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Devinarayan Housing and Property Development (P) Ltd. Vs. C.R. Gobind - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
SubjectArbitration
CourtChennai High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCRP(PD) No. 355 of 2006, CMP. No. 3074 of 2006 and VCMP. No. 257 of 2006
Judge
Reported in(2006)4MLJ1626
ActsIndian Stamp Act - Sections 33, 35 and 36 - Schedule - Article 5; Indian Registration Act - Sections 16, 17, 17(1), 17(2), 34, 37, 49 and 49C; Evidence Act - Sections 62; Arbitration and Conciliation Act - Sections 34 and 37; Constitution of India - Articles 26, 226 and 227
AppellantDevinarayan Housing and Property Development (P) Ltd.
RespondentC.R. Gobind
Appellant AdvocateShah and Shah
Respondent AdvocateSuchit Anant Palande, Adv.
DispositionPetition dismissed
Cases Referred & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd.
Excerpt:
.....on banking business cannot be termed as an instrumentality of the state within the meaning of article 12 of the constitution; (3) even if a society cannot be characterised as a state within the meaning of article 12 of the constitution, a writ would lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty cast upon the society. in such a case, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the society is being treated as a person or an authority within the meaning of article 226 of the constitution and what is material is the nature of the statutory duty placed upon it and the court will enforce such statutory public duty. although it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those..........and conciliation act, sections 34, 37- constitution of india, articles 226, 227--orders passed by arbitral tribunal--not open to challenge under articles 26, 227. per p.k. balasubramanyan (for himself and on behalf of r.c. lahoti, cji, b.n. agrawal, arun kumar, g.p. mathur and a.k. mathur, jj):it is seen that some high courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an arbitral tribunal during arbitration would be capable of being challenged under article 226 or 227 of the constitution of india. such an approach is not warranted. section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable. under section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating his grievances against the award including any in between orders that might have been passed by the arbitral.....
Judgment:
ORDER

S. Ashok Kumar, J.

1. The respondent herein filed a Claim Petition before the Learned Sole Arbitrator as per the arbitration clause in the agreement for deciding the disputes arising out of the Construction Agreement dated 18.8.201 entered into between the respondent and the petitioner, who is the builder. During the course of the enquiry before the learned Arbitrator, the respondent wanted to mark the said Construction Agreement dated 18.8.2001 as an Exhibit. At that time, the revision petitioner filed a memo stating that the Construction Agreement cannot be marked as it is was insufficiently stamped and also that it was not registered. The respondent filed his counter to the memo and after a detailed enquiry, the learned sole Arbitrator dismissed the said memo. Aggrieved over the same, the petitioner-builder has filed this revision.

2. According to the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner, in view of Section 35 and Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act read with Article 5(i) contained in Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act read with Section 17(1)(f) of the Indian Registration Act and Section 49(c) of the Indian Registration Act, the alleged agreement dated 18.8.2001 which is typed on on a non judicial stamp paper of the value of Rs. 20/= is insufficiently stamped and since not registered, it cannot be received in evidence. If the respondent wants to rely upon the same, then as per Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, the document has to be referred to the Collector for adjudication of proper Stamp Duty payable on it. Moreover a xerox copy of the document cannot be permitted to be marked as Exhibit in view of Section 62 of the Indian Evidence Act. But the Arbitrator passed an order without referring the document to the Collector and he himself interpreted the document which is the subject matter of the issues comes under Article 5(j) of the Indian Stamp Act and not under Article 5(i). Aggrieved over the same, the petitioner preferred this revision contending that the Arbitrator has exceeded in his jurisdiction when there is a specific bar created under Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act making inadmissible of the document in question for want of sufficient Stamp duty.

3. Learned Counsel for the revision petitioner also relied upon the amendment brought in by the Tamil Nadu Government to avoid evasion of Stamp duty and registration fee on such agreements. Admittedly when the constitutional validity of the said amendment was challenged before this Court the same was upheld and on appeal the Supreme Court also confirmed the decision of this Court.

4. Learned Counsel for the revision petitioner also contended that the Law of Arbitration and Conciliation being a procedural law it will not prevail over the Stamp Act and Registration Act. The learned Counsel also emphasised Sections 35 and 36 of the Indian Stamp Act and also Section 49-C of the Registration Act.

5. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the CRP itself is not maintainable as the order dated 13.12.2005 impugned in this CRP is passed only in the Memo dated 3.9.2005 which cannot be challenged before this Court under Article 227 in view of the ruling laid down in the decision of the Apex Court in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. reported in , wherein the Constitutional Bench of the High Court held that order passed by the Arbtiral Tribunal cannot be challenged under Articles 26 or 227. The relevant head note is as follows:

(E) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Sections 34, 37- Constitution of India, Articles 226, 227--orders passed by arbitral Tribunal--Not open to challenge under Articles 26, 227.

Per P.K. Balasubramanyan (For himself and on behalf of R.C. Lahoti, CJI, B.N. Agrawal, Arun Kumar, G.P. Mathur and A.K. Mathur, JJ):It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an arbitral tribunal during arbitration would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. Such an approach is Not warranted. Section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral Tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating his grievances against the award including any in between orders that might have been passed by the arbitral Tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the arbitral Tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The arbitral Tribunal is after all, the creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties, but that would Not alter the status of the arbitral Tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by agreement. The stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the arbitral Tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India is disapproved. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible. The object of minimising judicial intervention while the matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will certainly be defeated if the High Court could be approached under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against every order made by the arbitral Tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate that once the arbitration has commenced in the arbitral tribunal, parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless, of course, a right of appeal is available to them under Section 37 of the Act even at an earlier stage.

6. In view of the above decision of the Apex Court, this CRP is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. Even with regard to the merits of the impugned order, whether the agreement is to be stamped as per Article 5(i) of Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act or it is sufficient if the same is stamped as per Article 5(j) Act, the learned Arbitrator relied on the judgement of this Court reported in AIR 1990 Mad. 251 wherein the Division Bench of this Court interpreted Article 5(i) of the Stamp Act and in what circumstances it can be invoked. The Division Bench unambiguously held that the scope of Article 5(i) is confined only one kind of transaction, in which the owner of the land must also become the contractor for the building put up at the cost of the vendee of the land. The Government also took the same defence. A reading go statement of objects and reasons for introducing the amendment to Stamp Act and Registration Act reveals that when the owner of a land constructs apartments and thereafter conveys joint right in the site and individual right in each of the instruments to several persons the instrument evidencing the transaction would be liable to Stamp duty on the market value of the land and the apartments. In sum and substance the Division Bench held that Article 5(i) could be applied only in respect of an agreement to construct a building or part of building entered into between a Vendor of the land, who had already sold a portion or a share of his interest in the land or the entire land to the other party to the agreement and thereafter the vendor of the land agrees to be the building contractor for the vendee for a portion or for entirety of a building.

7. But in the case on hand, the respondent did not enter into a Construction Agreement with the owner o the land but only with the Developer and that is the crux of the entire case. In the instant case, the vendor of the undivided share of the land in favour of the claimants is one Mrs. Sugantha Kumari, who is entirely a different person other than the builder. It is also not the case of the builder that at any stage the vendor and the builder are the same person. The petitioner is only a building contractor with whom the claimants have entered into separate identical agreements. In such circumstances, the learned Arbitrator after elaborately discussing the ruling of the Division Bench in the said decision, came to the right conclusion that if no transfer of immovable property takes place, Article 5(i) of the Stamp Act cannot be attracted so as to hold that the agreement should be sufficiently stamped as per Article 5(i) and consequently they ought to have been registered under Section 17(1)(f) of the Registration Act.

8. Apart from that Section 17(1)(f) of the Registration Act relates to instrument of agreement relating to construction of multiunit house building on land by several persons as referred to in Clause (i) of Article 5 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act. Also, the agreement does Not require registration because the same is exempted under Section 17(2)(v) of the Registration Act. Apart from the agreement dated 18.8.2001, a separate sale deed was executed by the owner of the land and the same was duly stamped and registered after paying the necessary Stamp duty and registration fee.

9. The learned Arbitrator also held that there is no conflict between the Arbitration Act on the one hand and the Stamp Act and Registration Act on the other hand, more particularly when there is Clause 35 in the agreement itself which provides for arbitration. In the above circumstances, viewed from any angle, the CRP is liable to be dismissed and accordingly the same is dismissed. No costs. Connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.


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