V. Dhanapalan, J.
1. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has been tiled by the Chief General Manager, Thermal Power Station-I Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited, Neyveli-7 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation'). In this appeal, the appellant has questioned the correctness of the order dated October 31, 1997 made in W.C. No. 74/96 by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour-II (Workmen's Compensation) (hereinafter referred to as the 'the Commissioner') awarding a sum of Rs. 66,516/- with 6% interest from the date of filing of the petition as compensation to the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 on account of death of one D. Govindasamy (hereinafter referred to as 'the Workman') who was working as a technician Grade-IV in the appellant/Corporation. The first respondent is the wife of the deceased workman and the respondents 2, 3 and 4 are his children.
2. The respondents 1 to 4 herein made a claim before the Commissioner under Section 10(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') claiming compensation for the death of the workman in an accident during the course of the employment on August 8, 1989. According to the respondents 1 to 4, the deceased 3 workman, who was aged 46 years was employed by the appellant in their Fuel Handling System (Operation) Division. On August 8, 1989, the workman sustained personal injury in an accident during the course of his employment resulting to his death on the same day. The cause of injury was that he attended night shift duty from 22.00 hrs. on August 7, 1989 up to 6.00 hrs. on August 8, 1989 and thereafter, he laid down on the platform near 'A' conveyor switch board. But, he did not wake up when he was attempted to be woken up by his co-workers. He was declared dead by the Doctor who examined him. In the post-mortem report given by Doctor at Government Hospital, Panruti on August 8, 1989 at 4.50 p.m. It has been mentioned that the death could have been occurred between 14.00 and 17.00 hrs. prior to post-mortem, due to strain and stress caused to him by the employment.
3. It is the case of the respondents 1 to 4 that on the date of death of workman, he was drawing a salary of Rs. 1,278.65, and the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 were entirely depending on his income for their livelihood. Due to the loss of the bread winner of their family, they have filed a petition for compensation claiming a sum of Rs. 66,516/-. In support of their claim, the first respondent, who was the first applicant before the Commissioner was examined as A.W. 1 and one S. Kanagaraj, a co-worker was examined as A.W. 2 and also one S. Dhandapani, who found the workman lying dead was examined as A.W. 3, besides marking Exhibits A1 to A5. One P. Madanagopal, Deputy Chief Engineer was examined as R.W. 1 and Exhibits R1 to R6 were marked on the side of the management for their defence.
4. On the other hand, the appellant herein, who was the respondent before the Commissioner has filed counter contending that the Commissioner has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim under the Act as the accident which according to the applicants gives cause of action for the claim, is not an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. It was further contended that the workman, who was wqrking in the Thermal Power Station-I of the Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. as Tech. Grade IV was posted on August 7, 1989 in the Night Shift commencing from 10.00 p.m. to 6.00 a.m. at the Fire Handling System (Operation) In the Thermal Station-I, but in contravention of the rules, he went to sleep at about 12.30 a.m. On a platform near 'A' Conveyor Switch Board and till. 5.30 a.m., he did not wake up. According to the appellant, the individual might have died during his sleep under the normal circumstances and the death was not due to any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, it was further contended that though he died during working hours, the cause of death cannot be attributable to his employment, which was a normal death. In such circumstances, the appellant has prayed before the Commissioner that they cannot be fastened with any liability whatsoever for payment of compensation under the Act and to dismiss the claim petition.
5. The Commissioner, after analysing the oral and documentary evidence and upon perusing all the material documents, has held that the workman died due to personal injuries sustained by him in the accident during the course of his employment on August 8, 1989 and awarded the compensation as claimed by the respondents 1 to 4 herein. Aggrieved by the said order, the Corporation/appellant preferred this appeal.
6. Heard Mr. N.A.K. Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/Corporation and Mr. N. Dhamodaran, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 4.
