Suharabi Vs. Special Tahsildar

- what remains to be seen is as to whether pinki died an un-natural death within seven years of her marriage and whether her death was attributable to the demand of dowry and further whether she was dealt with cruelty soon before her death. if these ingredients are proved by the prosecution then the conviction of the accused under section 304b, ipc will be complete.[para 9] the question is, in the absence of corpus delicti, could it be presumed that the accused persons alone were responsible for the death of pinki. we must hasten to add here that the accused persons have already been acquitted of the murder charge. [para 9] it is clear that pinki's death was caused because of the burns and not in the normal circumstances. the finding of the trial court and the appellate court in that behalf is correct. for this reason we are not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel that in the absence of corpus delicti, the conviction could not stand. [para10] it is clear that the prosecution has not only proved the offence under section 304b, ipc with the aid of section 113b, indian evidence act but also the offence under section 201, ipc. [para 15] held: we have gone through the judgments of the trial court as well as the appellate court carefully and we find that both the courts have fully considered all the aspects of this matter. we, therefore, find nothing wrong with the judgments and confirm the same. the appeal is, therefore, dismissed.[para 16]thottathil b. radhakrishnan, j.1. petitioner applied for re-determination of compensation under section 28a(1) of the land acquisition act, 1894. that was rejected as time-barred. hence, this writ petition.2. heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned government pleader.3. petitioner applied on 20th november, 2004 relying on an award passed by the court on 21st august, 2004. section 28a(1) of the l.a. act provides that the written application under that provision shall be made within three months from the date of the award of the court. the word 'month' is not defined in the l.a. act. therefore, the definition of that term in section 3(35) of the general clauses act, 1897 applies. hence, the month has to be reckoned according to the british calendar. therefore, the period of three months for the purpose of an application under section 28a(1) has to be reckoned according to the british calendar, applying section 3(35) of the general clauses act. the award of court relied on by the petitioner was delivered on 21st august, 2004. by the proviso to section 28a(1) of the l.a. act, the date of pronouncement of the award by the court shall be excluded in computing the period of three months. therefore, the period of three months for the petitioner to apply under section 28a(1) on the basis of the award relied on by her ends on 22nd november, 2004. the petitioner's application filed on 20th november, 2004 was, therefore, well within time.4. for the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order does not stand. it is accordingly quashed. the first respondent will take up the application of the petitioner and render decision on it, on merits.the writ petition is allowed as above.