid relates to a claim for constructive total loss. The petitioner has urged that the goods are reasonably abandoned as the loss is found totally unavoidable and the cost of recovering, reconditioning and forwarding the said goods to the destination was found not profitable. Section 60 of the Marine Insurance Act has defined the Constructive Total Loss -
'(1) Subject to any express provision in the Policy, there is a constructive total toss where the subject-matter insured is reasonably abandoned on account of its actual total loss appearing to be unavoidable, or because it could not be preserved from actual total losswithout an expenditure which would exceed its value when the expenditure had been incurred.'
'(2) in particular, there is a constructivetotal loss -
(i)-(ii)... ... ... ...
(iii) in case of damage to goods, where the cost of repairing the damage and forwarding the goods to their destination would exceed their value on arrival.'
34. Clause 6 of the Institute Cargo Clauses (All Risks) attached to the Policy (at page 17 of the petition) has provided :
'No claim for Constructive Total Loss shall be recoverable hereunder unless the goods are reasonably abandoned either on account of their actual total loss appearing to be unavoidable or because the cost of recovering, reconditioning and forwarding the goods to the destination to which they are insured would exceed their value on arrival.'
35. According to Mr. Chowdhury, in order to assert Ground II the petitioner was required to give notice of election to abandon the subject-matter insured to the insurer. The writ petition does not contain any pleading that the petitioner has given such notice of abandonment to the respondent No. 1 which is a condition precedent for claiming constructive total loss. In this connection, the provisions of Section 62 of the Marine Insurance Act have been referred to. That the petitioner has not given the notice of abandonment to the respondent No. 1 is evident from his letter dated September 11, 1987 wherein the petitioner has, inter alia, stated as follows : --
'(4) if we wished to do so, then, as soon as we became aware of the fact that the M. V. 'SRI KAILASH' had been abandoned by her crew (with all cargo on board) on arrival in Bombay on or about the 4th April, 1982, that there then existed a threat of loss of or damage to our above consignment or that there was every possibility of our being irretrievely deprived of the possession thereof, we co.uld have given you Notice of Abandonment and claimed from you as for a'Constructive Total Loss' of the consignment. We, however, did not do so......'
36. Mr. Chowdhury submits that in the writ petition there is no pleading and no ground has been taken that the petitioner is entitled to a partial loss. In view of specific assertion in the aforesaid letter (dated 11-9-87) that the petitioner could have claimed for constructive total loss but did not do so, there cannot be any question of waiver of notice of abandonment on the part of the respondent No. 1. Thereafter, Ground II is also not sustain able on facts and in law as well.
37. Mr. Chowdhury has placed reliance referring to a Judgment of the House of Lords in the case of British and Foreign Marine Insurance Co. v. Gaunt reported in (1921) All ER (Rep) 447 wherein it has been held -
'In a policy of marine insurance against 'all risk' those words cannot be held to cover all damage however caused, for such damage as is inevitable from ordinary wear and tear and ordinary depreciation during transit or is due to inherent vice an act of the assured, or a risk which it is not lawful to cover, is not within the policy. To be covered by such a policy damage must be due to some fortuitous circumstance, accident, or casualty. In a claim under the policy the assured discharges the onus which is on him by proving that the damage arose from any of the insurable risks or accidental circumstances which were incidental to the journey, and was not such as would be expected to occur in the course of a normal transit'.
38. Mr. Chowdhury has also referred to the observations of the Queen's Bench Division in the case of F.W. Berk & Co. Ltd. v. Style, reported (1'955) 3 All ER 625 wherein it has been held :
'The plaintiffs had bought on a f.o.b. contract, a consignment of kieselguhr to be shipped from Africa to London. The kieselguhr was packed in paper bags and the good's were insured in transit between warehouse and warehouse by two policies of marine insurance against 'all risks of loss and/or damage from Whatsoever causearising'. Each policy included a suing and labouring clause binding the insurers to contribute to the charges of the assured in suing and labouring for the safeguard and recovery of the goods and also incorporated the Institute Cargo Clauses (Wartime Extension), cl. 6 of which provided that the insurance should in no case be deemed to cover loss or damage or expense proximately caused 'by....... inherent vice or nature of thesubject-matter insured'. On the kieselguhr being transferred at London from the ship's hold to a lighter a number of bags burst, and the plaintiffs incurred expenses in re-bagging and landing the kieselguhr. The court found that the subject-matter of the insurance was the kieselguhr packed in paper bags, not the kieseguhr alone, and that there was 'inherent vice' in the goods because the bags in which the kieselguhr was packed were defective at the time of shipment. In an action to recover under the suing and labouring clause the expenses incurred in fe-bagging and landing the kieselguhr, the defendant underwriter denied liability on the ground that the expenses were caused by the inherent vice of the goods within cl. 6 abovenamed and S. 55(2)(c) of the Marine Insurance Act, 1903.'
39. In reply, Mr. Gupta submits that the judgment in the case of British and Foreign Marine Insurance Co. v. Gaunt, reported in (1921) All ER (Rep) 447 (supra) cited by the respondents, is distinguishable on the face of it. This very case brings out the characteristics which can be described as inherent in goods, i.e., where damage was a certainty. Similarly, in the case of F.W. Berk A Co. Ltd. v. Style, reported in (1955) 3 All ER 625 (supra) cited by the respondents, the nature of the goods, namely, sugar packed in paper bags was such that damage during shipment Was inevitable and hence there was inherent vice. This case also is clearly distinguishable. There was no inherent vice in the cargo concerned in the present case. Inherent vice has to be shown, not presumed. It is the conventional practice that when a clean Bill of Lading is issued in favour of the Shipper (petitioner herein) or in favour of any party, it is presumed that the consignment in question is perfectly in order.So the question of inherent vice does not in any event arise at all. Assuming for argument's sake, had there been any inherent vice at the very beginning of the journey, the Insurance Company would never have issued the policy in favour of the petitioner. Had there been any inherent vice, it would have been there at the very inception and not at a subsequent stage. In other words, the vice has to.be there at the very outset, if at all. -The Insurance Company cannot take specious plea of the same at a later stage that there was inherent vice.