7. The learned Counsel for the appellant in his submissions, has contended that the nature of duties of the workman did not involve any stress and in any case on the fateful day, he had not been subjected to any extra hard/manual work. The learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Commissioner has not properly appreciated the evidence of A. W. 1 who deposed that the workman was not suffering from any disease and also the Commissioner had erroneously concluded that the workman died due to stress and hard work given during the course of his employment, when the fact remains that he had gone to sleep during the tenure of employment and death occurred while he was asleep, and there is no evidence to indicate that he had performed any duty after 00.30 hrs. The learned Counsel further submitted that the heart attack suffered by the deceased cannot be deemed to be an accident within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act, and that there must be a causal connection between the accidental injury and the employment. The expression 'employment' cannot be confined to the mere nature of the employment. He has Further contended that in the case of death caused by accident, the burden of proof rests upon the workman to prove that the accident arose out of as well as in me course of employment.
8. Per contra, Mr. N. Dhamodaran, learned Counsel for the respondents 1 to 4 herein has contended that there is no error in the finding of the Commissioner that the heart attack suffered by workman during the course of his employment on August 8, 1989 can be deemed to be an accident within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act. The Tribunal has given a specific finding that the workman died due to personal injuries sustained by him in the accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. The learned Counsel drew my attention to the deposition of A.W. 2 and A.W. 3 the co-workers who deposed that at about 5.30 a.m. they were informed by one Muthuvel, another co-worker that the workman D. Govindaswamy was found dead and A.W. 2 had gone to the spot immediately where he saw the workman bleeding from his mouth. Learned Counsel also focused the attention of this Court to the evidence of R.W. 1 the Deputy Chief Engineer of the Corporation, who has admitted that on August 7, 1989, the workman died during the working hours, and in his cross-examination, he has admitted that he did not know how the deceased died on August 7, 1989 and no workman told him that the deceased slept during working hours and that he has any ailment at the time of his death. Learned Counsel has submitted that the Tribunal, based on these oral evidence, supported by the documentary evidence viz., Exhibits A1, the FIR, Exhibit A2, the post-mortem certificate. Exhibit A3, the pay certificate Exhibit A4, the report of the Deputy Security Officer of the Corporation to the Chief Security Officer and Exhibit A5 the opinion of the Medical Officer, has held that the workman D. Govindaswamy suffered heart attack during the course of his employment on August 8, 1989 and that can be deemed to be an accident within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act and such finding is based on proper appreciation of the evidentiary value and material records available before the Commissioner and therefore, there is no infirmity in the findings of the Tribunal and he prayed this Court to dismiss the appeal filed by the Corporation.
9. The learned Counsel for the appellant/Corporation, in support of his contention that the burden of proof rests upon the workman, has relied on the decision of Supreme Court reported in Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. (P) Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahmmed Issak : (1970)ILLJ16SC , which read as follows at p. 19 of LLJ:
6. In the case of death caused by accident the burden of proof rests upon the workman to prove that the accident arose out of employment as well as in the course 1 of employment. But this does not mean that a workman who comes to Court for relief must necessarily prove it by direct evidence. Although the onus of proving that the injury by accident arose both out of and in the course of employment rests upon the applicant these essentials may be inferred when the facts proved justify the interference. On the one hand the Commissioner must not surmise, conjecture or guess; on the other hand, he may draw an inference from the proved facts so long as it is a legitimate inference. It is of course impossible to lay down any rule as to the degree of proof which is sufficient to justify an inference being drawn, but the evidence must be such as would induce a reasonable man to draw it. LORD BIRKHNHIAD L.C. in Lancaster v. Backwell Collieiy Co. Ltd. 1918 WC and 1 Rep 345 observed:
If the facts which are proved give rise to conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability so that the choice between them is a mere matter of conjecture then of course, the applicant fails to prove his case, because it is plain that the onus in these matters is upon the applicant. But where the known facts are not equally consistent, where there is ground for comparing and balancing probabilities as to their respective value, and where a reasonable man might hold that the more probable conclusion is that for which the applicant contends, the arbitrator is justified in drawing an inference in his favour.
10. Learned Counsel for the appellant has relied upon the following decisions to establish his claim that the heart attack suffered by workman cannot be construed to be an 'accident' within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act.
(i) Parwatibai v. Rajkumar Mills 1959 II LLJ 65 (MP)
(ii) Bai Shakri v. New Manekchowk Mills Co. Ltd. 1961 I LLJ 585 (Guj)
(iii) Mrs. Kamalabai Chintaman v. Divisional Superintendent Central Railway, Nagpur 1971 LIC 735
(iv) Randal Jawahirlal v. Smt. Leela Bai 1972 II LLJ 598 : (Raj)
(v) Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay v. Smt. Sulochanabai Sadashiv Joil 1977 LIC 1735
(vi) The case Leela Devei v. Ram Lai Rahu 1990 (76) FJR 153.
11. Let us go through the case laws cited by the learned Counsel one by one.
In 1959 II LLJ 65 : (supra), a learned single Judge, of the Indore Bench has held as follows in pp. 67 & 68 of LLJ:
(6) It cannot be disputed that the sudden death of Kalu, who was suffering from heart disease, was caused by an accident. It is well established that the word 'accident' in Section 3(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, has been used in the popular and ordinary sense and means 'mishap' or untoward event not expected or designed'. If the injury or death from the point of view of the workman, who dies or suffers the injury is unexpected or without design on his party, then the death or injury would be by accident although it was brought about by a heart attack or some other cause to be found in the condition of the workman himself. Kalu clearly did not design the heart attack or intend that he should die as a result of it. His death was thus caused by an accident. It is also clear, that the deceased died while he was on his job and thus in the course of his employment. The question remains whether the accident 'arose out of the employment....
12. In the decision reported in 1961 I LLJ 585 : (supra) it has been observed, thus in pp. 587 & 588 of LLJ:
Though the word 'accident' occurring in Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is not defined in the Act, the word has been a subject-matter of a number of decisions as a result of which it has come to acquire a settled meaning. The word accident generally means some unexpected event happening without design even though there may be negligence on the part of the workman. It is used in the popular and ordinary sense and means a mishap or an untoward event not expected or designed. What the Act really intends to convey is what might be expressed as an accidental injury. It includes not only such occurrences such as collisions, tripping over floor obstacles, falls of roof, but also less obvious ones causing injury, e.g. strain which causes rupture, exposure to a draught causing chill, exertion in a stokehold causing apoplexy and shock causing neurasthenia. But the common factor in all these cases, is some concrete happening at a definite point of time and in capacity resulting from the happening. Since Section 3 provides that the accident must arise out of and in the course of the workman's employment, the accident in order to give rise to a claim for compensation must have some causal relation to the workman's employment and must be due to a risk incidental to that employment. But, although an accident must be a particular occurrence which happens at a particular time in order that it may constitute an accident within the meaning of Section 3, it is not necessary that the workman should be able to locate it in order to succeed in his claim. There would be cases where a series of tiny accidents, each producing some unidentifiable result and operating cumulatively to produce the final condition of injury, would constitute together an accident within the meaning of this Section....
13. In Mrs. Kamalabai Chintaman's case (supra), the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur after referring to its own judgment has dealt with Section 3 of the Act as hereunder:
6. We have a case of our own High Court in : (1954)ILLJ614Bom Laxmibai v. Chairman and Trustees, Bombay Port Trust, where Chief Justice Chagla had delivered the judgment. He has dealt with Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act somewhat in detail after referring to several English cases. He was dealing with a case of a watchman employed by the Port Trust at its pumping station at Carnac Bunder, Bombay. He was on night duty on the night of August 20, 1951, between 7 p.m. to 7 a.m. At 1 a.m. on August 21 the deceased complained of pain in his chest and was asked to lie down. His condition deteriorated and at about 6 a.m. he died. That the medical evidence showed that the deceased was suffering from heart disease and that the death was brought about by the strain caused by the deceased being on his legs for a certain period of time. The question whether the watchman died of injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment was then considered by this Court. While dealing with the conditions that have got to be satisfied, viz., that the accident arose in the course of the employment of the workman and that the accidental injury must arise out of the employment, Mr. Justice Chagla recapitulated this expression which had led to the judicial discussion in England and observed as follows:
Whereas in the course of employment emphasises the time when accidental injury was caused, 'out of employment' emphasises that there must be a causal connection between the employment and the accidental injury....