40. On the question of bad packing, Mr.Gupta submits that this is defence taken without any factual foundation and it merely repeats language of the insurance policy. There is not an iota of evidence to suggest that the packing was in any way defective. From the admitted facts, no conclusion can be reasonably drawn to the effect that there was any vice, far less inherent vice or defect in packing. No material has been produced in support of this allegation. He puts a question that if there had been bad packaging would the Insurance Company issue a policy in favour of such party? The answer will be certainly in the negative. This plea taken by the Insurance Company, subsequently is a specious plea and has no substance at all and it is only to defeat the .petitioner's claim.
41. Mr. Gupta further submits that it was open to the respondents, if they so wished, to inspect the condition of the packing or the condition of the cargo prior to shipment. Not having done so, the respondents are not entitled to complain about the alleged defects which could have been discovered prior to the shipment. It is common knowledge that in the case of Insurance, for example; life insurance, examination of the subject-matter of insurance does take place at the instance of the insurer.
42. During arguments, reliance was sought to be placed by the respondents on the bailee clause, namely clause 9 of the insurance policy, but this ground hot having been taken in the letter dated December 2, 1987 cannot be allowed to be taken at this stage of hearing of the writ petition, He submits that the respon-dents are not entitled to rely on any groundother than those mentioned in the letter datedDecember 2, 1987 for justifying the repudia- -,tion.
43. In this context, Mr. Gupta has placedreliance on a judgment reported in : [1978]2SCR272 which is well established.that an orderwhich gives a ground for it cannot bedimproved upon later on by giving, additionalgrounds. According to Mr. Gupta, the bailee clause is not at all applicable in the facts andcircumstances of the present case; in order toattract the clause, the insured will have to dosomething by which the respondents' rights are not preserved, i.e. destroyed. This clausedoes not compel the insured to file a suitagainst the carrier. The respondent company was aware of all relevant facts at all materialtimes. It is not their case that anything 'wasconcealed from them. They were perfectly atliberty, if they so wished, to have filed a suitagainst the carrier or any other personresponsible for loss to the cargo.
44.Let us now consider whether the writpetition is entitled to be entertained by this Court in view of the pleadings adduced by the parties stated, as aforesaid.
45. The judgment in L. Hirday Narain's case reported in : [1970]78ITR26(SC) (supra) in fact supports the writ petitioner, as the writ petition having been admitted by one of the learned Judges of this Court, at the time of final hearing, the respondents are precluded from taking such plea that the petitioner had alternative remedy, in view of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court and, in my view, the writ petition should not be dismissed, as the petitioner had alternative remedy byway of filing suit.
46. As such, in my view, the present writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution.
47. Regarding the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Life. Insurance Corporation of India, reported in AIR 1985 SC 1265 (supra), it can be observed that the Supreme Court in that case has not laid down any hard and fast rule, as to whether theInsurance Company could not be directed to make payment had there been any lapse on the part of the Insurance Company where the petitioner's claim is covered by the relevant clauses of the policy.
48. According to me, in the facts of the present case there was no delay on the part of the petitioner as the petitioner had done all that he could do regarding the shipment of goods.
49. Further, in my view, the damage caused to the cargo was not because of the delay on the part of the petitioner but because the ship was abandoned by the crew which came within the purview of all risks and the respondents are duty bound to pay the insured sum.
50. This Court is also of the view that the petitioner has ho hand in matter of delay and the respondent-Insurance Company cannot be allowed to take shelter under that plea.
51. Regarding 'inherent vice', on the basis of the pleadings, it appears that the cargo in question never had 'inherent vice' which iwould be evident from its very nature of damage caused to the goods, which was inevitable and natural and that deterioration ito the cargo was not due to any defect or vice which was inherent in the same and in my view the deterioration took place because of superimposed circumstances.
52. The cases cited by the respondent Insurance Company, namely (1) British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co. v. Gaunt reported in (1921). All ER (Rep.) 447 at 455 (supra) and (2) F. W. Berk & Co. Ltd. v. Style. reported in (1955) 3 All ER 625 (supra), are distinguishable in the facts of the present case, as the facts are not similar.
53. In my view, the defence of bad packing should not be made available to the respondents, who have merely contended that packing was defective, and as such, the respondents, at a subsequent stage are entitled to take such defence.
54. In conclusion, this Court is of theview that the claim of the petitioner is other-wise justified and, accordingly, the responddent-Insurance Company should be directed!to pay the amount of insurance, which iscovered by the policy.
55. Accordingly, in my view, the writpetition is entitled to succeed.
56. The respondents should be directed to make payment of the sum assured being 23,328 covered by its Policy Number 2312100641 2312100641 -(2) dated September 8, 1981 within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order.
57. Let a writ in the nature of Mandamus issue accordingly directing the respondent-Insurance Company to pay the claim of the petitioner within three months from date.
58. There will be no order as 'to costs.
59. If any certified copy is applied for with urgent fees, the same should be given to the parties as expeditiously as possible, under the Rules.
60. Petition allowed.