The learned Chief Justice recapitulated the medical evidence before him which established that the deceased died as a result of the strain caused upon his heart by the particular work that the deceased was doing viz. having to stand on his legs and having to move about as a watchman looking after the pumping station belonging to the Port Trust and, in that view, the learned Chief Justice held that the workman died as a result of an accident which he did not design or intend. Although it was clear because of the facts and circumstances of the case that the deceased died in the course of his employment, it was disputed that the death did not arise out of the employment of the deceased. The learned Chief Justice, therefore, considered the question whether there was or there was no causal connection between the death of the deceased and his employment. While discussing this question, the learned Chief Justice observed as follows:. The authorities again are clear that if the workman died as a natural result of the disease from which he was suffering then it could not be said that his death was caused out of his employment. The authorities also have gone to this length that if a workman is suffering from a particular disease and as a result of wear and tear of his employment he dies of that disease no liability would be fixed upon the employer. But it is equally clearly established that if the employment is a contributory cause, or if the employment has accelerated the death, or if it could be said that the death was due not only to the disease but the disease coupled with the employment, then the employer would be liable and it could be said that the death arose out of the employment of the deceased....
Therefore, it is clear that in all cases where a workman dies in the course of his employment, he cannot be given compensation, it may be that he died or got injury in the course of his employment. But in order to see whether he got the accidental injury in the course of his employment, we have to see whether there is clear and unequivocal evidence that the deceased died because of a particular strain during the course of his duties. It is not enough if it is shown that the workman died as a natural result of the decease from which he was suffering. It is not even enough if it is shown that if a workman was suffering from a particular disease and as a result of wear and tear of his employment he died of that disease; the appellant will have to show that the deceased died not only because of the heart disease from which he was suffering but also because of some contributory cause on account of his employment on his duties which he was performing at Chanda or between Mairi and Chanda. The evidence here, in my view does not show any causal connection between the death of the deceased driver and his employment. We have seen that he took charge of the Goods Train at about 10 a.m. at Mairi. He actually rested there for about 2 hours. Then he did his normal duties. Then he rested also at other intermediate station. After he came to Chanda, he did some work. He merely walked to the Guard merely to find out why he had shown red flag to stop his engine. While talking to him he collapsed. All these circumstances, therefore, clearly show that there was no causal connection between the death of Chintaman and his employment. The evidence is clear and unequivocal that the deceased died a natural death and not on account of any particular strain which he had on account of his employment.
14. In 1972 II LLJ 598 : (supra), the Rajasthan High Court has held thus:
7. The word accident has not been defined in the Act but we may take that any unexpected event happening without design and causing injury to or death to any person may be taken as an accident. But when we talk whether that accident arose out of the employment of the workman, we must bear in mind that accident must have some causal relation to the employment and must be due to the risk incidental to the nature of employment. To put in other words it is to be seen whether Srikishan died due to pneumonia alone or from pneumonia and employment together, i. e., whether it can be said that there was some sort of connection between the employment and the cause of death...
12... This was, therefore, held a 'locality risk' attached to the nature of the employment. Obviously there was no such 'a locality risk' in the present case.
15. In the decision reported in 1977 Lab IC 1735 (supra), while dealing with similar issue it has been observed by a Division Bench of Bombay High Court as hereunder:
11. On the second question, very little can be said in support of the finding. Three factors must be established to attract the liability under Section 3 of the Act. Firstly, there must be an injury. Secondly, it should be caused in an accident. Thirdly, it should be caused in the course of the employment. Mere death in ordinary course by some bodily ailment or even in the course of employment cannot attract liability of the employer under Section 3. The words 'injury' and 'accident' in Section 3 of the Act imply the existence of some external factor to cause death apart from internal ailment of the body. It was never suggested that the work ordinarily done by the deceased could directly or indirectly contribute to the pains in the chest. Nor any particular work of that day is suggested to be the cause of such pain and the resultant death. The duties attached to his post do not involve any strain. The trial Court has referred to the negligence in not extending treatment within 15-20 minutes. But there is no evidence either of any particular duty of any one in office nor evidence of its non-compliance. In fact there is no evidence of the deceased having indicated any gravity till he was removed to the hospital. That the deceased should have suffered from the pain in the chest and should have died immediately on reaching the hospital is indeed unfortunate. But this could as well be in the ordinary course of life without involving any accident or any personal injury to the deceased in the course of the employment. No such circumstance can be inferred merely from the death during the office hours. Some causal connection between the employment and the death, independently of the bodily ailment, must be shown to invoke Section 3 of the Act. It is difficult to see what inference can be drawn from the mere fact that the blood arteries of the deceased were contracted. This ordinarily is the effect of the age in natural course. Mr. Karandikar relied on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Bai Deva Kaluji v. Silver Cotton Mills Ltd. : (1956)ILLJ740Bom . The judgment only emphasises the need to look to circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is absent. With respect, there can hardly be any quarrel with this proposition of law. In the said case, the learned Judges drew an inference of an injury in the course of his employment, from the fact that the deceased had worked as weaver in the heat during the month of June in Ahmedabad, which could put strain on the heart of the deceased Mr. Karandikar could not draw our attention to any circumstance from the facts of this case to warrant such inference of the strain on the heart of the deceased. His reliance on the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Parwtibai v. Rajkumar Mills : (1959)IILLJ65MP , is equally misplaced. In the said case the workman was found to have suffered a shock while he was mounting a belt on the machine. He was found to have collapsed and died instantaneously. The learned Judges followed the Division Bench judgment of our High Court. We are unable to draw any assistance from the ratio of the said case. We are thus unable to uphold the finding of the learned additional Commissioner on the second point also.
16. In the case law reported in (1990) 76 FJR 153 (supra), a learned single Judge of Himachal Pradesh High Court has held thus:
The facts of this case do not, as a matter of fact apply to the present case since there is no evidence pointing out that the deceased was suffering from any pre-existing disease and that the work assigned to the deceased was of such a nature that caused immense strain thereby accelerating his death. The only grievance raised is that he was not provided with any uniform and there were no heating arrangements. So far as uniform is concerned, there was no duty nor any requirement for the employer to do so; rather clothing were to be worn by the deceased himself. Further, the nature of the job was, such that he was not to sit by the side of fire on facts, therefore, Shaiitaben's case, AIR 1968 Guj 113 : 1968 LIC 786 does not apply to the facts of this case.
17. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents 1 to 4 has relied on the following decisions:
(i) General Superintendent, Talcher Thermal Station v. Smt. Bijuli Naik 1994 Lab IC 1379 (Ori)
(ii) National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Balawwa 1994 I LLJ 433 : (Kant-DB)
(iii) Divisional Personnel Officer Western Railway, Jaipur v. Ashiya Begarn 1994 II LLJ 795 : (Raj)
18. In 1994 LIC 1379 (supra), G.B. PATNAIK, J. of Orissa High Court, after referring to various judgments in this issue extensively, has held as follows:
7. In the other Supreme Court case, : (1963)IILLJ615SC : 1963 II LLJ 615 also the question of notional extension of employer's premises was under consideration. In that case, the employee after finishing his work for the day at 7.45 p.m. at Jogeshwari Bus Depot boarded another bus in order to go to his residence at Santa Cruz and the said bus collided with a stationary lorry parked at an awkward angle as a result of which he was thrown out on the road and was injured and died at the hospital. The Supreme Court held in that case that the accident occurred during the course of his employment and, therefore, his wife was entitled to compensation. In the said case, the Apex Court observed that the question when does an employment begin and when does it cease depends upon the facts of each case. But the Courts have agreed that the employment does not necessarily end when the 'down tool' signal is given or when the workman leaves the actual workshop where he is working. There is a notional extension at both the entry and exit by time and space. The scope of such extension must necessarily depend on the circumstances of a given case. An employment may end or may begin not only when the employee begins to work or leaves his tools but also when he used the means of access and egress to and from the place of employment. This being the ratio and the employee in the instant case having died at the factory gate while coming to join his duty for the general shift at 8.00 a.m. a couple of minutes before 8.00 a.m. the theory of notional extension must apply. But the crucial question that arises for consideration is whether the nature of work which the deceased was doing can be said to have any connection with the coronary thrombosis which the deceased suffered and on account of which he ultimately succumbed. The doctor in his evidence has stated that strenuous physical work may cause coronary thrombosis and even for 3 or 4 months prior to the death, the deceased had been coming to him complaining of chest pain and the doctor had treated him five days prior to the occurrence for chest pain. The claimant, the widow of the deceased, in her evidence had stated that on Saturday evening the deceased came back from office and complained of chest pain and the Commissioner on consideration of other evidence has held that the deceased was doing strenuous physical work in the factory. In this state of affairs, the ultimate conclusion that the deceased suffered from coronary thrombosis and ultimately died of the same has a close connection with his strenuous work in the factory, cannot be said to be erroneous in any manner and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Commissioner rightly came to the conclusion that the injury suffered by the deceased has a direct connection with the employment in question. In this view of the matter, I find hardly any justification for interference by this Court with the impugned order of the Commissioner. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances, without any order as to costs.
19. In the case reported in 1994 I LLJ 433 : (supra), a similar issue came up for consideration before a Division Bench of Karnataka High Court. Speaking for the Bench, Venkatraman, J. has referred the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court and other High Courts on the subject. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are extracted hereunder in p. 437 of LLJ:
19. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company that there was nothing to show that the injury was caused on account of employment. It is not necessary that there should be direct evidence in this regard. It is a matter of inference. In Mackinnon Mackenzie case (supra) the employee who was a heart patient was admitted to hospital while on duty and died 7 days thereafter. He was a general servant who had to perform his duties standing up. Dealing with the question as to whether the death could be said to arise out of employment the Supreme Court has held as hereunder at 1969 II LLJ 812 at p. 814 & 815:
It is well-established that under Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act there must be causal connection between the death of the workman and his employment. If the workman dies as a natural result of the disease from which he was suffering or while suffering from a particular disease, he dies of that disease as a result of wear and tear of his employment, no liability would be fixed upon the employer. But if the employment is a contributory cause or has accelerated the death or if the death was due not only to the disease but the disease coupled with the employment, then it could be said that4l the death arose out of the employment it and the employer would be liable.
20. In Devshi Bhanji Khona's case 1985 LIC 1589 (Ker) (supra), the employee was a headload worker and he was already suffering from heart disease. In the course of his employment the deceased died on account of heart attack. Holding that there is a causal connection between the 51 employment and the death in the unexpected way, the Court held that was a case of accident arising out of and in the course of employment...
26. In Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Smt. Vatschala Uttam More : [1991]3SCR26a , the Supreme Court has considered the meaning to be attached to the expression 'use of a motor vehicle' and has held as hereunder:
The expression 'use of a motor vehicle' in Section 92A covers accidents which occur both when the vehicle is in motion and when it is stationary. Petrol tanker in question while proceeding along National Highway (i.e. while in use) after colliding with a motor lorry was lying on the side and it cannot be claimed that after the collision the use of the tanker had ceased only because it was disabled. The word 'use' has a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle having been rendered immobile on account of a breakdown or mechanical defect or accident. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that petrol tanker Was not in the use at the time when it was lying on its side after the collision with the truck.'
With regard to the meaning to be attached to the expression 'arising out of ' the Supreme Court has held as hereunder:
As compared to the expression 'caused by', the expression 'arising out of has a wider connotation. The expression 'caused by' was used in Section 95(1)9b(i) and (ii) and Section 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In Section 92A, Parliament, however, chose to use the expression 'arising out of which indicates that for the purpose of awarding compensation under Section 92A, the causal relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident resulting in death or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and proximate and it can be less immediate. This would imply that accident should be in connection with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need not be direct and immediate. This construction of the expression 'arising out of the use of motor vehicle' in Section 92A enlarges the field of protection made available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the beneficial object underlying the enactment. In the instant case the tanker in question was carrying petrol which is a highly combustible and volatile material and after the collision with the other motor vehicle the tanker had fallen on one of its sides on sloping ground resulting in escape of highly inflammable petrol and that there was great risk of explosion and fire from the petrol coming out of the tanker. In these circumstances it could be said that the collision between the tanker and the other vehicle which had occurred earlier to the escape of petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in the explosion and fire were not unconnected but related events and merely because there was interval of about four to four and half hours between the said collision and the explosion and fire in the tanker, it cannot be necessarily inferred that there was no causal relation between explosion and fire. Therefore, the explosion and fire resulting in the injuries which led to the death of the deceased was due to an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle viz., the petrol tanker.
20. In 1994 II LLJ 795 : (supra), the High Court of Rajasthan has held as follows at p. 798 ofLLJ:
10. On the basis of the decisions which have been seen above it is obvious that the facts of the present case can be said to be similar to the cases to those who were earlier suffering from disease and where death was acceleration on account of stress and strain of the working condition, it is not necessary that there should be a direct connection between the cause of death and the nature of duties. Even if a causal connection between the two can be shown then the dependents of the deceased would be entitled to claim compensation from the employer. In the matters like the present one it is not for the Courts to look to the minute details of the pleadings and the evidence which has been produced in the Court but it is to be seen whether on a broad analysis of the material before the Court it can be said that the accident which resulted in any injury was in the course of employment or out of the employment. If it is accepted that the deceased was suffering from high blood pressure from last one year his duties as cook in the Running Room added strain and this strain has a causal relationship with the cause of his death. It was hypertension leading to other complications. This causal connection will not go away merely because the deceased died after a week from the accident. The natural result of the disease is to be considered in a general manner and it cannot be expected that the Doctor would be able to analyse each step in order to show how the deceased developed the disease and succumbed to the same. Suddenly becoming unconscious as a result of strain is an unexpected event which can be said to be an accident leading to an injury in the course of employment and arising out of employment due to the working conditions, namely heated kitchen where the cooking was to be done. I am satisfied that the strenuous duties and working condition in which the deceased was working accelerated his death, as such the dependants are entitled to get the compensation.
21. In the light of the above submissions made by both the counsel, the question that would arise for consideration in this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is as to whether the workman died on account of the personal injury caused to him in the accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and whether there is a causal relationship between the accident and the employment.
22. It is seen that the first respondent herein was examined as A.W. 1 before the Commissioner and one S. Kanagaraj and S. Dhandapam, co-workers were examined as A. W. 2 and A. W. 3. They have deposed about the employment of the deceased workman D. Govindasamy under the appellant/Corporation which is not in dispute. The commissioner has discussed about the contentions of the applicants as well as the respondent and has concluded that the strain and stress given to the workman in his work accelerated to his sudden collapse in the working spot and the death of the deceased has been caused due to personal injury caused which can be construed as an accident within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act and that therefore, the appellant/Corporation is liable to pay compensation to the respondents 1 to 4 herein under the provisions of the Act.
23. It was stated on behalf of appellant that the deceased went to sleep at 12.30 hours in violation of the rules. As already pointed out, A.W. 2 a co-worker had deposed that at about 5.30 a.m., he was informed by one Muthuvel, another co-worker that the workman/Govindasamy was found dead and A.W. 2 ran to the spot immediately and that he saw the deceased with blood bleeding from his mouth. This version is supported by the evidence of A.W. 3 who deposed that at 5.00 a.m. he found the deceased lying dead on the platform. R.W. 1. Thiru. P. Madanagopal who was examined on the side of appellant herein had deposed and admitted in his evidence that on August 7, 1989, the workman died during the working hours. During cross-examination, he admitted that he did not know how the deceased died on August 7, 1989 and no workman told him that the deceased slept during working hours and that there is any ailment at the time of his death. The Tribunal after giving due credence to these evidences and giving consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case had held that the workman died on account of personal injury caused in the accident that took place out of and in the course of employment.
24. In the light of the conclusion that the workman had died on account of heart attack (Myocardial Infarction) suffered by him in the course of his employment, the further question that arises for consideration is whether the heart attack suffered by the deceased workman can be deemed to be an accident within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act and whether this heart attack suffered by the workman can be termed as a personal injury suffered by him on account of accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Before I proceed to consider the said question, it is useful to refer to Section 3(1) of the Act, which runs as follows:
If the personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
From a reading of Section 3(1) of the Act what would emerge is that an employer is liable to pay compensation, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, to a workman if such workman suffers personal injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that the object behind the legislation is clear that benefit should reach the person aggrieved and the provisions of the Act have to be interpreted liberally. Bearing this principle in mind the expression 'accident' found in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act has to be understood in the context as an event or incident taking place unexpectedly or suddenly. In other words, the basic and indispensable ingredient of the accident is the 'unexpectation'. The workman in this case. was not already suffering from heart disease, as disclosed by the oral evidence. The accident took place within the premises of the appellant on August 7, 1989 night and in the morning of August 8, 1989.
25. With regard to the question whether the heart attack suffered by workman could be termed as personal injury by accident attracting the provisions of Section 3 of the Act. It is relevant to refer to Exhibit A. 5, the post-mortem report, which revealed that no poison or Alcohol was found in the viscera of the body of the deceased and that the death would have occurred due to 'Myocardial infarction'. Personal injury under the Act means physiological injury. It may be external or it can be internal. Chest pain arising duly alter remaining busy in strenuous work for many hours is an accident with internal injury. Accident and injury are distinct in cases where accident is an event happening externally to a man, but sometimes accident may be an event happening internally to a man and in such cases accident and injury coincide. Sueh cases are illustrated as failure of heart, bursting of an aneurysm and the like. In this case, there is a causal relationship between the employment and the accidental injury sustained in an unexpected way. It would entitle the dependants or the legal representatives to get compensation. The Tribunal has relied on the decision reported in Tejubai v. General Manager, W. Railway 1983 LIC 119 and after applying the above decision, came to the conclusion that the heart failure of the workman during his duty hours can be termed as injury within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act.
26. The next issue raised by the counsel is with regard to the definition of 'accident'. The term 'accident' is not defined in the Act anywhere. The Tribunal has relied on the decision reported in Janaki Animal v. Divisional Engineer, High Ways, Kozhikodu 1956 II LLJ 233 : wherein it has been held that when a man suddenly collapses and dies very soon after and the Doctor is not in a position to suggest any reason for his sudden collapse, the death must be held to be due to accident arising out of and in the course of employment. He has also relied on the decision reported in Said Diva Kuluji v. Silver Cotton Mills Ltd. : (1956)ILLJ740Bom . Further, the Commissioner has applied the proposition of the law laid down by the Orissa High Court in the judgment General Superintendent Talcher Thermal Station v. Smt. Bijull Naik (supra) which we have extracted above, to the present facts of the case that strenuous work in factory causing heart attack to the employee shall be deemed to be accident and the employer shall be liable to pay compensation to the dependants of the deceased employee, and held that the deceased workman Govindasamy died by personal injuries sustained by him in the accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on August 8, 1989.
27. It is seen from the records that the finding of the Commissioner is that the workman died by personal injuries sustained by him in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on August 8, 1989, as the death was caused due to Myocardial infarction and heart disease. The said finding recorded by the Commissioner is purely a question of fact. I do not find any error in the said finding recorded by the Commissioner and no interference is called for in this appeal in exercising the power under Section 30 of the Act. Therefore, in the light of the discussion made and the decisions referred to above, I am of the considered view, that the conclusion reached by the Commissioner that the workman died on account of injury suffered by him in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment is correct and justified and I have no hesitation to take the view that appellant is liable to pay compensation and therefore, there is no merit in this appeal.
28. As per the earlier direction of this Court, the respondents/claimants have been permitted to withdraw 50% of the award amount along with accrued interest and the balance amount was directed to be invested in any one of the Nationalised Banks. In such circumstances the respondents/claimants are permitted to withdraw the balance along with accrued interest.
29. With the above direction, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected C.M.P. is dismissed.